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ABSTRACT i 
The primary intention of this study is to establish the theoretical 
significance of silence within the sphere of the twentieth-century 
Southern African novel in English. Clearly a feature of recent writing, 
silence is less overtly thematised in earlier work. Since relatively 
little critical and theoretical attention has been paid to silence as a 
positive phenomenon, however, modes of reading it are sought within the 
broader sphere of the social sciences, and specifically its tradition of 
social constructionism. Care is taken to address the pressures of the 
local context, identified in terms of the postcolonial paradigm as 
relating to language and to culture. A deliberate theoretical innovation 
is the renunciation of the trope of penetration in favour of the notion 
of an interface between intact language-culture systems, given an 
understanding of culture as existing between subjects in relations of 
power. Fictional narrative which addresses cross-culturality is thus 
read as a process of cultural translation, and the volitional deployment 
of silence as an act of resistance to its power. The significance of 
language is registered in the use of speech-act theory, in the 
insistence on meaning as generated in spatially and temporally situated 
conversation, and in the exploration of the influence of pronominal 
relations on identity. Emerging from my investigation is a recognition 
of the measure offered by silence of the autonomy of character as 
subject, and a corresponding recognition of the constitutive capacity of 
the reader to site the power of narration amongst the polyphonic voices 
within the culture of the text. The postcolonial paradigm indicates the 
need for a regional rather than a national perspective; thus the 
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interfaces considered in the case studies include, in Plaatje's Hhudi, 
orality and literacy, tribal membership and non-sectarianism, Tswana and 
English; in Paton's Too Late the Phalarope the private domain and 
apartheid as public hegemonic discourse, narration as possession, and 
the tragic as structuring textual relations; and in Head's Haru the 
constitution of a postcolonial identity that resists and transcends the 
discursive hostility of racism, and the dislocation, displacement and 
alienation of exilic refuge from apartheid. 
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Gift 
You tell me that silence 
is nearer to peace than poems 
but if for my gift 
I brought you silence 
(for I know silence) 
you would say 
This is not silence 
this is another poem 
and you would hand it back to me. 
(Cohen 1969:24) 
For it is by living on the border line of history and 
language, on the limits of race and gender, that we are in a 
posi tion to translate the differences between them into a 
kind of solidarity. 
(Bhabha 1990:320) 
Chapter 1 1 
THE AUTHORITY OF SILENCE 
1.1 Foe: The story of Silence 
In J.M. Coetzee's fifth novel, Foe (1986), the issue of silence is 
foregrounded explicitly. The frequent use of the word within the 
narrative is echoed at a structural level as the character-narrator 
Susan Barton seeks to find ways of telling her story of shipwreck on an 
island, a story which includes the slave Friday who is mute because 
tongueless. As Williams asks, in an important article on the novel, "How 
can she find the story of silence by using words, consciousness, 
language or even a novel?" (1988:34). In conversation with Foe, the 
professional writer whom she tracks down on her return to London with 
Friday, and who she hopes will tell her story, Susan herself comments, 
"if the story seems stupid, that is only because it so doggedly holds 
its silence. The shadow whose lack you feel is there: it is the loss of 
Friday's tongue" (1986: 117). An argument ensues between the two about 
how the story is to be told, and she asserts, "You err most tellingly in 
failing to distinguish between my silence and the silences of a being 
such as Friday .... the silence of Friday is a helpless silence. He is 
the child of his silence, a child unborn, a child waiting to be born 
that cannot be born. Whereas the silence I keep regarding Bahia and 
other matters is chosen and purposeful: it is my own silence" (1986:121-
122). 
The silence which Susan insists is "chosen and purposeful" is by no 
means as straightforward as she believes. For one thing, it is at least 
part of the reason why her story constitutes what Carusi has termed a 
"failed narrative" (1989:135). Susan is unable to induce Foe to accept 
her terms of reference, to write her story the way she wants him to. He 
refuses to respect her silence about the four remaining "parts" he sees 
as constituting her story (1986:174), pressing her again and again for 
details. In a debate that becomes quite trenchant, Foe relates to her 
another story, that of an Irishwoman on the brink of death whose 
'confession' is cut short "over all her protestations" by the priest 
called to shrive her: 
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"You are free to give to the story what application you 
will", Foe replied. "To me the moral of the story is that 
there comes a time when we must give reckoning of ourselves 
to the world, and then forever after be content to hold our 
peace." 
"To me the moral is that he has the last word who 
disposes over the greatest force ... " (1986:124). 
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In Foe's view, the time for volitional silence is after and not during 
our "reckoning of ourselves" - the story we "give" to the world. Susan 
should, he implies, be content to surrender her story and then to hold 
her peace. As Susan points out, however, his formulation conveniently 
overlooks the fact that giving reckoning is not the end of the story: 
the "last word" is, ultimately, a matter of power. In the Irishwoman's 
case, the 'end of the story' is execution and this fate is the reason 
why she tries to prevent the priest from bringing her confession to a 
close. Silence, for her, is quite literally death. In Susan's case, 
Foe's resistance to telling her story the way she wishes it to be told 
represents a denial of her narrative authority; the consequence is not 
death, but a failure to achieve ontological status as a character within 
her story. In Dovey's words, "Susan Barton's story is the story of a 
woman seeking to authorize her own representation" (1989b:122). It is a 
consequence she circumvents, ultimately, by electing to tell the story 
herself. 
Susan has touched on the matter of power in the distinction between her 
own "chosen and purposeful" silence, and the silence of Friday, which is 
"helpless". Fighting consciously (both against Foe and through Foe) to 
secure ontological status for herself, she nevertheless refuses, for 
mp.ch of the novel, to accord such status to Friday. Thus, while she 
acknowledges the power of Friday's silence, she insistently 
conceptualises it as avolitional, non-agentic: 
"Mr Foe ... when I lived in your house I would sometimes lie 
awake upstairs listening to the pulse of blood in my ears 
and to the silence from Friday below, a silence that rose up 
the stairway like smoke, like a welling of black smoke. 
~efore long I could not breathe, I would feel I was stifling 
ln my bed. My lungs, my heart, my head were full of black 
smoke. I had to spring up and open the curtains and put my 
head outside and breathe fresh air and see for myself that 
there were stars still in the sky" (1986:118). 
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As it is described here, the "silence" of Friday exerts sufficient power 
over Susan to force her into a string of actions designed to buttress 
her connection with the 'world out there' against the claustrophobia 
that threatens to choke it: she gets up, opens the curtains, puts her 
head outside to breathe fresh air and look for stars. Powerful as it is, 
Friday's silence can be resisted successfully by opening the window into 
the world outside. It can be resisted in this way because Friday's 
silence is, unlike hers, not his "own": it is not volitional. This is 
how, for most of the novel, Susan sees Friday's silence. However much it 
may become her focus and her preoccupation (as Dovey has pointed out it 
comes to supplant her own story, 1989b:124), the threat it poses can be 
contained. 
At times Susan has to confront an alternative possibility, however. She 
describes watching Friday dance, for example, thus: 
Tears came to my eyes, I am ashamed to say; all the elation 
of my discovery that through the medium of music I might at 
last converse with Friday was dashed, and bitterly I began 
to recognize that it might not be mere dullness that kept 
him shut up in himself, nor the accident of the loss of his 
tongue, nor even an incapacity to distinguish speech from 
babbling, but a disdain for intercourse with me (1986:98). 
If Friday's silence is indeed "a disdain for intercourse" with her, it 
is elective. And if Susan is hurt by his rej ection of her, she is 
influenced more significantly by the encroachment of this rejection upon 
her 'project': her conceptualisation, through narrating them, of events, 
of her history. Friday does not exist simply as a backdrop to the play 
of her interpretation, he is not the tabula rasa upon which she can 
inscribe their reality. Indeed, in a subsequent response to Susan's 
attempt to teach him to write, Friday cleans the slate himself. 
I reached out to take the slate, to show it to Foe, but 
Friday held tight to it. "Give! Give me the slate, Friday!" 
I commanded. Whereupon, instead of obeying me, Friday put 
three fingers into his mouth and wet them with spittle and 
rubbed the slate clean (1986:147). 
If Friday must be taught to make "writing of a kind" (1986:152), the act 
of erasure is his own. If Friday must be given the word, he nevertheless 
retains the ability to choose not to 'speak' it. 
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It is upon the intentionality of Friday's silence that Susan's own 
narrative flounders. As a first-person retrospective, her narration is 
subsequent to her functioning as a character in her story. Her story is, 
amongst other things, an attempt to render, to give meaning to, to do 
justice to this functioning, and so to constitute herself as a 
character. To the extent that such constitution depends upon the silence 
of Friday, her narrative, too, is predicated upon it. Yet Susan must, as 
I have shown, face the possibility that her reading of this silence is 
inaccurate. Friday's silence can only remain the subject of her 
narrative so long as it is a "helpless" silence, because as soon as it 
is recognised as voli tional it becomes interactive , reactive, 
implicating her power over him as part of the condition of its 
existence. The confrontation with alternate possibilities at the 
diegetic level (to use Rimmon-Kenan's term, 1983:92) thus undermines her 
narrative because, as Foe has done at the extradiegetic level, it 
challenges her authority: her right to tell the story. 
Pivotal as Friday's silence is to the power relations that inhere in the 
novel, we can infer from it some of the political implications of the 
narrative. As the subject of her story, Friday is also subject to the 
process of her narration: Susan's 'narrati ve authori ty derives from the 
SUbjection of her character, Friday. Yet if Friday's silence is 
volitional then he is himself a subject, autonomous, entire unto 
himself, and therefore antipathetic to her attempt to turn him into a 
character in her story. The relation that exists between narrator and' 
character, in this case, is an oppositional, an adversarial relation. It 
also mirrors, in important ways, the relation between herself, as 
character, and the narrator she initially chose to tell her story, Foe. 
In that instance the opposition was based on his masculine authority and 
her feminine resistance to the terms of his willingness to narrate; in 
this case, the narrative status of the relationship between Susan as 
narrator and Friday as character serves to underline the political 
status of the relationship between Susan as Englishwoman and Friday as 
African slave: 
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Long and hard I stared at him, till he lowered his eyelids 
and shut his eyes. Was it possible for anyone, however 
benighted by a lifetime of dumb servitude, to be as stupid 
as Friday seemed? Could it be that somewhere within him he 
was laughing at my efforts to bring him nearer to a state of 
speech? I reached out and took him by the chin and turned 
his face toward me. His eyelids opened. Somewhere in the 
deepest recesses of those black pupils was there a spark of 
mockery? I could not see it. But if it were there, would it 
not be an African spark, dark to my English eye? (1986:146). 
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The insight that such a moment brings to Susan has to do not only with a 
recognition of her power (and Friday's subjection), but also with a 
recognition of its inefficacy. However much she might exert her will 
over him - by reaching out and taking him by the chin and turning his 
face towards her - her attempt to tell her story is ultimately 
frustrated by the possibility of the "spark", in the "deepest recesses 
of those black pupils", that she cannot reach. In Marais's reading, much 
of the narrative process in Foe has to do with fre"edom (1989a: 192). He 
represents what he terms the "equivalences and escape routes" in the 










C escapes F S escapes A Sl escapes M T escapes R. 
Susan chooses Foe to tell her story, but then disagrees with him about 
the terms of its telling. Unlike Susan, Friday does not choose his 
narrator. What is common to both, however, is their resistance to the 
process of being narrated. As Susan escapes the control of Foe, her 
intended narrator, so Friday escapes the control of Susan, his 
unintended narrator. Hence the 'failure' of the narrative: its "escape" 
from its readers. 
The example of Coetzee's novel has been deliberately chosen in order to 
illuminate the concerns of the study that will follow. As a highly self-
conscious work of fiction it problematises many issues that are less 
explicitly significant in other and earlier works of Southern African 
fiction. The cultural interfaces to be found in the three-way 
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relationship that exists between Friday, Susan, and Foe include cross-
racial relations, colonial-imperial relations, and cross-gender 
relations; and through the play with and upon narrative interfaces, 
Coetzee's consideration of silence comes to grips also with matters of 
narrative authority and power. It is not my intention in this study to 
conduct a comprehensive survey of silence in the 'twentieth-century 
Southern African novel in English'. Before moving on to a theoretical 
introduction, however, I would like to contextualise the discussion of 
Foe - and indeed of the case studies that will follow in the second part 
of this dissertation - by essaying briefer considerations of other 
instances of the functioning of silence in texts within this domain of 
our literature. 
1.2 Some Other Silences 
Njabulo Ndebele's Fools was published in 1983, three years before, Foe. 
written in exile, it provides the retrospective perspective of a black 
writer on township life in South Africa during the 1960s. The narrative 
offers a crucial concatenation, on two important occasions, of silence 
and laughter. The relationship between Teacher Zamani and his wife is 
characterised by his silence about his rape, several years before, of 
Mimi, a pupil of his, and the subsequent birth of a child. Associated 
with this illicit 'fertility' (1983:196), as he terms it, is the 
impoverishment of his marriage. At the beginning of the novella he meets 
the young Zani, Mimi's brother, who, having completed his education in 
Swaziland, has returned to Charterston township "to bring light where 
there has been darkness" (1983: 164) . Zamani is forced to rescue Zani 
later in the day when he is stabbed in a drunken argument, and to take 
him home. He subsequently asks his wife Nosipho, who is a nurse, to look 
at Zani's wound. An argument ensues: 
" . .. Carry your own sin, but do not use me as your holy 
water." 
"I thought we had long put that matter behind us", I 
said. 
"W~en w~ never even talked about it? The only language I 
recognlsed In you was your degeneration", she said. 
. "What you do not . re~lise is that I degenerated a long 
tlme ago. It was all lnslde. Then it came out", I said. 
"What do you mean?" 
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What meaning could I give her? She was doomed never to 
know. I had cared enough for her all those years never to 
let her know. The secret lay in the breasts of a young 
woman; in the letter she wrote to her brother, and in the 
restless mind of her brother (1983:199-200). 
7 
Although she recognises the "language" of his "degeneration" ("the women 
the drinking ... night after night of absences"), she has plainly 
not noticed the 'silence' he has maintained about himself, the secret he 
has kept from her because he cares for her. Her perception of his 
degeneracy is corroborated by his own scrutiny of himself naked before 
getting into bed, and his recognition of the "truth" of her 
prescription, "To sympathise with you would be to destroy you further. 
No. You should be given what you have most desired: contempt. And then 
your greatest salvation: the contempt of your woman" (1983:200). 
Her words, he says, are like "the truth of rain falling after a long 
drought. But the drought had been too long: very little would grow 
again". Nosiph9 is thus unable by herself to bring about his 
"salvation". It is the effect of the return of Zani that the language of 
degeneration should be replaced by a language of regeneration, and that 
this should happen most crucially in his disclosure of Zamani's secret 
to Nosipho. Once she knows, she challenges Zamani: "'Why didn't you tell 
me?' she asked. 'All those years! I could have left.' I have never been 
able to face crucial moments. I just kept quiet. 'I could have left,' 
said Nosipho again" (1983:257). The glass of water she brings echoes the 
image of rain, and he calls her gesture "the first act of kindness in 
years that Nosipho had shown towards me which was not done out of a 
sense of duty". She goes on to recognise, explicitly, "But I will not 
leave now ... I have invested too many years of my life in what has all 
along been the inexplicable discomfort of living with you. No, I will 
not leave now" (1983:258). It is at this point that his continuing quiet 
gives way to laughter: 
Yes, I have never been able to face crucial moments. 
Instead, I suddenly felt like laughing. I wanted to laugh 
very deeply. Not because there was something funny, but 
because laughter would express total understanding. Crucial 
moments have ,al,ways deprived me of words, and I've always 
r~sorted to V1Slons .... And I laughed. I went into a great 
flt of laughter. And tears started flowing from my eyes. And 
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once, when I wiped them off, I saw a smile on Nosipho' s 
face, and she was shaking her head (1983:258). 
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The second occasion on which silence is replaced by laughter occurs when 
Zamani goes again to rescue Zani from the consequences of his outspoken 
political idealism - in this instance the attempt to break up "the 
picnic in the wood at Rand Nigel" on "Dingane' s Day", the "Day of the 
Covenant" against which Zani has earlier been protesting. Zamani 
stumbles into a confrontation between three people: the principal of his 
school, who has organised the picnic, Zani, who is challenging the 
principal's exploitation in charging full-day prices at 4:30 p.m., and a 
Boer whose car the principal accidentally stones instead of Zani. The 
Boer's response is to pullout his whip, and, frustrated in his efforts 
to beat Zani or the principal, to turn it upon Zamani. zamani recognises 
that the Boer's "absolute power", his "essence of contemptuousness" is 
little more than a veneer: although the Boer is forced to 'appeal' to 
his voice, "his whip was all there was to him ... no amount of violence 
against me would give him any self-respect". The logic of the 
confrontation is that if Zamani can beat the whip he can beat the man. 
And this he does: 
I offered no resistance as he lashed at me. I just stared at 
him. I struggled hard to absorb the searing pain, trying to 
subject my body to the total control of my mind. I wanted to 
scream. It was as if my skin was peeling off and boiling 
water was being thrown over the exposed, lacerated inner 
flesh. But my silence was my salvation; the. silence of years 
of trying to say something without much understanding; the 
silence of desperate action. This would be the first silence 
that would carry meaning .... I felt in the depths of me, 
the beginning of the kind of laughter that seemed to explain 
everything. And when the sound of laughter came out, it 
filled my ears, shutting out the pain even further. It 
seemed to fill out the sky like a pounding drum. And that is 
when the Boer started weeping (1983:276). 
Although the regeneration Zamani achieves is significantly qualified by 
subtle correspondences between himself and the white man, and his 
implied reconciliation with his wife by his recognition earlier that he 
doesn't love her (1983:240), the silences that have been described are 
positive in bringing the story to a hopeful resolution. Ndebele's focus 
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is the relations that Zamani has within his community, rather than those 
he has with white people outside it. since Zamani's silence has offered 
him a mode of dealing with his degeneracy, the shift from silence to 
laughter, particularly in the encounter with the white man but also in 
the conversation with his wife, serves the redemptive function of 
enacting his reclamation of self-esteem. This function marks a 
SUbstantial contrast with the silence in Coetzee's Foe, which is 
characterised not only by the isolation of its characters and their 
dislocation out of community, but also a stasis which debars prospects 
of transformation or liberation into meaningful human relationship. 
By contrast with both, the silence at the heart of Doris Lessing's The 
Grass is Singing is one associated with death, both of the white woman, 
Mary, through whose consciousness much of the novel is focalised, and of 
the black man who kills her. Published some thirty-five years before 
Fools, the novel is set during the 'high colonialism' of the 1930s and 
1940s in rural Southern Rhodesia. Although the story announces itself as 
a "murder mystery", the "mystery" is one experienced rather by its 
readers than by the community in which the murder occurs: 
they did not discuss the murder; that was the most 
extraordinary thing about it. It was as if they had a sixth 
sense which told them everything there was to be known, 
although the three people in a position to explain the facts 
said nothing .... The most interesting thing about the whole 
affair was this silent, unconscious agreement (1950:10). 
Given the structure of the novel - Chapter 1 stands as what Rimmon-Kenan 
calls a prolepsis (1983: 46), which specifies the ending to which the 
action will come - it is the quest of the narrative to explore the 
mystery. Strikingly, however, this exploration is directed towards the 
consciousness and the memory and the past experiences of the victim of 
the murder, Mary, and not its perpetrator, Moses. In fact, it is the 
silence of Moses which constitutes the story as a mystery despite the 
exploration it undertakes and the revelations · it makes about Mary. 
Al though he is mission-educated, and although considerable intimacy 
develops between him and Mary in the close confines of the house in 
which he is servant, he speaks on very few occasions, and then briefly, 
and ambivalently, given the reactions of those who hear him. When he 
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offers to take care of Dick who is suffering from fever, Moses is 
"wounded, even reproachful" at her attempted refusal, and "the half-
humorous, half-reproachful voice left her disarmed against him" 
(1950:196). Towards the end of the novel, by contrast, their neighbour 
Charlie Slatter is appalled at the "rudeness", "surly indifference", 
"self-satisfaction" and "conscious power" with which Moses speaks to 
Mary (1950: 219) . The intervening consciousness of Charlie (and 
subsequently that of Tony Marston, the English assistant Charlie brings 
in) is important in admitting an outsider into the closed world of the 
relations between Mary, Dick, her husband, and Moses, and hence 
defamiliarising what have become accepted modes of interaction between 
the three. 
Yet if the range in interpretations given Moses's speech alludes to an 
interiority at stark odds with the silence in .which he generally 
contains himself, the patterns of focalisation in the novel offer 
approaches to this interiority which are scarcely less ambivalent. His 
absence of speech on the two crucial occasions of violence in the novel 
allows only mediated access to his consciousness, and, significantly, it 
is Mary through whom these events are focalised. On the first the 
violence is enacted by her against him: 
And she saw in his eyes that sullen resentment, and - what 
put the finishing touch to it amused contempt. 
Involuntarily she lifted her whip and brought it down across 
his face in a vicious swinging blow .... Then she saw him 
make a sudden movement, and recoiled, terrified; she thought 
he was going to attack her. But he only wiped the blood off 
his face with a big hand that shook a little (1950:147). 
Although, in her words, "the man looked at her with an expression that 
turned her stomach liquid with fear", he says nothing, and obeys her 
instruction to get back to work. The second occasion of violence occurs 
when, at the end of the novel, he kills her: 
She felt she had only to move forward, to explain, to 
appeal, and the terror would be dissolved. She opened her 
mouth to speak; and, as she did so, saw his hand, which held 
a long curving shape, lifted above his head; and she knew it 
would be too late. All her past slid away, and her mouth 
opened in appeal, let out the beginning of a scream, which 
was stopped by a black wedge of hand inserted between her 
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jaws. But the scream continued, i~ her stomach, ~hoking her; 
and she lifted her hands, clawll.ke, to ward hl.m off. And 
then the bush avenged itself; that was her last thought. The 
trees advanced in a rush, like beasts, and the thunder was 
the noise of their coming. As the brain at last gave way, 
collapsing in a ruin of horror, she saw, over the big arm 
that forced her head back against the wall, the other arm 
descending. Her limbs sagged under her, the lightning leapt 
out from the dark, and darted down the plunging steel 
(1950:254) . 
11 
Focalisation shifts, at the point of her silencing by death, to Moses, 
allowing the narrative to impute various emotions and purposes to him. 
Yet its attempted invocation of his , consciousness stops short of 
anything approaching certainty. Although the occasion is said to be "his 
final moment of triumph, a moment so perfect and complete that it took 
the urgency from thoughts of escape, leaving him indifferent", the novel 
ends in thwarted speculation: 
Though what thoughts of regret, or pity, or perhaps even 
wounded human affection were compounded with the 
satisfaction of his completed revenge, it is impossible to 
say. For, when he had gone perhaps a couple of hundred yards 
through the soaking bush he stopped, turned aside, and 
leaned against a tree on an antheap. And there he would 
remain, until his pursuers, in their turn, came to find him 
(1950:256). 
The arrest which ensues is focalised through the consciousness of Tony 
Marston, the outsider. Although, in the estimate of the narrator, "For 
the sake of those . few lucid moments, and his present half-confused 
knowledge, it can be said that Tony was the person present who had the 
greatest responsibility that day", we also learn that "He could not even 
begin to imagine the mind of a native" (1950:33). It is a combination of 
such failure of imagination and the silence Moses maintains about 
himself which contains him within the "murder mystery". 
Moses' silence is thus differentiated from Friday's in being associated 
more explicitly with agentic power. On the one hand he is able, by 
murder, to terminate the relation of servitude in which he is located 
for much of the text. On the other his evident refusal of narrative 
access to his story echoes the autonomy which has, paradoxically, 
characterised this relation of servitude 'within' the text. If he goes 
to his death he takes his story with him. 
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Given these two examples, we might begin to identify and investigate the 
functioning of silence in a range of texts by black and white writers, 
by women and by men. In other novels published during the 1980s, for 
example, we might recognise the silence that Tambu, narrator-protagonist 
of Tsitsi Dangarembga's Nervous Conditions (1989), feels she must accord 
her uncle Babamakuru, despite the severe illness of Nyasha, her friend 
and his daughter. We might note the ways in which music and silence 
interact, in Menan du Plessis's Longlive (1989) to evoke the "silent 
extra part" of the fourth member of a 'quartet' who share a house in 
Cape Town, and whose suicide at the end of the novel is left unfixed, 
like "a melody I like another voice I breathing through the piece. As 
though it had a soul" (1989: 58). We might consider the silence of the 
black women, in Nadine Gordimer's July's People (1981), who are 
confronted with the presence of Maureen Smales and her family to whom 
July has extended refuge; or the elliptic communication between Maureen 
and July, and subsequently between herself and her own family; or indeed 
the 'silence' into which she disappears as the helicopters circle above 
her, ambivalent augurs of fate or rescue. Looking to earlier periods, we 
might notice the silence of Mabongo, in Modikwe Dikobe' s The Harabi 
Dance (1973), when approached by his employer to return to the job from 
which he has been dismissed, or Martha's silent resistance towards her 
parents over the matter of the marriage they have arranged for her. We 
might recall the silence in which Willieboy dies in the back of a police 
van in Alex la Guma' s A Walk in the Night (1967), or the inarticulacy 
wi th which Michael Adonis explodes into violence. We might think of 
Paul's injunction to Selena "not to tell anybody" about their sexual 
relationship in Daphne Rooke's Hittee (1951). We might explore the 
secrecy Andrina maintains about herself, in Pauline smith's The Beadle 
(1926), as she packs for the Englishman who has seduced and then 
abandons her, or indeed the long silence Aalst Vlokman maintains about 
his fatherhood. 
Two important qualifications should emerge from this brief survey: 
first, that whereas silence can be recognised as a feature of texts in 
our literature it is by no means exclusive to this literature, and 
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second, that a study of silence need not restrict itself to texts which 
use the term or invoke the concept explicitly. In order to emphasise 
this second point I would like to conclude the survey by considering a 
text in which the functioning of silence is quite implicit, and which 
thus sets up points of contrast as well as comparison with Coetzee' s 
novel. Published some sixty years before Foe, William Plomer's Turbott 
Wolfe (1926) broke important ground in offering a positive 
representation of an evidently successful 'miscegenous' relationship in 
Zululand in the 1920s: that between Zachary Msomi, a zulu man who is 
"going to be a parson" (1926: 29), and Mabel van der Horst, the Dutch 
housekeeper of a dissenting widow (1926:28). The ironic counterpart to 
their relationship is the unconsummated desire felt by Wolfe himself, an 
Englishman, for Nhliziyombi, a Zulu girl. Three conversations take place 
between these two. The first occurs on a narrow path in the Native 
Reserve where Wolfe has taken to walking, after seeing and falling in 
love with Nhliziyombi: 
"Greeting", she said. 
"Greeting", I answered. "Where are you going?" 
"I am just going." 
These words were a formula, but my heart was in torment, 
and I could hardly keep my hands and lips from hers. 
On a sudden impulse I took a gold pin that I wore in my 
tie, and pinned it to her clothing, where it gleamed in the 
sun. 
"There you are", I said. "There's a present for you." 
"Are you giving it?" she asked incredulously. 
"It is yours." 
She was alarmed at being favoured by a man she had come 
to know as Chastity, and exclaimed softly: 
"Oh, white men!" 
Then she ran down the path, checkered with shadows. Nor 
did she look back (1926:35). 
The innocence he then attributes to her is clearly confirmed by her 
'incredulity' and 'alarm', and yet her parting comment seems informed by 
more experience than Wolfe is willing to recognise. The second "slight 
and ordinary" conversation occurs when she comes to his shop: the 
"kindness" he notices in her nature then (1926: 38) is borne out in the 
third and final encounter between them: 
There was a banana-grove about a mile from the house. That 
was , the place where I happened on Nhliziyomhi, not quite by 
accldent, on a warm clear afternoon. I told her that I loved 
CHAPTER 1: THE AUTHORITY OF SILENCE 
her intensely, but that my name forbade me to go any further 
than a confession of my love. I felt a coward. She was 
puzzled and alarmed at first, but warmed into sympathy. She 
took my head for a moment between her lean brown hands. We 
sat in the banana-grove, frankly content, without moving or 
uttering a word for more than an hour . 
It was one of the saddest, happiest days of my life 
(1926:39). 
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As we discover at the outset of Wolfe's narrative, he has come home to 
England, to recount his story to a school-friend, the frame narrator, 
and then to die. He is thus set in stark contrast with Mabel and Zachary 
who, together and happy, remain in Africa. The root of Wolfe's failure, 
it seems to me, is not his "chastity" per se, but rather his mode of 
perception of Nhliziyombi. The descriptions he offers of her are 
intriguing in two respects: first, that they are almost entirely visual, 
and second, that they give rise to a great deal of brooding and 
emotional intensity on his part. She functions, in significant ways, as 
an icon, onto whom he can proj ect the qualities he finds desirable: 
"dignity", "taste", "all that beauty (it might be called holiness), that 
intensity of the old wonderful unknown primitive African life - outside 
history, outside time, outside science . She was a living image of what 
has been killed by people like Flesher, by our obscene civilization" 
(1926:31). The silence in which Nhliziyombi is contained by the 
narrative (and in which he joins her for "more than an hour") is such 
that Wolfe only discovers after his profession of love that she is in 
fact betrothed to her cousin at Hlohloko, and that she will proceed to 
marry him (1926:40). 
Of course such a representation of a black woman is by no means 
exclusive to Plomer, as this study wi l l go on to show. Before moving on, 
however, I would like to focus briefly on the counterpoint Plomer's text 
offers Coetzee' s, because it will provide a point of entry into the 
discussion of postcolonial theory that will follow . Unlike the explicit 
problematisation of silence in Foe, the functioning of silence in this 
novel is implicit: Turbott Wolfe does not use the term silence in regard 
to Nhliziyombi, nor does the narrative draw attention to it in other 
ways. Compared to the self-consciousness and sophistication of Coetzee's 
postmodern narrative strategy, Plomer's modern one is relatively simple, 
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despite the frame narrator, and the papers and poems of Friston which 
are included in 'appendices'. Although both texts make use of first-
person narrators, Turbott Wolfe offers a reversal of the relations 
between narrative and gender that we found in Coetzee's novel: in place 
of Susan Barton, Plomer's narrator is a man, and (in my reading) the 
significant silence that of a woman, not a man. The points of contact 
between the two novels are, nonetheless, important. In both instances 
the narrator attempts to accord meaning to the silence of the 'other', 
but fails: Susan Barton is perplexed by the physical muteness of Friday, 
Turbott Wolfe discovers the 'real truth' about Nhliziyombi only after he 
has both declared his love and decided not to pursue it. In both texts 
possibili ties exist of the characters' deliberate resistance to being 
narrated: in Nhliziyombi in the privacy of a life of her own despite the 
narrator's vested interest in her, in Friday in the privacy of his 
dancing, and his ritual of spreading petals on the water, and in the 
spark which might exist in the depths of his eye. In both texts the 
narrators, and the writers, are white, English-speaking, and aligned 
with colonial power, and the people characterised by silence are black 
and colonised. 
Whereas Lessing's The Grass is Singing follows a similar pattern of 
textual relationship, the pattern is significantly modified, in 
Ndebele's Fools, by the fact that the writer and the narrator-
protagonist are both black, and, indeed, that there is no significant 
black-white relationship within the story. The nature of silence in 
these four texts is quite varied. unlike Friday's silence which he is 
effectively unable to break, Susan in the end tells her own story. 
Nhliziyombi 's silence is associated both with the narrator's iconic 
construction of her and the self-contained life she goes on to lead. 
Moses' silent agentic power ends in his death. Zamani' s shift from 
silence to laughter signals the regeneration not only of his self-esteem 
but also, prospectively, of significant relationships he has within his 
community. 
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1.3 critical Responses to Silence in OUr Literature 
This brief survey has been conducted in order to indicate both the 
existence of silence as a feature of our literature, and something of 
the variation in meaning it can have; hence to provide grounds for the 
study that follows. Later in this chapter I will come back to these 
readings in order to establish the significance of the · postcolonial 
paradigm for a theorisation of silence in our literature, and indeed for 
a delineation of what I mean by 'our literature'. At present, however, I 
would like to pose a question: given that silence seems to exist as a 
feature of our literature, what critical attention has been paid it? The 
answer is, regrettably, not much. Since silence has been an interest of 
mine over a number of years, I have myself published three articles 
relevant to my thesis here, and to which reference will later be made: 
"Paton and the Silence of Stephanie" (1989, on Too Late the Phalarope), 
"The Renunciation of Voice and the Language of Silence: Pauline smith's 
'The Schoolmaster'" (1991), and "Two Sides of Empire: Heart of Darkness 
and Hhudi" (1992b). I have quoted in passing from Williams's 1988 
article, "Foe: A Story of Silence" which critically established this 
concern of Coetzee's. Another important source fqr the conceptualisation 
of my interest has been McCormick's 1983 "Strangeness and Familiarity in 
the Little Karoo", a brief but seminal article which considers the 
accommodations of narrative strategy to the social and economic status 
of the main characters, and concludes, "speech is not a powerful weapon 
or tool in the lives of the bywoners, each of whom is characterised 
explicitly as being silent" (1983:176). Some attention has been paid to 
silence in other spheres - autobiography (van Wyk Smith 1991) and 
women's poetry (Lockett 1990; Chapman 1990) - but by far the greater 
interest has been in language and related issues. Even a casual 
examination of titles of critical articles for words relating to this 
sphere produces an impressive list: dialogue (Eglington 1960, Voss 
1990), discourse (Dovey 1989b, Wicomb 1992), expression (Chapman 1988), 
language (Brink 1992, Coetzee 1981 and 1988, Cornwell 1989, Marais 
1989b, Mpe 1992, Ndebele 1986, Nkosi 1981, Wylie 1991), oral influence 
(Mzamane 1984), talk (Horn 1989), voice (Mzamane 1991), and words 
(Lockett 1992). This interest is, of course, in line with international 
trends: in citation indices the category of "silence" features only 
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rarely, yet interest in language has grown tremendously since the 1960s 
with the various influences of continental theory, deconstruction, and 
linguistics. The interest of postcolonial theory in language will be 
considered in greater depth later in this chapter, but mention might be 
made at this point of Bhabha, who has written extensively on "colonial 
discourse", and Spivak, whose seminal article posed the question, "Can 
the Subaltern Speak?" (1988). 
1.4 The Problem of Theory in Our criticism 
As we might recall, Marais found, in the novel Foe, the following 











C escapes F S escapes A Sl escapes M T escapes R. 
The last of these "routes" reflects Marais's belief that the text 
escapes the authority of the reader, and alludes, I think, to the 
'impossibility' of final knowledge in a postmodern condition. Yet in a 
study of narrative as performance, Maclean takes up in a rather 
different way the dynamics of power in reading. She observes: 
The advent of the named author, the titled and genre-
labelled text, the imprimatur of printing and publication, 
have all tended to turn the previously fluid relationships 
of narrative performance into a static relationship of 
possession. Even Iser [in The Implied Reader] sees the 
reader very much as a puppet whose strings are pulled by the 
text. Naomi Schor acutely observes that this sense of 
proprietorship, of owning the text and controlling the rules 
of the game, has merely passed from the author to the critic 
in recent years. The most recent studies respond to her 
demand (1980) that narrative be seen not as a matter of 
ownership but of negotiation, and concentrate on the 
interplay between telling and hearing (1988:19). 
In the case of Foe, the attempt at critical 'ownership' can perhaps be 
indexed by the seminar hosted, shortly after its publication, by the 
Department of Theory of Literature at UNISA in Pretoria in March 1988 , 
and the journal volume that ensued, dedicated to exploring if not 
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identifying the meaning of the novel (Journal of Literary Studies 1989 
5(2)}. The effect of such critical interest has been to privilege and 
even to impose certain readings of the text; readings that have their 
roots in imported metropolitan theory. On the one hand, so specific a 
focus on one novel has tended to isolate it from the body of Coetzee's 
previous work. On the other, so specific a focus on Coetzee as the 
postmodernist writer of international standing, as one of a "growing 
band of international political metafictionists" (Marais 1989a:183), has 
highlighted his affinities with mid-Atlantic theory at the expense of 
his connections with the local or regional corpus out of which his 
concerns have, to some extent at least, come. My contextualisation of 
Coetzee's concern with silence was an attempt to demonstrate these 
conceptions; and his own critical work - White Writing: On the Culture 
of Letters in South Africa (1988) is an obvious case in point - attests 
to the local aspect of his literary allegiances. 
This attempt at critical ownership can perhaps be read as an act of 
recuperation, given some of the harsh reviews received by Foe on 
publication ("Postmodern Games While Soweto Burns" is one cited by Dovey 
1989b: 119), and which evidence the difficulties faced by regionally-
minded critics in claiming him for their own. At what might be termed 
the 'metadiegetic' level of critical and theoretical commentary, the 
political implications of distance and engagement with social realities 
have been particularly acute: the starting-point of Dovey's Introduction 
to the NELM Bibliography, for example, is "the question of the political 
relevance of Coetzee's writing, a question which has been the source of 
an ongoing debate amongst scholars and critics within south Africa" 
(1990a:1). It is my impression that the debate is less acute following 
the pUblication of Age of Iron (1990), which engages rather more 
directly with South African political realities. Yet my own interest in 
Coetzee has less to do with the tensions between distance from and 
engagement with the local context, than the broader significance of his 
wr i ting (and Foe is a particular example) for a positioning of South 
Africa as a 'postcolony' of the Empire. 
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These critical responses to Foe reflect in important ways a problem that 
has, certainly in the past, bedevilled criticism in our region, a 
problem that might help to explain the relative absence of theoretical 
interest in silence, beyond the metafictional readings of Coetzee that 
have been mentioned. The emphasis on Coetzee as postmodernist ~iter of 
international standing is in line with a trend, in our criticism, of 
importing theories from Europe and from America and applying them to 
'local' texts. Much of the theory that informs critical writing here 
stems from the works of, for example, Raymond Williams, Terry Eagleton, 
Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Frederik Jameson, Jean 
Fran~ois Lyotard. This trend has been particularly, though by no means 
exclusively, apparent in the work of Departments of Literary Theory 
housed in some of our universities, and of the South African Society for 
General Literary Studies and its Journal of Literary Studies; within 
wider academic circles it may well have to do with the practice of 
conducting postgraduate work abroad and returning to local positions 
from which to disseminate research findings. Perhaps the apogee of this 
trend is Dovey's The Novels of J H Coetzee, which sets out to describe 
Coetzee's "strategy as, not simply criticism-as-fiction, but as 
(Lacanian) psychoanalytic criticism-as-fiction" (1988:11). 
A charitable reading of this trend might view it as a response to 
another trend, earlier though still established, of largely non-
theoretical practical criticism of works by local writers, frequently in 
an attempt to establish their "value" or "significance" - or their lack 
of these things. In regard to Pauline Smith, for example, the titles of 
Eglington's '" Quaintness' in Pauline Smith: Observations on her style 
and Dialogue" (1960), Haresnape's "'Pauline Smith's 'Desolation' and the 
Worthwhile African English Text" (1977), and Dale's "Art or Artifice: 
Some Thoughts on The Beadle" (1979) reflect the orientation of the trend 
towards reading the text 'as a thing in itself'. Current debates about 
the "value" of politically committed poetry serve as a more recent 
example. So, too, does MacKenzie's contention, within the context of his 
SUbstantial and important work on her, that the early novels of Bessie 
Head are "flawed" (1989:35). Motivations underlying this trend probably 
include the wish to gain recognition for texts and writers by 
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establishing their value in orthodox critical terms; the concerted 
efforts towards explication that follow inclusion of texts in high 
school syllabuses; and the attempt at reclamation of writers from 
obscurity, often associated with specialist expertise or postgraduate 
study. The field has been new, and hence wide open to territorial claim-
staking. A different, though related, manifestation of this tendency has 
been a call for the complete "africanisation" of syllabuses. It is 
perhaps a danger for any literature developing within a particular 
region 1 that the regional should loom so large as to value what is close 
at hand because it is close at hand. In our context solipsism and 
alienation from the mainstream "out there" have been exacerbated both by 
our geographic distance from the metropolitan Centre and by the cultural 
and academic boycott that had its roots i the 1960s. 
My own argument is not with the two trends per se, of importing theory 
or doing without: merely with the exclusiveness and the entrenchment 
that has bedevilled them, the hegemonies within Southern African 
critical circles not being limited to either side. In the breach that 
has developed between the two trends, much illuminating work falls into 
the domains of social history or biography: the work of Couzens on 
Dikobe, and of Couzens, Gray and Willan on Plaatje stand as particularly 
good examples. Yet such work tends to be broadly marxist or atheoretical 
in orientation, and the need for theoretical development now seems to me 
a matter of urgency. In a call first made in 1979, Maughan Brown spelt 
out the need for a "black aesthetic": 
1 
Firstly, it is essential that the critic be as conversant as 
possible with the traditions, mythology and art, in short 
the culture, of the community from within which the writer 
comes .... Secondly, critical standards should not predate 
the literature they are attempting to assess; they should, 
as far as possible, grow out of that literature .... 
I,am conscious of two different senses in which the term "region" 
mlg~t be understood: as a subsidiary unit wi thin a country or 
natlon, or, as here, a broader corpus of literature' and 
fol~owing As~c~oft, Griffiths and, Tiffin (1989:17) as a geo~raphi~ 
entlty comprlslng several countrles. My use of 'Southern Africa' 
subsequently will follow the latter sense. 
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Thirdly, aesthetic response is cuI turally determined 
(1982:50). 
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The impact of black critics has been slow to register itself (Ndebele 
stands as a significant exception), and even then their work often 
reflects the complex effects of exile. Al though I have some quibbles 
with the last of Maughan Brown's criteria, his injunctions about context 
have a value that extends beyond "black" criticism, and so they remain 
important. 
Read positively, the two critical trends might be recognised as attempts 
to identify the relations that ought to exist between our literature and 
the Centre. If the balance remains to be achieved, the route to be taken 
is not to abandon or discount European and American theories. Rather it 
is to work from an understanding of the pressures of context, to a 
specification of the theoretical requirements of this context, to a 
consideration of what extant theory can offer. In my view an important 
corrective is available in postcolonial theory, which, despite its 
(paradoxically) metropolitan origins, has been developed by people like 
Bhabha, said and spivak, whose roots at least are in 'postcolonial' 
cultures. 
Before moving on to a theorisation of silence, I would like briefly to 
recapitulate the position we have thus far reached. Firstly, if we 
recognise silence as a feature of our literature, we need to recognise 
too that a theoretical approach to it is not available within the sphere 
of local criticism. Secondly, if a theory is not available and needs to 
be developed, then this theory ought to be directed by the pressures of 
our context if it is to avoid the problems detailed above. Thirdly, and 
for these reasons, in the theory we develop we will need to consider the 
ways in which silence reflects the pressures of context. Finally, it 
should be clear from this recapitulation that the approach to be 
followed in this study will not be a purely literary one, but will draw 
on insights from the broad sphere of the human sciences. 
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1.5 The Postcolonial Paradigm 
In their groundbreaking study, The Empire writes Back, Ashcroft, 
Griffins and Tiffin offer a passing recognition of the significance of 
silence: 
The post-colonial text therefore does not 'create meaning' 
through the mere act of inscribing it, but rather indicates 
a potential and shifting horizon of possible meanings. Its 
capacity to 'mean', though, is circumscribed finally by that 
post-colonial silence ... which cannot be overwhelmed by any 
interpretation. 
It is this concept of silence, not any specific cultural 
concept of meaning, which is the active characteristic 
linking all post-colonial texts (1989:187). 
This "potential and shifting horizon of possible meanings" is amply 
clear in Foe, which, as I have demonstrated, takes as one of its primary 
premises the indeterminacy of meaning. Yet the formulation warrants one 
substantial extension; that silence frequently offers a "potential and 
shifting horizon of possible meanings" of its own. My reading of 
Coetzee's novel in relation to other novels within the corpus of 
Southern African fiction thus sought to demonstrate that his concern 
with silence is neither exclusive nor radically new. It also sought to 
establish the broader significance of Coetzee' s writing for a 
positioning of South Africa as a ,'postcolony' of Empire: to read his 
work back to the past as well as to the Centre. 
Although it is not my intention to undertake a comprehensive exploration 
of postcolonial theory, it seems pertinent at this point to consider 
some of the meanings of the term "postcolonial" which the study by 
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin supplies. They use the term, in the first 
instance, 
to cover all the culture affected by the imperial process 
from the moment of colonization to the present day .... What 
each of these [post-colonial] literatures has in common 
beyond their special and distinctive regional 
characteristics is that they emerged in their present form 
out of the experience of colonization and asserted 
themselves by foregrounding the tension with the imperial 
power, and by emphasizing their differences from the 
assumptions of the imperial centre. It is this which makes 
them distinctively post-colonial (1989:2). 
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The prefix 'post' is thus equivalent to 'from the beginning of' rather 
than, as might be expected, 'after' the end of the colonial process. 
This meaning of the prefix allows the term to be applied to "the first 
texts produced in the colonies in the new language [which were] 
frequently produced by the 'representatives' of the imperial power" and 
which therefore "can never form the basis for an indigenous culture nor 
... be integrated in any way with the culture which already exists in 
the countries invaded" (1989: 5). Although the authors do go on to 
delineate a "second stage of production within the evolving discourse of 
the post-colonial" (the "literature produced 'under imperial licence' by 
, natives' or 'outcasts'''), the prescriptive nature of this application 
seems to me contentious. One of the problems of theoretical categories 
(and the exclusions and prescriptions that arise from them) is that, 
being static, they tend to cope indifferently well with transition and 
with change. Another is that, being ,exclusive, they generally give scant 
recognition to possibilities of integration and synthesis. There seems 
little reason, for example, why comparisons between the first colonial 
writings and indigenous narratives from an oral tradition might not in 
the future form the basis of an integrative focus on common experiences 
from different perspectives. These issues will be explored in my study 
of Hhudi, the first novel written in English by a black South African. 
Such prescriptiveness arises from the attempt to use the term 
"postcolonial" as an attribute of certain cultures and literatures; to 
use it exclusively. To be fair, the writers do offer a second use of the 
term as critical practice, as a "reading strategy" (1989:189). They say: 
The idea of 'post-colonial literary theory' emerges from the 
inability of European theory to deal adequately with the 
complexities and varied cultural provenance of post-colonial 
writing. European theories themselves emerge from particular 
cultural traditions which are hi dden by false notions of 
'the uni vers,al '. Theories of style and genre, assumptions 
about the unlversal features of language, epistemologies and 
value systems are all radically questioned by the practices 
of post-colonial writing. Post-colonial theory has proceeded 
from the need to address this different practice (1989:11). 
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Two "major paths" may be discerned within such a critical practice: 
on the one hand, via the reading of specific post-colonial 
texts and the effects of their production in and on specific 
social and historical contexts, and on the other, via the 
'revisioning' of received tropes and modes such as allegory, 
irony, and metaphor and the rereading of 'canonical' texts 
in the light of post-colonial discursive practices 
(1989:194). 
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since my own study will fall within the broad sphere of a postcolonial 
reading, it seems worth specifying a third possible use of the term, 
which is as a paradigm (one which I read as underlying Ashcroft, 
Griffi ths and Tiffin's investigation). Fundamental to the paradigm is 
the notion of a metropolitan Centre which in the days of Empire had 
control over vast areas of the world. So powerful has been the impact of 
this Centre on the economy, politics and culture of these former 
colonies, that even after independence they continue to experience a 
sUbstantial orientation towards it. The process of colonialism has of 
course been a historical one; yet the mythology of the postcolonial 
paradigm is sufficiently general to offer terms of approach both to 
specific countries, and, more importantly for my purposes, to the 
regions into which they fell under the auspices of specific colonial 
powers. The relations between the "postcolonies" (as we might now term 
them) and the Centre are characterised by at least two important 
features: linguistic connection and geographic distance. Whereas the 
first of these supplies both a common heritage and a communicative 
medium, the second exerts a pressure towards isolation, and, together 
with the historical legacy of domination, towards inequality. In my 
reading of Bessie Head's "autobiographical novel", Maru, these pressures 
will be seen to take a distinctive form in the double isolation of 
racial marginalisation and exile. 
In Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin's version, the postcolonial paradigm 
is by no means value neutral. The Centre is necessarily oppressive, and 
postcolonial texts properly resistant. They say of their own study: "the 
discussion of post-colonial writing which follows is largely a 
discussion of the process by which the language, with its power, and the 
writing, with its signification of authority, has been wrested from the 
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dominant European culture" (1989:7-8, my emphasis). And it is with 
evident approval they note that the second of the "two major paths" 
cited above "has begun, more recently, to produce powerfully subversive 
general accounts of textuality and concepts of 'literariness'" 
(1989:194, my emphasis). Despite these oppositions they identify in the 
present, the writers do elsewhere indicate potential resolutions in the 
future: 
The post-colonial world is one in which destructive cultural 
encounter is changing to an acceptance of difference on 
equal terms. Both literary theorists and cultural historians 
are beginning to recognize cross-culturality as the 
potential termination point of an apparently endless human 
history of conquest and annihilation justified by the myth 
of group 'purity', and as the basis on which the post-
colonial world can be stabilized (1989:36). 
And indeed the model has demonstrable application. The first of these is 
the recognition of "cross-culturality", since a definitive, though not 
an exclusive, feature of our literature is that it so frequently 
represents interaction across cultures. In the terms of ethnography 
which will be explored in Chapter 2, "cross-culturality" , and 
specifically the concept of "cultural translation", allows a replacement 
of the trope of 'penetration' which has characterised much writing about 
postcolonial Africa by that of the 'interface' which accords autonomy to 
the two cultures in contact. The "termination point" which it thus 
represents offers a way of addressing both the political processes which 
South Africa is currently undergoing, and its past history. 
The applicability of the postcolonial model in this regard might become 
more readily apparent if we recognise that, in our case, as elsewhere, 
it must accommodate the specificities of local history. Certainly to 
recognise apartheid as the cultural domi nant of our society, established 
with the accession to power of the Nationalist government in 1948 and 
its uninterrupted sovereignty since then, is necessarily to recognise 
the equation of colonialism here with apartheid as an oversimplification 
and an inaccuracy. I see three reasons for this: that neither 
Nationalist rule from 1948 nor Republic status from 1961 can be viewed 
as the kind of "independence" from Empire that occurred in other 
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"postcolonies"; that the claim of the Afrikaner power bloc to indigenous 
status has been recognised by at least those parties that don't 
subscribe to the dictum "one settler one bullet"; and that, February 
1990 notwithstanding, apartheid is by no means yet dead. 
And yet apartheid can be read in postcolonial terms. Dorsinville's model 
of dominating-dominated societies that can exist within one postcolony 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 1989:32) can help to explain the 
hegemonies of Afrikaner power. Furthermore, despite the rampant 
iniquities that followed 1961, "the apartheid regime" owed much to the 
colonial structures that preceded it, and indeed had much in common with 
colonial regimes elsewhere. Finally, account must be taken of linguistic 
and cultural divisions amongst the settlers: so that a postcolonial 
inquiry might focus as productively on the culture and literature of 
Afrikaans-Nederlands as that of English - or, indeed, those of a number 
of other settler languages. 
Applying postcolonial terms in a revisionist reading of policies 
regarding 'miscegenation' and 'apartheid' might help us see such 
policies as responses to the pressures of cross-culturality rather than 
(or in addition to) acts of exclusion and oppression. We might, then, 
find it easier to resist the "received tropes and modes" in which such 
policies were registered in fiction. The two laws which represented the 
apotheosis of high apartheid were, as I see it, the Immorality Act and 
the Mixed Marriages Act. My discussion of Paton's Too Late the Phalarope 
will attempt to contextualise these laws as discursive practice, and to 
read the 'tragedy' of the protagonist, which depends on the silence of 
his counterpart, a black woman, as a failure to constitute an identity 
outside of their prescriptive force. 
The second contribution of postcolonial theory is in regard to language. 
I mentioned above, in passing, that linguistic connection with the 
Centre supplies both a common heritage and a communicative medium. 
Neither of these is unproblematic. The "Englishness" of South African 
literature and criticism may well be a source of connection with the 
Centre, but it also serves to position this literature as that of an 
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outpost. Our sense of alienation, of what Jacobs refers to as standing 
"in the sign of imaginative exile" (1990:123), is by no means 
gratuitous. On the one hand, the only South African writers widely 
represented in bookshops in England in July 1992 appeared to be Gordimer 
and Coetzee. On the other, critics writing from our particular 
"postcolony" have had relatively little impact on metropolitan critics 
of texts either in metropolitan canons or in "third-world" or 
"postcolonial" literatures (or, as they are now termed, the "new 
literatures in English"). This was particularly evident, for example, at 
the eighteenth annual Conference of the Joseph Conrad Society (United 
Kingdom) held in London in July 1992: though the problem there seemed to 
me one of access rather than choice. It is also noteworthy that eight of 
the thirteen writers Ward considers in his recent Chronicles of Darkness 
(1989) are Southern African - yet his consultation of Southern African 
critics is little more than slight. It will take concerted efforts for 
such an impact to be made: and perhaps in this context recognition 
should be given to the South African Society for General Literary 
Studies (mentioned already) for its continued affiliation to the 
International Comparative Literature Association, to the Cape Town 
journal Pretexts for its reciprocal publishing arrangement with the 
American journal social Text, and to the Durban journal Current Writing 
for its deliberate inclusion of work by international as well as local 
scholars. 
The communicative medium supplied by linguistic connection with the 
Centre is problematic for many writers, and particularly so for those 
who use English as a second language. To write in English, after all, is 
to use the medium of the Centre. In a keynote address to the 1988 11th 
Annual Conference on Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies in 
German-Speaking Countries, Nkosi, for example, asserted: 
. .. today the dispute between the hegemonic North of the 
coloniser and the exploited South of the colonised is no 
longer mainly about political rights, but about the control 
of discourse. The privileged texts of the dominant culture 
are being challenged by the underprivileged texts of the 
oppressed culture (s) as the colonised and excolonised of 
this world assume full responsibility to speak for 
themselves. In the Southern African context, then, this 
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opposition between privileged and underprivileged texts 
constitutes the basic framework for writing Black as 
distinct from Writing White (cited in Welz 1991a:97). 
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outside South Africa the reaction to this problem has been most acutely 
focused in Ngugi's decision to return to writing in mother tongue and 
subsequently translating his work into English. A similar pattern has 
been followed by South Africans both in exile (Mazisi Kunene), and at 
home (Oswald Mbuyiseni Mtshali). From at least one viewpoint this 
reaction cannot be said to solve the problem, however: "syncreticist 
critics argue that even a novel in Bengali or Gikuyu is inevitably a 
cross-cultural hybrid, and that decolonization projects must recognize 
this. Not to do so is to confuse decolonization with the reconstitution 
of pre-colonial reality" (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 1989:30). South 
African "syncreticist" critics have agreed. Asvat, at the same 
conference as Nkosi, points out that the polarities Nkosi offers lead, 
in the long run, to a dead end. Welz reports: 
Asvat is of the opinion that what Black South Africa needs 
is a "writing that comes out of the furnaces of our 
indigenous consciousness" and is equally far removed from 
the constraints of English writing and thinking as from the 
traditions imposed upon it by contemporary African and Third 
World literature "where the oppressed are heroes, and the 
colonizers villains". In other words, Asvat objects to the 
imposition of a framework upon Black writing that is based 
on the dialectic of oppression, because it has become a 
clichA that stifles the life of the word and the literary 
imagination. All it creates are liabilities, inhibiting 
imaginary resourcefulness and creativity (1991a:99). 
A year after Asvat, Ndebele expressed himself along similar lines, as, 
subsequently, have Sachs (1990) and Oliphant (1990), amongst others. In 
Ndebele's words: 
the greatest challenge of the south African revolution is in 
t~e search for ways of thinking, ways of perception, that 
wlll help to break down the closed epistemological 
structures of south African oppression. such structures can 
~everely comp~omise ,reSistance by dominating thinking 
~tself. For wrlters thlS means freeing the creative process 
ltself from those very laws. It means extending the writer's 
perception of what can be written about, and the means and 
methods of writing (1989:45). 
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Both the call for writing "out of the furnaces of our indigenous 
consciousness", and the call for "extending the writer's perception of 
what can be written about" seem to me praiseworthy objectives. And yet 
Nkosi ' s concatenation of disco~rse and power is too important to be 
theoretically wished away; as might become apparent if we recognise that 
breaking down the "closed epistemological structures of South African 
oppression" is to take place in what has been for many one of the 
languages of oppression. Nor is the problem limited to those who are or 
consider themselves oppressed. Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 
distinguish in their account between "the 'standard' British English 
inherited from the empire and the english which the language has become 
in postcolonial countries" (1989:8, my emphasis). They do this because, 
in their view, like Nkosi' s, "One of the main features of imperial 
oppression is control over language. The imperial education system 
installs a 'standard' version of the metropolitan language as the norm, 
and marginalizes all 'variants' as impurities" (1989:7). An important 
section of their study is devoted to the ways in which postcolonial 
writing defines itself "by seizing the language of the centre and re-
placing it in a discourse fully adapted to the colonial place". Plainly, 
processes by which metropolitan power over the means of communication is 
rejected ("abrogation"), and the language is captured and remoulded to 
new uses ("appropriation") are experienced by all writers in English (or 
"english") in the postcolonies (1989:39). 
The "control of discourse" thus necessarily goes beyond literary medium 
to the domain of criticism: to the acceptance of texts as literature; to 
the priorities accorded genres and styles; to the issues with which 
criticism should concern itself. In a special issue of the PHLA devoted 
to black aesthetics, for example, Gates argues: 
Opposing the essentialism of European "universality" with a 
black es~entialism - an approach that in various ways 
c~aracterIzed a large component of black literary criticism 
SInce the black arts movement - has given way to more subtle 
questions. What is following the critique of the 
essentialist notions that cloaked the text in a mantle of 
"blackness", replete with the accretions of all sorts of 
sociological clich~s, is a "postformal" resituation of 
texts, accounting for the social dynamism of subj ection, 
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incorporation, and marginalization in relation to the 
cultural dominant (1990:19). 
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Al though his reference is to black American rather than black African 
writing, his final point has substantial application for South African 
literature, and indeed for all postcolonial literature: because it 
addresses the terms in which criticism is to take place. If the cultural 
dominant in South Africa is that of apartheid, I have pointed out above 
that apartheid is not itself a discrete phenomenon, but rather an 
outgrowth (pernicious as it may be) of imperial and colonial structures. 
My choice, following Nkosi, of a "Southern African" as opposed to a 
"South African" perspective is thus an advised one. Even granting 
Gates's implied injunction against "essentialist notions that [cloak] 
the text in a mantle of 'blackness''', it seems to me that colonial 
experiences within the Southern African region have been similar enough 
to motivate an attempt to find a single theoretical framework to account 
"for the social dynamism of subjection, -incorporation, and 
marginalization". And if, sadly, the determination with which the 
frontline states have established and enforced the cultural boycott 
gives the concept of "Southern Africa" a putative rather than an actual 
significance, one of the more effective ways in which "the privileged 
texts of the dominant culture" might be challenged is by recognising, 
theoretically, South Africa's location in Africa rather than its 
location as an outpost of Empire. 
Since silence is being used, in this study, as an issue around which 
theoretical explorations can be undertaken, we should recall the 
requirement I specified above that a theorisation of silence should 
address the pressures of context. This consideration of postcolonial 
theory has enabled us to assess the extent to which it can contribute to 
an examination of silence wi thin our literature and a resolution of 
problems within its criticism. Its contribution to this point has been 
to supply terms for a reading of these pressures of context: as culture 
and as language. Its subsequent contribution will be to offer a basis 
for the delineation of the scope of this study, towards the end of this 
chapter. 
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1.6 Broader critical and Theoretical Responses to Silence 
It was my contention above that relatively little attention has been 
paid, in the international sphere, to silence. Nevertheless, having 
specified the pressures of context which should direct a theorisation of 
silence in our literature, thereby positioning our literature in 
relation to the Centre, I would like to consider briefly some critical 
and theoretical studies that have been made in the past in order to 
define my own point of entry to such a theorisation. 
Although the title of his Language and Silence (1967) is promising, 
steiner's treatise conceives of silence in largely negative terms. In 
his chapter on "The Retreat from the Word", he undertakes a broad 
anal ysis of aspects of Western culture : perceiving a decline in the 
confidence that "truth and realness ... can be housed inside the walls 
of language" (1967:32), a significant "submission of successively larger 
areas of knowledge to the modes and proceedings of mathematics" 
(1967:33), a "pronounced and startling" retreat from the word in 
philosophy (1967: 38), a tendency in "the writer of today" to use "far 
fewer and simpler words" (1967:44), and a "retreat from vitality and 
precision" in "the language of the mass media and of advertisement in 
England and the United states" (1967:45). In "Silence and the Poet", he 
recognises silence as both a temptation facing the poet (1967:58), and a 
solution to the debasement of the word: "A civilisation of words is a 
civilisation distraught", and "It is better for the poet to mutilate his 
own tongue than to dignify the inhuman either with his gift or his 
uncaring" (1967:73). Since steiner's study aims itself at a broad 
analysis (and expose) of Western culture, and since it reads silence in 
negati ve or residual terms, its application for my specific study of 
silence is limited . 
. In his A Theory of Literary Production (1978), Macherey concerns himself 
with the broader relations between literature and society; nevertheless 
in his concept of "determinate absences" he identifies a specific 
literary effect. In doing so, he goes rather further than steiner does 
towards recognising silence as a positive phenomenon: 
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The speech of the book comes from a certain silence, a 
matter which it endows with form, a ground on which it 
traces a figure. Thus the book is not self-sufficient; it is 
necessarily accompanied by a certain absence, without which 
it would not exist. A knowledge of the book must include a 
knowledge of this absence. 
This is why it seems useful and legitimate to ask of 
every production what it tacitly implies, what it does not 
say. Either all around or in its wake the explicit requires 
the implicit: for in order to say anything, there are other 
things which must not be said {1978:85}. 
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Macherey draws attention to the fact that expression always has what is 
termed in economics 'opportunity costs': that is, the value {or expense} 
of all that is not said so that what is said can be said. In Macherey's 
reading of silence expression always involves a selection {conscious or 
not, determined or not} amongst possibilities, and so in silence is 
represented all the possibilities of expression that have not been 
chosen. Yet his formulation does not restrict itself to a negative 
version of silence. He proceeds to discuss the impact of silence upon 
speech: 
Yet the unspoken has many other resources: it assigns speech 
to its exact position, designating its domain. By speech, 
silence becomes the centre and principle of expression, its 
vanishing point. Speech eventually has nothing more to tell 
us: we investigate the silence, for it is the silence that 
is doing the speaking {1978:86}. 
It is of course the notion of "silence doing the speaking" which has 
motivated my thesis: which might otherwise be a rather futile study of, 
in Donne's powerful famous words, "absence, darkness, death; things 
which are not" {1971:72}. Silence is: silence is a thing in itself. 
Despite this recognition, Macherey conceives of silence from the point 
of view of those reading it, not those using it: his focus is on the 
text and not the human subject. 
Sontag's study, "The Aesthetics of Silence" {1983}, by contrast, does 
confront the 'humanness' of silence. Posing the question, "How literally 
does silence figure in art?", she proposes several answers: 
Silence exists as a decision .... Silence also exists as a 
punishment .... Silence doesn't exist in a literal sense 
however, as the experience of an audience. It would mea~ 
that the spectator was aware of no stimulus or that he was 
unable to make a response .. .. Nor can silence, in its 
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li teral state, exist as the property of an art-work .... 
There is no neutral surface, no neutral discourse, no 
neutral theme, no neutral form .... As a property of the 
work of art itself, silence can exist only in a cooked or 
non-literal sense. (Put otherwise: if a work exists at all, 
its silence is only one element in it) .... And, finally, 
even without imputing objective intentions to the art-work, 
there remains the inescapable truth about perception: the 
positivity of all experience at every moment of it. As Cage 
has insisted, "There is no such thing as silence. Something 
is always happening that makes a sound." .... "Silence" never 
ceases to imply its opposite and to depend on its presence 
.... Silence remains, inescapably, a form of speech ... and 
an element in a dialogue (1983:185-187). 
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Sontag's insistence that silence cannot exist as "the property of an 
art-work" is an important one, in drawing attention to the metaphoric 
nature of our particular study. Although I will go on to challenge 
Cage's assertion that "there is no such thing as silence", Sontag's 
suggestion that we view silence as "a form of speech ... an element in a 
dialogue" provides a rationale for the speech-act approach that will be 
followed here. 
In a study entitled The Language of Silence: On the Unspoken and the 
Unspeakable in Modern Drama, Kane offers a delineation of the expressive 
dimensions of silence, which, as he points out, cannot be limited to the 
"absence of language": 
The retreat from the word encompasses not only nonverbal 
symbolism, but also many forms of connotative, indirect 
dramatic expression such as innuendo, intimation, 
hesitation, reticence, and bivalent speech that implicitly 
conveys more than it states .... When I refer to silence, I 
am employing the term in its broadest sense, encompassing 
both the absence of speech and implicit expression 
(1984:15). 
Plainly "innuendo, intimation, hesitation, reticence and bivalent 
speech" are all highly context-dependent, and the intentions that might 
be said to motivate them cannot be divorced from the social or cultural 
location of the person intending - nor, indeed, of the person or persons 
who interpret them. The distinction Kane draws between silence as the 
"absence of speech" and as "implicit expression" is an important one, 
for reasons that go beyond the specification he offers subsequently of 
some of the qualities that silence might 'convey': 
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The dumb silence of apathy, the sober silence of solemnity, 
the fertile silence of awareness, the active silence of 
perception, the baffled silence of confusion, the uneasy 
silence of impasse, the muzzled silence of outrage, the 
expectant silence of waiting, the reproachful silence of 
censure, the tacit silence of approval, the vi tuperati ve 
silence of accusation, the eloquent silence of awe, the 
unnerving silence of menace, the peaceful silence of 
communion, and the irrevocable silence of death illustrate 
by their unspoken response to speech that experiences exist 
for which we lack the word (1984:18). 
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Al though our urge, like Kane's, might be to delineate the range or 
compass of meanings that silence can have, it remains an inherent 
paradox that, 'lacking the word ' , we should yet try to fix in words the 
meaning of specific instances of silence. Can silence really be 
translated into the terms of language? 
Maclean doesn't use the term silence, but in her consideration of 
Narrative as Performance: The Baudelairean Experiment she offers a 
sharper - and more contentious - sense of the ways in which silence 
might function in drama and in narrative: 
The theatrical model ... helps in giving an account of the 
essentially iconic nature of much narrative representation. 
While popular wisdom suggests that a picture is worth a 
thousand words, it is also true that words present us with a 
thousand pictures .... In narrative, as on stage, one action 
must represent a whole series of actions, the words spoken 
stand for words unspoken, what we are allowed to see becomes 
metonymic of the unseen (1988:16). 
In this reading Maclean takes up Kane's distinction between the absence 
of speech and implicit expression and contends that what is present in 
performance (and hence in narrative) 'stands for' what is absent, so 
that silence is 'represented in' the words that are spoken. The 
implications of incomplete specification will receive detailed 
consideration in regard to Leitch's conception of character as trope in 
Chapter 3 ("how many characters are said to have armpits?" he asks, 
1986: 158). Yet Maclean's almost Derridean play upon absent presences 
indicates a focus not upon silence per se, but on what is said that 
represents it. 
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within the domain of poetry, and specifically Australian poetry, Zwicky 
begins a consideration of "Speeches and Silences" by referring to 
Donne's 'Songs and Sonnets', in which "there are two characters present. 
The second is certainly mute. Or rather, the words are not articulated 
but the reader can usually tell how the character behaves and what the 
character would say if granted speech" (1986: 27). Zwicky's example 
coheres with my own study of the poetry of Donne. In many of his love 
poems, the presence of the implied listener is registered through the 
modulations of the speaker's address to her: in his paraphrases of 
remarks she makes; in his comments on her appearance, gestures and 
actions; in the shifts in his argument as she responds to it or reacts 
against it; in his self-conscious or reflexive reinterpretations of the 
nature of the address, given her non- response to it. Read in the terms 
Kane offers, her silence develops resonances which are crucial to the 
meaning of the poems. Read more resist antly, the address of the speaker 
can begin to be seen, as Zwicky suggests, as dialogic, as one of two 
voices even though the other is seldom if ever raised (Hooper 1990a). 
In regard to narrative, Cheung's "Imposed Silences in The Color Purple 
and The Woman Warrior" falls into the domain of feminist criticism. In 
her article she delineates the "psychological imperative to expression" 
(1988:162) which motivates the development of the two heroines of -these 
novels. The following excerpts provide an outline of her position: 
Celie and Maxine feel the spell of verbal power at an early 
age, but it takes time for them to learn to fight and create 
with words. In the process, they use words to describe 
wordlessness; writing is not the chosen but the desperate 
alternative to speech (1988 :165) . 
For someone besieged by silence, self-expression is a heroic 
act, an offensive with verbal artillery (1988:166). 
"I thought talking and not talking made the difference 
between sanity and insanity. Insane people were the ones who 
couldn't explain themselves" (Kingston, cited in Cheung 
1988:164). 
That the injunction to silence should provoke expression is 
not so paradoxical as it might seem, for the relief sought 
by those frustrated by silence - forbidden or unable to 
speak - can only come through articulation (1988:172). 
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since Cheung begins her article with the rather ironic observation that 
"women authors and feminist critics have been unduly vocal on the theme 
of silence", we might read her conceptualisation of silence as 
originating within the framework of theories of empowerment which are 
both didactic and dynamic. Silence is imposed on the individual by a 
source of power outside her. It is only with the development of the 
individual's own power that the injunction to silence can be resisted; 
such power taking the gradual form of 'learning and fighting and 
creating' with words. Cheung's emphasis, then, is on silence as a 
condition to be fought against, because it represents powerlessness. 
Also wi thin the sphere of narrative, Hampson has offered a reading of 
"'Heart of Darkness' and the Speech that Cannot be Silenced", to which 
extensive reference will be made later. In it, he shows how African 
languages are "presented consistently as pre-verbal, pre-syntactic sound 
- as sound that is the direct expression of emotion, as sound that is 
pure sound (akin to music), as sound that is utterance without meaning 
... " (1990: 17). Although we cannot refer to the literal silence of the 
Africans in Heart of Darkness, therefore, their effective silence 
provides a ground upon which Marlow's self-defining narrative can 
figure. In this case a resistant reading might deliberately reverse the 
figure-ground resolution, muting the power of Marlow' s narrative in 
order to "hear" the silence of the Africans he encounters. 
1.7 Preliminary Definitions 
Given the range in responses to the issue of silence surveyed above, and 
the difficulties we might therefore recognise as being inherent in 
writing about it, it seems important now to essay some definitions. The 
Concise Oxford offers the following: 
1. Abstinence from speech or noise, being silent, non-
betrayal of secret etc., fact of not mentioning a thing, not 
communicating any message, etc. ... 2. Absence of sound 
stillness ... 3. Oblivion, state of not being mentioned .. : 
4. v.t. Make silent by force, superior argument, etc. 
One root of the difficulties of writing about silence is, I think, 
apparent in the second sense of the word, to which Sontag alludes: 
"Absence of sound, stillness". Perhaps the most commonplace usage and 
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the most widespread understanding, it nevertheless reminds us that 
silence is related to the domain of sound, of what is audible, and so to 
wr i te about it, to seek for silences in words on the page, is to 
undertake a quest that is metaphoric at the outset. And to seek for 
silences in works of literature is inevitably to come to grips with a 
range of problems of textualisation. These problems will receive 
detailed consideration in Chapter 3 in regard to character. 
On the other hand, this definition is both more straightforward and less 
applicable to my study than the remaining three, because it makes no 
reference to people or to their communication. The fourth sense, "Make 
silent by force, superior argument etc." is likewise a common usage: its 
importance for my purposes has to do with the human activity it implies. 
We might be reminded, for example, of the silence that Mary imposes on 
Moses by whipping his face in The Grass is Singing, or the priest's 
silencing of the Irishwoman in Foe by shriving her before she is ready. 
In the first and the third senses of the word we find highlighted, 
respectively, the agency ("Abstinence from speech or noise, being silent 
... ") and the passivity ("Oblivion, state of not being mentioned") that 
can inform silence. The last might remind us of the "long silence" that 
awaits all speakers, and the concomitant concern of writers with the 
'immortality' of their work - a concern which reached an apotheosis in 
the sonnets of Shakespeare. Intrinsic to my study will be an 
understanding of silence as a human phenomenon, and, although some 
attention will be paid to the transitive meaning of the verb, and to the 
silences, fortuitous and deliberate, that are written into texts, 
attention will especially be directed to silence as abstinence from 
speech. 
1.8 Silence and Language 
Our consideration of postcolonial theory above provided terms in which 
to recognise the pressures of context which, in my view, should direct a 
theorisation of silence in our literature. These were specified as 
culture and as language, plainly both human phenomena. In taking up the 
lead suggested by Sontag, I would like to focus, first, on language. If 
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to recognise silence in human terms is to recognise the relations 
between silence and speech, then our theoretical starting point should 
clearly be the field of linguistics. Obvious as this might seem, 
linguistics has in fact paid relatively little attention to silence as a 
positive phenomenon. Rather it uses silence, most importantly, to define 
the fundamental unit of linguistic analysis which is" following Lyons, 
the utterance: "any stretch of talk, by one person, before and after 
which there is silence on the part of that person" (Harris, cited by 
Lyons 1968: 172 ). Lyons goes on, "It must be remembered that we are not 
dealing here with the formal definition of some linguistic unit, but 
with a pre-scientific description of the linguist's data. 'Silence' and 
the other terms used to characterize and delimit utterances are to be 
understood with the tolerance customarily granted to everyday non-
scientific discourse" (1968: 172). In a text entitled Speaking, Level t 
distinguishes three sorts of "moments of silence" which a conversation 
can contain: pauses, which interrupt one unit of a speaker's speech, 
gaps, which occur after the completion of a unit when nobody 'claims the 
floor', and lapses, when the silence between units is particularly 
extended (1989:32-33). Such 'definitions' clearly occur within the 
sphere of descriptive linguistics, and as such at a level of analysis 
that will need augmentation if it is to be useful in this study. Since 
linguistics will contribute substantially to our theoretical 
orientation, however, it seems worth pursuing a little further the 
definitions it can offer. 
'utterances', as we have seen, are units of analysis, as opposed to 
syntactic or grammatical units. Lyons's description of the "situation of 
utterance" is one which will receive fuller attention in Chapter 3 in 
regard to the model of narrative as discourse. For the present it is 
important to note that "speech acts" are a specific form of utterance. 
Following the delineation Lyons offers (in a later text), the theory of 
speech acts has its roots in Austin's How to Do Things with Words 
(1962), in which "performative utterances ... are [specified as] those 
in the production of which the speaker, or writer, performs an act of 
doing rather than saying". Austin's theory of speech acts, then, 
"insofar as it is a theory at all . . . is a theory of pragmatics (in the 
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etymological sense of 'pragmatics': "the study of action, or doing"). 
Furthermore, it is a theory of social pragmatics: a theory of social 
insti tutions and conventions. This aspect of Austin's theory has not 
always been given the emphasis that it deserves" (1981:172-175). 
Fowler's description usefully supplements Lyons's: "The most important 
approach to speech as action is the theory of speech acts or 
illocutionaryacts originally proposed by J.L. Austin, and developed by 
J.R. Searle. The basic insight is that language-use has an extra 
dimension which has been somewhat neglected by logicians and linguists: 
a performati ve dimension ... " . This performati ve dimension is most 
apparent in "utterances containing performati ve verbs such as promise, 
declare, name, baptize, request, order, guarantee. [In these instances] 
the utterance of the sentence actually constitutes the action referred 
to. It is literally a speech act, not just saying something but doing 
something through speaking ... ". The important thing to note, concludes 
Fowler, is the "prevalence of speech acts in discourse: the fact that 
speakers in dialogue continuously engage in a series of illocutionary 
acts such as requesting, undertaking, challenging, asserting, warning, 
and so on. This is the chief mechanism by which conversation is 
maintained as a practical interaction as well as a channelling of ideas" 
(1986:104-106). 
In his reading or speech-act theory Lyons suggests, but does not insist 
upon, a refinement that is important for an application of the theory to 
li terature: '" Language act' would be a much better term .... It must 
constantly be borne in mind ... that 'speech act' like 'utterance', on 
the one hand, and 'inscription' or 'text', on the other, is intended to 
cover the production of both written and spoken language" (1981:172). If 
silence can be read within a speech-act framework, this qualification 
helps address the problem raised earlier as regards the metaphoric 
nature of silence in literature. 
This brief overview of speech-act theory has been undertaken in order to 
establish its relevance for a study of silence. It seems important to 
specify, however, that I will be drawing upon the theory not for 
specific applications of individual concepts, but rather for the broader 
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reading it suggests of narrative as speech act, hence as performed 
utterance. In doing so I will be following in the line of Pratt's Toward 
a Speech-Act Theory of Literary Discourse (1977), Lanser's The Narrative 
Act: Point of View in Prose Fiction (1981), and Maclean's Narrative as 
Performance: The Baudelairean Experiment (1988), as well as more 
theoretical studies like Chatman's "The structure of Narrative 
Transmission" (1975), Genette's Narrative Discourse (1980), Rimmon-
Kenan's Narrative Fiction: contemporary Poetics (1983), and, most 
recently, Petrey's Speech Acts and Literary Theory (1990). In Rimmon-
Kenan, we encounter the following basic definition: 
the term narration suggests (1) a communication process in 
which the narrative as message is transmitted by addresser 
to addressee and (2) the verbal nature of the medium used to 
transmit the message (1983:2). 
Drawing on the work of other writers, Lanser offers several refinements: 
"By situating literary communication within a speech act framework, a 
concept of the text as message/object gives way to a more dynamic and 
fruitful notion of the text as a specific kind of communicative and 
aesthetic act" ( 1981 : 62). She cites the distinction drawn by Genette 
between "voice ('who speaks?') and vision ('who sees?')", and notes, 
"The concept of voice encompasses distinctions about the narrator's 
relation to the story, the time of narration, and narrati ve level; a. 
separate set of indices is necessary for describing the mode of vision 
or 'focalization' the narrative entails" (1981:37). She also cites a 
comment by Pratt, that speech-act theory offers "perhaps for the first 
time ... a description of literary discourse that answers the need for a 
contextually based approach to texts" (1981:68). 
Before leaving the field of linguistics, we should note some of the 
philosophical consequences of an application of speech-act theory to 
literature, and, by extension, into which fields it leads us. In his 
recent review, Speech Acts and Literary Theory, Petrey emphasises the 
importance of context: "Other linguistic schools address the structure 
of language in itself; speech-act theory examines the power of language 
in communities. Language's communa l power is the effect of its 
'performative i capacity" (1990 : 3) . Elsewhere Petrey insists on 
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"collective acceptance" or "accord", "audience uptake", "multilateral 
participation", "sociality" (1990:5-6). He comments, "Much of the 
excitement of speech-act theory is its demonstration that entities often 
taken as incompatible are instead thoroughly interactive ... The theory 
also brings together the inner self and the outer world, the individual 
and the communal, but it does so only when we participate perceptibly in 
communal life" (1990: 6). These links will be taken up subsequently in 
regard to character and identity, and particularly in the case study of 
Head's Haru. The implication here is that, "Before there can be 
per formative language, there must exist a social body that recognizes 
and accepts the conventional procedure in which the language functions" 
(1990:7). We will note the same understanding of Austin as motivated 
Lyons's insistence on "social pragmatics", "social institutions" and 
"conventions" cited above (1981: 175); Lyons offers another important 
corrective. He concludes his chapter "Worlds within Worlds: The 
Subjectivity of utterance": 
When I talk about the subjectivity of utterance, I am 
referring to the locutionary agent's expression of himself 
in the act of utterance and of the reflection of this in the 
phonological, grammatical and lexical structure of the 
utterance-inscription. Two points need to be emphasized in 
connection with the notion of self-expression to which I am 
appealing in this definition of 'subjectivity'. First, I 
want the term 'self-expression' to be taken literally .... 
Second, the s.elf which the locutionary agent expresses is 
the product of the social and interpersonal roles that he 
has played in the past, and it manifests itself, in a 
socially identifiable way, in the role that he is playing in 
the context of utterance (1981:241). 
Apparent in this delineation, and seminal to speech-act theory, is a 
focus upon the individual self, socially produced, but nevertheless 
existing as subject, as agent within a communicative framework. This 
insistence sets the theory at direct odds with the decentring of the 
subject that has occurred in poststructuralist approaches. Some of the 
consequences of this insistence will be pursued in greater depth in 
Chapter 2 in regard to culture as it exists between subjects in 
relations of power, and in Chapter 3 in regard to character as a 
textualisation of the human subj ect in cultural terms. The agentic 
nature of communication is intrinsic to my study, and one of its most 
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important implications is that if we decide, in certain circumstances, 
to read silences as 'speech' acts it is incumbent upon us to recognise 
that people 'own' the silences they enact . 
From the dual emphases upon the social and the subjective, it should be 
plain that we are venturing into the terrain of the social sciences. 
Concepts that will prove important in this regard, and to which I would 
like to make anticipatory reference, are Giddens's structuration theory 
(1987), Berger and Luckmann's social construction of reality (1967), and 
Berger's social construction of identity (1963), and, in what Harre has 
termed "new paradigm psychology", Shotter's analysis of pronominal 
relations in the construction of the self (in Shotter & Gergen 1989:22). 
The relevance of these concepts will become clear later; the question 
that might need addressing now is a broader one about the contribution 
these fields are equipped to make to a study of silence in literature. 
In the first place, the most immediate "pressure of context" which I 
experience myseif is as a white teacher of predominantly black students. 
Given the reflexivity which has become an intrinsic characteristic of 
these fields, as well as literature, they allow a theoretical 
conceptualisation of this 'racial interface' in linguistic and in 
cuI tural terms: thus they are in important ways compatible with the 
postcolonial paradigm outlined above. In the second place, and despite 
this reflexivity, a major tradition exi sts within these fields of social 
constructionism which has not succumbed to what Nash terms "Literature's 
Assault on Narrative" (1990): its decentring of the subject, and its 
exacerbation of the adversarial conception of culture which has been the 
legacy of post-Romanticism. In the third place, there has developed 
within these fields an increasing focus ~pon narrative and its 
significance in the constitution of various domains of knowledge and in 
the construction of the self, as might be apparent in the concepts to 
which I referred above, and to which I will pay further attention in 
Chapters 2 and 3. To summarise then, the broad contribution these fields 
will make to my study is to facilitate a recentring or reconstruction of 
the postcolonial subj ect, which, as I will go on to show, becomes 
incumbent upon us once we recognise the silence of this subj ect in 
positive terms. 
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1.9 Silence and Culture 
Culture and language are an obvious concern of the social sciences. My 
interest in these fields has been stimulated by the specific 
contributions of cultural anthropology, or ethnography. Interpretive 
anthropology, in particular, takes as its 'subject' of study "culture", 
given the understanding of culture as 
always relational, an inscription of communicative processes 
that exist, historically, between subjects in relations of 
power (Clifford 1986:15). 
For this reason, ethnography, and specifically an ethnographic study of 
American Indians conducted over twenty-five years ago, has offered the 
most useful delineation I have encountered of the ways in which silence 
functions in human interaction. It is also strikingly compatible with 
the insights and philosophical underpinnings of speech-act theory 
specified above. In III To give up on words': Silence in western Apache 
Culture", Basso identifies six social contexts characterised by what he 
terms "acts of silence" and "silence behaviour". These are: "meeting 
strangers", "courting", "children, coming home", "getting cussed out", 
"being with people who are sad", "being with people for whom they sing". 
Basso advances the hypothesis that "keeping silent in western Apache 
cul ture is associated with situations in which participants perceive 
their relationships vis a vis one another to be ambiguous and/or 
unpredictable" (1972:81). He is cautious about the generalisability of 
his findings: "The question remains to what extent the foregoing 
hypothesis helps to account for silence behavior in other cultures. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible at the present time to provide anything 
approaching a conclusive answer". He points out, specifically, that 
"keeping silent amongst the Western Apache is a response to uncertainty 
and unpredictability in social relations", and so it is triggered by 
quite specific contextual cues (1972:83). 
Despite Basso's caution about the context-specificity of his findings, 
his concepts of "silence behaviour" and "acts of silence" seem to me to 
have profound significance for a study of silence in relation to culture 
and narrative. This significance has to do with the recognitions they 
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demand: first, of the deliberacy or volition which can motivate silence, 
and second, of the autonomy of the party who uses silence thus 
deliberately. These recognitions plainly cohere with Lyons's insistence 
on the agency of the subject in a communicative framework; they will 
also be seen (in Chapter 2) to be aligned with the renunciation of the 
trope of penetration in favour of the concept of the interface in both 
cross-cultural and narrative interaction. The volitional nature of 
silence is thus intrinsic to the theoretical recognition within this 
study of the autonomy of the subject. 
The implications for "reading" culture are profound; they are no less so 
for reading literature. If we consider again the discussion of Foe with 
which this chapter opened, and the briefer discussions of Fools, The 
Grass is Singing, and Turbott Wolfe which followed, we will recognise 
the silences in these novels as the silences of black people. Now, 
whereas a common-sense conception of silence might encourage us to 
condone the appropriateness or realism of fictional depictions of silent 
women, or lower-class or black people, the concepts offered by Basso 
force us to foreground their silence, and to read it from their point of 
view. Most crucially in regard to character, as I will show in Chapter 
3, these recognitions facilitate a resistant reading of silence. 
1.10 The Scope of this study 
The delineation of speech-act theory and ethnography thus far has 
established a point of entry to a theorisation of silence in our 
li terature. The maj or theoretical problem which remains is that of 
textualisation: how do we read silence as a manifestation of cross-
cultural interaction in the narrative text? It will be the concern of 
Chapters 2 and 3 to grapple with this problem. Major concepts that will 
be introduced in order to address it will be those of "cultural 
translation", and specifically the narrator as "cultural translator", 
and character as a textualisation of the subj ect. The role of the 
reader, and particularly the "cross-border reader", will be considered 
in both these regards: as "reviewer" of the translation, and as party to 
the "construction" of the identity of characters. The volitional silence 
of characters will nonetheless be read as resistance to the power 
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relations inherent in the act of narration, and by implication the act 
of reading. 
The task that remains for this chapter is a delineation of the scope of 
the study. I should insist at the outset that my intention is not to be 
exhaustive, comprehensive, or even representative. since a major part of 
this work is to establish the theoretical significance of silence in our 
literature, the texts selected for consideration are designed to stand 
as case studies for the testing, refinement and elaboration of the 
thesis . Given these limits, the thesis is likely, if successful, to 
serve as a basis for extended and comparative studies in the future. 
I have said above that the consideration of postcolonial theory had been 
undertaken both in order to assess its potential value for a 
theorisation of silence in our literature, and in. order to provide a 
basis for the selection of texts. Although the following two chapters 
constitute an extension and development of the theoretical approach to 
be followed, I would now like to anticipate Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and 
motivate this selection in terms of the theoretical framework of the 
first three. 
In the first place, the domain from which they have come is, as my title 
specifies, "Twentieth-Century Southern African Novels in English". The 
regional perspective, as I explained above, is an attempt to subvert the 
hegemonic polarities identified by Nkosi (of "dominant" and "oppressed" 
culture, of "privileged" and "underprivileged" texts, of "coloniser" and 
"colonised") by emphasising South Africa's location in Africa rather 
than its location as an outpost of Empire. This perspective will be 
particularly apparent in regard to the geographical migrations that 
occur in Hhudi, and in the complexities of Head's position as an exile: 
it is evident also in the fact that these texts are broadly rural in 
location and not explicitly political. And yet the medium that links us 
with the Centre can hardly be ignored: and so consideration will be 
directed to the ways in which "Englishness" comes into contact, in 
Hhudi, with oral traditions of indigenous languages, in Too Late the 
Phalarope, with the dominant discourse of Afrikaner cultural 
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nationalism, and in Maru, with an emergent "Africanness". The pressures 
of cross-culturality are strongly reflected in all three texts. In 
important ways these pressures construct each of the protagonists as a 
transitional figure, and hence draw attention to the relations between 
individual and community or communities. Also significant is the 
historical change that sees cross-culturality translated first into the 
imperial terms of segregation and miscegenation, and subsequently into 
Afrikaner cultural national terms of apartheid. Thus we witness Mhudi's 
dislocation out of a settled traditional existence and her subsequent 
contact with people from three different communities (Qoranna, Boer and 
Matabele); we see a sexual relationship constituting Pieter (though not 
significantly Stephanie) as transgressor of the "iron law" demarcating 
the boundaries between black and white in Too Late the Phalarope; and we 
witness the racial prejudice endured and resisted by Margaret Cadmore in 
Maru. 
Since, as I will go on to show in Chapter 3, the issue of silence has to 
do with the textualisation of the human subject as character in cultural 
terms, and since, therefore, the relations between writer, narrator and 
character will receive some attention, it is perhaps apposite here to 
explain the decision to focus on texts which include a significant 
textualisation of a black woman. The issue of gender is a large one, 
reflecting an interface of its own, and my concerns in this study are 
not primarily feminist. My attempt has rather been to choose a subject 
whose race and gender serve as a constant around which variations in 
narrative treatment can be compared. Although the issue of alterity is 
one that affects all subjects whose silence in literature might be 
considered realistic, and the study could, therefore, have focused on 
white women characters, or black men, the black woman stands as "double 
other" to the white man who is the dominant figure in cultures of the 
Centre and many of the postcolonies, and so her silence in particular 
has become a matter of record (see , for example, Clayton 1990:27, Lewis 
1992:50, Driver 1992:457). 
The question of the voice of the black woman is one that this study will 
consider. The more important questions to which it will direct itself 
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are these: if she were to speak, would we be able to listen to her? if 
she chooses not to speak, should we not listen to her silence? 
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CULTURE AND NARRATIVE 
I began, in Chapter 1, to examine some of the ways in which the 
postcolonial paradigm might be drawn on to address the theoretical 
requirements of the Southern African context. One of the pressures of 
this context was identified as language, in a range of forms: as common 
heritage with the Centre, as medium of communication, as critical 
discourse. In a society characterised by cultural diversity, another of 
the pressures of context is cross-cultural interaction. Few if any 
novels in our literature do not deal with it, and at the level of 
criticism the hegemonic "control of discourse" to which Nkosi alludes 
can plainly be read in cultural terms . The endeavour of this chapter is 
to investigate the role played by culture ' in the narrative 
textualisation of the subject: it is important nevertheless to bear in 
mind the interrelatedness of language and culture, which will receive 
further attention in Chapter 3. 
2.1 Two Readings of Heart of Darkness 
Accepting the commission from Gates to find a theoretical approach to 
"the social dynamism of subjection, incorporation, and marginalization 
in relation to the cultural dominant" (1990:19) within the sphere of 
Southern African literature, we might direct attention to culture in two 
ways: to the influence of cross-culturali ty on narrati ve, and to the 
contributions that readings of culture can make to readings of 
narrative. Given also the implied commission from Nkosi that the 
privileged texts of the dominant culture should be challenged (in Welz 
1991a:97), I would like to begin by considering two recent articles on a 
work that still identifiably falls into this category. Although Heart of 
Darkness concerns itself not with Southern but with Central Africa, it 
stands as an important instance of cross-cul tural narrative, and one 
whose invocation of alterity can fruitfully be addressed in postcolonial 
terms. It is this alterity, I think, that has stimulated a polemical 
debate between critics with, respectively, African and metropolitan 
allegiances, a debate that is taken up in both the readings that follow. 
Since it offers a significant textualisation of a black woman, the novel 
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stands as a point of comparison particularly for the discussion of Hhudi 
in Chapter 4, but also for the novels to be considered in Chapters 5 and 
6. 
The two critiques that follow perhaps also need an introduction. In the 
first place they are written by critics whose positioning, with regard 
to the postcolonial paradigm, is recognisably different. Bowker is a 
South African, yet her comparative reading of Conrad, Achebe and Lessing 
stands as an instance of the use of 'imported' theory in our criticism 
noted in Chapter 1. Hampson is based in London, and the theory he draws 
on might likewise be classified as metropolitan. If both critiques 
address the issue of cross-cuI turality, the theories that inform them 
equip them differently, however, because the ethnography Hampson draws 
on has been developed in conjunction wi th research in the 'postcolonies' 
(and elsewhere), and hence has had a major interest in cross-cultural 
contact per se. By contrast, the postmodernism Bowker invokes in her 
article is substantially at odds with the postcolonial theory I have 
delineated, and, in my view, demonstrates the difficulties that 
postmodernism has with cross-culturality. Her article is useful in 
addi tion because it introduces the concept of the boundary, and so 
provides a basis for a discussion of 'the interface'. Hampson's study is 
important for different reasons. The most useful definition of silence 
in Chapter 1 came from the domain of ethnography. Hampson's application 
of the concept of cultural translation both establishes in highly 
suggestive ways the value of ethnography for literary analysis, and 
stands as a comparative basis for the kind of study that will be 
undertaken in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. On a structural level, his use of 
the ethnographic model sensitises him to the discursive situation in the 
novel, and to the relations that exist between writer, narrator, 
character and reader. On a broader level, his use of the ethnographic 
model invokes the context of early exploration and travel writing which 
had a seminal influence on conceptualisations of the 'other', and which 
has thus become the subject of recent work such as Pratt's Imperial 
Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (1992), Mason's Deconstructing 
America: Representations of the Other (1990), and, within our criticism, 
van Wyk Smith's Introduction to his Shades of Adamastor (1988), and 
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Lockett's "The Black Woman in South African English Literature" (1988) 
which draws in turn on Gray's delineation of the Adamastor myth in 
Southern African Literature: An Introduction (1979). Hampson's use of 
cultural anthropology also provides a point of connection with related 
concepts in other fields in the social sciences, some of which will be 
discussed here and some in greater depth in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Bowker on Heart of Darkness 
Bowker titles her article, "Textuali ty and Wor ldliness: Crossing the 
Boundaries. A Postmodernist Reading of Achebe, Conrad and Lessing", and 
in it draws the following distinction: 
A non-African such as Conrad in Heart of Darkness who uses 
African space as a foil in order to strengthen the 
boundaries of his own culture, writes an "outside of Africa" 
text; whereas a non-African (in the sense of being European) 
such as Doris Lessing in The Grass is Singing who does not 
use African space to emphasize her own cultural boundaries, 
but investigates the very nature of boundaries, the nature 
of the worlds which they enclose and what happens when 
different kinds of worlds (in this case white Southern 
African and African) are placed in confrontation in Africa, 
writes an "out of Africa" text (1989:61-62). 
The implications of this distinction for a postcolonial paradigm seem to 
me substantial, though Bowker, regrettably, does not explore them in 
such terms. Drawing on the work of Said, her theoretical alignme"nt is 
nevertheless with postmodernism and not postcolonialism: and so her 
distinction between Conrad and Lessing is based less on their position 
in regard to Africa than on their respective modernism and 
postmodernism. Rebutting Achebe' s charge of racism, she couches an 
invocation of the narrative frame of Heart of Darkness in Said's terms 
of filiation and affiliation. In doing so she asserts: "Conrad ... has 
to demarcate his cultural boundaries in order to protect that to which 
he belongs and that which he possesses. In view of Conrad's 
contextuality it is a textual imperative that he imperialistically 
perform an imaginative expropriation of a space of otherness, such as 
Africa ... " (1989:61, Bowker's emphasis) . Following MCHale's thesis that 
"the dominant of modernist fiction is epistemological and that of 
postmodernist fiction ontological" (1989:62), she goes on: "Lessing the 
postmodernist does not use the discursive situation to confirm and 
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reinforce boundaries; she investigates the nature of boundaries and the 
way discourse operates to confirm and reinforce them" (1989:66). 
The interpretive differences I have with Bowker must be reserved for 
later: at present it seems important to specify something of the 
theoretical significance of her argument. It is possibly a deliberate 
attempt to escape the pressures of context upon which I have been 
insisting that leads to her (rather incidental) reading of Africa as a 
"space of otherness" which Conrad can imaginatively expropriate in order 
to fulfil the "textual imperative" towards imperialism which demarcates 
his "cultural boundaries". To test the validity of her assertions about 
Conrad's use of African space one would need, presumably, to compare it 
with his use, in other novels, of Malaysian or South American or even 
English space; one might need to investigate the relations between his 
experiences of Russian imperialism in Poland as a child and his exposure 
to British imperialism in various parts of the world as an adult. This 
exercise plainly falls outside the compass of Bowker's article. Yet 
without such a validation her reading of Africa comes perilously close 
to that of the Scottish student (whom Achebe so reviled) who saw Africa 
as "merely a setting for the disintegration of the mind of Mr Kurtz" 
(1978:8). 
So incidental a reading of Africa is teasing , given that Conrad and 
Achebe are both writing quite emphatically of Africa; and, more 
importantly, given the reflexive possibilities of the theoretical mode 
of postmodernism in which Bowker chooses to write, given her own 
position as a critic writing "out of Africa", and given the fact that 
she does not explicitly recognise this position. Her sense of a 
poststructural loosening of boundaries (1989:56) proceeds, she says, in 
terms of the mandate of "critics such as Said [that] the function of 
postmodernist criticism is ... to resist a philosophy of pure textuality 
and critical non-interference, by engaging with social reality through 
the investigation of the connection between texts and the existential 
actualities of human life, politics, societies and events" (1989:58-59). 
Yet it is only in regard to Lessing that she attempts any engagement 
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wi th the social reali ties of Africa, and this engagement, too, is 
incidental. 
In the second place, Bowker gives relatively little emphasis to 
discourse, and the ways in which, if we follow Ashcroft, Griffiths and 
Tiffin, language can be said to 
[ consti tute] reality in an obvious way: it provides some 
terms and not others with which to talk about the world .... 
Worlds exist by means of languages, their horizons extending 
as far as the processes of neologism, innovation, tropes, 
and imaginative usage generally will allow the horizons of 
the language itself to be extended. Therefore the english 
[sic] language becomes a tool with which a 'world' can be 
textually constructed (1989:44) . 
Bowker's non-emphasis on discourse is curious, given the "typical 
postmodernist questions" she cites from McHale: "What is a world? What 
kinds of world are there, how are they constituted, and how do they 
differ?" (1989:63). It is curious, too, given her references to Said's 
reading of Conrad as the type of author "who deliberately conceives the 
text as supported by a discursive situation involving speaker and 
audience", and of the Conradian encounter as "persistently, the 
encounter between speaker and hearer" (Bowker 1989:58). If Bowker makes 
no attempt to explore her position as a critic "out of Africa", neither, 
here, does she explore the reflexive implications of her position as 
"audience" or "hearer", whom said identifies as intrinsic to Conrad's 
sense of the text. 
Her relative uninterest in these aspects of the discursive situation is 
associated, I think significantly, with what might be termed an 
adversarial conception of culture. She draws on Said's use of "the word 
culture to suggest an environment, process and hegemony in which 
individuals (in their private circumstances) and their works are 
embedded, as well as overseen at the top by a superstructure and at the 
base by a whole series of methodological attitudes". Culture, Bowker 
goes on, "designates something to which one belongs, and something which 
one possesses, as well as demarcat ing a boundary 'by which the concepts 
of what is extrinsic or intrinsic to the culture corne into forceful 
play' (Said). These kinds of pressure which culture exerts suggest that 
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resistance to culture has always been present" (1989:59). The 
'embedding', the 'overseeing', the 'possession' and the continuous 
"resistance" allude to a relation between individual and culture at once 
threatening and oppositional. 
Al though her focus at this point is on the critic, the relation is 
apparent also in regard to the writer: hence her reading of Heart of 
Darkness in which its author acts out the "textual imperatives" 
prescribed for him by his "contextuality". We thus see Conrad "creating 
an affiliati ve order in his text to compensate for a failed filiati ve 
order in his context" (1989:60). If the sight is a hollow one, it is 
perhaps because the concept of "context" is applied only to Conrad the 
writer, and not to Bowker the critic. Are we not entitled to ask, after 
all, which "textual imperatives" are prescribed for her, and which she 
is acting out? It is also perhaps because, interesting as are the 
distinctions and the relations between "textuality" and "worldliness", 
they do not, finally, constitute a theory of narrative. Given the cross-
culturality reflected in Conrad's text, such a theory cannot in fact be 
generated in terms of the adversarial conception of culture held by 
Bowker, and behind her Said, and behind them both Trilling's "opposing 
self", with its "certain powers of indignant perception" which it 
directs to the "terrible principle of culture" (1955:x-xi). As I will go 
on to show, in this and the next chapter, a theory that takes sufficient 
account of the relations between culture and narrative must be rooted in 
a more sophisticated sense of what Giddens terms the "recursive" nature 
of language, of the ways in which individual and culture are mutually 
constitutive (1987:163). 
I have explored Bowker's essay in some depth because the circumstances 
of its author and its publication might lead one to expect to find in it 
a "South African" reading of Heart of Darkness, and in order to 
investigate the reasons why one doesn't. I have explored the essay also 
in order to consider some of the things a "postmodern reading" of 
Conrad, Achebe and Lessing might well not consider. My own endeavour is 
to break out of the categories that have contained metropolitan and 
colonial literatures, in search of a theoretical framework that can 
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address both. In pursuing this endeavour, it will be necessary to move 
beyond Bowker's distinction between "out of Africa" and "outside of 
Africa" texts. Yet the distinction remains an important one, for at 
least two reasons. In the first place, it can sensi tise us to the 
predominant trope in much writing "outside of Africa": which is that of 
penetration. The trope is ancillary to processes of "discovery" and 
"exploration" engaged in by early travellers and later imperialists: it 
is perhaps most obvious in Van der Post's Venture to the Interior 
(1952), it is certainly plain in Heart of Darkness. We might, for this 
reason, refine Bowker's category slightly by speaking of "into Africa" 
texts. We might also redirect these categories to the sphere of 
criticism and ask whether, despite her position as a South African, 
Bowker's reading, and the postmodernism it represents, should not be 
classified as an "outside of Africa" reading of Africa. 
In the second place, underlying these categories is the concept of the 
"boundary"; a concept to which Bowker pays some attention. In the 
definition she derives from Said, it is one of the functions of culture 
to demarcate a boundary between what is extrinsic to it and what is 
intrinsic to it (1989:59). Conrad's creation of "an affiliative order in 
his text to compensate for a failed filiati ve order in his context" 
(1989:60) serves to "strengthen the boundaries of his own [sic] culture" 
(1989:61). Again, from Said, one of the most important functions of 
criticism is to "guard against entrapment within rigid boundaries" 
(1989: 58), and in this it is supported by the relaxing of boundaries 
"between different disciplines, between different discourses" (1989:56) 
which characterises our current poststructural period. (It is a trend 
that will be actively pursued in this di ssertation). 
For the purposes of my study the concept of the boundary will need 
further development. For example, the biographic emphasis Bowker gives 
the concept leads her away from a full consideration of the relations 
between self, discourse and reality. So , too, do the dicta she adopts 
from McHale, that 
the dominant of modernist fiction is epistemological and 
that of postmodernist fiction ontological. According to 
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McHale, for a modernist like Conrad the existence of. his 
world is taken for granted; he accepts that there 1S a 
knowable and ascertainable reality beyond the text and the 
question for him is how to reach this world through his text 
(1989:62). 
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It is more than my impatience with categories that makes the distinction 
seem inept; even a slight acquaintance with the stylistic feature watt 
(1979: 178) calls "delayed decoding" should be sufficient to challenge 
the judgement. Conrad's sense of reality is by no means as taken-for-
granted as this: he has a profound sense of how "words" can construct a 
"world", how in the case of Marlow as well as Kurtz the "voice" might 
constitute the "man". without a more sophisticated and less adversarial 
sense of culture Bowker cannot recognise these things: and so her 
concept of the boundary does not go as far as it might. It is a concept 
to which I shall return. 
2.3 Hampson on Heart of Darkness 
In the terms of my thesis, the major problem with Bowker's reading of 
Conrad's text is its inability to deal effectively with cross-
culturality. This problem takes several forms, including her failure to 
position herself in terms of her context; her failure to factor the 
reader in to her reading, and so to apply the terms of postmodernism to 
herself; hence her failure to recognise the constitutive force of her 
own condonation of Conrad's appropriation of African space. Most 
significant, for my purposes, is the inadequate attention she pays to 
language, discourse, and, particularly, silence. These issues will 
receive comprehensive attention in the course of this chapter. A 
different perspective on them is available in another recent article on 
Conrad's text, entitled "Heart of Darkness and 'The Speech that Cannot 
be Silenced'" (1990), in which Hampson applies the insights of "modern 
dialogic or reflexive anthropology" (and specifically the work of 
Clifford, Marcus and Asad) to concerns similar to Bowker's. It might be 
pertinent to point out that my reading of Hampson is, in its insistence 
on the criteria of contextuality, intended to stand as a corrective to 
Bowker's reading of Said. Despite Hampson's location at the metropolitan 
Centre, his use of ethnographic theory sensi tises him to the cross-
culturality that is represented in Conrad's novel, and allows him to 
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address many of the issues that Bowker doesn't. It is particularly his 
use of the concept of "cultural translation" which offers a mode of 
approach to the textual complexities of relations between cultures, 
including relations of power, and which thus renders his reading 
amenable to application within the sphere of Southern African 
literature, to "out of Africa" as well as to "outside of Africa" texts. 
Like Bowker, Hampson begins his reading of Heart of Darkness by engaging 
with Achebe's allegations about its racism. Finding for Conrad, Hampson 
sees in the narrative method of the text evidence of far greater insight 
into processes of cultural contact, and the ways in which these can be 
represented in works of fiction, than Bowker (or Achebe) would be 
willing to allow. Because of this he pays a great deal more attention to 
narrative audience in Heart of Darkness (and indeed to all four parties 
to the "situation of narrative utterance" - writer, narrator, character 
and reader - if I might collapse the terms of Lyons and of Genette, in 
anticipation of Chapter 3).1 Such attention is important because of two 
recognitions which underlie it: that communication is a human system, 
and that representation is a communicative act. 
Hampson cites the observation by Asad that, "When anthropologists return 
to their countries, they must write up 'their people', and they must do 
so in the conventions of representation already circumscribed ... by 
their discipline, institutional life, and wider society" (Hampson 
1990:26). In Heart of Darkness we witness just such a process: Marlow 
returns to London to recount his tale on a boat on the Thames. His 
representation (of Kurtz, of Africa) is a representation for a specific 
audience, and is thus circumscribed by the conventions he shares with 
this audience. "Marlow's audience, like the readership of Blackwood's 
Magazine, is made up of males of the colonial service class", says 
1 John Lyons's "situation of utterance" includes spatial and 
temporal features; it includes, typically, a distinction between 
speaker and hearer, with the speaker at the "centre" of the 
"deictic system"; and it includes reference to an object or person 
as the "subject of discourse" (1969:275-276). Gerard Genette of 
course, titled his theorisation of the novel Narrative Disco~rse 
(1980). 
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Hampson (1990:26). In this regard they are very like the readership for 
whom Conrad was writing: his "original consti tuents [were] the 
subscribers to Blackwood's and New Review, an audience still secure in 
the conviction that they were members of an invincible imperial power 
and a superior race" (Parry, cited in Hampson 1990:26). 
The link (between the returning anthropologists, Marlow and Conrad) is 
the "conventions of representation" which circumscribe the telling of 
the tale. It is, I think, generally accepted that Conrad's use of the 
narrator Marlow is a highly self-conscious one. His use of Marlow's 
audience is no less so: "Conrad shows his understanding of the 
parameters within which he was writing by mirroring them in Marlow's 
relations with his audience" (Hampson 1990: 26). Plainly, the cultural 
location of any narrator exerts a pressure on the kind of narrative that 
can be told, and by inscribing these parallels into the structure of his 
story Conrad is both demonstrating his awareness of these pressures, and 
. interpolating an imaginative distance for himself from them. 
It is Hampson's critical innovation to read not only Conrad but also 
Marlow as an ethnographer, as a "cultural translator". He says, "Conrad 
is not 'pretending to record scenes', he is not presenting an account of 
Africa: he is presenting Marlow's experience of Africa and Marlow's 
attempt to understand and represent that experience" (1990:22, my 
emphasis). 
2.4 Cultural Translation 
The metaphor of the narrator as cultural translator seems to me a 
profound one. Yet before considering its implications for a postcolonial 
theory of narrative, we need to explore the concept of cultural 
translation in more detail, within the framework of ethnographic 
studies. The concept is by no means an unproblematic one. In an essay 
entitled "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern 
Nation", for example, Bhabha points out, "Cultural difference emerges 
from the borderline moment of translation that Benjamin describes as the 
'foreignness' of languages" . . .. The 'foreignness' of language is the 
nucleus of the untranslatable that goes beyond the transparency of 
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subject matter" (1990:314). If, as Bhabha implies, the attempt to 
translate in effect serves to emphasise differences, it would appear to 
be self-defeating. The question he does not here pursue is for whom 
differences are emphasised. 
Before addressing the question, I would like to clarify the problem by 
relating cuI tural to linguistic translation. In The Linguistic 
Construction of Reality, Grace distinguishes between two different views 
regarding the way in which languages represent reality. "The basic 
epistemological assumption of the mapping view might be stated as 
follows: there is a common world out there and our languages are 
analogous to maps of this world. Thus, the common world is represented 
or 'mapped' (with greater or less distortion) by all languages". Crucial 
to this view is what Grace terms the "intertranslatability postulate ... 
[that] all languages and all things that can be said in any of them must 
be commensurable because this universally-shared world is their common 
measure" (1987:6-7). Grace opposes to this view a second, the "reality-
construction view of language". Grace devotes his book to delineating 
this view and so it cannot easily be summarised; its most crucial 
aspect, for our purposes, is its opposition to the intertranslatability 
postulate. Since "a language is shaped by its culture, and a culture is 
given expression in its language, to such an extent that it is 
impossible to say where one ends and the other begins" it follows that, 
"what can be said, and what can be talked about, may be quite different 
from one language-culture system to another", and hence, "it is not the 
case that anything which can be said in one language can also be said in 
any other language" (1987:10-11). 
It might be apparent already that the "mapping view of language" is 
inadequate for the purposes of this study. Conversely, the "reality-
construction view of language" can contribute in important ways to an 
application of the model of cultural translation to literature. Although 
the Latin root of the term "translation" suggests a bearing- or 
carrying-over of meaning, Grace's distinction entails sacrificing the 
notion of spatial movement in favour of a concept of semantic or 
epistemological compatibility between two language-culture systems. The 
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need for this shift will be argued in greater depth later in this 
chapter in the identification, within the notion of cultural 
translation, of the interface. 
At present I would like to take up the question that Bhabha doesn't 
pursue, which is, for whom are differences emphasised? The question is 
an important one because its answer helps to position us as readers in 
relation to the narrator as cultural translator. In order to address 
this question, we need to consider the degree to which translation can 
be considered as narration. We might, in this regard, recall Rimmon-
Kenan's basic two-part definition: "the term narration suggests (1) a 
communication process in which the narrative as message is transmitted 
by addresser to addressee and (2) the verbal nature of the medium used 
to transmit the message" (1983:2). The model of narrative as utterance 
will receive fuller attention in Chapter 3. For the moment we might 
recall the refinements that Lanser offers and adduces from different 
critics (1981:62): that speech-act theory allows us to see the text not 
just as "message/object" but as a "specific kind of communicative and 
aesthetic act", that the Genettian concept of "voice" establishes the 
narrator's relation to story, time and level of narration (1981:37), and 
that, following Pratt, speech-act theory "answers the need for a 
contextually based approach to texts" (1981: 62). There are obvious 
complexities involved in transl?tion which are not necessarily present 
in narration which arise from its relations to two distinct language-
culture systems. One of these is its orientati~n or directedness; 
another is the problem of accountability (which applies also to novels 
of cross-cultural relation) . Since translation is clearly both 
communicative and verbal, however, and since it can thus be viewed as a 
speech act, it is probably safe to read it as a specific form of 
narration if we bear such complexities in mind. 
By reading it as a form of narration, we might then infer the following 
about cultural translation. In the first place, although translation is 
always intentional or directed, it will generally be for the translator 
that differences are emphasised. Asad distinguishes, in this regard, 
between processes of criticism and translation, pointing out that, "for 
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criticism to be responsible, it must always be addressed to someone who 
can contest it" (1986:156). Translation, plainly, is very seldom 
"addressed to someone who can contest it", and hence is not accountable 
to those "translated". This gives the translator tremendous power. Asad 
exemplifies this power in regard to "unconscious" or "implicit" 
meanings: "If the anthropological translator, like the analyst, has 
final authority in determining the subject's meanings - it is then the 
former who becomes the real author of the latter" (1986:162). In the 
second place, as we saw in Hampson's discussion of Mar low and his 
audience, translation always entails a negotiation with the "conventions 
of representation" of those for whom the translation is being made. The 
intersubjectivity that characterises translation is thus generally with 
the target readership or audience, not with those whose culture is being 
translated. These two features might be demonstrated by reference to 
Marlow, and specifically to what might be termed the psychological 
functions of his narrative. As I showed in Chapter 1, we cannot refer to 
the literal silence of the Africans, but their effective silence 
provides a ground upon which Marlow's self-defining narrative can 
figure. "In telling his story Marlow is attempting to recuperate his 
experience into the terms of his own culture: attempting to make it 
apprehensible both to his audience and to himself". His "figuration of 
Africa predominates because he is constrained by no medium with Africa. 
He is not accountable to the Africans for his representation of them" 
(Hooper 1990b). 
In the third place, Asad points out that "there are asymmetrical 
tendencies and pressures in the languages of dominated and dominant 
societies" (1986:164). Although 'good translators' are willing to break 
down and reshape their "own language" in the process of translation, the 
language itself might not be amenable to such a transformation. 
To put it crudely: because the languages of Third World 
societies - including, of course,. the societies that social 
anthropologists have traditionally studied - are "weaker" in 
rela~ion to western languages (and today, especially to 
Engllsh), they are more likely to submit to forcible 
transformation in the translation process than the other way 
around. The reason for this is, first that in their 
political-economic relations with Third 'world countries, 
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western nations have the greater ability to manipulate the 
latter. And, second, western languages produce and deploy 
desired knowledge, more readily than Third World languages 
do (1986:157-158). 
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Thus cultural translation frequently has conferred upon it not only the 
authority of the translator but also the authority of the target medium. 
Nhudi, which will be considered in Chapter 4, provides an interesting 
case in point, because in some ways it deviates from these patterns. 
Although Plaatje undertakes a "translation" of tribal culture into the 
medium of English for an imperial readership, his narrative 
accountability is still directed substantially towards the community of 
whom he writes, and this accountability exerts a pressure on both the 
novel form and the representation of the central protagonist. In 
. addition his "appropriation" of the imperial target medium (to use 
Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin's term, 1989:39) has received rather 
qualified critical approval. The authority of this medium, in other 
words, has been only partially available to him. 
Although it might be difficult for those who are "translated" to 
challenge or to resist the translation, it is clearly true that 
translation is culturally and temporally located. As Bhabha has it, 
"cultural difference emerges from the borderline moment of translation", 
and so subsequent, or alternative, readers may have greater distance 
both from the authority of the translator and from the authority of the 
target medium. As critics it is incumbent upon us to be aware of our 
positioning in relation to text, writer and Centre. It is incumbent upon 
us I in other words, to exploit this distance, and thus to escape, in 
Bowker's terms, the "textual imperatives" that might otherwise arise 
from our "contextuality". Our positioning as "reviewers" of the 
"cultural translation" of the narrator will receive further 
consideration in relation to the concept of "the cross-border reader" 
towards the end of this chapter. 
2.5 Recent Developments in Ethnography 
It is a recognition of problems such as these which has characterised 
the development of ethnography in recent years. Their impact has been 
effectively to transform conceptions of both ethnography's "object of 
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study", culture, and the ethnographic enterprise itself. Replacing the 
"famous definition" of culture that Asad cites from Tylor - "that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, 
custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society" (Asad 1986:141) - is a new view of culture as "always 
relational, an inscription of communicative processes that exist, 
historically, between subjects in relations of power" (Clifford 
1986:15). Such a subjectification of anthropology's "object" of study is 
associated with new ways of seeing anthropology and, indeed, science. 
Like literary studies, anthropology too has registered the impact of a 
shift in "conditions of knowledge" to a "postparadigm" present, as 
Marcus and Fischer point out. They follow Lyotard in witnessing 
[a] loosening of the hold over fragmented scholarly 
communities of either specific totalizing visions or a 
general paradigmatic style of organizing research. The 
authori ty of "grand theory" styles seems suspended for the 
moment in favor of a close consideration of such issues as 
contextuality, the meaning of social life to those who enact 
it, and the explanation of exceptions and indeterminants 
rather than regularities in phenomena observed ... (1986:8). 
If anthropology can no longer speak "with automatic authority, as it did 
in the past, for others defined as unable to speak for themselves 
('primitive,' 'pre-literate,' 'without history')", this is because 
science itself is now "construed as a social process", and "the 
authority of a scientific discipline will always be mediated by the 
claims of rhetoric and power" (Clifford 1986:10-11). 
The impact of such recognitions has registered in a range of ways. 
Characterising the ethnographic research process in the past was a 
search for the field site that approximated "pristine culture, 'where 
they still do it'" (Marcus & Fischer 1986: 35). This "disappearing 
object" is now read by Clifford at least as "a rhetorical construct 
legi timating a representational practice: 'sal vage" ethnography in its 
widest sense" (1986:112-113). Governed, nevertheless, by the continuing 
quest of ethnography to elicit the "native point of view" and to 
elucidate "how different cultural constructions of reality affect social 
action", "problems of description" have thus been turned into "problems 
of representation" (Marcus & Fischer 1986:25,6). And so "the research 
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process itself, for fields such as cultural anthropology and 
history, is, significantly, a matter of representing in narrative form 
social and cultural realities" (1986:15). 
Before pursuing the implications of these developments within 
ethnography (the emphasis on narrative and the subjectification of the 
object of study), I would like to consider their relations with similar 
trends in the broader sphere of the humanities and the social sciences. 
The increasing predominance of narrative in these fields can be inferred 
from the titles of Kreiswirth's "Trusting the Tale: The Narrativist Turn 
in the Human Sciences" (1992), Nash's Narrative in culture: The Uses of 
storytelling in the Sciences I Philosophy and Literature (1990), and 
Polkinghorne's Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences (1988), as well 
as three contributions in Shotter and Gergen's Texts of Identity (1989): 
"Narrative Culture and the Motivation of the Terrorist", "Narrative 
Embodiments: Enclaves of the Self in the Realm of Medicine", and "The 
Construction of Identity in the Narratives of Romance and Comedy". 
Kreiswirth's opening comment might be taken as representative: "As 
anyone aware of the current intellectual scene has probably noticed, 
there has recently been a virtual explosion of interest in narrative and 
in theorizing about narrative; and it has been detonated from a 
remarkable diversity of sites, both within and without the walls of 
academia" (1992:629). Toolan offers an ingenuous preface to his 
Narrative: A critical Linguistic Introduction: 
What is it about narrative that makes it such a pervasive 
and fascinating phenomenon? And how can one begin to answer 
such a question without entering into a narrative of one's 
own? The fact is, as my opening sentence announces, 
narrative are everywhere. Or are potentially so. Everything 
we do, from making breakfast to making the bed to making 
love (and notice how those - in any order - make a multi-
episode narrative) can be seen, cast, and recounted as a 
narrative - a narrative with a beginning, middle and end, 
characters, setting, drama (difficulties or conflicts 
resolved), suspense, enigma, 'human interest', and a moral. 
(The moral of the story of my making breakfast this morning 
could be summarized as "Don't clean the toaster while 
cooking porridge.") (1988:xiv). 
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In "Slaughtering the Subject: Literature's Assault on Narrative", Nash 
positions himself quite clearly within the "fraternity" of "Derridean 
deconstructionism" and identifies the dismantling, the decentring, the 
indeterminacy of the subject that is associated with it. Nevertheless, 
he notes with considerable wryness, 
One of the greatest disappointments in late twentieth-
century sceptical literary theory and the fiction it has 
produced, for those of us who were so excited about it, has 
occurred not in writing's failure to represent "the outside 
world", but in its failure, no matter how hard it has tried, 
not to represent it. Writing's utter inability to stay out 
of the world, out of readers' thoughts about the world; 
writing's inability to avoid implicating itself, its reader, 
and its writer, by its very utterance, in the world - to 
avoid getting its hands dirty (1990:212). 
He points out that "radical indeterminism in literature 
postmodernist, poststructuralist forms of indeterminism" is no longer 
"radical" but "by all standards , middle-aged ... it's not quite so 
nimble as it once appeared, it's developing the suggestion of a 
metaphysical paunch, and it shows signs of a mid-life crisis; it does 
break out in unexpected hot flushes, hoarse hysteria, myopia, and the 
general display of nervous defence mechanisms and tics of an idea no 
longer quite sure of its own sex-appeal" (1990:213-214). Underlying the 
humour is an important point: that even radical indeterminism cannot 
"stand outside history", and that its "incapacity to lay responsibility 
at society's door without finding a rationale for denying its own 
responsibility" is in the end simply debilitating. His conclusion (the 
'implication' of writing by its "utterance" in the world) is important 
for my purposes in preparing the ground for the recuperation or 
recentring of the character as subject that will be essayed in Chapter 
3; it is important here for its relevance to ethnography's 
reconstitution of itself. He says: 
wi thin the frame of reference drawn when indeterminism is 
cla~m7d to provide a tool of c~itique, it's literally 
legl~lmate for, me ~o say that , wlth any forthright and 
con~lstent , obb teraho,n of the ldea of the experiencing, 
actlng subJect - of dlscrete persons as agents of discrete 
events and intentions - or with any description of the 
subject as simply a manifestation of impersonal collective 
forces, we can't hope either to account intelligibly for 
change, explain to ourselves how we feel ourselves to be in 
CHAPTER 2: CULTURE AND NARRATIVE 
disagreement with someone else, or hold anyone responsible 
for his or her acts. Not only do social interaction and 
poli tical action become incomprehensible; so - if watched 
closely does the notion of indeterminacy itself 
(1990:216). 
6S 
within the field of ethnography, the shift from description to 
representation is clearly related to the subjectification of its 
"object" of study, and to the concomitant recognition that cultural 
translation necessarily involves textualising the human subject. Having 
lost the "automatic authority" with which it spoke in the past "for 
others defined as unable to speak for themselves", ethnography has also 
become aware of the partiality, the intentionality and, in Clifford's 
term, the fictionality of its accounts of such people: "Ethnographic 
writings can properly be called fictions in the sense of 'something made 
or fashioned,' the principal burden of the word's Latin root, fingere. 
But it is important to preserve the meaning not merely of making, but 
also of making up, of inventing things not actually real" (1986:6). Asad 
makes a similar point in his claim that "the historian is given a text 
and the ethnographer has to construct one" (1986:144). Clifford 
observes: "It would be interesting to analyze systematically how, out of 
the heteroglot encounters of fieldwork, ethnographers construct texts 
whose prevailing language comes to override, represent, or translate 
other languages" (1988:112n). The process of "overriding, representing 
and translating" is not limited to cultural translation, as I will go on 
to show, but characterises all narration. Cultural translation is, 
nevertheless, particularly marked by the need for a "sophisticated 
epistemology that takes full account of intractable contradictions, 
paradox, irony, and uncertainty in the explanation of human activities" 
(Marcus & Fischer 1986:14-15). 
The textualisation of the human subject in ethnography is a dual 
process: on the one hand, cultural translation issues in texts, and on 
the other it reads culture as text. In regard to the first aspect, we 
will recognise that the production of texts makes them available not 
only to the observer, but also, ultimately, to the observed: in Marcus 
and Fischer's term, "the actors in relation to one another" (1986:26). 
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One outcome is the disappearance of the culturally "pristine": the 
textualisation of their culture has engendered "an ethnography in 
reverse among many peoples who not only can assimilate the professional 
idioms of anthropology, but can relativize them among other alternatives 
and ways of knowledge" (1986: 37). A similar effect is apparent in the 
field of literature, which will be examined in relation to Nkosi' s 
notion of the "cross-border reader" later in this chapter. 
It is a concatenation of both aspects of the process that has led to the 
development of reflexivity, of "the present dominant interest in 
interpretive anthropology about how interpretations are constructed by 
the anthropologist, who works in turn from the interpretations of his 
informants" (Marcus & Fischer 1986: 26). Referring to Geertz and to 
Clifford, Rabinow has commented thus on the trend: 
. .. anthropologists, or some of them in any case, are now 
discovering and being moved to new creation by the infusion 
of ideas from deconstructionist literary criticism ... . 
Although there are many carriers of this hybridization .. . 
there is only one "professional", so to speak, in the crowd. 
For whereas all the others mentioned are practicing 
anthropologists, James Clifford has created and occupied the 
role of ex officio scribe of our scribblings. 'Geertz, the 
founding figure, may pause between monographs to muse on 
texts, narrative, description, and interpretation. Clifford 
takes as his natives, as well as his informants, those 
anthropologist~ past and present whose work, self-
consciously or not, has been the production of texts, the 
writing of ethnography. We are being observed and inscribed 
(1986:242). 
Rabinow goes on to accuse Clifford of parasitism, of "feeding off 
others' texts", of pursuing "textualist meta-anthropology", of sounding 
a "voice from the campus library", of being an "ethnographer of 
ethnographers" (1986:243). He concludes: "The metareflections on the 
crisis of representation in ethnographic writing indicate a shift away 
from concentrating on relations with other cultures to a (nonthematized) 
concern with traditions of representation, and metatraditions of 
metarepresentations, in our culture" (1986:251). 
Pertinent as Rabinow's critique might be , there is some irony in his 
pique at being treated as an anthropological "object of study", as well 
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as in his insistence on the distinction of being a "practicing 
anthropologist". Nor is the charge he goes on to level at Clifford, of 
failing to "use self-referentiality as anything more than a device for 
establishing authority" (l986:244), entirely just, because the 
consequences of the reflexi vi ty upon which Clifford insists are far-
reaching. Bhabha, in the article referred to earlier, cites Levi-
strauss's description of the ethnographic act, which 
demands that the observer himself is a part of his 
observation and this requires that the field of knowledge -
the total social fact - must be appropriated from the 
outside like a thing, but like a thing which comprises 
within itself the subjective understanding of the 
indigenous. The transposition of this process into the 
language of the outsider's grasp - this entry into the area 
of the symbolic of representation/signification - then makes 
the social fact "three dimensional". For ethnography demands 
that the subject has to split itself into object and subject 
in the process of identifying its field of knowledge; the 
ethnographic object is constituted "by dint of the subject's 
capacity for indefinite self-objectification (without ever 
quite abolishing itself as subject) for projecting outside 
itself ever-diminishing fragments of itself" (1990:301). 
Significant implications for the critic as well as for the narrator as 
cultural translator, to which I will return, include the importance of 
self-posi tioning and accountability. Clifford's formulation is rather 
simpler, though it coheres with Bhabha' s: "It has become clear that 
every version of an 'other,' wherever found, is also the construction of 
a 'self,' and the making of ethnographic texts ... has always involved a 
process of 'self-fashioning'" (1986:23-24). 
Neither is Clifford alone in privileging dialogue as a mode of response 
to the "implicatedness" of the ethnographer. In a consideration of 
"post-modern ethnography", Tyler goes a great deal further than Rabinow 
in rejecting representation, in favour of what he terms "evocation", 
which is "neither presentation nor representation ... [as] the discourse 
of the post-modern world" (1986:123). He goes on, "because post-modern 
ethnography privileges 'discourse' over ' text', it foregrounds dialogue 
as opposed to monologue, and emphasizes the cooperative and 
collaborative nature of the ethnographic situation in contrast to the 
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ideology of the transcendental observer" (1986: 126). The ethnographic 
text, he concludes, 
will thus achieve its purposes not by revealing them, but by 
making purposes possible. It will be a text of the physical, 
the spoken, and the performed, an evocation of 'quotidian 
experience, a palpable reality that uses everyday speech to 
suggest what is ineffable, not through abstraction, but by 
means of the concrete. I t wi 11 be a text to read not with 
the eyes alone, but with the ears in order to hear "the 
voices of the pages" (st. Bernard) (1986:136). 
Tyler's final emphasis on "voices" is characteristic of the movement 
away from description towards a "metaphor of dialogue, which more 
literally suggests the actual situation of anthropological 
interpretation in fieldwork" (Marcus & Fischer 1986: 29). It is also 
associated with a rejection of what Clifford terms "visualism". As he 
points out, "once cultures are no longer prefigured visually - as 
object, theaters, texts - it becomes possible to think of a cultural 
poetics that is an interplay of voices, of positioned utterances" 
(1986:12). The metaphor of dialogue is particularly useful in allowing 
that cultural interpretations are located "in many sorts of reciprocal 
contexts", and writers are therefore obliged "to find diverse ways of 
rendering negotiated realities as mu l tisubjective, power-laden, and 
incongruent" (1986:15). Clifford emphasises the polyphonic nature of 
such renderings: "As Bakhtin has shown, dialogical processes 
proliferate in any complexly represented discursive space (that of 
ethnography, or, in his case, a realist novel) . Many voices clamor for 
expression" (1986:15). Elsewhere he points out, "as written versions 
based on fieldwork, these accounts are clearly no longer the story, but 
a story among stories" (1986:109). 
Tyler's and clifford's emphasis upon "voice" takes us back to Hampson's 
"modern dialogic or reflexive anthropology" with which our discussion of 
ethnography began. It might also remind us of the first ethnographic 
study cited in this thesis: Basso's investigation of "acts of silence" 
and "silence behaviour" in Western Apache culture. If we imagine the 
principles which Basso had to follow in order to discover the 
"reciprocal contexts" and the "negotiated realities" which gave rise to 
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silence we might have some sense of the "situation of anthropological 
interpretation in fieldwork". Suspending our judgement of the power 
relations of the scientific collection of data, for the moment, we might 
see that what Basso brought back was the 'story of silence', and that he 
did so because, predominant among the many voices clamouring for 
expression, was the 'voice of silence'. 
2.6 Applications: Ethnography and Narrative 
In beginning a consideration of the applicability of ethnography for a 
study of narrative, it seems worth recalling, briefly and for purposes 
of contrast, Bowker's "adversarial" conception of culture. In Clifford's 
view, '" culture' is always relational, an inscription of communicative 
processes that exist, historically, between subjects in relations of 
power" (1986:15); it is also necessarily "contested, temporal, and 
emergent" (1986:19). Since "the ethnographic experience involves a state 
of being in culture while looking at culture" (1988:93), it is 
inherently ontological as well as epistemological. And since, as Marcus 
~nd Fischer claim, "the research process itself, ... for fields such as 
cultural anthropology and history, is significantly a matter of 
representing in narrative form social and cultural realities" (1986:15), 
the recognitions ethnography has come to about its own textuality have 
substantially been recognitions of the reactivity of narration. 
Anticipating the discussion of Chapter 3 and the poststructuralist claim 
that the subject is constituted in and through language, we will see 
that Grace's formulation is informed by a similar insight, "a language 
is shaped by its culture, and a culture is given expression in its 
language, to such an extent that i t is impossible to say where one ends 
and the other begins" (1986:10). 
Given the problematic nature of the model of cultural translation, there 
remain several reasons why it can contribute substantially to a 
postcolonial theorisation of the novel. The first is the point of 
contact between cultural and literary studies indicated above: in 
important ways translation is narration. And the disappearance of the 
culturally "pristine" and the concomitant recognition of the reactivity 
of cultural translation has had a parallel in the domain of literature. 
. I 
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We might in this connection recognise Nkosi's challenge to the 
privileged texts of the dominant culture, or Achebe's critique of Heart 
of Darkness, as instances of the development of new readerships amongst 
people who have in the past been "translated". 
The second is the observation already cited from Ashcroft, Griffiths and 
Tiffin that "cross-culturality" is beginning to be recognised by 
literary theorists and cultural historians "as the potential termination 
point of an apparently endless human history of conquest and 
annihilation justified by the myth of group 'purity', and as the basis 
on which the post-colonial world can be stabilized" (1989:36). Since the 
concept of cultural translation developed specifically in order to 
address the issue of cross-culturali ty , in the full sense of culture 
which Clifford supplies, and since, as I have shown above, translation 
is a form of narration, the concept can fruitfully be used to address 
cross-culturality in literature. 
A third reason for retaining the model is that the relevant 
qualifications arising from recent ethnographic rereadings can sensitise 
us to the existence and nature of narrative authority, and more broadly 
to the relations between language, knowledge and power. This is directly 
related to the matter of silence. Clifford's invocation of Bakhtinian 
polyphony, his insistence that the ethnographic account is only "a story 
among stories", one voice amongst the many clamouring for expression, is 
linked, in his view, to the renunciation of visualism. within the sphere 
of literature I have referred already to the iconic mode in which 
Plomer's black woman is represented in Turbott Wolfe. In Chapter 4 a 
contrast will be drawn between the silent black woman in Heart of 
Darkness, and the strongly-voiced Hhudi. More pointedly, to 
conceptualise stories in vocal terms entails a critical mode of approach 
that is aural rather than visual, and thus one that will encourage us to 
hear and to listen to their silences. 
In Chapter 1 I considered the significance of medium in the postcolonial 
paradigm: a fourth reason for the retention of the model of cultural 
translation is the topicality of translation per se. A call has been 
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made recently by Daniel Kunene for a "massive translation project" of 
Southern African texts, in order to expand their audience and so give 
access to them to readers who would otherwise not have it. This is 
clearly a laudable endeavour. Especially given the interrelatedness of 
language and culture on which Grace insists, however, the problems to 
which it might give rise are substantially greater than those involved 
in getting "literature specialists" and "comparative linguists of 
Southern African languages" to "link hands", as Kunene has suggested 
they should (1989:16). 
2.7 Boundaries, ' Interfaces and the Cross-Border Reader 
The fifth and most important reason for retaining the model of cultural 
translation is its relevance to the concept of the boundary, the border, 
the margin, and specifically its positioning of readers and critics. It 
was Bowker's failure fully to explore the value of this concept that led 
us to a consideration of Hampson's application of ethnography to Conrad. 
In the domestic and the ideological life of white South Africans, of 
course, the concept of "the border" has had a particularly pervasive 
(and invasive) power. In broader theoretical spheres the concept has 
attained some predominance : Spivak begins her "Theory in the Margin: 
Coetzee 's Foe Reading Defoe's Crusoe/Roxana" with a reference to the 
title of the President's Forum at the Modern Language Association annual 
conference, "Breaking Up/Out/Down: The Boundaries of Literary Study"; 
and the special theme of the 1988 International Language and Literature 
Association Conference in Munich was "Borders/Boundaries in Literature". 
Bhabha's essay has been referred to already: its title is 
"DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation" 
(1990). In his phrase, "the borderline moment of translation" 
(1990:314), we have seen an attempt to confront the problem of cultural 
differences in temporal terms. It seems important now to focus on the 
spatial aspect of the metaphor. 
In my discussion, earlier, of Grace's "linguistic construction of 
reality", I argued the need to sacrifice the sense of translation as a 
bearing- or carrying-over of meaning, in favour of a concept of semantic 
compatibility between two intact language-culture systems. To read 
CHAPTER 2: CULTURE AND NARRATIVE 72 
translation - and narrative - as existing or taking place at a margin or 
boundary is, critically, to renounce the trope of penetration, and so to 
conceptualise cultural contact as something other than venturing in to 
other people's world and venturing out again, and, in Conrad's ironic 
terms, 'carrying off the loot' of our discoveries (in Kimbrough 
1988:192). In theoretical terms, to recognise the boundary is to accord 
epistemological autonomy to the two cultures between which translation 
takes place. It is in such a sense that I have elected to use the term 
"interface" in this study, defined by the Concise Oxford as 
1. Surface forming common boundary between two regions. 2. 
Place, or piece of equipment, where interaction occurs 
between two systems, processes, etc. 
Located, Janus-faced, at the interface of two cultures, the translator 
carries out an action which might be specified, prepositionally, as 
"translation of X by Y for ZII. As Asad reminds us, translation is unlike 
critique in not generally being "addressed to someone who can contest 
it" (1986:156}. "The onus then falls on us, as "subsequent or alternative 
readers II , to exercise our critical distance from the authority of the 
translator and of the target medium in order to "review" the 
"translation". Although we may not have access to the meaning systems of 
both cultures (X,Z), recognising the interface allows us at least to see 
these respective meaning systems as extant and intact. 
various implications arise from such a theoretical recognition. As I 
have suggested, to see translation as taking place at the interface is 
to see it not as a carrying-over of meaning, but as the engendering of 
compatibility between two meaning systems. On the other hand, part of 
the force of the notion of "conventions of representation II is its 
insistence that meaning is not an inherent property but is always 
"meaning for" someone (the translator, or the reader or hearer of the 
representation). Thus the orientation or direction of the translation 
becomes important. To the extent that translation is always directed, it 
always entails a negotiation with the "conventions of representation II of 
those for whom the translation is being made, and which thus 
circumscribe the 'telling of the tale'. such direction is also important 
in relation to the issue of narrative accountability, as we will see 
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particularly in the case of Nhudi in Chapter 4, but also in the case of 
Too Late the Phalarope in Chapter 5. Yet the state of "being in culture 
while looking at culture" is not the sole property of the translator. 
While the reflexive awareness which characterises the ethnographic 
experience might more commonly be associated with the narrator, it can 
also characterise the reader. As I will go on to show, this condition is 
probably most apparent when the "current" readership of a text differs 
markedly from that to which it was first directed. 
For the model of cultural translation to be applied to an analysis of 
narration, therefore, the cultural location and cultural consciousness 
of all four parties to the situation of narrative utterance are plainly 
crucial. In a society as culturally diverse as that of Southern Africa, 
what might be termed the "ethnographic addresses" of any given set of 
writer, narrator, character, and reader may vary tremendously, and so 
give rise to a highly complex set of cultural interfaces within a 
reading of anyone novel. Particularly if narration, like culture, takes 
place between "subjects in relations of power", then the goal for the 
critic is to be aware of the polyphony of the text, of the narrative as 
"a story among stories", of the multiple voices 'clamouring for 
expression' . 
It is perhaps because literature has had less trouble coming to terms 
with its own textuality than ethnography that a goal like this does not 
seem to be a radically new one. Literature has been less successful, 
however, in coming to terms with the ontological status of the character 
as human subject. Since it is particularly the power relations amongst 
narrators and characters that will receive attention in my next chapter, 
it seems important now to consider some of the ways in which narrative 
contends with a boundary of its own: that between textuality and 
worldliness (to borrow the terms Bowker borrows from Said). To do so we 
will need to return to the domain of literary studies. 
Part of my rationale for including Head's novel Haru in this study is 
her positioning as an exile, and the influence this exerts on her 
textualisation of the character Margaret, and on the narrative and 
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cultural relations in which Margaret is located. In a fascinating study 
of Exile and the Narrative Imagination, Seidel has used the idea of 
exile "as an enabling fiction, or at least a fiction enabling me to 
address the larger strategies of narrative representation" (1986 : xii ) . 
Exile by definition involves boundaries: between where one is, and where 
one used to be or wants to be. In Seidel's words, "an exile is someone 
who inhabits one place and remembers or projects the reality of another" 
(1986:ix). Seidel draws on Kierkegaard's parable of the imagination as a 
mental borderland, "controlled by the generative notion that the line 
marking the end of the familiar is the same as that marking the 
beginning of the unknown. The line that limits is also the line that 
dares .... The imagined outland is a version of the inland; the possible 
a version of the previous" (quoted in seidel 1986:3).2 In Kierkegaard's 
concatenation of "familiar" and "unknown", the "outland" and the 
"inland", the "possible" and the "previous", we can identify distinct 
worlds; and in the "line" that 'marks', that "limits" and "dares", the 
interface at which narrative is located. It is important to recognise, 
however, that the text-world interface is never fixed. In a 
consideration of "Intertextuality and Ontology" Frow offers an 
interestingly similar conception of what he terms, following Derrida, 
the "general text": 
2 The full text reads as follows: 
If I imagined two kingdoms adjoining one another, with one 
of which I was fairly well acquainted, and altogether 
unfamiliar with the other, and I was not allowed to enter 
the unknown realm, however much I desired to do so, I should 
still be able to form some conception of its nature. I could 
go to the limits of the kingdom with which I was acquainted 
and follow its boundaries, and as I did so, I should in this 
way de~cribe the boundaries of this unknown country, and 
thus wlthout ever having set foot in it, obtain a general 
conception of it. And if this was a task that engrossed my 
energies, and if I was indefatigable in my desire to be 
accurate, it would doubtless sometimes happen that, as I 
stood sadly at my country's boundary and looked longingly 
into the unknown country, which was so near me and yet so 
far away, some little revelation might be vouchsafed to me 
(quoted in Seidel 1986:3). 
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In this sense the general text is both the structure of 
textuality itself ... and that edge or margin of textuality 
... which problematises its self-containedness, opens it out 
constantly to an 'outside ' which is never properly external 
to it .... [it is] not a limitless text but a principle of 
textuality that subverts the edges between inside and 
outside, symbolic and real, signification and reference .... 
The double movement of this text invol ves a simultaneous 
textualisation of the real and recognition of the limits of 
textuality; and it is the incompatibility or undecidability 
between these two moments that is governed by the 
problematic of the edge, the margin, the limit (1990:48-50). 
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Frow's problems with the notions of the general text and of 
intertextuali ty lead him finally to accept the "hard resistance to 
discourse of an ontologically distinct domain of factuality" (1990:54). 
It should be apparent already why I cannot in this study contemplate a 
similar acceptance. It is particularly in regard to readership that the 
concept of the text-world boundary, and the motility of this boundary, 
is theoretically indispensable. 
I claimed above that the reflexive awareness which characterises the 
ethnographic experience is not the sole preserve of the translator, or 
narrator; further, that it is probably when the "current" readership of 
a text differs markedly from that to which it was first directed that 
such awareness is most crucial. It seems to me that Achebe's rereading 
of Heart of Darkness, "An Image of Africa", is a case in point, and that 
the debate that followed from it can usefully be reviewed (and perhaps 
adjudicated) in these terms. In a recent article on South African 
literature, Nkosi has offered a mode of conceptual ising differences in 
readership. He says: 
South Africa is a country of borders, both internally and 
separated from the outside by international borders, a 
network of geopolitical lines carving up geopolitical 
spaces. My own interest begins at the point where the South 
African subject of discourse attempts to interpellate the 
reader across these borders, from the confines of his or her 
own community, with its own specific values and cultural 
interests, in order to define his or her own unique 
identi ty . This "cross-border" reader seems to me to be of 
great importance as one of the constitutive principles in 
the shaping of South African literature (1990:12). 
Of course Nkosi's concerns are fairly specific. It is possible to argue, 
he goes on to say, that "the character and identity of South African 
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literature is determined somewhere else, by people outside the community 
in whose name the writer claims to be speaking". Thus Nkosi's 
formulation of the "cross-border reader" insists on the possibility that 
the translator may be translating his or her "own" culture for an 
"alien" culture, rather than vice versa. In the broader terms of the 
postcolonial paradigm, local writers who "write back" to the Centre 
might be seen as doing just this (in this study Plaatje is a case in 
point). Unlike Nkosi's "South African subject of discourse", Conrad was 
not directing his writing to "cross-border readers", and so Achebe's 
reaction - and the counterreactions by Western critics - can be read as 
a collision between different conventions of representation, as a 
failure of compatibility between different meaning systems. 
As the title of Achebe's critique ("An Image of Africa") shows, it is 
Conrad's representation of Africa and particularly of Africans that 
gives him most trouble. In a description which is for me a seminal 
statement of postcolonial consciousness, Achebe asserts: "Heart of 
Darkness projects the image of Africa as 'the other world', the 
anti thesis of Europe and therefore of civilization ... " ( 1978: 3 ). He 
goes on, "the most interesting and revealing passages in Heart of 
Darkness are, however, about people" ( 1978: 4). What bothers Achebe is 
the "limbs and rolling eyes", the "savages clapping their hands and 
stamping their feet ... in their place", "Africa as setting and backdrop 
which eliminates the African as human factor", the "dehumanization of 
Africa and Africans" (1978:5-9). Perhaps Achebe's most telling point is 
his observation that "these people must have had other occupations 
besides merging into the evil forest or materializing out of it simply 
to plague Marlow and his dispirited band" (1978: 12). It is a similar 
sense of 'the way things really were' that informs Head's wry remark: 
"Africa was never 'the dark continent' to African people" (1981:xiv). 
In Achebe' s critique of Heart of Darkness we find a particularly good 
example of challenge to "the privileged texts of the dominant culture". 
As a "cross-border reader" it is his cultural location and consciousness 
that supplies the critical distance which leads him to resist the 
conventions of representation largely shared by Conrad, Marlow and the 
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western critics who have leapt to the defence of Heart of Darkness. It 
is what Achebe 'knows of' Africa that is opposed to what Conrad 'does 
with' Africa. More specifically, at least part of Achebe's challenge is 
directed at the "control of discourse" which manifests itself in 
Conrad's text as the "withholding of [human expression]" from the 
African woman in particular and the Africans in general. Recalling Asad 
we might recognise a failure adequately to translate the speech that is 
heard, or, more seriously, a "translation" of speech into silence. In 
Marlow's comment about himself, "I have a voice too, and for good or 
evil mine is the speech which cannot be sileQced" (1973:52), we see the 
stark opposition that exists, in this regard, between the narrator and 
the Africans he depicts. 
The complexities, in this instance, of the interplay between narration, 
cultural translation and review might perhaps be clarified if we 
structure it in terms of the "subordination relations" or "narrative 
levels" (1983:94) which Rimmon-Kenan derives from Genette. If, in our 
reading of criticism of Conrad, we are positioned at the "extradiegetic" 
level, then Achebe's critique (and others') might be seen as the 
diegesis we are reading. Conrad is located at the hypodiegetic level 
which Achebe reads, and Marlow, whom Conrad writes, at the hypo-
hypodiegetic level, with "Africa", then, at the centre. We might 





Conrad Marlow Africa 
This might seem both crude and clumsy: it is useful if we recognise that 
the interface between each of these levels is a cultural as well as a 
narrative interface. It is also useful if we recognise that the 'frame 
interfaces' (if I might introduce the term) between, say, us and Marlow, 
or Achebe and Africa are similarly distinguished. 
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It has been the endeavour of this chapter to "discover" the cultural and 
textual interfaces at which narration as cultural translation is 
located. If, as I claimed earlier, a recognition of the cultural 
interface supplies a theoretical mandate to accord epistemological 
autonomy to the two cultures between which translation takes place, it 
is a recognition of the motility of the textual interface that puts the 
onus on us, as "subsequent or alternative readers" to "review" the 
"translation". In regard to the cultural translation that takes place in 
Heart of Darkness, we can choose not to condone Marlow's use of African 
silence as "a tabula rasa onto which he may project the interpretations 
and figurations of his own narration" (Hooper 1990b:113). We can choose 
deliberately to reverse the figure-ground resolution, muting the power 
of Mar low' s narrative in order to hear the silence of the Africans he 
encounters. We may choose to read this silence, in Basso's terms, as an 
act of volition, with a symbolism of its own. 
It is with the issue of silence, therefore, that I would like to 
conclude. Having drawn, in this chapter, on the insights of ethnography 
to explore the model of narrator as cultural translator, the quest 
remains to find or develop a critical conceptualisation of its textual 
complement, character. I pointed out above that literature has had 
limited success in coming to terms with the ontological status of the 
character as human subj ect. Al though it is not the intention of this 
analysis to be normative or prescriptive, my exploration of the realm of 
ethnography has also been undertaken in order to develop a framework 
that will give recognition to this status. The developments that have 
taken place in ethnography - its recognition of the reactivity of 
narration and, related to this, the subjectification of its object of 
study - seem to me to offer particularly important guidelines for a mode 
of approach to the narrative textualisation of the human subject in 
cultural terms. For the purposes of this study, it is a crucial 
characteristic of silence that it exists both as a cultural and as a 
narrative phenomenon. If in the volition that can motivate silence we 
recognise resistance both to ethnographic authority and to narrative 
power, in silence itself we can recognise a measure of the ontological 
status of the character as human subject. It will be the specific 
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concern of Chapter 3 to examine this dynamic in terms of the narrative 
and cultural interfaces now identified. 
Chapter 3 80 
CHARACTER AND TEXTUALITY 
The endeavour of the previous chapter was to identify and examine the 
cultural and textual interfaces at which narrative is located, and to 
explore some of the implications arising from the model of narrative as 
cultural translation. It is my intention in this chapter to investigate 
the relations between character and narrative, and so to develop a 
theoretical conceptualisation of character as the textual complement of 
the narrator. 
3.1 Character and Subject 
I have alluded already to the need for a recentring or recuperation of 
the subj ect irr a postcolonial theory that attempts to address cross-
culturality in narrative. This need has reflected itself theoretically 
in several ways thus far. In Lyons's delineation of speech-act theory, 
we encountered an insistence on the "subjectivity of utterance", and, 
despite the view of the self as the "product of the social and 
interpersonal roles that [one] has played in the past", a further 
insistence that the term "self-expression" be taken literally 
(1981:241). Recent developments in ethnographic theory have included a 
recognition of the reflexivity of fieldwork accounts, and the 
subjectification of the object of study. In Clifford's definition, 
culture is "always relational, an inscription of communicative processes 
that exist, historically, between subjects in relations of power" 
(Clifford 1986:15). This view is coherent with Grace's conception of the 
interrelations of language and culture. His "linguistic construction of 
reality" has, of course, substantial roots in the social constructionism 
first delineated by Berger and Luckmann in the 1960s and which continues 
to register itself in a range of fields. Since the human being as agent 
capable of 'constructing' is intrinsic to both linguistic and social 
constructionism, these theories have important implications for the 
notion of the subject as constituted in and through language, and will 
be considered in greater depth later in this chapter. Nash's 
capitulation to the importance of the subject was a pragmatic one: 
without it, he said, "we can't hope either to account intelligibly for 
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change, explain to ourselves how we feel ourselves to be in disagreement 
with someone else, or hold anyone responsible for his or her acts" 
(1990:216). Of course the importance of individual responsibility is not 
exclusive to postcolonial societies, but in my view it is particularly 
acute in our context at present. 
The recentring or recuperation of the subject that is required by 
applications of the ethnographic model to narrative is thus mandated by 
a broader theoretical context in which the human subject has remained 
significant. The particular development we need to essay now is an 
investigation of the relations between such recentring of the subject 
and a theorisation of character in postcolonial terms. Following 
ethnographic trends we might see this as a deliberate 'subjectification' 
of our object of study, which is character. 
As I pointed out at the end of Chapter 2, a revisionist reading of 
silence is intrinsic to such 'subjectification'. Positioned as cross-
border readers by the motility of the text-world boundary, we have an 
onus placed on us to review the 'translation' that is narration. 
Recognising silence as both a cultural and a narrati ve phenomenon, we 
are enabled to read the volition that motivates silence as resistance 
both to ethnographic authority and to narrative power. Read so, silence 
supplies two directions for our discussion: to the ontological status of 
the character as human subject; alternatively, to the textualisation of 
the human subject in cultural and narrative terms. 
My exploration of recent trends in cultural anthropology was motivated 
by a recognition of culture as an insistent pressure of context which 
must be addressed in a postcolonial theorisation of the novel. The view 
of culture towards which the argument of Chapter 2 led us was that it 
exists "between subjects in relations of power". In our approach to the 
textualisation of the subject, now, we need to consider some of the ways 
in which it reflects the other pressure of context identified in the 
earlier chapter, language. In doing so I would like to broaden our 
perspective on culture and continue our response to the call made 
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recently by the sociologist Giddens for the promotion of "a convergence 
of social and literary theory" (1987:173). 
3.2 Subjectivity and Language 
We should perhaps be aware that Giddens's own work stands in sUbstantial 
relationship to Grace's conception of the interrelatedness of language 
and culture, though it offers developments and refinements which are 
significant for the 'identity' of characters and for the conventions of 
representation which influence our reading of them. Giddens's essay, 
"Action, Subjectivity and the constitution of Meaning", is included in a 
collection entitled The Aims of Representation: Subject/Text/History. 
Beginning with the decentring of the subject which has taken place in 
contemporary theory, Giddens notes a dichotomy between what he terms 
"subj ecti vist" and "obj ecti vist" approaches. "One of the problems with 
subjectivist approaches", he points out, is that "subjectivity is taken 
as a given ... not a phenomenon to be explicated but ... the basis of 
what it is to be a human agent" (1987: 163-164) . "Objectivist 
approaches", on the other hand, give priority to the social object, that 
is society, over the individual agent, and regard social institutions as 
the core component of interest to social analysis. Doing so they have 
"typically not been very adept at demonstrating the qualities which ... 
have to be attributed to human agents: that is to say, self-
understanding, intentionality, acting for reasons" (1987:160). In 
Giddens's view, structuralist perspectives in the social sciences and 
literary criticism fall into the category of objectivist approaches; and 
it is in regard to language that their impact on the subject has 
registered most strongly: "the decentring of the subject in 
structuralism and post-structuralism leads to the insertion of the 
subject in language, conceived of in a particular way - signs 
constituted through difference . . .. structuralism and post-structuralism 
promote a 'retreat into the code'" (1987:164). Acknowledging that the 
terms of human subj ecti vi ty are in fact linguistic terms "like any 
other, which therefore [have] to be understood in relation to the 
remainder of the terminology built into the language" , Giddens 
nevertheless insists that, "Terms like 'I' and 'me' ... gain their 
significance from the context of activities in which human agents are 
CHAPTER 3: CHARACTER AND TEXTUALITY 83 
implicated. They are part of the practical mastery of social relations, 
and of the continuity of social context which human agents display" 
(1987:164). 
Although we can accept with poststructuralism the insertion of the 
subject in language, in Giddens's view our conception of language itself 
needs closer and more sophisticated scrutiny. Giddens does not concede 
the structuralist proposition that society is like a language; rather he 
stipulates that "language is such an important feature of social 
activity that it expresses some of its most generic qualities" 
(1987:163). It is in this context that the "structuration theory" he has 
developed has its importance. The seeming opposition of objectivist and 
subjectivist perspectives in fact disguises complementarity: "this 
dualism should actually be represented as a duality, a duality that I 
call 'the duality of structure'" (1987:161). He speGifies as follows: 
According to the notion of the duality of structure ... 
structure is not as such external to human action, and is 
not identified solely with constraint. structure is both the 
medium and the outcome of the human activities which it 
recursively organizes. By the recursive character of social 
life I mean that social activity in respect of its 
structural properties exists in and through the use of the 
resources which agents make in constituting their action 
which at the same time reconstitutes those structural . 
properties as quali ties of the systems in question 
(1987:163). 
The interactive nature of "structure" and "human activities" renders 
them mutually constitutive: and in language we find an instance of the 
duality of structure. "Language exists only insofar as it is produced 
and reproduced in contingent contexts of social life" (1987:163). It is 
in this (recursi ve) sense that we need to understand the subsequent 
contention that "language is the medium of social practice" (1987:168). 
Language is nevertheless not exclusively constitutive of meaning, 
because "intervening between the unconscious and the conscious is 
practical consciousness, the underlined center of human practical 
activity". Giddens explains: 
Here there is a set of ties not just between discourse and 
'the . ot~e~ side of language [the unconscious]', but between 
the IndIvIdual as an agent and the institutions which the 
CHAPTER 3: CHARACTER. AND TEXTUALITY 
individual constitutes and reconstitutes in the course of 
the duration of day-to-day activity. A good deal of what we 
do is organized knowledgeably in and through practical 
consciousness; it follows that the way in which we make 
sense of our own actions and the actions of others and the 
ways in which we generate meaning in the world are in an 
elemental sense methodological. What I mean by this is that 
the sense of words and the sense of actions does not derive 
solely from the differences created by sign codes, or more 
generically by language .... The origins of meaning are not 
to be traced to the referent, and not to the system of 
differences that constitutes language as a semiotic system, 
but to the methodological apparatus embedded in a practical 
consciousness of the routines of day-to-day social life 
(1987:167). 
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Practical consciousness is differentiated from language as a constituter 
of meaning in being not "necessarily available to the discursive 
awareness of the social actor" (1987:165). It is the inaccessibility to 
discourse of practical consciousness that disqualifies a purely 
linguistic motivation either for the subject per se, or for the 
decentring of the subject. In another essay in the same collection as 
Giddens's, Weimann offers a useful and elegant corroboration: "as soon 
as language is viewed as annihilating the subject, as soon as the 
subject is viewed purely as a function of discourse but discourse not, 
simultaneously, as a function of the subject, the whole question of 
representation cannot be reconsidered at the crossroads of structure and 
event, system and history" (1987:177). 
The significance of Giddens's duality of structures will be considered 
in some depth during the course of this chapter. Before proceeding, 
however, it might be worth identifying two implications which have 
motivated my reference to his theory. On the one hand, although the 
reading of character might generally fall into the domain of practical 
consciousness, our quest as critics is to become discursively aware of 
the processes that inform such reading. On the other hand, and 
particularly if we read resistantly, a critical conceptualisation of 
characters as subjects must acknowledge the possibility of their agency 
if it is to be sufficiently sensitive to their silences. 
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3.3 The Decentring of Character 
At this point it might be worth applying Giddens's discussion of 
language and the subject to a theory of character developed by Docherty 
in relation to postmodern fiction. Docherty begins with a rejection of 
the "mimetic conception of character in fiction", which, he claims, 
"brings with it some unnecessary critical baggage" (1983:xi-xii). Most 
redundant amongst the baggage is the tendency towards essentialism which 
makes this conception of character appropriate to allegory and 
inappropriate to twentieth-century fiction. "In this approach to reading 
character, we make the leap from an understanding of the meanings of 
singular characters to the truth or message being expressed by their 
author; the characters are simply the porte-parole of an author, and it 
is his or her meaning which we readers seek" (1983:xii). The problems 
Docherty has with the conception of characters as "simply the porte 
parole of an author" might be understood in terms of Giddens's category 
of subjectivism, whereby the agent is "preconstituted subjectively" 
(1987:164), so that the character simply expresses the subjectivity of 
the author. Docherty's opposition to this author-given conception of 
character takes the form of a laudable insistence on "real interaction 
in a dialogic form, or common production of meaning by the writer and 
reader working together" (1987:xiii). The theory of characterisation 
which he proceeds to elaborate is, he says, a contribution to a "new 
tradition of writing" which takes cognisance of the "self-consciousness 
as written compositions" that characterises "writerly" texts, and "the 
linguistic interplay between writer and reader which goes on in the 
production of the text as it is read" (1983:xii). His attempt is to 
decentre the "monological authorial voice" and enter the reader into "a 
kind of collaborative dialogue with the fiction" (1983:15). 
Although this might seem to accord with the communicative and 
intersubjective conception of narrative which I have been advancing, it 
is in regard to the question of 'selfhood' that Docherty's understanding 
departs substantially from mine. Speaking specifically about Beckett, 
Docherty offers the following comment: 
Clearly, then, the self is no longer being equated with the 
mind, and the body is thus no longer a gateway to it. The 
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self is rather a surface with no depth; more correctly, it 
is that which is constituted in language. In a world of 
relative and unstable human words, where characters are but 
'word-masses', then the characterological self becomes that 
which mediates between the author and reader through the 
words; that is, it is the implied voice (1983:34). 
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The constructions "that which is constituted in language", and "word-
masses", should remind us of Giddens's "retreat into the code", the 
"insertion of the subj ect in language". concentrating as it does on 
processes rather than products, Docherty's conception of character sheds 
some light on the fragmentation and intermittence that results from 
experimentation with the notion of "self": 
... the naive assumption, upon which all of the subsequent 
experimentation in fiction in this respect depends, goes as 
follows: if I am a new self at every moment, at every saying 
of 'I', then why fix myself in one named self ... and more 
radically, why retain the notion of the self at all? Why not 
become so fully liberated as to be able to assume whatever 
personality and name I wish at any moment; why not become a 
series of discontinuous manifestations of different 
'selves', none of which need ever relate to themselves nor 
to any previous manifestation of a self? ... Another way of 
regarding this would be to say that the notion of the 
coherent and unified self has been replaced with that of the 
surface subjectivity: we have not a series of 'selves' as 
such but rather a series of instants of subjectivity, a 
series of instantiations of the 'I' (1983:75-76). 
Yet although he calls it naive, Dochert y takes such experimentation 
seriously enough to conclude: "we may in some sense still have 
'character', but the question of the humanity, or re-cognizable 
humani ty, of such 'character' is raised" (1983: 77). By emphasising the 
expressive functions of narrative over the communicative, by concurring 
in an ahistoric and decontextualised sUbstitution of the id for a social 
identi ty, Docherty is in effect, despite his disclaimers, proclaiming 
the death of the character. 
Before proceeding to a theoretical engagement with Docherty, some of the 
implications of his claims might become apparent if we refer them, 
briefly, to three examples. In Foe, with which this thesis began, we saw 
the quest of Susan Barton to constitute herself in language by 
engendering herself as a character in her narrative. This quest, in my 
view, arose from her unwillingness to be simply a "series of 
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discontinuous manifestations of different 'selves' ... a series of 
instants of subjectivity". In Too Late the Phalarope, which will be 
considered in Chapter 5 , a 'tragic' tension is set up between the 
hegemonic discourse of apartheid, and the attempts of the masculine 
protagonist Pieter van Vlaanderen to define a self in opposition to its 
terms. Powerful as his 'I' might be, it is ultimately thwarted by its 
failure to achieve recognition by the 'you's' around him. In Karu, the 
efforts of the central character to constitute a self must contend with 
the pressures of cross-culturality that take the form of extremely 
hostile racism. The initially discursive self she constitutes, "I am a 
Masarwa", is, however, one that she ultimately leaves behind in favour 
of a broader African identity which can incorporate human and non-
discursive qualities and modes of relationship. 
In my view, three distinct problems militate against the incorporation 
of Docherty's postmodern theory of character into a postcolonial 
theorisation of the novel. Firstly, by focusing on fragmentation and 
intermittence per se, he fails to offer a positive reading of 
'omission'. Secondly, in eroding the ontological autonomy of the reader, 
he discounts the constitutive power the reader has over the meaning of 
the text. And, thirdly, by ignoring the social construction of identity, 
he fails to balance his sense of character as an element of the text 
with a recognition of character as a (textualised) human subject. 
Distinct as these problems are, they are also clearly related, and the 
relations between them can be identified, as I will go on to show, in 
the terms of the cultural and the social . 
3.4 Omission and Implicature 
In regard to the first problem, Docherty's failure to offer a positive 
reading of 'omission', we might well recall the feature of structure 
which Giddens identified, that it "presumes the idea of an absent 
totality". This feature can be seen as particularly important for 
language, if we recognise language as the kind of structure as absent 
totality that Giddens proposes. He says, for example: "To understand the 
sentence which the speaker utters means knowing an enormous range of 
rules of a syntactic and semantical kind, which are not contained within 
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the speech act, but are nevertheless fundamental to understanding it, or 
to producing it" (1987: 162). Giddens is of course not alone in seeing 
language this way: in regard to narrative (and hence character) this 
particular feature has received specific attention from critics working 
in other fields and paradigms than Docherty. 
Maclean's observations on the representative nature of action in 
narrative and in performance were cited in Chapter 1: I would like to 
refer to her comments again here specifically in regard to 
characterisation. She says, 
The theatrical model ... helps in glvlng an account of the 
essentially iconic nature of much narrative represeritation. 
While popular wisdom suggests that a picture is worth a 
thousand words, it is also true that words present us with a 
thousand pictures .... In narrative, as on stage, one action 
must represent a whole series of actions, the words spoken 
stand for words unspoken, what we are allowed -to see becomes 
metonymic of the unseen (1988:16). 
Metonymy offers an explanation of omission that takes into account the 
selective nature of narration. By allowing a minimal, fragmented and 
intermittent presentation of character to "stand for" what is unseen 
because unrelated, we may recognise the reading of character as the 
completion of a gestal t. The 'presence' of a character is thus not 
limited to what 'is presented of' that character, but can include, in 
Giddens's words, "relationships of absences and presences embedded in 
instantiation of language, in speech, or in text" (1987:162). 
As we have seen, Lanser's study, The Narrative Act: Point of View in 
Prose Fiction, situates literary communication within a speech-act 
framework, and so comes to a notion of the text "as a specific kind of 
communicative and aesthetic act" (1981:62). One aspect of point of view 
which she identifies is that of 'absence'. In doing so she cites 
questions posed by the philosopher Merleau-Ponty: "But what if language 
speaks as much by what is between words as by the words themselves? As 
much by what it does not 'say' as by what it 'says'?" (1981: 41-42) . 
These questions might recall the "certain silence", the "silence doing 
the speaking" cited from Macherey in Chapter 1, and the "rules of a 
syntactic and semantical kind" identified by Giddens. Lanser goes 
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further; developing her ideas along lines similar to Giddens when in 
place of 'omission' or 'absence', she introduces Grice's notion of 
"implicature" . 
Very frequently, a considerable breadth of context is 
necessary to determine the specific nature of an 
illocutionary act, for a great deal of speech activity 
operates through implicature, that is, through context-
related and rule-governed assumptions and calculations that 
communicators employ in order to give meaning to speech .... 
Grice's concept provides a tool for acknowledging, naming, 
and studying the "gaps" in discourse the unspoken 
assumptions and messages upon which meaning depends .... [in 
the words of Schauber and Spolsky] "it is in the nature of 
language and literature that much of what is needed for 
understanding will never be said" ... (1981:76-77). 
The links wi th Giddens's ' structure as absent totali ty' , and 
"relationships of absences and presences" embedded in the text are 
plain. Although Lanser doesn't say so explicitly, it seems to me safe to 
infer that our reading of character will operate as much as our reading 
of the text as a whole through "context-related and rule-governed 
assumptions and calculations", and in response to "unspoken assumptions 
and messages". 
If this is the case, then the concept of implicature can be related to 
the claim made in Chapter 2 that cultural translation (and narration) is 
always directed by . conventions of representation. Although in this 
instance the cultural dimension of conventions of representation is not 
predominant, such conventions can still be seen as intrinsic to the act 
of reading. Lanser expands on the notion of conventions by citing 
Culler's assertions about the completion of meaning: 
The ur-convention of novelistic discourse is that the text 
will permit the creation of a coherent and human, if 
hypothetical world. As Jonathan Culler says, "the basic 
convention governing the novel is the expectation that 
readers will ... be able to recognize a world which [the 
text] produces or to which it refers" .... These conventions 
are not, however, always easy to uncover; like the rules for 
language, they have been learned not as abstract regulations 
but through use, that is, through listening to, reading and 
telling stories (1981:112-113). ' 
The notions of implicature and of the conventions that direct 
interpretation of it can, furthermore, be understood in terms of 
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Giddens's "practical consciousness". From Lanser's description we can 
see that conventions are learned "through use"; that they are not always 
easy to uncover; and that they provide a (shared) basis for recognising 
and hence dealing with a "world". 
I will, a little later, consider the broader significance of implicature 
for the identity and the ontological status of charact.er. At present, 
however, I would like to apply the notions of implicature and of 
conventions to the reading Docherty offers of the character Charles 
Bovary: 
The 'meaning' of 'Charles Bovary' is located in the reader. 
In the process of 'character development', it is the reader 
who changes. The 'meaning' of a character is understood in 
terms of evaluations located in the reader; the reader then 
of course confers these evaluative judgements back upon the 
character in terms of a sense, significance, or meaning 
(1983:10). 
In the interplay between reader and character mooted here, the character 
has no 'real existence' apart from the reader's grasp of him. In terms 
cited already from Docherty we might see "Charles Bovary" as, simply, a 
"word-mass" constituted in language to "mediate between the author and 
the reader through the words" (1983:34). The proviso does occur a little 
later in Docherty's discussion that it is characters' "freedom to change 
which contributes in no small measure to the illusion of the character's 
real ontological existence" (1983:44-45). From this we might infer that 
the "meaning" of the character is the "illusion" of its "real 
ontological existence" which is "located in the reader". 
3.5 The Constitutive Power of the Reader 
Such a conception of character is plainly at odds with the terms of 
implicature and conventions developed above. To treat character as a 
"word-mass" is to limit its 'presence' to 'what is presented'. It is 
thus to disallow the effects of either metonymy or implicature, the 
"relationships of absences and presences" out of which the gestalt of 
character is completed. In terms of Lanser's conviction, we might 
recognise the (conventional) expectation of readers that characters, 
like texts, should be "coherent and human, if hypothetical". In my view 
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at least, for characters to 'work' they must have an existence beyond 
the words that constitute them. To demonstrate this we could begin by 
assuming the reverse. If characters did not 'exist', we might well take 
reading character to be a process of making evaluations and conferring 
them back upon characters, as Docherty proposes. Much as a scientist 
might employ the hypothetico-deductive method, or an aphasic use 
explicit subsumption to arrive at the meaning of words or things, 
reading character would be a procedure of linking characteristics 
together in order to fabricate or construct them. Each new observation 
would supply new evidence that would demand fresh hypotheses as to the 
nature of characters. Yet the phenomenological . inauthentici ty of this 
claim is obvious. What we experience is not just the signs of 
characters, but their presence, their ontological reality. Al though 
analysis might dwell on the fragmentariness and intermittence of 
postmodern characters, in reading them we do not experience an 
accumulation of hypotheses, but the shock of interruption or destruction 
of their presence. 1 
To assume that the "real ontological existence" of characters is an 
"illusion" is, in important ways, to run counter to the phenomenology of 
the reading process. In my view, this is an instance of Docherty's 
denial of the existence of conventions, independent of both author and 
text, which might condition or direct the reading of character. The 
consequences of such a denial are farreaching; leading, in terms of the 
second problem identified earlier , to an erosion of both the ontological 
autonomy and the power of the reader in constituting the meaning of the 
text. Docherty's stated purpose was to decentre the "monological 
authorial voice" and enter the reader into "a kind of collaborative 
dialogue with the fiction" (1983 : 15), and so to emphasise the "common 
production of meaning by the writer and reader working together" 
(1983:xiii). And yet as early as his introduction we see evidence of a 
sUbstitution of the authority of the text for the authority of the 
1 For these insights I am grateful to my colleague Dr Eldon wait 
who has a strong interest in phenomenology, and ~pecificallY th~ 
work of Merleau-Ponty. 
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author as defini ti ve of the reading process. "It is in the interaction 
of the writer's language with the position it affords the reader that 
the element of the text which we call 'character' is produced", Docherty 
asserts; and, "the theory will allow for the possibility of change or 
mobility in the meaning of character (and equally of the writer and 
reader) as the text is reproduced in the reading" (1983:xiii-xiv, my 
emphasis). The 'text-driven' theory of reading which Docherty advances 
results in the extension of the decentralisation of the self in fiction 
from character to reader. "The reader's own position, his or her very 
existence as an existentially effective subjectivity, can be subsumed 
under the same kinds of discontinuity of characterization as the 
fictional selves in the novel" (1983:83). The bent of Docherty's 
attitude to such processes can be inferred ~rom his references, in the 
passage cited above, to "liberation" (1983:75), and, in his 
introduction, to the "possibility of escape from a fixed selfhood, into 
an existence as a series of subjectivities" (1983:xv-xvi, my emphases). 
I am, of course, rather less enthusiastic about the subsumption of the 
reader's posi tion (indeed existence) under "the same kinds of 
discontinuity of characterization as the fictional selves in the novel". 
Once the subject positions of the reader are effectively dictated by the 
text, then the breakdown of the ego boundaries between character and 
reader is theoretically irresistible: and the erosion of the 'self' of 
the reader follows from the erosion of the 'self' of the character. In 
the terms I have been developing, a crisis of representation has become 
a crisis of ontology. 
Again, the limited autonomy and power Docherty accords the reader is at 
direct odds with the position of critics working within other 
theoretical paradigms. In her application of the model of performance to 
narrative, Maclean, for example, remains far more aware than Docherty of 
the ways in which, "Audience feedback, without which no live production 
is complete, is transformed in the case of the printed book and becomes 
the individual interpretation of the written text". For this reason she 
claims "there is no 'true' proprietorial interpretation", and concludes: 
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Control of people's minds is not a simple thing. Just as a 
teller endeavours to use audience feedback to control 
audience reaction by modifying the performance, so the text 
endeavours to construct its own reader. However, while 
narrators and narratees are and remain textual constructs, 
there is never any guarantee that the virtual 
reader/audience will obey the promptings of the text 
(1988:19). 
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Toolan offers a reading of narrative within the framework of "critical 
linguistics". He, too, observes that, unlike the "fiction" that is the 
"writer's audience", "real readers, real audiences, can apprehend 
stories in quite unpredicted ways, seeing a different point to them, and 
picturing quite dissimilar authors for them" (1988:80). Plainly, 
Docherty's decentralisation of the self and erosion of the 
"existentially effective subjectivity" of the reader demands a 
containment of the degrees of freedom accorded the position of the 
reader by other critics. 
The ontological crisis of the reader which arises in Docherty's theory 
of character introduces the third of the problems specified above. I 
would like to trace the implications of this crisis in two directions: 
firstly, the significance for a reading of character of the social 
construction of identity, and secondly, the concomitant theoretical 
exigency of balancing character as a (textualised) human subject and 
character as an element of the text. 
3.6 The Social Construction of Identity 
In following the first of these directions we can resume our 
consideration of the nature of identity. One of my obj ections to the 
I death of the character I engendered in Docherty's theory was that it 
stemmed from an ahistoric and decontextualised sUbstitution of the id 
for a social identity. This was most apparent in the emphasis given to 
the expressive functions of narrative by experimentation with the notion 
of the self. Al though he remarked on the naivete of such 
experimentation, Docherty failed to supply answers to the questions it 
posed: 
if I ama new self at every moment, at every saying of 'I', 
then why fix myself in one named self ... and more 
radically, why retain the notion of the self at all? Why not 
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become so fully liberated as to be able to assume whatever 
personality and name I wish at any moment; why not become a 
series of discontinuous manifestations of different 
'selves', none of which need ever relate to themselves nor 
to any previous manifestation of a self? (1983:76). 
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The 'naivete' informing these questions has to do with their solipsism, 
their disregard for relationship. And indeed in a discussion of first-
person narrative, Todorov draws attention to the general semiotic law 
according to which an 'I' always implies a 'you' (1981:40). This might 
be rephrased to say that to speak is generally to expect to be heard. 
In order fully to address Docherty's questions, in order to get a better 
sense of the relations between individual identity and social context, 
however, I would like to return to the domain of the social sciences, 
and specifically to two studies within the fields of sociology and 
psychology. Although Berger is perhaps more famous for the work 
published jointly with Luclemann, The Social Construction of Reality 
( 1967), (whose impact wi thin the social sciences is evidenced by the 
name of the series in which the later psychological study has been 
published: "Inquiries in Social Construction"), it is to his earlier 
book, Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective (1963), that I 
would like to refer. In it he offers a clear delineation of identity in 
terms of the relations between what he terms "man in society" and 
"society in man", and, in doing so, provides an interesting measure of 
the anti-humanism of Docherty's position. Berger puts it this way: "in a 
sociological perspective, identity is socially bestowed, socially 
sustained and socially transformed" (1963:116). He elaborates, "identity 
is not something 'given', but is bestowed in acts of social 
recognition", so that "to be human is to be recognised as human" 
(1963:117). Although the one-directional nature of this delineation 
needs modification to take into account Giddens's duality of structures, 
a less cognitive definition of identity found in various languages and 
cultures throughout Africa offers a material corroboration: "a person is 
a person because of people". 
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3.7 The Linguistic constitution of Identity 
In a more recent study, within the field of "new paradigm psychology", 
Shotter provides a specification of such processes. His article is 
particularly useful because it offers a substantial development of the 
'pronominal' understanding of identity apparent in Docherty, Todorov, 
and Giddens. Entitled "Social Accountability and the Social Construction 
of 'You''', it is prefaced with an epigram from Nietzsche: "The thou is 
older than the I" (1989:133). I would like to discuss Shotter's article 
in some depth, because, in addition to clarifying the relations between 
language usage and the constitution of identity, his pronominal analysis 
accords with recent studies in the sphere of autobiography (Bruss 1980, 
Cox 1980, Renza 1980, Eakin 1985, Eakin 1989, Lejeune 1989) to which 
reference will be made in passing. 
Shotter begins by noting an increasing concern, in social and 
developmental psychology, with "personhood, with persons, agency and 
action", which has been directed 
mostly towards the analysis of grammatical first-persons, 
towards what it is to be an active agent, an 'I', a subject 
doing something to something or someone else. Little 
attention has been paid to people's existence as the persons 
'addressed' by first-persons, to whom or what it is one is 
embedded in when one is rooted or embedded in communicative 
acti vi ty . And thus the nature of the grammatical second-
person has been ignored (1989:135). 
Shotter's article is an attempt to redress the balance: to "render the 
'I' problematic, and to show how little of sUbstance can be said about 
it, and also, perhaps surprisingly, to show how much of importance can 
be said about 'you '" (1989: 135). After considering the appearance and 
disappearance of the 'I' in Cartesian and in Jamesian philosophy, he 
takes up Benveniste's specifications of the non-referentiality of 'I'i 
its characteristic functioning, together with 'you' , within a 
"positional field" which is "constructed, moment by moment, in and 
through one's utterances" (1989:140). Despite the addition of an implied 
relationship with 'you', such shifting signification might well remind 
us of Docherty's "instantiations of the '1'''. 
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Shotter's quest, however, is to account for "why we feel so strongly 
that there must be somewhere such an entity" as an 'I' (1989:140). He 
relates this to the duality of structure, since "communally shared ways 
of, or means for, making-sense are constitutive of people's social and 
psychological being in quite a deep way". On the one hand, "one learns 
the nature of other people as 'you's', as certain kinds of 'you', who 
afford different kinds of opportunities for one's action - who 
'motivate' or 'invite' one to act in some ways rather than others" 
(1989:142). On the other hand, a sense of identity is related to what he 
terms "addressivity" and "the attribution of personhood": 
From our beginning as children, and continuing on into our 
li ves as adults, we are dependent upon being addressed by 
others for whatever form of autonomy we may achieve; thus, 
in this sense we can say that, as persons, we are always 
'you' s', always essentially second-persons. The 'thou' is 
older than the 'I' in the sense that the capacity to be 
addressed as a 'you' by others is a preliminary to the 
ultimate capacity of being able to say 'I' of oneself, of 
being able to understand the uniqueness of one's own 
position in relation to others, and to take responsibility 
for one's own actions. 
In other words, in this view, people are not eternal, 
unchanging entities in themselves (like isolated, 
indistinguishable atoms), but owe what stability and 
constancy, and uniqueness, they may appear to have - their 
identity - to the stability and constancy of certain aspects 
of the activities, practices, and procedures in which they 
can make their differences from those around them known and 
accountable (1989:143). 
Shotter has elsewhere written on 
, Intentionali ty' in an Ecological 
influence is apparent here as well: 
" 'Duali ty of Structure' and 
Psychology" (1983) . Giddens's 
if people are constituted in 
language, it is in language as social practice. 
Following this, Shotter offers what might stand as a direct reply to 
Docherty: "my action in being thus 'situated' takes on an ethical or 
moral quality. I cannot just relate myself to the others around me as I 
myself please: the relationship is ours, not just mine" (1989:144). One 
of the conclusions he comes to is that, 
when small children are addressed as 'you', rather than 
merely having information reported to them upon which to 
base (or not) their individual actions, they are being 'in-
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structed' in how to be. This is another sense in which human 
communication cannot be seen simply as a matter of 
information transfer from one location to another, it must 
be seen as ontologically formative, as a process by which 
people can, in communication with one another, literally in-
form one another's being, that is, help to make each other 
persons of this or that kind (1989:145). 
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An acute literary example of these processes is the developing 
consciousness of Margaret, in Head's Haru, to whom I have referred 
already. Subj ected as a child to the taunts and torments of being "a 
Bushy", it is part of her achievement of identity to acknowledge of 
herself, "I am a Masarwa". Less explicit, perhaps, though equally 
interesting, are the patterns of second-person address in Too Late the 
Phalarope: although, for example, both his aunt and his wife speak to 
Pieter as 'you', Stephanie uses the third-person, "baas". Stephanie 
herself, of course, is referred to as 'you', both by Pieter and by the 
magistrate who tries her. Shotter comments thus on the distinctions 
between the use of second- and third-person: 
Grammatically, at least, to be related as a second-person, 
rather than as a third-person, to a first-person is both to 
be situated quite differently and to be assigned a quite 
different set of privileges and obligations .... First- and 
second-persons (plural or singular) are, even if in fact 
non-personal or inanimate, always personified (with all that 
implies for the 'personal' nature of their relation) and are 
thus, so to speak, 'present' to one another, in a 
'si tuation ' . By contrast, third-persons need not be 
personified (they can be ' its' ); nor are they present as 
such to other beings or entities; nor are they necessarily 
'in a situation' (1989:135). 
The particular acuteness of Shotter's account of the pronominal 
relations that help to constitute identity is its concatenation of the 
phenomenologically experienced 'reality' of identity and the 
conditionality that stems from its basis in social exchange. Some of 
these implications might become clearer if we extend the range of 
application of Shotter's account. We might infer, for example, that the 
development of identity from childhood takes place particularly in I-you 
relationships. And so we might expect the impact of "addressivity" and 
the "attribution of personhood" to diminish with the attainment of 
adulthood, or more precisely. with the ' achievement' of identity. Yet 
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given the conditionality of identity, the fact that it is "socially 
bestowed, socially sustained and socially transformed" (Berger 
1963:116), such constitutive force is unlikely to disappear. 
Although a full consideration of the textualisation of the subject will 
follow, it seems important to note at this point some of the 
implications for literature of the linguistic constitution and the 
social construction of identity. I have referred above to relations 
between characters; here we might consider other textual relations. On 
the one hand, we should be aware, from the earlier discussion of 
Giddens, of the constitutive power of readers who bring conventions to 
bear on their construction of the identity of both characters and 
writers. On the other hand, we might draw on Shatter's insights to 
recognise the writing of character as an "attribution of personhood". If 
we do so, the case of autobiographic writing should prove particularly 
illuminating for an examination of the respective 'selves' or identities 
of writer and character. 
It is perhaps not surprising that autobiographic studies should have 
made much of Benveniste's recognition of the "combined double instance 
... the instance of I as referent and the instance of discourse 
containing I as the referee" (cited in Shatter 1989:140). Lejeune 
follows Benveniste in this distinction, but uses the capacity of the 
subject of reference to be designated by a noun to formulate his concept 
of the "autobiographical pact" (1989:8. Cox refers rather humorously to 
"that shifty pronominal shifter, the 'I' of discourse" (1980:124), and 
Renza pursues Benveniste through Barthes: 
"When a narrator [of a written text] recounts what has 
happened to him, the I who recounts is no longer the one 
that is recounted." Even this recounting "I", composed of 
what Barthes after Emile Benveniste calls "the instance of 
discourse", is not the self who writes as long as we take 
this self to be "an interiority constituted previous to and 
outside language" (1980:276). 
Renza goes on to recognise autobiographical writing as entailing a 
"spli t intentionality: the 'I' becoming a 'he'; the writer's awareness 
of his life becoming private even as he brings it into the public domain 
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and putatively makes it present through his act of writing" (1980:279). 
Bruss, by contrast, notes the way in which 
Autobiography simply exploits more general conventions that 
apply to language as a whole, especially the established 
structure of participation that defines the relevant roles 
of those who use language .... Thus the structure of 
autobiography, a story that is at once by and about the same 
individual, echoes and reinforces a structure already 
implici t in our language, a structure that is also (not 
accidentally) very like what we usually take to be the 
structure of self-consciousness itself: the capacity to know 
and simultaneously be that which one knows (1980:300-301). 
Eakin recognises that "the origin of the self as the reflexive center of 
human subjectivity is inextricably bound up with the activity of 
language" (1985:198), yet in his foreword to Lejeune's book he makes an 
important point which takes up both Renza' s and Bruss's formulations: 
"if the premise of autobiographical referentiality that we can move from 
knowledge of the text to knowledge of the self proves to be a fiction, 
the text becomes paradoxically not less precious but more: in making the 
text the autobiographer constructs a self that would not otherwise 
exist" (1989:xxiii, my emphasis). 
The crucial question that seems to me to arise, then, is whether the 
same is true of character in fiction: does the writer of a novel, for 
example, 'construct a self that would not otherwise exist'? The 
qualifications that "would be necessary for an affirmative answer serve 
to illuminate the relations between the 'selves' or identities of writer 
and character. First, despite the "autobiographic pact" which aligns 
them, the 'self' created by the writer in autobiography is not 
substantially less a character than that engendered by textualisation in 
fiction. Second, the 'self' of the character created in fiction is not 
to the same extent a 'self' of the writer as is created in 
autobiography. And yet the role of the reader in 'identifying' character 
is equally significant in both. 
These relations might be specified in the following way. We may infer 
from Benveniste's "combined double instance" that to say 'I' is to 
represent oneself. And then to inscribe an ' I ' is to constitute a 
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(represented or textualised) subject who is susceptible to the 
constitutive force of others. To put this another way, the represented 
'I' must also negotiate the duality of structure which might be rendered 
as an 'I'-you relationship. And if we recognise with Thoreau that "it 
is, after all, always the first person that is speaking" (cited by Eakin 
1985:9), then the narrative choice of third person for a character might 
be seen as a displacement or a deferral of 'personal representation' in 
order to avoid the constitutive force that would be brought to bear on 
an 'I'. Although I am anticipating the investigation of textualisation 
which will follow, it is my claim, here, that the 'constitutive force of 
others' is that brought to bear on the 'I' - or the 'he or she' - of the 
text by readers. 
Returning to a consideration of Docherty's "instants of subjectivity", 
his "instantiations of the 'I''' , we will recognise the extent to which 
he discounts the constitutive force of the 'you'. And so the 
"liberation", the "escape", the 'self-murder' of which he speaks is 
finally a flight of rarefied egotism, because it attempts to discard the 
domain of the social (and the cultural) by denying its influence on 
defini tions of self and identity. More importantly, the formulation 
whereby the text supplies the subject positions of the reader 
effectively erodes the power of the reader - and it is a crucial and a 
constitutive power - to "recognise" and hence to "bestow" identity upon 
characters. 
3.8 Character and Text 
The second of the directions specified above was that of responding to 
the theoretical exigency of balancing character as a (textualised) human 
subject with character as an element of the text, in a way that will 
thereby secure the constitutive power of the reader. In doing so we can 
return to our earlier consideration of the issue of omission. In a book 
entitled What Stories Are: Narrative Theory and Interpretation, it has 
been Leitch's claim that omission is theoretically intrinsic to 
characterisation. Beginning with the simple observation that "characters 
differ from people in being incompletely specified" (1986:158), he cites 
Braudy's postulate that "the basic nature of character in film is 
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omission .... Film character achieves complexity by its emphasis on 
incomplete knowledge" (1986:159). Likewise, if we "never know everything 
about any fictional character" (1986: 160), then omission must be an 
inherent factor in our reading of character in literature (and indeed in 
autobiography). Thus, "We recover the characters precisely by 
generalizing or extrapolating the exemplary thoughts we are given to 
cover the passage of years, the subjects which arise only briefly or not 
at all ... , or the dimensions of experience which are not specified but 
which we take for granted ... n (1986:160). The links with the notion of 
implicature are fairly plain: given that the 'provision' of characters 
in postmodern fiction is minimal, fragmented and intermittent, the 
notion of 'recovery' offers a better version of the reading act than the 
dehumanisation of both character and reader. Unlike Docherty's, Leitch's 
theory of character incorporates the role of the reader and hence is 
able to take into account the sociocultural construction of identity. 
Leitch perhaps goes further than Lanser in implying that the 
'recovery' depends on the conventions, the shared 
interpretations that allow writer (or specifically narrator) 




This intersubj ecti vi ty is perhaps most apparent in the development of 
the concept of the recovery of character into that of character as 
trope. In Leitch's formulation, "As plot is a trope for human 
experience, [so] character is a trope for human identity" (1986:146). 
Given the qualifications made in regard to autobiography, we should note 
that such identity is not necessarily that of the writer. Yet the 
concept of character as trope is important in linking social processes 
of identity construction with the conventions that guide our responses 
to and reading of character: by demonstrating how characterological 
identity might be "bestowed", "sustained" and "transformed" in the 
reading process. In invoking processes of sociality, it thus addresses 
the issue of the textualisation of the human subject. 
It is in the nature of tropes that they should be at once both grounded 
in a shared sense of reality and highly artificial. Rhetorical play 
always takes for granted an apprehension of reality in common; thus that 
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the need to share conventions is fundamental. The example Leitch 
supplies of "stories of all kinds [which] are filled with characters who 
are defined by ironic analogy to what they are not" (1986:159) is a case 
in point: clearly the recognition or apprehension of such characters 
depends on the appreciation of the irony. In regard to artifice, Leitch 
contends that if "the tendency of poststructuralist critics like Jacques 
Derrida and Jacques Lacan to question the authority of the human subject 
has rendered the philosophical basis of character suspect, this 
suspicion of character seems based on a confusion, or at least too close 
an association, between characters and people" (1986:148). Leitch 
explains: 
characters differ from people in being incompletely 
specified (how many characters are said to have armpits?) 
and intentionally intelligible, as human behavior is only 
among highly histrionic people or people performing for an 
audience. We might be said always to be acting ourselves, 
but characters are always on display in a more radical 
sense: They are designed to be apprehended, and that is all 
they are designed for. The identity of narrative characters, 
unlike that of real people, is a uniquely discursive 
function (1986:158). 
Although I have reservations about Leitch's final assertion, in regard 
to the issue of "display" it seems worth consulting again the way in 
which Todorov takes up Benveniste's formulations in relation to first-
person narrative: that to say 'I' is always to represent oneself 
(1981:39). "I run", for example, introduces a distinction (if not a 
bifurcation) between the 'I' who runs (subject of the discourse) and the 
'I' who speaks (subject of the speech act). Even when characters do not 
speak in first-person, their 'representedness' (and hence their 
artifice) is still definitive. It is a quality that Docherty, like the 
poststructuralist critics Leitch rebukes, overlooks. The "instants of 
subjectivity" of which he speaks, the "series of instantiations of the 
, I ' ", are in fact not ' selves' as such, but representations of a self; 
even, perhaps, postures assumed by a self. Reflexive as they might be, 
it is only with the collusion of the social context into which they are 
projected that such postures can be seen as constituting - or eroding _ 
the self who is projecting them. A trope can only work with the 
condonation of its readers. 
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It is for a similar reason that the final remark in the passage from 
Leitch needs scrutiny. If the identity of narrative characters is a 
uniquely discursive function, if "stories ... and the people in them are 
made of words" (Gass, cited in Leitch 1986:154), it is in Giddens's 
sense of language as the "medium of social practice" that characters 
should be seen as constituted in this way. As I demonstrated in my 
critique of Docherty, characters are more than a literary device, a 
"discursive function", an "element of the text". Leitch himself goes on 
to supply a corroboration: "The modern notion of character ... is 
nuclear in structure, implying some residual quality neither required by 
nor expended in the action, some resistance Todorov's narrative-men lack 
to exhaustion by their situation, plot function, or public action" 
(1986:149). It is the "residual quality", the "resistance" that 
intrigues me, and that necessitates a qualification of the notions of 
implicature and trope. Recognising that characters are "designed to be 
apprehended", that readers and narrators must share the understanding 
that they will respond to characters as human, characters would still 
plainly not 'work' if they did no more than fulfil this design, if they 
were unable to lay claim to some kind of 'reality'. 
It is in part for this reason that I would like to return now ' to a 
consideration of the textual interface . In Leitch's notion of character 
as trope we saw an approach to the textualisation of the human subject 
as character; in Todorov' s addendum and the studies of autobiography 
cited earlier we saw a move towards a recognition in the narrator of the 
textualised subjectivity of the writer . It has been my own endeavour to 
this point to establish the constitutive importance of the reader both 
for textual meaning and, more specifi cally, for characterisation. At 
least part of my resistance to Docherty's conception of character was 
the sense that a postcolonial theorisation of the novel must take 
account of the humanity of all the subj ects involved in the act of 
narration: writer, narrator, character, reader. On the other hand, since 
narration is an act not only of expression but also of communication, 
then, like it, the reading experience is located at the interface 
between text and world. If in Docherty's theorisation of character a 
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crisis of representation has become a crisis of ontology, it has done so 
because of a failure to acknowledge the existence of this textual 
interface, motile as it might be. 
3.9 Narrative utterance 
In order to find a way of incorporating into a theory of character both 
the textual interface and the humanity of the participants in the act of 
narration, I would like to return to an important observation that 
Giddens makes about language and textuali ty. It is characteristic, he 
says, that structuralist and poststructuralist thought 
inevitably leads toward the text, or more generically toward 
writing .... If meaning is constituted through difference, 
and difference derives from the overall nature of the code, 
then the text, in which differences are most directly 
displayed in a sort of visual sense, appears to be the prime 
vehicle of meaning. It was, therefore, quite logical for 
Derrida to take the step of regarding writing as the prime 
modality of signification. However, if the approach I have 
suggested here is correct, we have to accept that it is 
temporally and spatially situated conversation, not the 
text, and not writing, which is most essential to explaining 
what language and meaning are (1987:169-170). 
As we might expect, the reasons why Giddens makes this claim have to do 
with the fact that, "meaning is (a) contextual, and (b) methodological". 
The precision of the meaning that is embedded in sequences of talk is 
directly related both to "practical consciousness as a medium of the 
constitution and re-constitution of meaning in the day-to-day context of 
activity", and to the "methodological nature of the knowledge which 
[practical consciousness] involves" (1987:170). The consequences for 
social theory of such a conception of meaning include "rescuing the 
knowledgeable agent as the conceptual center for social analysis" 
(1987: 170). The implications for the "theory of the text" include 
recognitions of intentionality, in "recast" form; of the constitutive 
significance of form for the (writer) agent; of the "distanciation" of 
texts from their authors, and hence the significance of the "unintended 
consequences of action"; and, finally, of the "conditions of 
knowledgeabili ty" of texts as the relations between practical 
consciousness, discourse, and the unconscious (1987:170-173). 
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It seems sufficient, for the purposes of my discussion, to note these 
specific implications without exploring them here in detail. Rather, the 
pre-eminence Giddens gives "temporally and spatially situated 
conversation" can be marshalled as support for a model of narrative as 
utterance. This being the case, our attention can be directed to the 
"situation of narrative utterance" to which anticipatory reference was 
made in Chapter 2. 
In 1968 Lyons offered a delineation of the "situation of utterance" 
which, though it might today seem both emphatically structural and 
conservatively referential, remains quite compatible with Giddens's 
insistence on the centrality of "spatially and temporally situated 
conversation ... to explaining what language and meaning are", and thus 
also of the "context of activities in which human agents are implicated" 
(1987:164). For this reason it will be useful, for purposes of 
comparison at least, to examine Lyons's description. 
Every language-utterance is made in a particular place and 
at a particular time; it occurs in a certain spatio-temporal 
situation. It is made by a particular person (the speaker) 
and is usually addressed to some other person (the hearer); 
the speaker and the hearer, we will say, are typically 
distinct from one another (there may of course be more than 
one hearer) and moreover are typically in the same spatio-
temporal situation. (There are many common situations of 
utterance which are 'un typical , in these respects: it is 
possible to 'talk to oneself'; and, if one is speaking on 
the telephone, the hearer will not be in the same spatio-
temporal situation.) We will further assume that the typical 
utterance includes a reference to some object or person 
(which mayor may not be distinct from the speaker and 
hearer, cf. Have you finished yet? Has he finished yet? 
etc.); for the present, we will call this object or person 
to which reference is made in the utterance the 'subject of 
discourse'. The utterance will therefore contain as many 
'subjects of discourse' as there are lexical items in the 
utterance which refer to objects and persons (1968:175). 
Plainly, choosing to use the "situation of utterance" as a model for 
analysis of textualised narrative , entails recognising the displacement 
of the 'real' spatiotemporal dimensions which define it. In this regard 
Lanser cites a qualification insisted on by Ricoeur: 
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In spoken discourse ... the subjective intention of the 
speaking subj ect and the meaning of the discourse over lap 
each other in such a way that it is the same thing to 
understand what the speaker means and what his discourse 
means .... with written discourse, the author's intention 
and the meaning of the text cease to coincide. This 
dissociation of the verbal meaning of the text and the 
mental intention is what is at stake in the inscription of 
discourse .... The tie between the speaker and the discourse 
is not abolished, but distended and complicated (Ricoeur, 
cited in Lanser 1981:116-117). 
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Three distentions and complications seem particularly pertinent to our 
discussion. In the first place, as Toolan points out, if (inscribed) 
narratives are characterised by displacement, they can also be seen as 
"richly exploitative" of this "design feature of language". Since human 
language is able to be used to "refer to things or events that are 
removed, in space or time, from either speaker or addressee", narratives 
in particular "invol ve the recall of happenings that may be not merely 
spatially, but, more crucially, temporally remote from the teller and 
his audience" (1988: 5). This formulation might well serve to recall 
Seidel's reference to Kierkegaard' s parable of the imagination as a 
"mental borderland", and the discussion of the textual interface that 
followed, in Chapter 2. In the second place, it is the "distanciation" 
(as Giddens calls it) that occurs when the "author's intention and the 
meaning of the text cease to coincide" that creates a space for 
interpretation and validation by the reader. It is because of this 
"distanciation" that "there is no 'true' proprietorial interpretation" 
(Maclean 1988: 19); it is because of this "distanciation" that "real 
readers, real audiences, can apprehend stories in quite unpredicted 
ways, seeing a different point to them, and picturing quite dissimilar 
authors for them" (Toolan 1988:80) . In the third place, if narratives 
exploit the displacement that characterises their inscription, it is 
worth remembering, as Giddens points out, that "in a general way there 
is nothing distinctive to texts here. It is a characteristic of social 
life generally that its products escape the intentional input of their 
creators. In other words, one of the most distinctive qualities of 
social activity concerns the significance of the unintended consequences 
of action" (1987:173). 
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Some of the ways in which the concept of the textual interface can 
relate to the distentions and complications of the model of narration as 
utterance might be apparent already . Yet it is through a deliberate 
exploitation of the conception of our reading as an "unintended 
consequence" of the action of writing that I would like to examine the 
theoretical positioning of character that might be accomplished within 
this model. If the distanciation that occurs with the inscription of 
narrative opens up a space for interpretation and validation, the 
conventions that direct our reading nevertheless exist within the domain 
of practical consciousness. And if, as I pointed out at the beginning of 
this chapter, acknowledging the existence and the motility of the text-
world boundary places an onus on us to review the 'translation' that is 
narration, such a review must take the reflexive form of bringing these 
conventions into the realm of discursi ve awareness and scrutiny and 
ultimately into the realm of choice. This, it seems to me, becomes our 
critical mandate. 
3.10 Voices and Silences 
The reading of silence advocated at the end of Chapter 2 might be 
recognised now as a less explicit version of this process. since silence 
is both a cultural and a narrative phenomenon, the volition that 
motivates it can be read as resistance both to ethnographic authority 
and to narrative power. It is thus towards these issues of authority and 
power that I wish to direct our evaluat ion of the model of narrative as 
utterance in regard to the textualisation of the subject. In the first 
place, in its incorporation of Toolan's delineation of deixis, the model 
can be seen to offer a level of phenomenological authenticity which 
Docherty's reading of character lacked . Toolan points out: 
The very presence in any discourse of features such as I and 
yo~, o.f tense choices, and of discriminating adverbs and 
ad]ectlves such as here, there, this and that (all of which 
can be . brought .together under the label of deixis), means 
that d1scourse 1S consequently interpreted as grounded or 
anchored, coming from a particular speaker at a partic~lar 
place at a particular time. Any text, then that contains 
deictic information is thereby understood a~ oriented from 
the spatiotemporal position that those deictics imply 
(Toolan 1988:67). 
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In the second place, the model is consistent with the two-part 
definition cited from Rimmon-Kenan in Chapter 2: its groundedness in 
social interaction with her sense of a "communication process in which 
the narrative as message is transmitted by addresser to addressee", and 
both its spoken utterance and its inscribed text with the "verbal nature 
of the medium used to transmit the message" (1983: 2). In the third 
place, the model addresses a distinction insisted on by Toolan between 
focalisation in narrative and what he prefers to term "orientation" -
because "'cognitive, emotive and ideological' perspectives, in addition 
to the simply spatiotemporal one, may be articulated by a narrative's 
chosen focalization" (1988:68). Highlighted in the two questions he 
poses, "Who sees?" and "Who speaks?" (1988:69), the distinction should 
serve to remind us of the rejection of visual ism which accompanied the 
shift from description to dialogue in ethnography. In Clifford's words, 
"once cultures are no longer prefigured visually - .as object, theaters, 
texts - it becomes possible to think of a cultural poetics that is an 
interplay of voices, of positioned utterances" (1986:12). The same, 
plainly, is true of the participants in an act of narration. 
It is this last point that is most crucial to the issues of authority, 
power and silence. In applying Lyons's concept of the situation of 
utterance to narrative, we can recognise the four 'parties' ·to a 
putative situation of utterance as writer, narrator, characters, 
reader. 2 Our initial inclination then might well be to read narrative as 
In his discussion of Chatman's model, Toolan (whose choices I am 
following here) dispenses with three categories: 
The implied author is a real position in narrative 
processing, a receptor's construct, but it is not a real 
role in narrative transmission. It is a projection back from 
the ~ecoding side, not a real projecting stage on the 
encodIng side .... the narratee position is not properly 
part of the framework of the telling, but an integral device 
in narrational strategy .... Narratees, then are real 
enough textual entities, but they are not an ~xtratextual 
participant in the way that narrator and reader are. But 
when we come to assess the status of the so-called 'implied 
reader' I rather doubt whether this animal is real even in a 
t~xtual-:-s~rat~gic sense .... Accordingly, I will dispense 
wIth the Impll~d r~ader .t~e way I dispensed with the implied 
author, regardIng It, sImIlarly, as the inescapable version 
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the "utterance" addressed to the reader in which characters constitute 
"subjects of discourse". Yet the significant question, as Toolan reminds 
us, remains, "Who speaks?": who is making this utterance? To the extent 
that 'the writer' has a discrete historical existence, we recognise the 
utterance as having emanated from him or her in the historic past. Yet 
Shakespeare is by no means alone in his unwillingness to renounce 
'ownership' of his writings, in his concern with their 'immortality', in 
his desire for a 'continued existence' through them. And certainly 
commonplace wisdom would insist that, the death of the author 
notwithstanding, great writers 'live on ' in their works. As a matter of 
strategy - and convenience - we may choose rather to recognise the text 
as the "utterance' of 'the narrator' whose historical location is not 
biographically fixed, as the writer's is. If we choose to do so we 
should acknowledge the displacement reflected in the manoeuvre. Then 
again, there seems no reason why Giddens's comments about the 
intentionality of form should not apply to the inscription of the 
subjectivity of the writer in his or her work. He points out, "the 
creation of form is known to the agent to be constitutive of what the 
work is" (1987:172; Giddens's emphasis), and cites as an example the 
commonplace characteristic that "a novel has 'an author' and this is 
known to those who produce novels . . .. Al though there is no doubt, 
therefore, that what it is to be 'an author' is culturally variable, 
this does not mean it is not relevant to the explication of texts ... " 
(1987:172). If novels have narrators (as critics and theorists say they 
do), it is surely feasible that writers should, albeit not explicitly, 
recognise in narrators textualisations of their own subjectivities. It 
is also feasible that such recognitions should not be restricted to 
postmodern writing. To recognise in the narrator the position assumed by 
the writer at the textual interface is thus to reach a preliminary 
answer to the question, "Who speaks?". 
The further (and perhaps more difficult) question that arises, however, 
is, 'Who else speaks?'. In a paper on Bakhtin, Emerson has written as 
follows: 
of a reader that we can assume an author to have in mind 
(1988:79-80) . 
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But the writer of novels has an implicated voice. He can 
enter and manipulate, fuse or distribute his voice among 
characters. Or he can - and this requires an extra measure 
of commitment to freedom - grant autonomy to his characters; 
he can create not just objects but full-fledged subjects. 
This was the "Copernican revolution" that Bakhtin had, in 
1929, attributed to Dostoevsky. In Dostoevsky's novels, the 
author is no longer the creator around whom characters are 
forced to revolve but is, so to speak, himself but a planet 
among planets. By the end of his life, Bakhtin had come to 
see this freedom as characteristic of all true novels 
(1986:35). 
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The implications of this "Copernican revolution" for the ontological 
status of characters are profound . It was, of course, a Bakhtinian 
impulse that motivated the similar injunctions of postmodern ethnography 
to recognise the polyphonY 'of the text. In observing these injunctions, 
we must concede that "utterances" may be made not just by two but by 
three of the parties to the situation of narrative utterance: writer, 
narrator and characters. In this sense we might say that the text has 
multiple narrators; Clifford's "many voices [clamoring] for expression" 
(1986:15). Alternatively we might choose to hear "the narrative voice" 
shifting from one party to another, as each gets (or takes) the chance 
to tell "a story among stories" (1986: 109), as each speaks. 
A similar Bakhtinian influence is registered in the works of some of the 
critics already considered. Maclean, for example, cites his observation 
that we hear in the text not only the voices of characters and 
narrators, but also "the voices of language, of narrative tradition, of 
ideology, of the whole social context. In the spoken subject we have the 
whole range of voices of the tale itself and its various actors" 
(Bakhtin, cited by Maclean 1988:6). Lanser, too, sees works of narrative 
as having the capacity to be "multi-discursive - that is, to integrate 
the discourse of any number of personae within a single text - [and so 
to ] involve numerous subj eet-system relationships" ( 1981: 14). In this 
last phrase, as in Maclean's later "linguistic dynamics, a dialog ism 
such as that found by Mikhail Bakhtin in · the multiple voices of the 
text" (1988:22), we might find cues leading us back to Clifford, to the 
"communicative processes that exist . .. between subjects in relations of 
power" (1986:15), to the 'culture' wi thin the text. 
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It is in this context that the silence of characters takes on 
ontological significance. Following the ethnographic shift from 
description to dialogue should sensitise us to the vocal expression of 
the culture within the text. We might then add another question to the 
two posed by Toolan: 'Who hears? ' . within a polyphony of multiple voices 
clamouring for expression some will inevitably speak louder and longer 
than others: and so contestatory relations will be set up amongst them. 
Yet if our ear is attuned to the voices of the text, we will listen for 
the silence of those who do not speak. We will be aware that some have 
silence forced upon them. We might hear narrators attempting to tell the 
story of characters' silence (to borrow Williams's by-line on Foe). We 
will also be aware that some are choosing not to speak; that their 
silence is volitional. We might understand characters' silence as a 
(mute) commentary upon the stories that are clamouring around them; we 
might see it as an act of resistance to the attempt to narrate them. We 
might remember Macherey' s dictum, "it is the silence that is doing the 
speaking"; we might understand their silence as offering a 'story' of 
its own. 
Such a 'reading' would clearly result from the deliberate choice of 
readers who have become discursively aware of - and attempted themselves 
to direct - the conventions that generally direct reading. As such it 
offers resistance to the intersubjectivity which the text invites, even 
demands. As Lanser points out, "successful speech activity ... depends 
for its realization on the sender's authority and the receiver's 
validation of this authority" (1981: 82). In the resistant reading I am 
advocating, such validation of authority becomes a matter of 
interpretive choice. To recognise the narrative voice as one among many 
voices is to shift from choosing to validate the authority of the 
narrator or not, to choosing whose authority to validate, choosing whose 
voice should have authority 'conferred upon' it. That this authority is 
usually conferred upon the narrator does not mean it cannot be conferred 
elsewhere. If contestatory voices exist within the narrative, it is up 
to readers to arbitrate; it is part of the reading process, in other 
words, to site the power of narration. 
CHAPTER 3: CHARACTER AND TEXTUALITY 112 
Before concluding, it seems worth remembering Basso's conceptualisation 
of silence, because, as a reflexive ethnographer, his attempt was to 
understand the meaning of behaviour in the terms of those enacting it. 
with a heightened awareness of our own constitutive role in the reading 
of character, we are attempting something similar in addressing the 
textualisation of the human subject. In doing so we might take a last 
liberty with Toolan's distinctions, and add the question, 'Who 
overhears?'. Earlier I pointed out in regard to Docherty that his 
"instants of subjectivity", his "series of instantiations of the 'I''', 
are in fact not 'selves' as such, but representations of a self; even, 
perhaps, postures assumed by a self. More recently I have said that in 
the narrator we can recognise a textualisation of the subjectivity of 
the writer. To the extent that we concur with Leitch in identifying 
"display" as an essential attribute of characters, we might also begin 
to see that in representations of selves, in textualisations of 
subjectivity, in the display of characters, we have instances of 
directed performance. If, wi thin the culture of the text, there are 
those who engage in performances because of their consciousness of 
audience, we may speculate at least that there are those who refrain 
from performance because of the same consciousness, because of a 
resistance to being heard. I have elsewhere examined these dynamics in 
relation to the poetry of John Donne (1990a). Although the "utterance" 
in his poems typically takes the form of an ' I -thou' address, this 
address is nevertheless often influenced by the consciousness of its 
participants of an audience 'external to' the situation of utterance. In 
these instances it is resistance not to being heard, but to being 
, overheard' that motivates the silence of the woman listening to the 
speaker's address. Although in narrative the two-party situation may be 
more rare, the concept of audience consciousness should be retained as a 
possible explanation of silences within the polyphony of voices in the 
text. 
It is with the notion of power that I would like to end my discussion of 
character. The theory of character as one of many voices in the text 
seems to me to address in important ways the dual pressures of language 
and culture in our society, because, in my thesis, the multiple voices 
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of the text are inextricably bound up with the cultural location or 
'ethnographic addresses' of their owners. The implications of 
'characterological resistance' in particular are extensive. Although we 
might not wish to go so far as to see characters as a disadvantaged 
minority, it seems to me that siting authority with characters -
especially those who are silent - allows us to challenge or even to 
reverse the power relations of narration. Incorporating into a theory of 
character the possibilities of resistance to narrative as well as 
collusion with it, allows us to incorporate choice into the characters 
we read. Such a conceptual framework can sensitise us to the resistance 
(and collusion) that exists as much in real cross-cultural situations as 
in representations of them in fiction. Docherty's attempt to decentre 
the "monological authorial voice", to enter the reader into "a kind of 
collaborative dialogue with the fiction" (1983:15) fails, finally, 
because he embarks from the position that characters do not exist -
that, as it were, everyone knows characters don't exist - and in doing 
so he denies readers the power to confer identity upon characters. More 
importantly, he forgets that to narrate is, in Toolan's formulation, "to 
make a bid for a kind of power" (1988: 3), to venture a version of the 
subject narrated, to run the risk of a loud, "No I didn't! No I'm not!". 
Docherty makes no provision for characters to have quite different 
versions of themselves from those offered by narrators, for characters 
to answer back at the voices that narrate them. If we as readers choose 
to accept either one of these versions we nevertheless need to remain 
conscious of the possibility of the others. 
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In the following chapters three 'case studies' will be undertaken: that 
is, an analytic approach will be made to three different novels in the 
terms of the theoretical framework developed in the opening chapters. We 
might therefore find a point of entry to these applications by 
recapitulating certain aspects of the framework. 
The instance of cultural translation we might recall and which I will 
follow is that of Basso, whose ethnographic work amongst the Western 
Apache allowed him to recognise and to render the 'story' of their 
'silence'. The choice of the model of cultural translation has been 
motivated by a need to respond to cross-culturality as a pressure of the 
Southern African context. One consequence of choosing the model is the 
need for a reflexive awareness of the position of "being in culture 
while looking at culture". For the moment, therefore, I should perhaps 
dispense with my inclusive use of 'we': if one of its effects has been 
to project a coherence of purpose in my writing and your reading of this 
thesis, such coherence may well be influenced now by differences in our 
'ethnographic addresses'. 
positions need specifying. If the rise of the "cross-border reader" has 
introduced with some force the issue of narrative accountability into 
the domain of criticism, and if the adoption and application of 
postcolonial theory means that writers are to be analysed in terms of 
their relation to the Centre, then my own position might be clarified as 
a white, English-speaking teacher of predominantly black students, and 
the theoretical framework I have developed as one that attempts to take 
into account both my teaching and their reading at a cultural and 
linguistic interface. Part of my critical interest in the texts to be 
examined thus stems from my experience of teaching these texts in such 
circumstances over several years; and the 'review' of their cultural 
translation will, in SUbstantial if implicit ways, be directed towards 
accommodating the reader-response (or indeed reader-reaction) of black 
students. My location at the 'historically black' University of Zululand 
positions me, as well, on the margins of a different kind of 'Empire': 
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the hierarchy of academic institutions in this country, whose 'Centre', 
certainly in the field of English, remains firmly located with the large 
and largely white metropolitan universities. such positioning, while it 
might direct my urge towards affiliation outside the institutional 
sphere, also offers a unique perspecti ve on developments wi thin the 
mainstream: 'writing back to the Centre' is thus a local as well as an 
international affair. 
It is such positioning that has made the 'problem of theory in our 
criticism' particularly acute for me because of its failure to register 
the experience of groups such as black students. As I pointed out in 
Chapter I, silence is "being used, in this study, as an issue around 
which theoretical explorations can be undertaken". It is being used thus 
in order to make a claim for a theoretical recognition of pressures of 
context as well as to address them in theoretical terms. My endeavour is 
towards redirection as well as clarification. 
For these reasons, my use of areas of theory with different agendas has 
been cautious. Although Spivak, for example, has written on the 
'silence' of "subaltern women", her narrative accountability seems 
directed, with some ambivalence, towards the academy, and particularly 
women in the academy, at the Cent re: indeed it is part of her project to 
demonstrate the difficulties of "speaking of (or for) the subaltern 
woman" (1988: 271). Aside from t he specificities of "the Indian case 
[which] cannot be taken as representative of all countries, nations, 
cuI tures, and the like that may be invoked as the Other of Europe as 
Self" (1988: 281), there seem to me problems inherent in the notion of 
"subalternity", compounding as it does the concepts of subordination and 
alterity. The motivation underlying my careful 'recentring' of the 
postcolonial subject is not to deny but to defy the forces of history: 
to confront them with a deliberate revisioning of possible ways of 
seeing, or more to the point, hearing this subject. Although my project 
is critical and theoretical rather than creative, it is substantially 
like the one delineated by Ndebele and cited in Chapter 1: 
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the greatest challenge of the South African revolution is in 
the search for ways of thinking, ways of perception, that 
will help to break down the closed epistemological 
structures of South African oppression. such structures can 
severely compromise resistance by dominating thinking 
itself. For writers this means freeing the creative process 
itself from those very laws. It means extending the writer's 
perception of what can be written about, and the means and 
methods of writing (1989:45). 
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Even though the 'silence' of the black woman might be apocryphal, there 
remains something faintly insulting in asking whether she can speak; 
certainly to do so is to run counter to my recognition of the 
potentially volitional nature of silence. 
Nor should the deliberacy of this recognition disguise an important 
distinction. Following the ethnographic model, I am choosing to 
recognise character as a subject, and the volitional silence of 
character as resistance to the 'cultural translation' that is narration. 
My intention in doing so is less to make a directive and categorical 
insistence on subjectivity, volit ion and autonomy, than, reflexively, to 
extend the range and develop the finesse of the responses that may be 
made to character, and thus to such subjectivity, volition and autonomy 
as may in fact exist. Tyler's comment in regard to similar processes of 
reflexivity in ethnography perhaps bears repeating: "The ethnographic 
text will thus achieve its purposes not by revealing them, but by making 
purposes possible" (1986:136). 
since character as subject is intrinsic to a resistant reading of 
silence, it seems important to come to a working definition of the 
subject. Is the key to such status the exercise of choice? Certainly 
choice informs the character's ability to act. Another more elusive 
though more seminal feature of the subject is the power to constitute a 
self. This power seems to me functionally more definitive because, if 
the self is constituted in language, it is in language as part of a 
language:-culture system. And so self-constitution always exists in a 
certain tension with construction by others. Since such processes are 
apparent in the language of the text, they are also more amenable to 
analysis than the exercise of choice . It is possible, therefore, to 
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explore the ways in which language functions to constitute identity: 
both in the character's own language, and particularly his or her 
'representations' of the 'I, and in the 'constructions' of others, the 
relations in which a character functions as a 'you' . 
The questions that might inform the discussions that follow, then, are, 
what narrative functions does this character fulfil? what purposes does 
she carry out? what narrative options are open to her? Addressing such 
questions might clarify the narrative range in which the character can 
exercise her freedom and her autonomy as a subject. Silence can then be 
recognised as part of the character's response both to being narrated, 
and to the broader hegemonies of discourse that structure the 'culture' 
of the text. This culture, in clifford's terms, is "always relational, 
an inscription of communicative processes that exist, historically, 
between subjects in relations of power" (1986:15). In the novels 
selected for discussion these relations are particularly pertinent 
because in important ways each figure of the black woman is a cultural 
transi tional, and so her positioning in regard to community serves to 
structure her positioning within the narrative: Plaatje's Mhudi by the 
Mfecane, Paton's Stephanie by colonisation and urbanisation, and the 
Immorality Act, and Head's Margaret by the tensions between her racial 
origins, her education and cultural affiliations, and her ultimate 
alignment with an African totem. In the first and third of these cases, 
such transitionality is related to the biographic situation and 
experiences of the writer. In Paton's novel the interpolation of a 
first-person narrator complicates the narrative relations, and also, in 
my view, reflects in interesting ways upon his narrative endeavour and 
hence his positioning in relation to the Centre. 
It should be clear from this delineation that our 'review' of the 
'cuI tural translation' that takes place in each text also involves a 
resistant reading of narrative which, as a strategy to structure a 
polyphony of voices in the novel, must inevitably contend with this 
'culture' within the text. On the other hand, the 'reviews' that will be 
undertaken will also seek to position themselves in relation to specific 
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debates that have arisen in the criticism of the novels: in relation, 
perhaps, to the 'culture' around the text. Such positioning is important 
because all of these texts have had somewhat troubled receptions, and 
their place in the canon of Southern African literature (if one can be 
said to exist) is by no means secure . The readings that I will offer, 
then, will also constitute acts of critical validation, in insisting 
that these texts are both interesting and important. 
For this reason, another major interest of these studies will be the 
positioning of the writer (and his or her critics) in terms of the 
postcolonial paradigm, that is, in terms of alignment with the Centre 
and distance from or integration with the local context. Such 
positioning is important in identifying and explaining the 
accommodations of narrative strategy to cross-culturality in the text, 
especially as it evinces itself in linguistic polyphony and discursive 
relations, including the influence of culturally dominant codes on the 
lives of the characters. Such positioning is also important in locating 
the critical debates. 
The first of the studies to be undertaken is of Plaatje's Hhudi, which 
was written in the early years of this century and which offers a 
retrospective view of the impact of the Mfecane on local tribes on the 
South-Eastern borders of what was then Bechuanaland, as well as on the 
Boers who were making inroads from the South. The central protagonist of 
Plaatje's novel is a black woman, who serves as a principle of coherence 
in an otherwise apparently fragmented novel. Both her voice and her 
silence will receive attention; other concerns of the chapter will be 
Plaatje's position at the interfaces of oral and literate, Tswana and 
English, and tribal membership and non-sectarianism, and the ways in 
which these impact both on his narrative strategy and on the textual 
relations in which his central character is located. His purposes and 
his position as a writer will thus be related in broader terms to his 
positioning within the postcolonial paradigm. 
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SOL T. PLAATJE: IHUDI 
4.1 The Matter of Style 
An important critical debate about Nhudi (1930)1 has centred on 
Plaatje's use of language. In a 1980 commentary on the novel, Christie, 
Hutchings and MacLennan took up the line of Jahn's criticism of 
Plaatje's "padded Victorian style" (cited in Couzens 1978a) in what 
amounted to a resounding denunciation: 
Interesting though the novel is as a traditional historical 
romance, the language is incapable of doing precisely what a 
reader looks for in a serious work, Le. capturing the 
shifting texture of awareness and presenting the very 
feeling and quality of experience. The language is stuffy, 
learned (albeit impeccably) from nineteenth and possibly 
eighteenth century fiction. There is a presupposed moral 
fixity of meaning in the language, a set of moral attitudes 
which makes it incapable of aesthetic discovery. 
To put the whole matter simply, Plaatje' s style has 
resonances which run counter to the novel's political 
import. The organising power of the old patina of romance 
and the historical inertia of a language associated with Sir 
walter Scott in effect get in the way of Plaatje's attempt 
to penetrate the quality of 'the Native mind' (1980:81-82). 
It seems curious in retrospect that these writers should not have 
registered the thorough consideration given Plaatje's language by 
Couzens in his Introduction to the Heinemann edition (1978a), based in 
turn on two earlier articles. Couzens notes that Plaatje was a linguist 
who could speak at least nine languages; and finds 'sensi ti vi ty to 
register' in Plaatje's use of Biblical and epic language, and 
, creati vi ty' in his introduction of proverbs and the fable into the 
novel form (1978a:12-13). He points out, too, that Plaatje was, "at an 
early stage, encountering the same problems which later African writers 
in English have confronted: the tension between what they want to say 
and a language which has ' foreign' and often oppressi ve connotations, 
and how to translate the registers of one language into those of another 
language" (1978a:13). Elsewhere, Couzens comments, "Plaatje was fully 
1 Plaatje, S.T. 1978. Nhudi. London: Heinemann. All further 
references are to this edition. 
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aware of all the problems of 'translation' which still beset the African 
writer, but once his decision was made [to write in English] he did not 
fuss unnecessarily about it" (1978b:61). 
Before pursuing these comments in regard to the theoretical framework 
thus far developed, we should perhaps address some of the problems 
implicit in the judgements of Christie, Hutchings and MacLennan. In the 
first place, their criterion "aesthetic discovery" cannot simply be 
taken at face value, since it comes equipped with neither a 
specification of meaning nor a delineation of the ways in which such 
"discovery" ought to occur. In the second place, the non-reflexivity of 
the judgements renders them now rather prescriptive and naive. The 
question being begged is, Can a reader who is not a "Native" adequately 
judge the success of the attempt to "penetrate ... the Native mind"? In 
the third place, the fact that I do not share the writers' sense of a 
"presupposed moral fixity of meaning in the language" is less 
significant in itself than as an estimate of their failure to recognise 
the range in perspectives that might be taken by readers - let alone the 
'constitutive power the reader has over the meaning of the text' upon 
which I have been insisting. Like Achebe's attack on Heart of Darkness 
this critique of Hhudi represents a "cross-border reading", and one that 
is not redeemed by a sense of cross-cultural positioning. Couzens's use 
of the term "translation", by contrast, demonstrates an awareness that, 
since Plaatje was a member of one of the tribes of which he writes in 
Hhudi, his novel offers a rendition of his own culture for members of 
others. In this sense our own reading will be as much a cross-border 
reading as that of Christie, Hutchings and MacLennan. 
In theoretical terms, recognising the cultural interface allows us to 
see as extant and intact the respective meaning systems at which it 
occurs, and mandates us, as "subsequent or alternative readers", to 
exercise a critical distance from the authority of both the translator 
and the target medium in order to 'review' the 'translation'. Recalling 
Maughan Brown's injunctions that the "critic should be as conversant as 
possible with ... the culture of the community from wi thin which the 
writer comes", and that "critical standards should not predate the 
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literature they are attempting to assess" (1982: 50), we might notice 
that the debate about the novel's style is characterised by an 
application of extraneous standards to the languages of the text - an 
application apparent in Couzens's 'sensitivity' and 'creativity' as well 
as in Christie, Hutchings and MacLennan's "presupposed moral fixity of 
meaning" and "historical inertia". Perhaps my insistence is simply that 
the consequences of the judgement s need explication: rather than dismiss 
the novel as an "interesting ... traditional historical romance", for 
example, we need to become reflexively aware of the conventions of 
reading that we are bringing to bear on it, and, if these are 
insufficiently sensitive to its purposes, to develop new modes of 
response. 
We might, therefore, refer these conventions to the postcolonial 
paradigm, and its delineation of linguistic "appropriation" as "the 
process by which the language is taken and made to 'bear the burden' of 
one's own cultural experience, or, as Raja Rao puts it, 'to convey in a 
language that is not one's own the spirit that is one's own'" (quoted in 
Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin 1989:38-39). A judgement of Plaatje's 
stylistic successes and failures should not precede an awareness of his 
cultural and narrative purposes. We might also take up their terms to 
explore whether this text falls into the category of "literature 
produced under imperial licence by 'natives' or 'outcasts'" (1989:2), or 
whether it constitutes a rather more positive "cross-cultural hybrid" as 
suggested by 'syncreticist' critics (1989:30). 
In the third place, we might notice the novel's structural and thematic 
foregrounding of language and discourse per se, and in doing so listen 
to the polyphony of voices in the text. One of the reasons for this 
foregrounding was Plaatje's locat ion at the interface of oral and 
li terate culture and his concomitant search for ways of textualising 
oral tradition and experience; another was his attempt to incorporate 
mul tiple language-culture systems into his text and thus to manage 
cultural translations amongst them. Both these reasons demonstrate the 
influence of cross-culturality 'within' Plaatje's text, and so militate 
against a critical review of Mhudi in purely literary terms. 
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Nor should we ignore another aspect of the novel which has received 
critical attention: its relations to history. The views Mazisi Kunene 
has expressed in this regard have been quite as scathing as those of 
Christie, Hutchings and MacLennan: "Khudi itself is a second-rate, badly 
organized hodge-podge of semihistory, semifiction, shoddy allegory - a 
pastiche combining fact and fiction in a most illogical manner" (cited 
in Gray 1980:247). These views run directly counter to those of "the 
Rand School", as Kunene slightingly dubs Couzens, Gray, and Willan (in 
Gray 1980:245), whose critical reclamation of Plaatje has focused on the 
significance in contemporary terms of his 'rewriting' and 
'reinterpretation' of history. Gray in particular offers the following 
comment which, if patronising, is still perhaps acute: "for the black 
critic and writer within South Africa the legacy of oral culture is 
often taken as a reminder of the 'primitive' past which he or she is 
trying to escape" (1979:162). Given Kunene's status as a black South 
African critic, his critique might be seen as reflecting the "cross-
border" effects of history rather more significantly than those of 
culture which qualified the views of Christie, Hutchings and MacLennan. 
4.2 Plaatje's Purposes and position as a Writer 
Recognising our own cross-border positioning might lead us more easily 
to recognise also the interface between 'official' and 'tribal' versions 
of history at which Plaatje is located , and hence the ways in which his 
'rewriting' and 'reinterpretation' of history might be read as an 
attempt to establish and to develop a fictional voice. since I have 
argued above against 'extraneous standards', our theoretical approach 
now to the issues of language, history and cultural translation should 
perhaps begin with a consideration of Plaatje's purposes and his 
position as a writer. In his Preface to the Original Edition, Plaatje 
specifies as his two "objects" in writing the book: "(a) to interpret to 
the reading public one phase of ' the back of the Native mind'; and (b) 
wi th the readers' money, to collect and print (for Bantu Schools) 
Sechuana folk-tales, Which, with the spread of European ideas, are fast 
being forgotten" (1978:21). 
CHAPTER. 4: PLAATJE: IIBUDI 123 
A crucial distinction between Christie, Hutchings and MacLennan's sense 
of Plaatje as a writer and his own is signalled by his use of 
"interpret" as opposed to their "penetrate". The epistemological 
dimension of Plaatj e 's term is crucial because it reflects his quite 
frank awareness, and indeed acknowledgement, of writing Nhudi in 
reaction to white versions of history. It also reflects the mUltiplicity 
of 'interpretations' that take place between the four major language-
culture systems represented in the novel. It is this term in particular, 
therefore, that offers a mandate for a reading of his work as cultural 
translation. 
This means, in the first place, that the directedness of his work should 
be recognised. As a founder member and international representative of 
the South African Native National Congress, as a journalist and 
pamphleteer, and as the author of Native Life in South Africa (1987), 
Plaatje quite clearly construed himself as a spokesman for his people, 
whose duty it was to lobby their cause. It is Couzens's contention, in 
this regard, that Nhudi is an implicit attack on the Native Lands Act of 
1913 (1978a:17). It seems to me likely, at least, that Plaatje's 
decision to use English for his fiction (made, as Couzens had it, 
"without fuss") was strongly motivated by the access it allowed him to 
the "reading public" he mentions, which, predominantly white at · that 
time, would have included sectors of the colonial hierarchy with 
decision-making power. On the other hand his hopes are unlikely to have 
stopped short of being read by later generations of educated black 
people. Thus we might recognise his endeavour as being both 
commemorative and celebratory. 
In the second place, Plaatje reveals in his reference to what he will be 
'interpreting' a clear sense of the sophistication of his project. His 
inverted commas for "the back of the Native mind" draw attention to the 
use of terminology not his own: terminology devised to describe the 
'other' which he is applying, ironically, to himself. The category 
"Native" cannot be read as a simply racial one. The context to which it 
refers is a colonial one, which has now in some senses irrevocably gone, 
and so its use here very neatly reveals Plaatje' s consciousness of 
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'rewriting' imperial versions of the Mfecane of the 1830s. Hence his 
account of "collecting stray scraps of tribal history" which challenge 
the official construction of the Matabele as "fierce", "unreasoning" and 
"actuated by sheer lust for human blood" (21). The identification of a 
casus belli has a dual significance. On the one hand, it shows Plaatje's 
"Native" to be non-sectarian: indeed, the tension between the 
interiority with which the Matabele camp is depicted and the graphic 
violence suffered by the Barolong at their hands is one of the major 
structural achievements of the novel. On the other, it demands a 
recognition of the interiority of all "Natives": it insists that their 
psychology be respected, that their actions be read in human and not in 
objective terms. Plaatje's textualisation of these subjects is one that 
endeavours as far as possible to take their humanity into account. It is 
in this sense that we might read his text as an attempt not simply to 
find and raise a voice of his own, but in doing so to render the voice 
of "Native" people. 
In the third place, and for these reasons, we might be led to evaluate 
in fresh terms claims that have been made about the influence of orality 
that is reflected in Hhudi. In the second of Plaatje's stated objects we 
see evidence of his explicit concern with the preservation of oral 
culture against the inroads of British colonialism. Impressive as this 
concern might seem, -it should also remind us of Clifford's allegory of 
salvage: 
Ethnography's disappearing object is, then, in significant 
degree, a rhetorical construct legitimating a 
representational practice : "salvage" ethnography in its 
widest sense. The other is lost, in disintegrating time and 
space, but saved in the text .... I do, however, question 
the assumption that with rapid change something essential 
("culture"), a coherent differential identity, vanishes. And 
I que~tion, ~oo, the mode of scient~fic and moral authority 
assoclated wlth salvage, or redemptlve, ethnography. It is 
assumed that the other society is weak and "needs" to be 
represented by an outsider (and that what matters in its 
~ife is its past, not present or future). The recorder and 
lnterpreter of fragile custom is custodian of an essence 
unimpeachable witness to an authenticity. (Moreover, sinc~ 
the "true" culture has always vanished, the salvaged version 
cannot be easily refuted) (1986:112-3). 
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To apply this description to Plaatje we need to draw certain 
distinctions. Al though he might be recognised as "custodian of an 
essence, unimpeachable witness to an authenticity", he is not strictly 
an "outsider", as ethnographers typically are. Thus even if the 
"authority" he possesses "cannot easily be refuted", it might more 
easily be condoned, and indeed has been by several critics, as I will go 
on to show. Yet the problems of textualisation which characterise 
Plaatje's cultural translation are in many ways both more acute and more 
complex than those of the typical ethnographic situation, and so serve 
to qualify both his position and his purposes as a writer. 
Although Plaatje is separated from the events of his story by time, and 
although the roots of this story are not personal experience but 
history, his narrative position is that of an insider to one of the 
communities of whom he writes. The history which informs his story is 
mediated to him through the "stray scraps" (Preface, 1978: 13) he has 
collected from older members of the tribe, and his access to this 
history is dependent on his position as a "full-blooded member of the 
Barolong tribe" (Couzens 1978a:1). Both this position and the access it 
allows him can thus be seen as setting up tensions with the claim to 
non-sectarianism implicit in his "one phase of the 'back of the Native 
mind' ", and explicit in his membership and representation of the South 
African Native National Congress. We see evidence of these tensions in 
the numerous cultural interfaces in the novel, and in the explicit 
'interpretation' of many 'others', on both a general and an individual 
level, in response to questions such as, "What kind of people are the 
Matabele?" (86), and "What are Boers?" (90). 
A second set of tensions exists between his position as a tribal member 
and his distinction of being "the first to put memory to paper" 
(Plaatje, cited in Couzens 1987:50), in having, as Voss has proposed, "a 
fair claim to the title of the first South African man of letters" 
(1989:13). From the realm of autobiography, Lejeune offers a pertinent 
insight: 
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An author is not a person. He is a person who writes and 
publishes. Straddling the world-beyond-the-text and the 
text, he is the connection between the two. The author is 
defined as simultaneously a socially responsible real 
person, and the producer of a discourse. For the reader, who 
does not know the real person, all the while believing in 
his existence, the author is defined as the person capable 
of producing this discourse, and so imagines what he is like 
from what he produces. Perhaps one is an author only with 
his second book, when the proper name inscribed on the cover 
becomes the "common factor" of at least two different texts, 
and thus gives the idea of a person who cannot be reduced to 
any of his texts in particular, and who, capable of 
producing others, surpasses them all (1989:11). 
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This transition to the status of ' author' doubtless characterises all 
who write and publish. In Plaatje's case, his authorship, and the 
literacy which precedes it, work to distance if not to alienate him from 
oral culture. Although we don't see Plaatje, in Gray's terms, trying to 
escape a ' pr imiti ve ' past, such distancing is apparent in his non-
sectarian perspective, in his deployment of irony and humour, in the 
Christian values which inform his presentation of events, and in his 
exploitation of the literary resources of an English cultural heritage. 
Indeed this distancing works in two ways, because the formal shift from 
oral to inscribed is compounded by the linguistic shift from Tswana to 
English. A third set of tensions thus exists between the oral medium in 
which such storytelling would have taken place, and the 'target medium' 
into which Plaatje translated them - the medium in which he had already 
become a "man of letters". If his quest is to render the voice of 
"Native" people, we might recognise with Voss that "one of the 
significant silences of Hhudi is the comparative lack of reference to 
Britain" (1989:21). Yet if Plaatje's concern is to preserve Tswana 
culture against the inroads of British colonialism, the paradox remains 
that his preservation takes the form of translation into English. It is 
doubtless to his credit that he is able fruitfully to exploit the 
literary resources of this cultural heritage, as Gray (1979, 1981), 
Couzens (1978a, 1987), and most lately Walter (1992) have shown. The 
reservations of Christie, Hutchings and MacLennan notwithstanding, such 
exploitation is an important instance of the appropriation of the medium 
of the Centre. And yet we might recall the warning note from Asad cited 
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in Chapter 2: "there are asymmetrical tendencies and pressures in the 
languages of dominated and dominant societies" (1986: 164), and, since 
"the languages of Third Wor ld societies - including, of course, the 
societies that social anthropologists have traditionally studied - are 
"weaker" in relation to western languages (and today, especially to 
English), they are more likely to submit to forcible transformation in 
the translation process than the other way around" (1986:157-158). 
4.3 Complexities of Textualisation 
These tensions will receive consideration in the course of the 
discussion that follows: they should certainly serve to remind us of the 
significance of our task of 'reviewing' the translation. The 
implications of such complexities of textualisation seem to me broadly 
threefold. In the first place, Plaatje's participation in an oral 
tradition gives him a fundamentally communal conception of narrative, 
yet it is a conception which is tested in his act of narration. It is in 
the nature of oral narratives that they both belong to communities and 
are constitutive of communities - hence that they serve essentially 
conservative functions. The telling and retelling of stories that are 
the property of, for example, the clan serves to reinforce and to 
perpetuate the clan's identity. One of the ways it does so is by passing 
this identity on into the care of its younger members. It is to such a 
process that Plaatje alludes in the second of his stated objects: "with 
the reader's money, to collect and print ... Sechuana folk-tales, which, 
with the spread of European ideas, are fast being forgotten" (1978:21). 
By contrast, the individualism which informs the status of "author" is 
strikingly apparent both in the definition cited from Lejeune above, and 
in this comment from Giddens which was referred to, in passing, in 
Chapter 2: 
Now a text which has a particular form - for example a 
novel, a play, a poem, or a painting - in contrast to casual 
talk is a phenomenon into which an individual pours effort 
in order to ~chieve fo~m. It is not just that the producer 
puts effort 1nto what 1S produced that distinguishes a work 
fro~ ,a casua~ly produced outcome of mundane day-to-day 
actlv1ty. It lS that the creation of form is known to the 
agent to be constitutive of what the work is .... In this 
respect, for instance, there is a major set of discrepancies 
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between a novel and, say, myths, which are produced through 
repeti ti ve oral communication,. and may. have no indi ~idual 
author who lays claim to the prlme role ln the productlon of 
the story. A novel has "an author" and this is known to 
those who produce novels, who do so in the light of such 
knowledge as part of their generalized cultural experience 
(1987:172). 
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There is an important sense in which to tell a story about people is to 
distance oneself from them: in Rimmon-Kenan's schema, to insert a 
narrative level between oneself and them. In Plaatje's case, such 
distancing is compounded by the inscription of the stories contained in 
his novel, which thus lays claim not only to the 'authority' of 
narration but also to the 'authority' of the text. This point will be 
taken up again shortly. 
In the second place, given the communal nature of narrative in an oral 
society, Plaatje' s act of literary inscription impacts back upon the 
oral tradition from which it derives. The telling and retelling of 
stories reinforces and perpetuates the clan's identity by passing it on 
into the care of its younger members; it does so also by delimiting 
access to these stories. By his membership of his clan, Plaatje has 
inside access to the oral history he seeks to inscribe. Yet in writing 
and publishing Hhudi Plaatje directs himself to a "reading public" far 
removed from the communities in which the events of the story might have 
taken place. The transition he brings about in doing so, from audience 
to readership, disturbs the balance of narrative power: because once a 
story is inscribed it becomes a text that is no longer subject to the 
limi ts of access that define t he act of oral storytelling. Although 
Plaatje might claim to be preserving - or conserving - an essential and 
authentic oral culture, although he may be attempting to capture the 
craftsmanship of oral narratives, his act of inscription constitutes a 
radical cleaving of the barrier that would normally exclude members of 
the group who formed his "reading public", because the text it produces 
no longer depends on the spoken word for its existence. 
In the third place, therefore, we witness in Hhudi a modal transition 
from orality to inscribed lit erature. The significance of this 
transition again seems to me broadly threefold: its elements might be 
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considered in relation to critical debates about the narrative strategy 
of the novel, its foregrounding of language, and the symbolic terms in 
which Mhudi herself has been read. 
4.4 Narrative strategy 
Especially given my comments above about 'authorship', it seems both a 
misrepresentation and a reduction to see the text as simply mimicking an 
instance of oral narration, with Plaatje as its scribe, as some critics 
have done. Couzens claims, for example, that "the form of the novel is 
... that of a spoken story told to the writer by Half-a-Crown, almost 
certainly, the son of Ra-Thaga" (1978a:15). Gray goes further. The 
novel, he says, is "a document of living oral narrative" whose narrator, 
Half-a-Crown, "could quite legitimately have gathered every phrase of 
the work that is Nhudi from one or another source personally and 
faithfully". Although he is "the single narrator of all of Nhudi", HaIf-
a-Crown "is no omniscient narrati ve mouthpiece devised to lend 
verisimilitude and colour to a mixture of historical research and 
imaginati ve speculation ... he is none other than the actual son of 
Mhudi and Ra-Thaga" (1979:176-177). 
We might address these claims, in the first instance, by considering 
Half-a-Crown's position in the narrative structure of the novel. In my 
reading, his 'existence' as a "narrator" is shaky indeed, because (even 
in the Heinemann edition) he makes so few narrative emergences; when he 
does so he usually represents himself in third-person; and as a Morolong 
he is scarce likely to have had the substantial inside access to the 
Matabele camp that is offered in the novel. It is these facts, rather 
than the insensitivity of a readership "which denies his oral heritage 
any literary status" (1979:177), that render problematic the attempt to 
read him as "the single narrator of all of Nhudi". 
This might become more apparent if we consider two such ' narrative 
emergences'. One occurs in a commentary on the relationship between 
Mhudi and Ra-Thaga: "That exactly is how my father and mother met and 
became man and wife .... My father being a trained hunter, they had 
plenty of venison" (59-60). In the introductory qualifying phrase, and 
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particularly in the insistent "exactly", attention is paradoxically 
drawn to the fiction, to the ' si tuation of narrative utterance', in 
which Half-a-Crown is located. Another more significant emergence serves 
to introduce the Matabele subplot: 
Half-a-Crown may be permitted to digress and describe the 
beauty and virtue of one of King Mzilikazi' s wives - the 
lily of his harem, by name Umnandi, the sweet one. She was a 
daughter of Umzinyati (the Bison-city), the offspring of a 
lineage of brave warriors with many deeds of valour to their 
credit. Such was the description of her given to Half-a-
Crown, the hoary octogenarian, that it reminded him of a 
remarkable passage in the Song of Songs .... and when he 
changed 'vineyards' into ' cornfields', he thought he could 
visualize her appearance in his mind's eye with accuracy 
(91-92). 
Gray makes much of the distinction implied here between author and 
narrator: "... what the Lovedale text, in deleting the appearance of 
'Half-a-Crown', omitted to give evidence of was that Plaatje viewed 
himself not so much as a novelist but as a scribe, whose role was to 
record the story told him by an intermediary, this missing link between 
those who knew the history of the 1830s at first hand and who in his 
eighties was handing it on to Plaatje" (1979:175). It seems unfortunate 
that Gray's (probably valid) attack on the interventions of the mission 
press should lead to a loss of narrative perspective, and particularly 
to an elision of Plaatje' s definitive role as author, which I have 
described above in terms adopted from Lejeune and from Giddens. The 
element of narrative choice needs emphasis: if Plaatje did plan to use 
Half-a-Crown as his narrator in Hhudi, the intention seems incompletely 
realised even in the "original manuscript". 
In addition, even granting Gray's contention that "for Plaatje the 
acceptance of the novel form was merely the acceptance of a flexible 
enough medium which he could use for his own ends" (1979:175), the fact 
that the novel form exerts pressures of its own (as I will go on to 
show) should surely lead us to recognise ' Plaatje as an 'interpreter' not 
a 'scribe', and hence the importance of other textual choices he makes. 
Pre-eminent amongst these is the use of a broadly omniscient narrative 
structure which allows him to offer interior perspectives of two 
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directly opposing camps (Barolong and Matabele). Rimmon-Kenan provides a 
useful reminder: 
'Omniscience' is perhaps an exaggerated term, especially for 
modern extradiegetic narrators. Nevertheless, the 
characteristics connoted by it are still relevant, namely: 
familiarity, in principle, with the characters' innermost 
thoughts and feelings; knowledge of past, present and 
future; presence in locations where characters are supposed 
to be unaccompanied ... and knowledge of what happens in 
several places at the same time (1983:95). 
within the predominant omniscience there are important variations. One 
of the most important is Mhudi' s analeptic recounting of the Matabele 
raid in Chapter 3. Although this analepsis will receive attention 
subsequently, I should point out here that it constitutes an early 
instance of, on the one hand, her function as a principle of coherence 
in the novel, and, on the other, the rendition within the narrative of 
her "voice". 
A second variation is the figural narration which allows us access to 
the interiority of several camps. The conspiracy aimed at Umnandi stands 
as a case in point, focalised as it is through the consciousness of one 
of its perpetrators: 
Umpitimpiti laughed aloud, rather with his teeth than with 
his feelings. At that moment he cared not what became of 
Nomenti, who stood petrified with fear as she overhead the 
conversation. He was only anxious to get away from the place 
before his alarm was noticed; so he left the two men to 
continue their conversation. Hardly knowing where he was 
going, Umpi timpi ti walked through the courtyard into the 
open space where the assemblies are held and cases tried. 
There he found himself in the midst of a large crowd of men 
... (128). 
Such focalisation is important in examining the human consequences of 
Mzilikazi's power, hence its insistence on a moral frame applicable to 
both Matabele and Barolong. This works, in my view, to counter the 
process of 'othering' that takes place when different groups are 
'translated', for example in answer to questions such as "what are they 
like?". {This process will receive further attention later.} 
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A third is the use of proverbs and folk-tales to reflect the polyphony 
of tribal voices: the "folk-tales, legends and oral history" of 
Matabele, Qoranna, Boer, Barolong. In a more moderate claim for the 
novel's links with oral culture, Couzens cites Molema' s report that 
Plaatje called Hhudi his "evening reader". Couzens comments: 
[Plaatje] seems to have regarded Hhudi as analogous to folk-
tales, legends and oral history passed from one generation 
to another, around the fireside at night. It could thus 
contain the wisdom and history of his people, the very core 
of his own culture. Hhudi is very close to the spoken word 
because that is the way Plaatje learnt much of the history 
and fable he recounts in the novel (1978a:15). 
We should perhaps note that Couzens's final assertion elides Plaatje's 
acquaintance with Shakespeare and particularly the use of dramatic 
dialogue which Plaatje would have examined at close range in his 
translations of the plays into Tswana. Yet Couzens's description is 
important for its attention to the commemorative and celebratory 
impulses that formed part of Plaatje' s quest to conserve an essential 
and authentic oral culture. Elsewhere Couzens cites a comment by Ruth 
Finnegan that proverbs are "just one aspect of artistic expression 
within a social and literary context" (couzens 1978b:62). Using proverbs 
in his text, Plaatje is allowing the communal voice to speak. On the 
other hand, such 'allowing' is typically marked in the narrative. In the 
first speech of Gubuza to the Matabele, for example, two proverbs occur: 
"Wiseacres of different nationalities are agreed that cheap successes 
are always followed by grievous aftermaths. Old people are equally 
agreed that indi viduals, especially, nations, should beware of the 
impetuosity of youth" (54). The italicised phrases serve two separate 
functions. wi thin Gubuza' s speech they invoke an oral tradition whose 
authority is accepted by both speaker and hearers. within the narrative, 
they draw attention to the language-culture system of the Tswana which 
is distinct from the 'English' (and, in the first instance, the 
'American') of the text. They draw attention, in other words, to the 
'cultural translation' that is taking place. 
My primary purpose in considering the Couzens-Gray claims about the 
'orali ty' of Hhudi is not to attack a relatively atheoretical, and 
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certainly polemical, analysis of the novel: rather it is to insist on 
the existence of a textual interface between oral and inscribed 
narrative. since communities are represented in this novel substantially 
through their discourse, as I will go on to show, we need to recognise 
the significance of who has 'taken over narrating' at any given point, 
and in so doing to open our ears to the "multiple voices of the text" 
(Maclean 1988:6,22). And since the "distanciation" that occurs in 
inscription renders Plaatje's narrative susceptible to interpretation by 
readers, the most useful framework for such interpretation must be a 
recognition of the text as a literary representation of oral 
representations of history, with due emphasis given to each of these 
terms and the distinct pressures of context they reflect. 
4.5 Foregrounding of Language 
The second broad effect of the oral-literary interface is evident in the 
foregrounding of language in the novel . If we recall the judgements with 
which this chapter opened, we might recognise in . them an intuitive 
awareness of, and unease at, Plaatje's "appropriation" of the imperial 
medium, as delineated by Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (1989:38). The 
unease might become more apparent if we consider, by comparison, the 
critical latitude Voss brings to Plaatje's use of language: "The reader 
coming to Nhudi for the first time will be surprised and perhaps 
delighted by Plaatj e' s idiom, by a style which announces itself as a 
style. Only the individuality of a particular sensibility at a 
particular moment of class and history could unify the wide range of 
tone and register that Nhudi contains" (1989:19). My particular interest 
is less the successes or failures of Plaatje's syncretic style than the 
various influences it reveals: on the one hand an oral heritage, and on 
the other the cultural heritage and the authority of the target medium 
in which his act of inscription and translation takes place. 
The first of these influences relates i n significant ways to the issue 
of narrative accountability and hence to the treatment of the figure of 
the black woman which will, later, constitute a maj or focus of this 
chapter. For this reason I would like to offer a brief outline of the 
second influence here, as well as consider its relations with the first 
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in the course of the discussion that follows. At the beginning of this 
chapter I cited Couzens's observations that Plaatje was a linguist who 
could speak at least nine languages. His acquaintance with English 
literature included sUbstantial knowledge of the Bible, of Shakespeare 
and of Bunyan, as well as the contemporary popular fiction of Rider 
Haggard. These literary resources were tapped for "dramatic techniques, 
monologues, puns and other language devices, the chronicle-history, the 
lions and comets of Julius Caesar .••• allegory, parable, dreams and 
travel" (Couzens 1978a:14). Walter has more recently taken up Couzens's 
passing comment that "Hhudi is a kind of winter's tale of loss and 
regeneration" (1978a:9) in an examination of the novel's "romance 
patterning" and "romance vision" (1992:1). 
Such critical awareness of literary sources has not, however, been 
matched by a sense of the foregrounding of spoken language in the novel. 
In this regard we might recall Giddens's insistence on the model of 
"temporally and spatially situated conversation, not the text, and not 
writing, ... [as] most essential to explaining what language and meaning 
are" (1987:170). Plainly Plaatje's knowledge of literature and his 
translations of it give him a heightened consciousness' of medium, and so 
help to shape the specific form language takes on different occasions 
and in different circumstances in the novel: from the Edenic description 
of the marriage of 'Mhudi and Ra-Thaga, to the Solomonic wisdom of the 
judgement of some of the chiefs, to Gubuza's military speeches which are 
reminiscent of Shakespeare's Roman soldier heroes, to the construction 
of Mhudi as 'heroine', to the lyric mode into which several of the poems 
which punctuate the narrative are transcribed. Yet in my view the 
foregrounding of spoken language stems significantly from Plaatje's 
communal context of orality . Positioned as he is at the oral-literary 
interface, his narrative strategy represents language, and especially 
spoken language, as a powerful constitutive force within the world of 
the Bechuana and Matabele tribes that is his retrospective fictional 
target. 
Perhaps nowhere is the consti tuti ve power of discourse more apparent 
than in the ceremonies described in the novel, which take place in three 
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of the four communities in the novel. Writing almost forty years after 
Plaatje, Chinua Achebe made similar use of the mass salute to 
demonstrate the unity of the tribe: "Umuofia kwenul" (1958:63). In 
Plaatje's novel the mass salute of "thousands of leather-lunged 
Matabele" (50) takes place after the soldiers return from war. The range 
of discourse on this occasion includes both praise speeches in honour of 
Mzilikazi and his warrior son, and the oration of Gubuza who counsels 
prudence and restraint, and earns himself the disfavour of the crowds in 
doing so. Al though we might be aware of Shakespearean echoes, the 
detailed 'transcription' of the formal speeches and the inclusion of a 
contestatory voice give us a sense of interior access to the formal 
functioning of the tribe. This sense, it seems to me, is strengthened 
rather than diminished by the narrator's transcription of Matabele idiom 
("leather-lunged") to describe the power of their communal voice. Even 
his irony concedes admiration because it acknowledges the autonomy (if 
not the propriety) of Matabele values. 
An important counterpoint to this ceremony is the Barolong council which 
decides to support the Boers against the Matabele. The chief, Moroka, is 
characterised on this occasion in linguistic terms, in a description 
which includes the nature of the man, the quality of his thought, his 
relations with communal tradition, and his standing in the tribe. 
Although "not as great an orator as most of the Native chiefs", Moroka 
excels in philosophy, his expressions being witty and his humour dry. 
"He spoke in a staccato voice, with short sentences and a stop after 
each, as though composing the next sentence. His speeches abounded in 
allegories and proverbial sayings, some traditional and other [sic] 
spontaneous. His own maxims had about them the spice of originality 
which always provided his auditors with much food for thought" (111). 
Participant as he is in a communal field of wisdom, he is yet able to 
marshal it to his purposes, and also to take ini tiati ves which are 
condoned and respected by his listeners. The democratic accountability 
of his manner is reflected in the respect and reciprocity of the 
proceedings, which are thus sharply contrasted with those of the 
Matabele: the "announcement so momentous" (110) cannot be made until all 
the chiefs are present, and Moroka demonstrates an awareness that he has 
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no right to join hostilities without the consent of the tribesmen. His 
presentation of the case takes the form of a long speech which, "while 
leaving no doubt as to his personal sympathies, left the main decision 
in the hands of the assembly" (111). His deliberate naming of the 
several sections of the tribe at the end of this speech is successful in 
elici ting enthusiastic verbal support. The decision is thus made with 
the endorsement of the tribe; and the importance of communal sanctioning 
is explicitly acknowledged in Moroka's use of a proverb to conclude his 
speech: "Old people say the quarry of two dogs is never too strong" 
(113; my emphasis). 
If it is Plaatje's narrative strategy to foreground spoken language in 
his representations of these two communities, we should be aware both of 
the values which inform these representations, and of his Barolong 
allegiances. And if, as I claimed above, one value system is being 
brought to bear on both communities, Mzilikazi is characterised by none 
of the positive qualities which serve to identify Moroka, and the wisdom 
of the individual voice of Gubuza is effectively dismissed in the 
meeting of the Matabele chiefs that follows. 
Of course, communal discourse is not restricted to the ceremonial. 
Within the Matabele camp, the range of verbal activity includes 
espionage ( 135 ), prophecies by wizards (138) and by Mzilikazi himself 
( 174-175), and the policy-generating speeches of the powerful Gubuza 
(54, 103, 150). Within the Barolong camp we encounter a major courtcase 
(121-124), and "wrangling and arguing" that leads to a military pact 
(141-142), as well as the more domestic pursuits of matchmaking (159), 
and commentaries on topical events such as the "resurrection" of Mhudi 
and Ra -Thaga ( 83), and the arrival of the Boers ( 87 -88). I ndeed on 
several occasions Plaatje's dramatises the process whereby stories 
develop. The arrival of Mhudi and Ra-Thaga amongst the Qoranna is a case 
in point: 
Mhudi also became ,the talk of the people and many were 
the yarns spun concernlng the two supernatural Bldis, as the 
Qorannas call the Bechuana. Anecdotes in the history of the 
stra~gers were related and exaggerated with each repetition. 
GossIpers wagged their tongues and twisted the story about. 
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Some reported that Ton Qon' s party had returned with ten 
hides of lions killed single-handed by Mhudi, while the 
hunters could not bring back the pile of skins of other 
lions and tigers killed by Ra-Thaga. One chatterer had had 
ocular testimony of what he said, for he "saw the lions' 
skins in a hut at the chief's court." .... such were the wild 
stories that circulated in the Qoranna huts, which the 
strangers unacquainted with the Qoranna tongue were unable 
to correct (73). 
137 
The scepticism of the narrative voice in this account of oral fiction-
making offers an interesting perspective on Plaatje' s positioning in 
relation to oral culture: as an author he produces a text which, 
although perhaps modified in subsequent editions, is not subject to the 
"wild" retellings that occur here. Given that the Barolong stories of 
their "resurrection" which follows the reunion of Mhudi and Ra-Thaga 
with their clan are not "wild", we might also notice here how attention 
is being drawn to the difficulties of cross-cultural interaction in the 
absence of a common medium. 
since Plaatje is dealing with four different communities in his novel, 
this problem is a significant one. In the replies to questions such as 
"What kind of people are the Matabele?" (86), and "What are Boers?" 
(90), we have instances of the linguistic construction of 'others', 
since in the pronominal (and nominal) relations that are set up we see 
emphasised points of difference from the culture of the speaker and 
indeed of the hearer. In answer to the first, for example, posed by the 
Boers to their Barolong hosts, we hear: "They are nearly all much 
blacker than ourselves. Their men go about stark naked even in the 
presence of their children. The women are well-dressed just like ours 
. . .. if you examine individual footprints, you will find that the 
Hatabele feet are much shorter, yet half as stout again as Barolong 
feet" (86, my emphasis). The man Rantsau is strategically important to 
the Barolong because he is multilingual. As Chief Moroka describes him: 
"You are Rantsau, son of Thibedi, are you not? A much 
travelled young man of considerable experience at home and 
abroad! You understand the language of the Basuto and of 
the Qoranna and the Hlubis, and the Boers down i~ Graaff 
Reinet, don't you, Rantsau? You must speak Setebele too? I 
would like to send you as a spy to Inzwinyani before we 
proceed to attack Mzilikazi. You will go? I know you will 
when I command you" (107-108). 
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Rantsau is exceptional in the number of languages he speaks; yet the 
matter of intertribal communication affects others as well. We might 
recall, for example, how Mhudi's sense of the grotesque is triggered by 
hearing the Qoranna speak (72). And the friendship of Ra-Thaga and de 
Villiers develops thus: "They made up their minds to learn each other's 
language, so de Villiers taught Ra-Thaga how to speak the Taal and Ra-
Thaga taught the Boer the Barolong speech. They were both very diligent 
and persevering and, having ample opportunities for practice, they both 
made very good progress" (114). Unfortunately individual understanding 
does not safeguard relations on a broader scale, as de Villiers 
discovers when billeted amongst Mogale's people on a spying expedition 
("They distressed him very much by telling one another that the broken 
Sechuana he spoke was probably the Boer language", 120) and Ra-Thaga has 
forcefully brought home to him when he dares to drink water from a Boer 
cup after a long and tiring journey ("soon a number of Boers were 
scrambling towards the pool, gesticulating so rapidly and loudly that 
his Boer vocabulary proved useless to him", 118). In addition to 
emphasising the cultural interfaces that exist in the novel, such 
instances draw explicit attention to the difficulties of cultural 
translation. 
In considering, now, the foregrounding of discourse on a personal level, 
I would like to focus on two women, Umnandi and Mhudi, because they 
reflect in important ways Plaatje's concern with the position of women 
in different communities. Mhudi is significant for two major reasons in 
addition. Firstly, although she is a central character around whom the 
narrative coheres, her dislocation out of a settled traditional culture 
makes her a transitional figure. Secondly, Plaatje's choice of the novel 
form sets a communal conception of narrative in tension with the 
rendition of individual experience. Both of these features are 
particularly apparent in the discursive relations in which she is 
located. 
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4.6 Language and Silence: UIlnandi 
If, as I claimed earlier, Plaatje' s identification of a casus belli 
demands a recognition of the interiority of all "Natives" and if, as 
Couzens claims, the use of proverbs and folk-tales offers a shifting 
perspective ... that there are two sides to every argument" (1978b:62-
64), it is particularly through the subplot that centres round Umnandi 
that our interior view into the Matabele community is developed. Since 
the predominant values of this community are, in the terms of the 
narrative, military, the position this community accords women in 
general, and its own women in particular, serves both to subordinate and 
to silence them. The involvement of women in the Feast of Welcome, for 
example, is restricted to cooking, singing and dancing; and any personal 
distress they feel at losses sustained in the battle of Kunana is 
expected to be suppressed or discounted. In the narrative rendition, 
they are certainly not to ask any awkward questions, of the kind Gubuza 
poses: 
No one, much less a woman, cared to know the cause of the 
raid, for the end had amply justified the means. They knew, 
and for them the knowledge was enough, that Prince Langa had 
raided the Barolong cattle-posts, killed the owners and 
captured every beast. Hence their joy was too great to 
consider the relatives of their own young fighters who fell 
at the point of the spears of the Barolong defenders (51). 
The partiality of the narrative rendition of the Matabele is evident, I 
think, in the derisive phrase "much less a woman" which seems to be a 
deliberate and ironic adoption of a Matabele point of view. It is also 
evident in the valuation of military prowess over human life which is 
ascribed to them, and which renders the contrast with Umnandi's 
'pacifism' that much sharper. 
Unlike these women, Umnandi is individualised. She has several 
attributes that secure her position as favourite of the king, her 
husband, and of the people in the city . Not only is she fair, stately, 
and excellent at cooking and beer brewing, she is also a "mother to all 
the attendants at court" (94), providing for their needs at her own 
expense. Her childlessness undermines her position, however, and her 
husband's favouritism and his verbal indiscretion particularly lay her 
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open to the machinations of her co-wives. Knowing she has consul ted a 
medicine man in secret, they attempt to incriminate her for adultery. 
She is forced to flee. Delayed for ten chapters, her ultimate return to 
Matabele society has sUbstantial narrative significance because only 
then is she accorded explicit recognition. The narrative identifies, in 
retrospect, "the gap created by Umnandi's disappearance, so painfully 
evident in the domestic life of the nation [which] seemed to overshadow 
all other troubles" {176}. Mzilikazi speaks to himself about her: 
"That daughter of Mzinyat o .. . was the mainstay of my 
throne. My greatness grew with the renown of her beauty, her 
wisdom and her stately reception of my guests. She vanished 
and, with her, the magic talisman of my court. She must have 
possessed the wand round which the pomp of Inzwinyani was 
twined, for the rise of my misfortune synchronized with her 
disappearance. Yet she was not the only wife in my harem. 
How came it about that all was centred in her?" {172}. 
Later he names her publicly the "central pillar of the life of Mzilikazi 
and the Matabele nation" {180} . 
Powerful as she may be as a feminine principle in Matabele society, it 
is only by her absence that her importance is recognised, not by her 
speech. It is characteristic of Matabele society, within the novel, that 
men speak, not women; and even in an informal context the only 
indi vidual Matabele women beside Umnandi whose words we hear are the 
rival wife Nomenti, and the maid Nomsindo. Umnandi herself speaks on 
only two occasions. The first occurs just before her flight. The 
conversation between her and Nomsi ndo ends thus: 
Suddenly waking to the full 
situation, Umnandi exclaimed: 
nothing, except for the best." 
Nobody, however, heard these 
swooned {97}. 
meaning of her perilous 
"But child, I have done 
words because the girl had 
The silence into which her words fall here prefigures both her 
disappearance from Matabele society, and her disappearance from the 
narrative. In Chapter 19 after meeting and befriending Mhudi, she lends 
support to a resounding condemnation of war: 
"What will convince [men] of the worthlessness of this 
game, I wonder?" 
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"Nothing, my sister," moaned Umnandi with a sigh, "so 
long as there are two men left on earth there will be war" 
(165). 
141 
In doing so she raises an individual voice against the backdrop of all 
the Matabele women who asked no questions about the raid on Kunana. 
Since she is still in exile, however, her words are not heard by the 
people who most need to hear them. 
4. 7 Language and Ifarrati ve: Mhudi 
We might again be conscious of the pressures of narrative allegiance if 
we compare the representations of the two significant individual women 
in the novel. If Umnandi is foregrounded within Matabele society, it is 
one of Mhudi' s textual functions to provide a centre around whom the 
narrative can cohere, as the action of the novel moves amongst different 
societies. In fulfilling this function she is set in stark contrast with 
Umnandi. Not only does she speak more frequently; her words resound 
through the narrative as her judgements are gradually confirmed by it. 
Her outspokenness stems in part from her Barolong origins, because, in 
the terms of the novel, the recognition given women in Barolong society 
is substantially greater than that in the other three communities. At a 
formal level, for example, women are able to participate fully in the 
processes of law. In the court case between Mrs Noko and Mrs Poe, the 
Boer Cilliers and his friends are "amazed" by the number of women who 
enter into the proceedings (123). Moroka' s judgement is offered after 
representations by all concerned, and is one which satisfies the 
individuals, including the women, who are involved in the case. At an 
informal level, Plaatje's description of the reunion between Mhudi and 
her cousin Baile might be seen as representative: "Now, good health and 
a sound pair of lungs go hand in hand, and a Chuana woman in moments of 
excitement can generally give full play to th'ese organs" (82). Yet 
Barolong women are not only vocal: their speech is effective. We see 
evidence of this in the story Mhudi recounts of her youth, in which it 
is the "shouts of girls' voices" that chase away a lion. (The 
association between Mhudi and lions of course occurs elsewhere and is 
illuminating for the ways in which it marshals folklore to define her in 
"heroic" terms.) We see evidence of this also in the tale of Tlholo, the 
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timid, who flees the Boers. Instead of following suit, Tsetsanyana, 
Matsitselele, and Maupenyana argue away their fear and find a rational 
solution to the "riddle" of his "apparitions in the air, devils in space 
and a boggard in every tree". Much to his regret, Tlhlolo is unable 
subsequently to "seal the lips of those chatterboxes who saw him 
running" (90). 
Thus we might see in the condemnation of war Mhudi offers in 
conversation with Umnandi the cUlmination of several judgements passed 
by her. Like this one, those that precede it are clearly condoned or 
confirmed by the narrative. Her wholesale condemnation ot the Matabele 
to her husband at Re-Nosi, for example, is repudiated by him at the 
time, but before the end of the novel he is participating actively and 
enthusiastically in the war against them. The torment of the Hottentot 
maid which Mhudi witnesses when she visits the Boers leads her to name 
these Boers, with heavy irony, "my husband's friends" (117). In this 
instance the power of her judgement is confirmed by the fact that the 
term becomes established usage amongst the other Barolong women. It is 
also borne out by subsequent events: the excessive and unwarranted 
beating of Dancer and Jan (162), and the perfidious attempt to claim all 
the land in the division of the spoils of war {141}. Clearly the Boers 
are not to be trusted. Mhudi also warns her husband about Ton-Qon, the 
Qoranna headman. In Ra-Thaga's reaction to this warning we see an 
interesting tension between his personal experience of her wisdom, and a 
communal "common sense" which leads him to ignore it. 
With regard to manly occupations . .. he recalled a Sechuana 
proverb which his comrade used to quote, viz., "Never be led 
by a female lest thou fall over a precipice". And so when 
Mhudi warned him against this powerful headman he put it 
down to some idiosyncrasy, peculiar to women, which would no 
doubt wear off in time {74}. 
He is quite wrong to do so, and so endangers both Mhudi and himself. 
She is able, however, to resist Ton-Qon's "highly objectionable" 
proposi tions, to secure her husband's well-being, and to bring about 
their own reunion in the face of extreme threat to it. In this she is 
contrasted with Umnandi, whose life was similarly set at risk by the 
intrigue of others, yet whose only recourse was to run away. More 
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importantly, it is by means of verbal skill as well as resourcefulness 
in exploiting communally defined gender roles that she does so, 
hoodwinking Ton-Qon into letting her go, and then seeking the assistance 
of other women: 
Ton-Qon did the talking in the light of the wood-fire on the 
hearth while she did the t hinking. 
"The fire is burning low," she said at length, "and we 
need more wood. Let me go for some 1" Leaving Ton-Qon to 
cogi tate by the fire, Mhudi resolved not to return to her 
hut that night. She hastened to the chief's harem where by 
means of signs to aid her imperfect knowledge of the 
language, she informed the ladies that her husband being out 
hunting she was afraid to spend the night alone in her hut. 
She at once found refuge wi th one of the chief's wives (75). 
It is perhaps a measure of the solidarity Mhudi manages to establish 
between her own experience and that of other women that the language 
barrier does not work to her disadvantage, as we have seen it do for 
both her husband (118) and his Boer friend de Villiers (120). 
Coming as they do from a Barolong woman, and condoned as they are by the 
narrative, we might see the judgements Mhudi passes on the other 
communities as expressing a Barolong point of view. Yet, bearer of oral 
culture and wisdom that she may be, she is also importantly a 
transitional figure. It is si gnificant, for example, that these 
judgements frequently occur in her conversations with her husband. 
Dislocated out of her original community, it is within her relationship 
with Ra-Thaga - probably the most important personal relationship in the 
novel - that her individual voice is heard most clearly. It seems 
appropriate, therefore, that a consideration of the discursive relations 
in which she is located should focus upon this relationship. 
In the first place, even though Mhudi is a forthright and outspoken 
woman, she nevertheless respects the communal conventions that govern 
conversation between a man and a woman. She says to Ra-Thaga shortly 
after their meeting in the wilderness, "No ... though I have lost my 
people I have not lost my manners. Men first, you have the right-of-way" 
(39). This explicit deference to Ra-Thaga as a man is frequently 
reflected also in her thoughts about him and her attitude to him, 
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sometimes to ironic effect. After Mhudi has herself killed the lion 
which Ra-Thaga is holding by the tail, they go into their hut, 
where he skinned his buck while sunning himself in the 
adoration of his devoted wife. Her trust in him, which had 
never waned, was this evening greater than ever. She forgot 
that she herself was the only female native of Kunana who 
had thrice faced the king of beasts, and had finally killed 
one with her own hand. Needless to say, Ra-Thaga was a proud 
husband that night (66). 
The irony of the narrative here emphasises how her concentration on his 
achievements diminishes her sense of her own. This pattern of 
interpretation is not invariably followed, however. When she deals with 
Ton-Qon, the narrative registers a greater awareness on her part of the 
balance of their respective contributions. "Ra-Thaga was noble, but a 
man like the rest of them, or he would never have joined this wicked 
man's party against her advice ... " (74). Such awareness does not lead 
to point-scoring; rather to an even greater determination on her part to 
"get him home at any cost" (75). Lastly, after her encounter with the 
Boers, she subjects her husband to "interrogations [which continue] 
almost to the small hours of the morning" . Nevertheless, with her "love 
for the Boers ... shattered as quickly as it had been formed, [Mhudi] 
retained a strong confidence in the sagacity of her husband who 
apparently had the sense to make friends with the one humane Boer that 
there was among the wild men of his tribe" ( 11 7 ). Al though her own 
judgements are generally proved accurate in the course of events, she 
deliberately defers to her husband and concentrates on his positive 
achievements rather than "her own or his failures. such a line of 
response might reflect naivete on her part, were it not for the 
marginality of their position. Given this, her endeavour might more 
fruitfully be read as a conscious attempt to maintain allegiance to 
communal conventions and so to structure their relationship in socially 
rather than just individually meaningful ways. 
The grounds for this attempt can be traced to the timing and the 
location of their marriage which are symptomatic both of the destruction 
of their community and of the transitional nature of their relationship. 
Half-a-Crown describes their union thus: 
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That exactly is how my father and mother met and became man 
and wife. There were no home ceremonials, such as the 
seeking and obtaining of parental consent, because there 
were no parents; no conferences by uncles and grand-unc~es, 
or exhortations by grandmothers and aunts; no male relat1ves 
to arrange the marriage knot, nor female relations to herald 
the family union, and no uncles of the bride to divide the 
bogadi (dowry) cattle as, of ,course, there were no catt~e, 
It was a simple matter of tak1ng each other for good or 111 
with the blessing of the 'God of Rain'. The forest was their 
home, the rustling trees their relations, the sky their 
guardian, and the birds, who sealed the marriage contract 
with their songs, the only guests (61). 
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In an oral community, all the arrangements for marriage are made 
verbally, and it is one of the more poignant features of their 
relationship that their marriage takes place without communal 
negotiation or communal sanction. It is left to nature, and specifically 
the song of birds, to seal the marriage contract. (This offers another 
instance of the foregrounding of language in the novel: elsewhere, too, 
Mhudi's affinities with nature allow her access to the "speech" of 
animals (doves, 48, and monkeys, 76), though it is not always access she 
appreciates or enjoys.) Revealingly, the next ceremonial recognition 
given their marriage occurs amongst the Qoranna, after the threat posed 
to it by Ton-Qon has been overcome when Chief Massouw passes judgement 
against him. The marriage receives communal sanction by their own people 
only when the couple are reunited with the remnants of the tribe at 
Thaba Nchu. 
The absence of a community at Re-Nosi influences their relationship in 
significant ways. Both their isolation, and the exclusive bond that 
results, are apparent in the name they give their home, "Re-Nosi" 
meaning "we are alone". In contrast to the standard polygamous 
relationship, Mhudi is, in her terms, "singled out for [the] exceptional 
favour" of monogamy {60}: "Did they not say that man is by nature 
polygamous and could never be trusted to be true to only one wife? But 
here is one as manly as you could wish, and I have never, never seen a 
husband of any number of wives as happy as mine is with me alone!" {61}. 
Ra-Thaga acknowledges explicitly that the intense bond between them 
derives at least in part from thei r evidently residual status: "He could 
not withhold his veneration from - as far as he could see - the only 
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living Morolong beside himself, lest the change should reverse his 
fortunes" (73). Each must be "sufficient for the other's company until 
they should have children of their own" (60). Being man and woman they 
can do so, as the narrative indicates with sly humour after their first 
meeting: "Each of them thought it rather fortunate that the other was of 
the opposite sex" (38). The narrative distance implied by such irony, 
the monogamy of the relationship, and the Edenic terms in which their 
marriage is described might draw our attention to the value system 
inherent in the narrative, and thus the active 'interpretation', rather 
than simple 'inscription', of experience that is taking place. Yet the 
significance of 'oral experience' is, I think, plain. 
Since Mhudi and Ra-Thaga are both Barolong, the exclusiveness of their 
bond takes a verbal form as well. Their individual isolation immediately 
after the destruction of Kunana is reflected quite explicitly as a 
linguistic exile, of which each is conscious, though in different ways. 
Ra-Thaga, for example, experiences his loneliness thus: 
Each of his mornings was but the resumption of his fruitless 
search for the company of human beings, which it seemed he 
was never to find in this world. As he dragged his feet 
through the dewy grass he seemed to have no particular 
destination in view. He wondered how much longer this 
solitude would last. with a drooping spirit he mused over 
the gloom of existence and asked himself if he still could 
speak his own language; or, if, supposing he met anyone and 
was addressed, he could still understand it (34). 
Mhudi is less explicit about her sense of verbal isolation, but it is 
reflected nevertheless in her recounting of her experiences. At the end 
of her first-person narrative in Chapter 3, she observes, 
My only living friends were the turtle doves whose language 
I thought I could almost understand. I think that if this 
solitude had been prolonged for another month, I should have 
been able to sing their songs and learn to converse with 
them; yet I longed for the company of a man, like the one 
who appeared in my dream (48). 
The man she has dreamed about is characterised as having "treated me to 
the joy of hearing our language uttered once more in the beautiful voice 
of a wellspoken man" (48), and her dream is realised when she meets Ra-
Thaga: "In fact, I am not quite certain that you are a man, but if you 
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are a dream, I will stay with you and dream on while the vision lasts; 
whether you are man or ghost I have enjoyed the pleasure of a few words 
wi th you" (35) . It is thus in contact with one another that the 
linguistic exile they have each suffered is brought to an end: "i t 
naturally followed that when she was alone, he too was alone; and when 
she had company, he too had company. There being no third person, she 
spoke only to him and he to her" (61). Marginal and transitional as it 
might be, their relationship is also both idyllic and ideal: no 
linguistic interface exists between them, and so no 'translation' is 
necessary. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the development of Mhudi' s individual 
voice is registered most powerfully in the context of this relationship, 
as I have claimed above. The compass of Chapter 1 is a broad sweep into 
the past history of the Barolong; it also begins to focus upon Ra-Thaga 
as masculine protagonist who will meet the 'heroine' Mhudi in Chapter 2. 
This meeting in the wilderness provides the occasion for a retelling of 
their respective stories: though of the two it is only Mhudi who is 
given the opportunity of a first-person recapitulation. In Rimmon-
Kenan's terms, her narrative is both intradiegetic - because intercut 
into the first narrative - and homodiegetic - since she is present in 
the story she narrates (1983:94-94). This analepsis is most significant 
because Mhudi's retelling of the Matabele raid upon Kunana foregrounds 
the point of view of the women who suffered it. It is this retelling, 
for example, that reveals the vicious attack upon women and children to 
have been carefully premeditated (41). It is also this retelling which 
challenges the initial representation of women as victims: by giving 
them voice, and by emphasising their resistance to their attack and 
their heroism in enduring it. 
"Kill me, you coward, go back and brag that you have killed 
a woman in kirtles. If that be your Zulu prowess, I admire 
the Bechuana trait of measuring strength with bearded men 
and never defiling their spears with women's blood" (40). ' 
Encapsulated in this report of the words of Mhudi's cousin Baile we can 
identify important aspects of both orality and textualisation. Heard by 
a woman who has herself been attacked, Baile's words are passed on by 
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this woman before her death to Mhudi, and so incorporated into the 
account Mhudi offers to Ra-Thaga. In inscribing the story, Plaatje 
passes these words on to us, his readers, reconstituting in his fiction 
events that evidently occurred. within an inscribed fictional mode, 
then, he modulates the narrative to allow several voices to speak, and 
dramatises the process of storymaking. 
Similar polyphony is apparent in the comment and question with which Ra-
Thaga draws attention to the significance of audience. Before he invites 
Mhudi to speak of her experiences he says, "On seeing you, I did not 
believe that you were a Morolong. But it turns out the two of us, at any 
rate, are left alive to tell the story - to whom? Ah, yes, to whom?" 
(38). The reflexive implications of this rather plaintive question seem 
to me profound. While the sharing of stories in isolation intensifies 
the bond between Ra-Thaga and Mhudi, it also makes him conscious of the 
loss of any other audience to hear their stories. Heartfelt as his sense 
of loss might be, we at a critical remove can recognise other influences 
it registers. If a story is told, then whom it is told to will affect 
its meaning. I f there 
'silenced'. Plaatje's 
silencing, and that is 
is no-one to tell it to, the story itself is 
act of inscription works to prevent such 
one of its purposes. And if his endeavour is in 
this way to circumvent such "loss" of the oral mode, then dramatised 
here is not loss per se but the "distanciation" which occurs when "the 
author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide" 
(Ricoeur, cited in Lanser 1981:117). Concomitant upon such 
"distanciation" is the replacement of a communal audience with a (cross-
border) readership. In Ra-Thaga's case these are transient effects: once 
reunited with the remainder of his tribe his access to a communal 
audience is renewed. For Plaatje the transition is a permanent one: 
positioned as he is at the interface between orality and inscribed 
li terature, his narration produces the text to which we have access 
today. 
Although Plaatje is able to modulate the novel form to accommodate 
several voices, and indeed several discourses, this form nevertheless 
exerts pressures of its own on his act of inscription. The most 
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influential of these is the pre-eminence it generally accords individual 
experience, and the tension so set up with a communal conception of 
narrative. Plaatje's 'history' is 'rewritten' very much in terms of a 
woman. Mhudi ' s voice is strongest, and it is an individual and a 
feminine voice. And yet Kunene's "second-rate, badly organized hodge-
podge of semihistory, semifiction, shoddy allegory" (in Gray 1980:247), 
might alert us to the fact that individual experience itself does not 
here supply an organising principle, as it might in a more 
conventionally structured novel. And if "Mhudi acts as a centre around 
whom the potentially random, fragmented, episodic narrative coheres" 
(Hooper 1992), it seems to me incumbent upon us also to listen to the 
polyphony of the text, the 'many voices clamouring for expression'. If 
we recognise in the narrative the textualised subjectivity of the 
writer, as I proposed in Chapter 3, we should appreciate also Plaatje's 
attempt to accommodate the demands of other voices wi thin the novel 
form. 
4.8 The ·Symbolism· of Mhudi 
It is in this context that I would like to address a third critical 
failure to recognise the modal transition in Hhudi from orality to 
inscribed literature: the "symbolism" of the character Mhudi. This issue 
seems to me a particularly important one because it takes up both the 
positioning of Mhudi as an individual in relation to community, and the 
textualisation of the human subject discussed in Chapter 3. 
The attempt to read Mhudi in symbolic terms has become something of a 
critical commonplace. Couzens likens her to "the other heroines of the 
book, Umnandi and Hannetjie" in being "a symbol of purity, courage, of 
'Mother Africa' (1978a:18). Gray comments, 
Mhudi, Plaatje's central character, is something of a Mother 
~frica figure wit~in the novel, the first in a gallery which 
lnforms the entlre sequence of black Southern African 
li terature through Abrahams's Wild Conquest to the Soweto 
protest poetry of today. She motivates and tests the novel's 
characters; she is life-giving, unconquerable, firm, never 
to be cheated nor to be manipulated unjustly (1979:181). 
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certain I y both the meaning of Mhudi' s name (the Harvester) and the 
"stature" and "grandeur" Bessie Head finds in the book (blurb) might 
support a symbolic interpretation, and if it is one of her functions to 
act as a principle of coherence in the novel, this function might be 
served as well by a symbol as by a character. 
Yet, associated as it is with a concentration on the 'literary' 
qualities of the novel, the attempt to read Mhudi in symbolic terms is 
both a problematic and, finally, a restrictive one. In the first place, 
Couzens's claim that all three "heroines" are "Mother Africa" figures is 
critically ingenuous in failing to account for the variations that exist 
amongst them, and hence their relations of structural counterpoint. 
Al though Hannetj ie's impact on the course of events is minimal, we 
should recognise her as the prototype of a young Boer woman. In the 
"winter's tale" of Umnandi's exile and return (Couzens 1978a:9), we see 
the suffering and prospective regeneration of Matabele society through 
the withdrawal and restoration of its feminine principle. In Mhudi we 
have a bearer of Barolong culture, yet one who is distinguished by her 
dislocation out of community and her concomitant transitional status. 
Reflected in the lives of these three women is a range of experience 
which individualises the history Plaatje is rewriting. 
This individualisation is most apparent in the transitional status of 
the character Mhudi, a status which works to undercut a simple reading 
of her as "Mother Africa". Dislocated out of Barolong community, out of 
a potentially fixed and settled existence, she never completely belongs 
to a community again. Indeed, in the periods of isolation she undergoes 
we see the conception of community tested by the individual qualities of 
courage, determination and enterprise she must draw on in order to 
rescue her husband, and sometimes herself, from danger. Al though the 
domain of the personal receives relatively little attention in Hhudi, 
her determination to be with her husband at all costs reflects both the 
closeness of the bond that exists between them, and the ways in which 
this has come to replace communal affiliation. On the other hand, Mhudi 
experiences reinstatement into not one but two different communities. If 
she is reunited with the Barolong at Thaba Nchu, the duration (and 
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harmony, after Ton-Qon is punished) of her stay with the Qoranna would 
seem to argue for the importance of community per se over and above its 
particular identity. In Mhudi's words: 
"What a treat to hear again the hens cackle by day, the 
cocks crow at night, the raucous bark of the sheep dog, to 
say nothing of the jabbering of the children even if one 
knows not their language. It makes my heart swell with joy" 
(74) • 
Her experiences might not have detribalised her, but, together with this 
non-sectarian emphasis on community per se, they supply her with an 
individual perspective that allows sympathetic encounters and 
relationship with women from several camps: the Qoranna woman who offers 
her a refuge from Ton-Qon, her Barolong cousin Baile who shared her 
suffering at Kunana, the Hottentot woman abused by the Boers, the 
'angel' Hannetjie, and the refugee queen of the Matabele, Umnandi. Her 
emergent individualism is apparent also in the innovations she makes and 
initiatives she takes: her ability to brew beer from berries in the 
absence of corn (72), her warning to her husband about the dangers of 
the Qoranna (73) and the Boer (117), her solitary quests to rescue him 
from danger (75, 152). Finally, the emblematic power Mhudi gains in her 
encounters with lions (Couzens 1978: 14) is an original marshalling of 
folklore in feminine terms, since Plaatje has deliberately substituted a 
woman for a man in traditional tal es. 
4.9 Mhudi: Voice and Silence 
I have devoted some attention already to the significance of Mhudi' s 
voice. Its quality and power seem to me most definitive of her 
character, and offer, in the third place, most resistance to subsumption 
under the category "symbolic". In seeking to attune ourselves to Mhudi's 
voice, we might consider, for purposes of comparison, the symbolic 
"woman of darkness" represented in Conrad's novella. 
' ... from right to left along the lighted shore moved a 
wild and gorgeous apparition of a woman. 
, 'She walked wi th ~easured steps, draped in striped and 
~:lnged cloths, treadlng the earth proudly, with a slight 
J lngle and flash of barbarous ornaments, She carried her 
head high; her, hair was done in the shape of a helmet; she 
had brass leg~lngs to the knees, brass wire gauntlets to the 
elbow, a crImson spot on her tawny cheek, innumerable 
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necklaces of glass beads on her neck; bizarre ~hings, 
charms, gifts of witch-men, that hung about her, gllttered 
and trembled at every step. She must have had the value of 
several elephant tusks upon her. She was savage and superb, 
wild-eyed and magnificent; there was something ominous and 
stately in her deliberate progress. And in the hush that had 
fallen suddenly upon the whole sorrowful land, the immense 
wilderness, the colossal body of the fecund and mysterious 
life seemed to look at her, pensive, as though it had been 
looking at the image of its own tenebrous and passionate 
soul. 
'She came abreast of the steamer, stood still, and faced 
us. Her long shadow fell to the water's edge. Her face had a 
tragic and fierce aspect of wild sorrow and of dumb pain 
mingled with the fear of some struggling, half-shaped 
resol ve. She stood looking at us without a stir, and like 
the wilderness itself, with an air of brooding over an 
inscrutable purpose. A whole minute passed, and then she 
made a step forward. There was a low jingle, a glint of 
yellow metal, a sway of fringed draperies, and she stopped 
as if her heart had failed her. The young fellow by my side 
growled. The pilgrims murmured at my back. She looked at us 
as if her life had depended upon the unswerving steadiness 
of her glance. Suddenly she opened her bared arms and threw 
them up rigid above her head, as though in an uncontrollable 
desire to touch the sky, and at the same time the swift 
shadows darted out on the earth, swept around on the river, 
gathering the steamer into a shadowy embrace. A formidable 
silence hung over the scene. 
'She turned away slowly, walked on, following the bank, 
and passed into the bushes to the left. Once only her eyes 
gleamed back at us in the dusk of the thickets before she 
disappeared (Conrad 1973:87-88). 
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The woman is an "apparition", whose context, appearance, dress and 
ornamentation are described in visual detail. The scene is landscaped as 
background, which is relatively static, and foreground, across which she 
moves, as an isolated figure, "from right to left along the lighted 
shore". This figure in particular is characterised by metallic qualities 
of "bronze" and "brass" which flash, glitter, glint and gleam. Apart 
from the jingling of her ornaments, the entire encounter takes place in 
silence: a "hush" having "fallen suddenly upon the whole sorrowful 
land", and a "formidable silence" hanging over the scene. Although some 
attempt to penetrate her experience is evident in the modality of 
Marlow's description at a few points - "with an air of brooding over an 
inscrutable purpose", "as if her heart had failed her", "as if her life 
had depended upon the unswerving steadiness of her glance", "as though 
in an uncontrollable desire to touch the sky" (my emphasis) - the 
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evaluations implicit in such terms as "fantastic" , "warlike" , 
"statuesque", "wild", "gorgeous", "measured", "proudly", "barbarous", 
reveal a personal reaction to a predominantly iconic scene. The image of 
the woman is on the one hand material, so "she must have had the value 
of several elephant tusks upon her", and on the other hand spiritual, 
"the image of [the] tenebrous and passionate soul" of "the immense 
wilderness, the colossal body of the fecund and mysterious life". The 
woman we have here is a symbol, a "woman of darkness", described by a 
man who can by no means apprehend her as a woman or a human being 
because he can neither speak to her nor hear her (see also Hooper 1993). 
If we follow Hampson (1990: 22) in reading her narrator, Marlow, as a 
cultural translator, the iconic mode in which he presents her is plainly 
one which predates the explicit rejection of visual ism associated with 
postmodern ethnography. Mhudi, by contrast, presents herself, and she 
does so most powerfully in the long analepsis Plaatje grants her in 
Chapter 3. I have attempted already to demonstrate both how individual 
and personal is Mhudi's voice and how it derives much of its strength 
from the mandate and sanction of community. This might become clearer if 
we consider her own act of 'cultural translation' in a later context. 
Although some references have been made already to the following 
interchange with her husband after her visit to the Boers, I would like 
to examine it in a little more detail here as a counterpoint to the 
Conrad's 'woman of darkness' considered above. 
Mhudi, whose love for the Boers was thus shattered as 
quickly as it had been formed, retained a strong confidence 
in the sagacity of her husband who apparently had the sense 
to make friends with the one humane Boer that there was 
among the wild men of his tribe. And when they left, she 
shook the dust of Moroka's Hoek off her feet and vowed never 
to go there again. 
That night Ra-Thaga could scarcely go to sleep. Mhudi 
pestered him with questions about the Boers and her 
interrogations continued almost to the small hours of the 
morning. "What sort of people are these friends of yours?" 
she would ask. "Have not the Boers got a saying like ours: 
aye ne modiga (a plea for someone chastised}?" 
All next day callers were told of the cruel episode of 
the previous afternoon. Every now and then she would 
exc~ai~: "~y hus~and' ~ friends! They looked at the girl 
sqUIrmIng WIth paIn, WIth her ear between two irons and they 
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peacefully smoked their pipes like a crowd of people 
watching a dance . Give me a Matabele rather. He, at. any 
rate, will spear you to death and put an end to your palns. 
1Iy husband's friends!" 
After this the Boers occasionally heard themselves 
referred to as 'Ra-Thaga's friends.' The Barolong women 
using Mhudi's own words called them 'my husband's friends.' 
Not knowing the orig~n of the phrase, the Boers thought that 
they had made a fresh impression of friendliness among their 
hospitable black benefactors, and so took it as a compliment 
(117). 
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Focalised through the consciousness of Mhudi, the passage offers a 
perspective on the Boers ("the wild men of his tribe") that is starkly 
contrasted with any perspective they are ever likely to have had of 
themselves. The name she goes on to give them, "my husband's friends", 
becomes accepted usage amongst the rest of the Barolong women, 
demonstrating her power wi thin her community to define and identify 
those outside it. The Boers' misinterpretation of this name highlights 
several things: the communication gap that exists between black and 
white; the Boers' failure to recognise that the woman who visited them 
might have a point of view - and force of judgement - of her own; and 
their complete absence of conscience over the abuse of a Hottentot 
slave. In the passage Mhudi's "interrogation" of her husband, "almost to 
the small hours of the morning", is evidence of the community's 
tolerance and condonation of women's voice, (as well as her husband's). 
On the other hand, it is Mhudi's sense of the relations between men and 
women that are accepted wi thin her community (as well as personal 
loyalty) that sees her finding reasons to continue to respect and 
believe in her husband, despite his noxious friends. It is communal 
wisdom that informs her questioning and judgement of the action she has 
seen: she says, "Have not the Boers got a saying like ours: aye ne 
mOdiga (a plea for someone chastised)?" The community in which such 
wisdom has arisen is represented most directly in the "callers" who come 
to visit Mhudi, who listen to what she has to report of the Boers, and 
who pass on her judgement of them. 
In Marlow's narrative of the Afri can woman we saw a translation of 
culture that issues in a 'text': the woman is substantially a function 
of his discourse. In Plaatje's rendition of Mhudi we hear the 
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foregrounding of her voice. The more significant parallel, however, is 
perhaps that between Marlow and Mhudi who function, at this point, at a 
similar diegetic level. Her account of the Boers, like Marlow's account 
of the African, becomes a 'text' circulated amongst her community that 
fixes the 'nature' of the Boers. In this instance, however, the 'text' 
paradoxically serves as an instance of the engendering of meaning within 
temporally and spatially situated conversation that Giddens delineated: 
its appropriateness derives from its location in an 'oral' community. 
4.10 Communal and Textual Relations 
Indeed, my final reason for rejecting a reading of Mhudi in symbolic 
terms is its failure to recognise the respective communal positioning of 
character, writer and narrator and hence the textual relations that 
exist among them. Although the oral tradition upon which Plaatje draws 
in order to rewrite history is inherently conservative, his attempt to 
preserve it through inscription substitutes a cross-border readership 
for its primary communal audience and thus engenders a radical cleavage 
wi th it. In particular the novel form he chooses to recount communal 
experiences is one which privileges an individual, personal and feminine 
voice. If we recall that "to narrate i s to make a bid for a kind of 
power" (Toolan 1988:3), to venture a version of the subject narrated, to 
open up the possibility of characterological resistance, the questions 
we might then ask are what kind of narrative voice is generated in the 
process, what kind of narrative voice commandeers the story that is to 
be told? It seems to me important to recognise that the 'radical 
cleavage' engendered in Plaatje's inscription is in some ways echoed in 
the figure he writes, who is dis located out of a traditional settled 
existence and ventures forth to make a life of her own. There are ways 
in which Mhudi' s experience might be seen as metaphoric of Plaatje' s 
discovery of literate culture, the development of his political 
awareness, and its concomitant emphasis on individualism. 
Having rejected symbolism as an adequate mode of approach to the 
textualisation of Mhudi as a human subject, we might consider again 
Plaatje's stated purposes in writing the novel. Is she simply a woman 
subj ected to history: history in the form of the events through which 
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she lives, and history in the form of the narrative that tells her 
story? It is striking that the substantial and significant narrative 
analepsis she is allowed is balanced by several quests she undertakes in 
isolation through the wilderness; quests characterised by the same 
'silence' we saw in the first linguistic exile she and Ra-Thaga 
suffered. (Unlike her, he is never completely isolated again.) More 
importantly, if we recognise Mhudi as the central protagonist of the 
novel, we must recognise also that several chapters of the novel have 
little or nothing evidently to do with her. Like Umnandi, she is 
"silenced" for large parts of the narrative. Are we to view Mhudi, then, 
as simply an authorial mouth-piece, who speaks on cue, and holds her 
peace when bidden? 
Given the conceptions of silence and the textualisation of the human 
subject developed in earlier chapters lt might be plain already that my 
answer to these questions will be, No . But let us address them by first 
reformulating them: do we find characterological resistance or 
collusion, do we need to insist on an alternative version Mhudi might 
have of herself? Reading her silence as volitional is likely to give us 
a broader range of response within which to recognise her reactivity as 
a character. That is, if we try to understand her silence from her own 
point of view we might have a more sympathetic sense of her reactions to 
being narrated, to having her story told, and having it told the way it 
is. Referring to the concept of t he cultural interface should also lead 
us to consider the respecti ve ethnographic addresses of Mhudi and of 
Plaatje. We might speculate, then, that her response to the Barolong man 
narrating her would follow similar patterns of courtesy as those which 
marked her first conversation wit h Ra-Thaga. Her sense of her place in 
the scheme of things might be similar in relation to community and in 
relation to narrative. She would expect to be heard when she speaks, but 
would not expect her story to dominate the story as a whole; she would 
. be content to enter the narrative domain from time to time, but would 
get on with her own life while the narrative focuses elsewhere. In this 
sense what Mhudi has to deal with is verbal frugality rather than 
silencing, and this frugality in fact works to her advantage. Although 
she speaks more than many other characters, she is silent for large 
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parts of the narrative, and this silence highlights her speech when it 
occurs. In Macherey's words, "the unspoken has many other resources: it 
assigns speech to its exact position, designating its domain" (1978:86). 
It is perhaps for this reason that Mhudi's voice is so powerful: in my 
"hearing" of the novel her judgements ring, her pronouncements echo, her 
opinions resound. In the instances when "silence" might be imposed on 
her, when her husband, for example, does not "listen to" her, it is 
striking that the narrative "hears" her, bearing out her predictions in 
the course of the events that follow. 
silence therefore does not function in this novel as a narrative barrier 
because it does not seem to offer an instance of characterological 
resistance. unlike the black woman of darkness in Conrad's novella, 
Mhudi has a life of her own, and one of which the narrative takes 
cognisance. For these reasons, she does not need to use silence to 
oppose the encroachments of the narrative. Nor, having verbal power, 
does she need to resist the silences in which she is left, as a 
character, to get on with her own life. The control she has over her 
communication, as well as the attention that is paid to it, shows the 
narrative condoning and confirming her autonomy. By equipping her with a 
voice and allowing her to use it, Plaatje ensures that Mhudi does not 
function simply as a Mother Africa figure, but registers the tensions 
and transitions that characterise his own narrative endeavour. 
In a narrative that is sympathetic to the autonomy of characters, as 
described by Bakhtin (Maclean 1988:6), we are unlikely to find 
characterological resistance. In the case of Mhudi, her acceptance of 
the narration of her story is associated both with the closeness of her 
ethnographic address to that of her narrator, and with the transitional 
nature of their allegiance to an oral culture. It is also associated 
with the sensitivity and the condonation with which the narrative 
registers her voice. We might, in conclusion, recall Bhabha's point that 
"the transfer of meaning can never be total between differential systems 
of meaning" (1990:314), and hence that cultural translation both 
reflects and reinforces the epistemological autonomy of the cultures 
being translated. Even if Plaatje' s explicit concern is the English 
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readership towards which his translation was directed, and even if his 
target medium is in many respects the literary English with which he was 
acquainted, we might estimate the extent to which Mhudi has an 
ontological existence of her own by noticing how much more she is a 
translation "of" an African woman than a translation "for" an English 
readership. And in this we might estimate too the implicit force of the 
accountability that goes with a communal conception of narrative. Unlike 
Marlow who "carried off" narrative ~loot for an audience ethnographically 
like himself, Plaatje continues to orient his cultural translation 
towards the community he is attempting to render in his fiction, towards 
those who might "overhear" it. 
In the two novels that will be considered next, ethnographic address, 
cultural allegiance and narrative accountability remain important 
issues. It will be interesting , therefore, to see if the connections 
posited in this Chapter between the narrative recognition of the 
autonomy of characters and the nature and extent of their silence is 
sustained. 
Chapter 5 159 
ALAN PATON: TOO LATE THE PHALAROPE 
Plaatje's text was an indigenous reply to imperial versions of history. 
We found a mandate in terms of his position and purposes as a writer to 
apply to his text the model of cultural translation developed in the 
earlier chapters. This model needed significant modification to take 
into account the complexi ties of textualisation associated wi th the 
tensions between tribal membership and non-sectarianism, Tswana and 
English, and orality and literature. Substantial attention was therefore 
devoted to the text as an instance of modal transition from orality to 
inscribed literature, focusing specifically on the narrative strategy of 
the novel, its foregrounding of language, and the symbolic terms in 
which Mhudi has been read. The speculation with which the chapter ended 
was that the relative closeness of the respective 'ethnographic 
addresses' of writer and character, Plaatje's 'feminist' sympathies, and 
the Bakhtinian autonomy accorded the characters moderated the narrative 
relations of power and reduced the need for a resistant reading of her 
silence. 
The text that will be considered in this chapter presents an extremely 
different case, and not least because its writer belongs to the dominant 
cuI ture which subordinated Plaatj e 's. Paton's first novel, Cry, the 
Beloved Country, brought him fame and fortune, led him into public life, 
and marked a watershed in South African literature in exploring "the 
central social and political dilemmas of South Africa in greater depth, 
detail and passion than any of [his] predecessors" (Hutchings 1992:185). 
By contrast, Too Late the Phalarope 1 was published eight years later in 
1953 and never achieved the critical reputation of his earlier work. In 
a 1982 article on Paton, Watson deals with the second text summarily in 
a footnote, and in 1985 Glenn evinces surprise at the outset of his 
article "to find how often the opinion occurs that Too Late the 
Phalarope is superior as a novel to Cry, the Beloved Country". Ward's 
1 Paton, A. 1971. Too Late the Phalarope. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
All further references in parenthesis are to this edition. 
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chapter on Paton in Chronicles of Darkness (1989) makes no mention of 
it. 
On the other hand, the text has been the subject of favourable attention 
from a small following of partisans. In '" A Hunger of the Soul': Too 
Late the Phalarope Reconsidered", Cooke offers what constitutes, 
effectively, a recuperation of the text into the terms of Romanticism, 
given the primacy his reading accords individual experiences of "psychic 
conflict", 'liberation' and 'joy'. "Running counter to the narrator's 
lamentations about the destructiveness of interracial sexual contact is 
what emerges as the novel's basic theme: the sense that only through 
such experience can a White South African achieve a fully integrated 
self", he claims (1979:38). Motivated by an attempt to establish the 
universality of the text, Thompson concludes his "Poetic Truth in Too 
Late the Phalarope" with the following judgement: "These, surely, are no 
mere African truths" (1981:44). Perhaps the most effective defence of 
the novel is included in a collection on South African literature whose 
publication this year comes after a SUbstantial and regrettable delay. 
comparing Paton's two early novels, Hutchings locates the writer within 
a "tradition of English Puritanism ... . characterised by great moral 
earnestness, by a belief in moral imperatives that take precedence over 
the pursuit of happiness" (1992:184). Whereas this moralism is explicit 
in Cry, the Beloved' Country, it is implicit in Too Late the Phalarope, 
and its "implicitness helps make Too Late the Phalarope a far more 
impressive work of fiction" (1992:185) . 
5.1 The Figure of stephanie 
Finding myself amongst this group who consider the novel significant and 
interesting I I would like, for several reasons I to begin this chapter 
with a consideration of the figure of the black woman represented in it. 
Comparing her with Mhudi will allow us to recognise changes in the 
linguistic and cultural context that have, by 1953, taken place since 
the publication of the earlier novel in 1930 (and even more markedly 
since the nineteenth century upon which Plaatje offers a retrospective 
view) I and which provide a SUbstantial rationale for the inclusion of 
this text in my study. Perhaps most prominent among these changes is the 
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rise of Afrikaans as a language and a cultural discourse. The strongly 
emergent white nationalism which in 1910 issued in Union, and to aspects 
of which Plaatje was reacting, has a parallel in the accession to power 
of the National Party in 1948. Focusing on this figure will allow us to 
'read back' to the hegemonies of Afrikaner linguistic and cultural 
nationalism from 1948 to aspects of which Paton was reacting. 
Significant among these were apartheid legislation such as the 
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949, and, more pertinently for 
this novel, renewed enforcement of the Immorality Act of 1927 (a revised 
version of which would be passed by Parliament in 1957). Given the 
concatenation of gender and racial interfaces in the novel, my own 
reading will be counterpointed to feminist readings of the figure of the 
black woman in this novel and elsewhere in our literature so as to 
position more clearly the agenda of my study. And Given the relatively 
limited critical attention that has been paid to the figure of 
Stephanie, such . a comparison might help us to develop terms in which to 
understand her position in regard to the 'tragedy' of the novel, the 
critical debate that has focused upon it, and Paton's position in 
relation to the Centre. The questions towards which this consideration 
of the figure of the black woman will, ultimately, be directed are those 
specified in the Introduction to the Case Studies: what narrative 
functions does she have to fulfil? what narrati ve purposes does she 
carry out? and what narrative options are open to her? 
Our first meeting with Stephanie occurs at the beginning of Chapter 2, 
which is marked by a shift from the first-person narrati ve of Sophie, 
the maiden aunt of the protagonist, to focalisation through the 
consciousness of her nephew, Pieter van Vlaanderen, who is a lieutenant 
in the police force. Stephanie is introduced running barefoot in the 
dark towards the "black people ' s location". She has evidently been 
running hard, since her breath comes "with a kind of moaning", and 
since, although she runs past Pieter "so close that he could have 
touched her", she is not aware of him. Intent on escaping her pursuer, 
she has sufficient awareness of her surroundings and sufficient presence 
of mind to hide in the same "shadows of the trees" in the "vacant 
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ground" as Pieter. She lies down and tries to "control her gasping" 
(11) . 
Before following this interlude through to its conclusion, we might 
consider some of its implications for the context of the novel and of 
the black woman figured in it. Her introduction as "the girl" (10) 
implies a certain inevitable connection between her action in its 
context and her gender; the fact that "bare feet running" in the dark in 
the direction of "the black people's location" are likely to be 
feminine, and the pursuer masculine. The term, "the girl", also alludes 
to a linguistic diminution typically directed, in white Southern African 
society, towards adult black men and women (we see subsequent instances 
of this term on pages 33-34 and 93, and of the term "boy" on pages 116, 
125, 129). We might recall, by contrast, Hannetjie's invitation to 
Mhudi, the "noble mosadi", to take care of children she might have 
(1978:183). The use of the Tswana term and the fact that Mhudi was able 
to decline highlight the absence then of relations of servitude that 
have, by 1953, become well established in southern Africa. These 
relations are echoed in the geographic separation of the "black people's 
location" from the named streets of Venterspan, although the darkness of 
this street which connects them is explained rather defensively by the 
narrative as characteristic of the whole (white) town. The lack of 
lighting indicates the town's setting in the rural areas (typically 
rendered in the narrative as the "grass country"), and the names of the 
town and its streets its predominantly Afrikaans popUlation. A 
noticeable shift has taken place from the Boers who were one of the 
'tribes' in Hhudi, displaced and marginal, to this established urban 
community which is part of a dominant political power. 
"The lieutenant" does not speak to Stephanie when she lies down near 
him, but stops her pursuer, identifies him, and sends him to his home to 
deal with him there. Since this episode serves to foreshadow the 
relationship that develops between Pieter and stephanie, we might note 
in Pieter's handling of Dick his 'charity' in not laying a charge, the 
boy's "Englishness" which emphasises the range in application of the 
Immorality Act (15), and Pieter's command of English as well as 
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Afrikaans (II). Having despatched Dick, Pieter turns his attentions to 
stephanie. It is not obvious which language is used between them. We 
learn elsewhere that Pieter as a boy is both conversant and literate in 
the language of the black people on his father's farm. Stephanie's use 
of the modal "should" and the rather abstract "believe" indicate a level 
of sophistication which belies the simplicity of register as it is 
rendered here. Both these features are evident also in the conversation 
between her and the magistrate in court. Al though on two subsequent 
occasions we will see her using Afrikaans in the incantatory "Dis my 
enigste kind" (45, 54), her use of "baas" here stems from a pattern of 
address sufficiently widespread to attest to the predominance of 
Afrikaans in the linguistic structuring of relations between black and 
white in South Africa, and so it does not identify the medium of 
exchange as being Afrikaans. (The language Paton gives his black 
characters has been the subject of attention by Ward, 1989: 74-76, and 
Coetzee 1988:126-129, though they both focus on Cry, the Beloved 
Country.) If we recall that the apparently omniscient narration in Too 
Late the Phalarope is in fact a version of events reconstructed 
retrospectively by Sophie from her own observations and from diaries and 
letters written by Pieter probably in Afrikaans, we might have some 
sense of the narrative complexities of the rendition of dialogue in this 
novel. We should also recognise that Pieter is distinguished from Sophie 
in his understanding of the black language, and hence in his access to 
the language-culture system Sophie describes as "a separate world", of 
whose "joys and sorrows no one knows at all" (41). 
The conversation between Pieter and stephanie that follows provides an 
illuminating perspective on the relationship that develops subsequently. 
The two are already acquainted with each other, as we can infer from his 
"I did not recognize you, stephanie" (12), and, in response to his "You 
know who I am?", her "Baas, I know well" (13). His authority over her is 
evident in the I submissiveness I ( 12 ) and the I obedience I ( 14) of her 
responses, and in the communicative initiative he takes, asking eight 
questions in the course of the interchange and concluding with an 
instruction. It is perhaps most evident in her deferent use of the 
third-person "baas" which recognises him as a white man. There is 
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nevertheless a certain deliberacy here in the way she withholds specific 
information by using the formulation "I know well", and by rephrasing 
his question as "What should I do?" (13). The concluding narrative 
comment, "So there she went with knowledge to destroy a man" (14) is, of 
course, not borne out in the case of Dick; equally it prefigures her 
subsequent power over Pieter. 
This interchange should be read as a reconstruction by the first-person 
narrator, Sophie; that is, as constituting part of a complex narrative 
strategy which will receive comprehensive attention later in this 
chapter. I would here like to focus on the ways in which Stephanie is 
constructed by the narrative in the passage of commentary which is 
inter cut into the exchange between her and Pieter. 
She was twenty-three, or twenty-five perhaps, and her father 
and her mother were unknown, and there was a good deal of 
lightness in her colour. But she lived in the black people's 
location with the old woman Esther, who was said to be more 
than a hundred years old. Some said that Esther was a child 
when our white people first came trekking into the grass 
country, and it was true that she herself told of it, but I 
think it was only an old woman's vanity. Stephanie looked 
after her, and kept her alive by brewing and selling liquor, 
which is against the law, and brought her often into the 
courts. She was a strange creature, this girl Stephanie, 
with a secret embarrassed smile that was the mark of her . 
strangeness. She took her sentence smiling and frowning, and 
would go smiling and frowning out of the court to the 
prison, and would come out from the prison smiling and 
frowning, and make more liquor, and go back smiling and 
frowning to the court. She had a child whose father was 
unknown, and she kept it at some place in the reserve, in 
Maduna ' s country, and she had a queer look of innocence 
also, though she was no stranger to those things which are 
supposed to put an end to innocence (13). 
Evident in this passage is certain information whic~ is presented as 
factual: the absence of her parents, the lightness of her colour, the 
presence of a child "whose father was unknown", her support of the old 
woman Esther, her liquor-brewing, her appearances in court and her 
consequent sojourns in prison, her promiscuity. There are points on 
which the narrative offers judgements: the fact that Esther is kept 
"alive" by Stephanie, the association between supporting Esther and 
breaking the law, Stephanie's "strangeness" which is marked by a "secret 
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embarrassed smile", her resigned acceptance of entrapment within a cycle 
of poverty, crime, and imprisonment, and her "queer look of innocence", 
despite her experience. Evident in these judgements is the ambivalence 
of the narrator towards stephanie, instanced most acutely, perhaps, in 
the concatenation of her "smiling and frowning". 
This broad construction of Stephanie is borne out by her subsequent 
appearances in the narrative: we discover that she is extremely 
hardworking when she gets a job, that her loyalty to the old woman is 
exceeded only by her love for her child, that she is willing to accept 
imprisonment but not the loss of her child. We can infer certain things 
about Stephanie, too: her lack of education, her illiteracy, her 
alienation from a legal system that is punitive rather than provident to 
someone in her position. We also infer a certain ruthlessness underlying 
her "innocence", since she is also willing to entrap Pieter once her 
child is taken away from her by the "white women" of the Women's Welfare 
Society {169}. 
It will be immediately apparent that the narrative uses to which Paton 
is putting the figure of the black woman are substantially different 
from those of Plaatje. Recognising this, it may yet be illuminating to 
juxtapose an outline of similar 'facts' of Mhudi's existence with this 
representation of Stephanie in order to highlight some of the 'losses', 
, absences' and 'presences' that have resulted from changes in their 
respective social, political and cultural contexts. Unlike Stephanie, 
Mhudi lives in several different places, dislocated out of her initial 
home, Kunana, by the military attack of the Matabele. She is 
nevertheless substantially integrated into both the "hospitable Qoranna" 
group {81} with whom she lives, and the Barolong people with whom she is 
reunited at Thaba Nchu, deriving much of the strength of the 'voice' 
which so definitively characterises her from the mandate and sanction of 
communi ty . Mhudi finds and marries Ra -Thaga in the wilderness; the 
relationship that develops is close, longstanding, and mutually 
supportive, and so obviates the need for other sexual relationships {she 
actively resists the propositions of Ton Qon, and neither she nor the 
only white man with whom she comes into contact, de Villiers, have any 
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romantic interest in each other}. Mhudi has two children, but her 
attachment to them is subordinate to her devotion to her husband. Given 
her integration into the community she is able to leave them with her 
cousin when she follows him to war . As 'the Harvester', Mhudi is not 
dependent on employment to support herself and her family: we might 
recall the description of life at Kunana which is replicated at Thaba 
Nchu: 
woman's work was never out of season. In the summer she 
cleared the cornfields of weeds and subsequently helped to 
winnow and garner the crops. In winter time she cut the 
grass and helped to renovate her dwelling. In addition to 
the inevitable cooking, basket -making, weaving and all the 
art-painting for mural decorations were done by women. 
Childless marriages were as rare as freaks so, early and 
late in summer and winter, during years of drought and of 
plenty, . every mother had to nourish her growing brood, 
besides fattening and beautifying her daughters for the 
competition of eligible swains {25}. 
Even given the idyllic nature of Plaatje's reconstruction, its 
invocation of community serves as a point of contrast for the 
circumstances of stephanie's life . She has, evidently, neither parents 
nor husband, and her attachment to Esther seems not to be based on blood 
relationship. Lost to Stephanie is the autonomy of tribal life. The 
absence of parents and the "lightness in her colour" indicate white 
sexual involvement amongst her forebears. Her current existence is in 
significant ways residual: it is dependent upon white society and 
structured by it. As we will she is tried in terms of its laws, she is 
forced to seek' employment in domestic service because her customary 
means of livelihood is illegal, and her "say" over her child is taken 
away from her by its Women's Welfare Society. Significantly, such power 
as she does have stems from this same residual position: since 
miscegenation laws have defined her as taboo, Pieter's attraction to her 
can be exploited and used against him. 
Of course this attraction is in many ways the focus of Paton's novel, 
and one which must be considered even in a resistant reading of 
Stephanie. The relationship between them will receive detailed 
consideration subsequently. At present, I wish to focus on the broader 
CHAPTER 5: PATON: '100 LATE 'rIIE PHALAROPE 167 
narrative treatment given two specific aspects of her characterisation 
which are significant within the narrative and seminal to the 
representation of her relationship with Pieter: her discourse and her 
smile. 
5.2 Her Discourse and Her Smile 
Some consideration was given above to the first conversation between 
Stephanie and Pieter. The only other person whom we see her address 
directly is the magistrate before whom she appears in court. From the 
comparison with Mhudi we might be inclined to recognise Stephanie's 
"brewing and selling liquor" (13) as having its roots in tribal custom. 
As such it is communally accepted within the location, it pays better 
than domestic work (93), and it allows her to care for "the old woman 
[who] is very old" (53). Yet this activity is defined by the law as 
illegal, and it is the duty of the court to enforce the law. The 
equivocation of the narrative voice is apparent also in the depiction of 
the magistrate. We are offered evidence of his impartiality when he 
gives her "the usual two weeks", but decides "there was no proof that 
she had meant to run away from Venterspan, nor any proof that she did 
not mean to return" (53). Nevertheless it is he who introduces the 
"matter of the child", and in questioning her makes a "jest" at her 
expense: 
- You have a child, he said. 
At the mention of the child, she was immediately another 
woman, and she looked round the court with wary eyes, as an 
animal might look round when it is hunted. 
Then she said, I have a child. 
- And you are always in prison? 
- Not always, she said. 
- How often have you been in prison? 
She tried to count the times, even using her fingers, 
and smiled and frowned, but at last shook her head and gave 
it up. 
- Many times? 
- Yes, many times. 
Then she said urgently, but not so many. 
The magistrate wrote it down, and then he read it out 
not always, but many times, but not so many. ' 
She could see it was a jest, and that the magistrate and 
?thers were amused by it, and she looked round the court as 
If to be on guard the better (53). 
CHAPTER 5: PATON: 7.'00 LA'rE mE PHALAROPE 168 
In addition to the system of laws, the power relations of court 
procedure work quite clearly against her. It is the magistrate who 
defines what is relevant to the case, it is he who asks questions and so 
delimits the information she can supply. In this instance, the "jest" is 
shared by "the magistrate and others" but excludes her. Part of the 
power and most of the cruelty of this "jest" stems from his inscription 
of her words so that they are available to be read aloud and so used to 
mock their simplicity and apparent contradictions. 
In recognition of these power re lations, she refrains, on this occasion, 
from use of the familiar "baas". During her second court appearance she 
uses a formal version of third-person address, "the magistrate": 
She did not stand there smiling and frowning, nor did 
she play with her fingers , but she stood there silent and 
watchful, till the magistrate asked her if she had anything 
to say. 
- The magistrate said I must work, she said. 
- Yes. 
- So I got work with Baas Willemse. 
- Yes. 
- Then they heard I had been in prison, so they sent me 
away. 
- Yes. 
She turned and looked at Japie. 
- Then the baas got work for me. 
- Yes. 
- And the Oubaas died. 
- Yes. 
- So I lost that work also. 
- Yes. 
Then she was silent, having no more to say. 
- Then you did no work? 
- No. 
- You made more liquor? 
- Yes. 
- Therefore I must sentence you to two weeks in prison. 
- What about the child . 
. - We will tell you about the child when you come out of 
prlson. 
- I could get no work, she said. 
. Then when the magistrat e made no answer, she said to 
hlm, I cannot lose the child. 
An~ the magistrate said, fortunately or unfortunately, 
that wlll not be for you to say . 
So she said to him again, I cannot lose the child (164-
165). 
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The structure of this interchange, and particularly its patterns of 
question-and-answer, is likewise revealing of the power relations 
between the two speakers. It is in response to the magistrate's 
invitation that Stephanie recounts her experiences. Her rendition of the 
different stages of her 'career' is stilted, but facilitated by the 
magistrate' s affirmatives. At the point in her story at which she has 
run out of opportunities for employment these affirmatives stop. He then 
asks two questions, and bases his sentence on her replies, effectively 
discounting her preceding account of her experiences. In response she 
poses a question of her own, and since he offers no real reply, 
emphasises it by repeating the two aspects of her 'case' which should 
militate in her favour. The magistrate's first response is to make "no 
answer" ; his second is to affirm his own power over her by denying her 
the right "to say" what wiil happen to her child. 
A point of significance in regard to these court hearings is the fact 
that the magistrate is given a narrative opportunity to justify his 
position, but she is not. On the second occasion, he summons Pieter's 
mother and his aunt, Sophie, for a consultation on the "matter of the 
child" (165). He says to them: 
This is the twelfth time that the girl has been sent to 
prison. When she comes out again, and if Mr Grobler finds 
her a job, and if for some reason or other she loses the 
job, she will think again, as she so obviously thinks now, 
that she has some kind of right to break the law. And how 
will the child grow up? Obviously to think that if he is not 
fed with a spoon, then he too has a right to break the law. 
If such a child is to be taken away, it should be done soon, 
for the longer he stays with his mother, the more likely is 
he to grow up into a skelm. I should say too, that Mr 
Grobler has already done more than he was obliged to do, for 
as far as I know, he is not obliged to find employment for 
such persons (166). 
The narrative balance of sympathies in this matter is fairly plain, 
because neither Stephanie's enactment of this 'crime' nor its possibly 
pernicious consequences are confronted in the narrative. Revealed in the 
magistrate's comments is rather more ignorance than knowledge of the 
circumstances of Stephanie's ' case'. Since her son does not, in fact, 
stay with her in the 'location', but in "Maduna' s country" which is 
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beyond Bremerspan, we might be led to question the nature of the 
jurisdiction of the white magistrate and the white Women's Welfare over 
the 'reserve', and certainly its intervention, in this case, in the 
"separate world" it represents. The magistrate's comments thus offer a 
clear delineation of the marginality of stephanie's position: those who 
have the right to sentence her do not have an obligation to help her 
avoid repeating her 'crime'. 
Her silence following her first sentencing and the first threat to her 
child stands in counterpoint to the magistrate's explication of his 
position: 
She left the dock and followed the policeman to the door, 
but half way there she halted, as though she would not go, 
as though something must be done or be said, as though it 
were unbelievable that her offences, for which she had been 
willing to pay without complaint, should suddenly threaten 
her with such a consequence. She turned and looked at me and 
my nephew as though she would say something to us, but she 
knew that she could not do such a thing in a court 
So then she went out {54}. 
Of course, Sophie's sympathetic interpretation serves effecti vely to 
focalise the event through Stephanie's consciousness. It remains 
striking, however, that Stephanie is unable to speak on her own behalf, 
and that nothing she might have to say is likely to be effective against 
the due processes of the law. 
It seems fairly plain from the discursive encounters that do, and do 
not, take place in court, that Stephanie's power in relation to official 
procedures is minimal. More significantly, her lack of power in the 
discursi ve si tuation of the court provides a context for her 
relationship with Pieter. The discursive relations in which she is 
located can, I think, be clarified by a reference to a second 
significant aspect of her characterisation: her smile. 
In the passage of narrative commentary cited earlier, Stephanie is 
described as having "a secret embarrassed smile that was the mark of her 
strangeness". This smile is particularly prevalent in court: "she took 
her sentence smiling and frowning, and would go smiling and frowning out 
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of the court to prison, and would come out from the prison smiling and 
frowning, and make more liquor, and go back smiling and frowning to the 
court" (13). The ludicrous description highlights both her deference to 
the 'due processes of the law' and her resignation to her fate. It also 
reflects the ambivalence of the narrative voice noted above. In her 
encounter with Pieter in the Kloof (which will be considered in greater 
depth later) her smile is described variously as "secret", sheepish, 
"strange and secret", and irresponsible (44-45). Significantly, in that 
encounter, her smile disappears when she speaks of her child. 
On the occasion of the first court case Sophie goes on to speculate 
about its origins: 
. .. the girl stood in the dock, smiling her secret smile. 
Then she would think it not right to smile, or perhaps her 
smile had some time angered someone in authority, for she 
would frown as though by that she would show respect for the 
law and the court, and would show that she was not careless 
and indifferent. So she went between smiling and frowning, 
so that unseeing persons might not have known that was the 
sign of her nervousness, and might not have believed it had 
they been told, thinking that she must by now surely be used 
to being in the court (52-53). 
The "smile and the frown" are concatenated, in Sophie's response, with 
"the strange innocence that made me pity her, though innocent she could 
hardly be". Confronted with the threat of losing her child, she stops 
smiling ("the smile was gone from her now", and she "did not smile any 
more" (54)). On her second appearance in court she "did not stand there 
smiling and frowning, nor did she play with her fingers, but she stood 
there silent and watchful" (164). 
The disappearance of the smile is associated both with some fairly 
forceful questions on her part as to the fate of her child, and a 
disappearance of the term "innocence" in Sophie's description of her; 
indeed, Sophie sees her as being "like a tigress for the child" ( 165 ) , 
and "not like one on whom sentence is passed, but like one who passes 
it" (169). In important ways her smile encapsulates the qualities that 
the narrative requires of her: submissi veness, deference, 
irresponsibility, secrecy, and strangeness . Of course, as I will go on 
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to show, stephanie's smile is one of the more potent aspects of her 
attraction for Pieter, yet in her final encounters with him she does not 
smile, but evinces "respect" (162, 163), and humility (163, 170). 
My discussion of Stephanie thus far has been undertaken with certain 
ends in mind. It has been an attempt to challenge the critical trend 
(which will be discussed later) that takes her and her textual position 
in Too Late the Phalarope for granted. It has thus constituted a 
resistant reading which deliberately emphasises her humanity in order to 
demonstrate that she does have a story to tell, even if it is not, in 
this narrative, explicitly told. This reading has thus been an attempt 
to establish terms in which to read critical debates that have developed 
in regard to her, and, more substantially, in regard to the novel as 
'tragedy'. The most basic term I have established, I hope, is the 
possibility of a recognition of her as subject. Since it is not my 
intention simply to take this term as read, however, the issue that will 
be addressed in the discussion of critical debates that follows has to 
do with the converse of her humanity and her subjectivity: the extent to 
which she is, to use Leitch's words, "a uniquely discursive function" 
(1986: 158), the extent to which she is simply a construct of Sophie's 
narrative. In my consideration of Stephanie I have already given 
attention to her discourse. Given an understanding of the interrelations 
between discourse and culture, given weimann's corrective that "as soon 
as the subject is viewed purely as a function of discourse but discourse 
not, simultaneously, as a function of the subject, the whole question of 
representation cannot be reconsidered at the crossroads of structure and 
event, system and history" (1987:177), the discussion that follows will 
focus on discourse in various forms: critical discourse, narrative 
discourse, especially as it invokes and positions itself in relation to 
the broader sphere of Afrikaner cultural hegemony and the discourses of 
apartheid, and the constitutive force of Pieter's discursive relations 
with those around him. 
5.3 A Feminist Critique 
In a recent article entitled "The Black Woman in South African English 
Literature", Lockett has delineated three broad categories in terms of 
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which representations of this figure can be read: "untouchables", 
"unattainables" and "destroyers". These categories have their roots in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century travel writing. "Since the first 
travellers and explorers in Africa were inevitably white, male and 
European, their descriptions of black women are often distorted 
reflections of the cultural prejudices of such men .concerning gender and 
race: black women, together with black men, are the 'other', yet their 
sex alienates them still further from those who write them" (1988:21).~ 
In Lockett's reading, the destroyer figure emerges after the 
promulgation of the Immorality Act of 1927: 
In post-1927 South African English fiction the black woman 
thus takes on an altered character in her relations with 
white men (for this continues to be her major fictional 
role). Like the unattainable she is a sexual temptress, 
often attracti ve, but with physical qualities that recall 
her descent from the untouchable. In this guise she becomes 
a destroyer figure, for by consorting with her the white man 
faces the danger of prosecution under the Immorality Act 
and, as a convicted criminal, his life and that of his 
family is destroyed .... it is the black woman, and equally 
the law itself, which function as instruments of destruction 
(1988:29). 
Lockett's reading of Stephanie as a "destroyer" appears to be based on 
Pieter's view of "his developing illicit attraction to Stephanie as a 
form of psychotic illness", and "the relationship as evidence of his own 
debased character ... [and] his dealings with the black woman ... a 
descent into filth" (1988:31). Of course the term 'destroy' is, 
conveniently, very pervasive in the novel. Yet a striking difference 
between Lockett's reading and my own is her acceptance of the 
predominance of masculine experience. stephanie can really only be read 
as a destroyer if we condone, as we are supposed to, the narrative focus 
upon Pieter. 
~ Perhaps Lockett's first assertion needs some qualification for 
Mary Louise ~ratt! in, h,er Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and 
Transculturatlon, ldentlfles what she terms "exploratresses" in 
both America (Flora Tristan and Mary Callcott Graham) and Africa 
(Alexandra Tinne, Mary Kingsley, and Florence Baker). Their 
travels we!e, however, un?ertaken ~n the nineteenth century rather 
than, ~arller, and certalnly then impact on evolving literary 
rendltlons of the other was slight compared to that of men. 
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Although it is perhaps surprising that a feminist reading of the novel 
should uncomplicatedly accept the predominance accorded masculine 
experience, Lockett's reading in fact follows a fairly well-established 
critical trend which has been described in an article entitled "Women 
and Nature, Women as Objects of Exchange: Towards a Feminist Analysis of 
South African Literature", in the same collection as Hutchings's. In it, 
Driver identifies what she terms (following Ellman) a "phallic stance" 
within our dominant literary critical tradition. Although it has 
"particularly to do with the reception of texts written by women", this 
stance is broadly characteristic of "the male-centred mythologising that 
forms the basis of South African literature and literary criticism" 
(1992:455), in which the "female perspective is ignored" (1992:457). 
This is especially true of the black women's perspective. 
5.4 TOo Late the Phalarope as Tragedy 
In relation to Too Late the Phalarope, this trend takes the overall form 
of condoning the narrative foregrounding of the experiences of the 
masculine protagonist and the narrative 'silencing' of Stephanie's 
story, and the specific form of viewing the novel as 'tragedy', with 
Pieter as 'tragic hero'. Gordimer' s 1961 commentary on "The Novel and 
the Nation in South Africa" offers an early and useful delineation of 
this view: 
In terms of tragedy as the rest of the world knows it, there 
is a tragedy in Alan Paton's Too Late the Phalarope - the 
private tragedy of a man of fine instincts in conflict with 
an instinct that seems misplaced from some earlier, brutish 
existence. The writer takes care to endow his hero with 
noble attributes and virtues, and provides that he shall 
bring about his own downfall, thus fulfilling the classic 
condi tions of tragedy, that the hero shall topple from a 
height, and that the fall shall be brought about by a fatal 
flaw in his nature (1973:41). 
Gordimer goes on to question and to resist the novel's 'tragic' aspect: 
Van Vlaanderen regards his own lust not as lust but 
specifically as something connected with black flesh. 'It is 
not the awfulness of lust that shocks and shames· but the 
awfulness of its object - a black woman. The moral' focus of 
the book ... is off-centre .... the morality of the novel _ 
the morality of South Africa - claims tragedy on the wrong 
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count. The thunderbolt misses; the explosion, like the moral 
truth, is off-centre. For lust can be a tragedy for a man, 
but it is not a national disaster (1973:41-42). 
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Gordimer's ability to appreciate and to resist the tragedy has a 
significance greater than her dismissal of "lust" as a putative 
"national disaster" - though it is revealed in this dismissal, as I will 
go on to show. For the moment, we can recognise in her comments a 
specification of the,is~e~ that are central to a readi 0 the novel 
as tragedy: the distinction between the private and the public domain, 
Pieter's endowment with "noble attributes and virtues" to make him a 
'tragic hero', his "downfall" through a sexual relationship with a black 
woman, because of a "fatal flaw in his nature", his location in "the 
morality south Africa has built on colour" (1973:39). 
Apparent in Gordimer's commentary is a sense of unease at Paton's choice 
of the tragic mode; unease which has its roots, I think, in uncertainty 
and suspicion as to the nature and the possibilities of tragedy in the 
Southern African context. such unease is apparent in her first 
qualification, "tragedy as the rest of the world knows it", and in her 
association of "the morality of the novel" with "the morality of South 
Africa" in claiming "tragedy on the wrong count" (my emphasis). The view 
towards which my analysis will proceed is that Paton's use of tragedy is 
an act of alignment with "the rest of the world" rather than with "the 
morality of South Africa", and so Gordimer' s polarities offer a useful 
point of entry to a postcolonial positioning of the writer and his 
novel. 
Not surprisingly, other critics as well as Gordimer have evinced unease 
at Paton's use of the tragic mode. Although Watson's article focuses on 
Cry, the Beloved Country, it offers a provocative and compelling 
explanation of Paton's choice of tragic mode in terms of his liberalism. 
I shall deal at some length with this article because the implications 
of watson's critique for Too Late the Phalarope deserve more detailed 
attention than they generally receive (perhaps because he relegates the 
later text to a footnote). In beginning his argument he enlists 
Coetzee's observations that tragedy has been "a favoured mode among 
White south African writers .... Tragedy is typically the tragedy of 
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inter-racial love: a White man and a Black woman, or vice versa, fall 
foul of the laws against miscegenation, or simply of White prejudice, 
and are destroyed or driven into exile" (in watson 1982:31). Paton uses 
the mode, in other words, partly because it is available to him. In 
doing so he is effectively cheating, however, because through the 
processes of identification and catharsis, in watson's view, "tragedy 
affords a solution, both artistic and otherwise, to that which in 
reality has not been solved at all" (1982:31). And yet it is not only 
"because of its apolitical nature that tragedy becomes a mode which 
resul ts in mystification rather than revelation". As he points out, 
citing steiner, "a tragedy without God, a tragedy of pure immanence, is 
a self-contradiction. Genuine tragedy is inseparable from the mystery of 
injustice, from the conviction that man is a precarious guest in a world 
where forces of unreason have dark governance" (1982:31). Paton's use of 
tragedy is illegitimate because it falsifies South African realities: 
the series of misfortunes which his novel relates are 
definitely not the results of the obscure workings of gods 
( or of God) whose ways and whims cannot be discovered by 
man. Like the law which has been formulated as an expression 
and defence of the interests of white South Africa alone, 
and which therefore has no credibility as an impersonal god, 
these misfortunes are quite explicable in terms of the man-
made reality and historical conditions of South Africa in 
the first half of this century. Cry, the Beloved Country is 
thus a tragedy of 'pure immanence' on top of which a 
mystifying Christian concern with suffering and joy has been 
imposed. In short, it is not genuine tragedy at all 
(1982:33). 
On the whole I find Watson's delineation of the problems associated with 
Paton's use of the tragic mode in his novels compelling. Support can 
certainly be marshalled for it from several sources. Gordimer, for 
example, notes that Too Late the Phalarope, like Millin's God's 
Stepchildren, is "written wi thin the accepted framework of the south 
African morality [and hence is] part of what one might call the 
literature of victims .... We are shown what people suffer under the 
imposition of a particular policy, a way of life, a particular 
morality". Characteristic of this literature, Gordimer points out, is a 
textual absence of figures responsible for the laws and the policies 
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which is clearly related to the "technique of mystification" watson 
identifies in Paton's writing (1982:33). In addition, the "victims" are 
never "shown in anything but a passive role - what is done to them, 
rather than how they take it, is the sUbject-matter of the book" 
(Gordimer 1973:43). Although, as I will go on to show, the separation of 
"how they take it" from "what is done to them" is an oversimplification, 
it is indeed Paton's representation of victims which ' has drawn reactions 
from more radical critics, and black critics in particular. In 
Mphahlele ' s reading of Cry, the Beloved Country, message supersedes 
character, and Paton fails "to study the characters of people in a 
process of change" (1962:159). Ngugi wa Thiong'o, as might be expected, 
goes further, repudiating the "good Christian souls in Alan Paton's Cry, 
the Beloved country, who suffer without bitterness, and move through an 
oppressive system without even being stirred to anger". Paton's 
imaginative failure is an inability to see the African "in an active 
causal-effect relationship with a significant past" (1972:43). 
The broader questions left to us by both Gordimer and Watson seem to me 
implicitly to invoke the pressures of context which ought to be taken 
into account in an assessment of the possibilities of tragedy in 
Southern Africa: the ways in which, for example, Paton's novel responds 
to and reveals the interrelations of discourse, at a range of levels, 
and the reaction to cross-culturality that takes the form of apartheid. 
More immediately, if we are called upon to read Paton in political 
terms, it seems only fair to read his critics in the same way. Finn has 
rather ingenuously observed, "Both liberalism and Alan Paton might be 
considered passe by some and disregarded by political and academic 
radicals and reactionaries of whatever ilk today" (1988: 315). Yet the 
debate between Watson and Rive that preceded Finn's paper by five years 
shows just the reverse. In a paper entitled "The Liberal Tradition in 
South African Literature" Rive takes up Watson's critique, allowing 
himself the adroit critical manoeuvre of citing Paton's own words: 
I hold in contempt those young white Radicals who sneer at 
liberals and liberalism. Who were their mentors? If it had 
not been for the Jabavu's, Marquard's, ' Hoernle's they would 
have been in darkness until now. One cannot ~easure past 
labour in terms of present demands. One expects black power 
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to sneer at white liberals. After all white power has done 
it for generations. But if black power meets white power in 
headlong confrontation, and there are no black liberals 
around, then God help South Africa. Liberalism is more than 
poli tics. It is humanity, tolerance and love of justice. 
South Africa has no future without them, least of all white 
South Africa (1983a:30). 
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Of course a further deconstruction might read Paton's reaction to "young 
white Radicals who sneer" as further evidence of his' liberalism, because 
it is couched in individual, in human, and in Christian terms. This is 
not the form Watson's reaction takes, however. In a letter to the editor 
of contrast after its pUblication of Rive's article, watson claims he is 
"very far from wishing to take issue with Paton himself". He chooses, 
rather, to direct the force of his attack at Rive, whose "coffee-table 
chat masquerades as criticism", claiming "Rive does Paton a disservice -
in fact does just the opposite of celebrating his life and work - by so 
clearly failing to appreciate the real nature of the liberal tradition 
in South Africa" (1983:89). Yet, as Rive points out in his reply, it is 
more than "peevishness and petulance masquerading as counter-criticism" 
that shows up Watson's refusal explicitly to locate his own political 
predilections: it is a failure to recognise the "colour-caste emphasis" 
built into South African liberalism which gives it its "peculiar 
quality", and which explains why "[it] is not acceptable to most blacks 
and liberal writing is not popular in the townships" (1983b:92-93). 
It is perhaps this refusal, more than the apparent difference in 
political priorities, that leads watson largely to overlook the issue of 
readership, and hence to focus on the vagueness and obscurity rather 
than the potential value of the category of "protest" fiction that Rive 
delineates. Using this category Rive manages to explain, in rather more 
sympathetic terms than Watson, what liberal writing cannot be expected 
to reflect or to do. Comparing the respective writers of Cry, the 
Beloved Country and Path of Thunder, he observes, "Paton, through no 
fault of his own, talks about oppression, Abrahams, at least while he 
was in south Africa, lives with it" (1983a:27). Hence the shift away 
from the liberal concern with "the victim" to protest at 
"victimisation" , so that "the perpetrator comes into his own as a fully-
fledged character. The novel is not intended to callout the reader's 
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mere sorrow for the suffering black hero; it is also a condemnation of 
those people who cause his suffering" (1983a:27-28). Thus Rive's 
category offers a refinement and amplification of Gordimer's 
characterisation of the "literature of victims". We do not need, here, 
to follow the further development of Rive's argument. My endeavour has 
simply been to indicate that, despite watson's ungraciousness towards 
Rive, the criticisms watson level s against Paton and the liberal vision 
may well have been met in different kinds of fiction to which he pays 
little attention. 
Emanating from Ri ve' s debate wi th Watson, to summarise, are several 
important points. First, Watson ' s reading of Paton and liberalism in 
political terms is necessarily influenced by his own political 
predilections which, within this debate, he declines to specify. Second, 
if Too Late the Phalarope is t o be classified in terms of Paton's 
liberalism we should bear in mind the range of narrative possibilities 
within which it is located. Third, the link watson seeks to establish 
between tragedy and liberalism is a significant one. Fourth, tragedy in 
Southern Africa nevertheless needs to be read in terms of pressures of 
context. And finally, both Paton ' s liberalism and his use of tragedy in 
Too Late the Phalarope must be read in relation to his postcolonial 
posi tioning, as distancing him from the hegemonies of apartheid and as 
aligning him with the Centre. The last three of these points will be 
taken up in the discussion that follows. 
5.5 TOo Late the Phalarope as Moral Tragedy 
The broader questions left to us by Gordimer and Watson had to do with 
the possibilities of tragedy in the Southern African context. This issue 
has received substantial, though implicit, attention in the recent 
article by Hutchings to which I have referred already. written shortly 
after the Watson-Rive debate, its reference to the central terms of this 
debate is somewhat oblique, perhaps because its primary purpose was to 
locate Paton wi thin the corpus of South African literature. And yet 
Hutchings's characterisation of Paton as a "Puritan" offers a 
delineation of the possibilities of tragedy within the domain of 
liberalism that directly challenges watson's dismissal (in fact shows up 
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watson's refusal at the outset to read Paton in Paton's own terms). For 
this reason I would like to bring Hutchings's argument to bear on 
watson's critique of Too Late the Phalarope, and in this way provide a 
critical context for my own reading of the novel. The footnote watson 
gives the novel reads as follows: 
Paton creates exactly the same form of mystification in his 
later novel, Too Late the Phalarope (1953). Apart from the 
fact that it also uses a spurious form of tragedy (the 
Immorali ty Act is no substitute for the gods), Paton also 
sees the problem here as being a tyranny of fear and a lack 
of love. He does not seem to realize that the rigid 
Afrikaner Calvinist mentality that he portrays in this novel 
(and which is exemplified by Pieter Van Vlaanderen's 
father), its lack of warmth and spontaneity, its many 
obsessional traits (such as love of Discipline and order, 
which manifests itself in strict parents and, particularly, 
in authoritarian fathers) operates as a defence mechanism 
among the ruling whites, especially the Afrikaners, against 
a basic national anxiety, arising from a basic national 
insecurity. In other words the Calvinist gives evidence of 
an obsessional and authoritarian national character in an 
attempt to compensate for an abnormally high level of 
anxiety originating in a deep sense of national insecurity. 
His rigid nature, therefore, is due as much to his political 
position in south Africa as to any supposedly inherent 
traits. But in Too Late the Phalarope Paton, . through the 
mouth-piece of Tante Sophie, suggests that the tragedy might 
have been avoided if sufficient love had been forthcoming. 
This might, of course, have been true. But in so far as this 
novel is a study of Afrikaner Calvinism in general, it is to 
be doubted whether the love, the true love as opposed to the 
twisted, which he advocates is any solution at all. Once 
again Paton is attempting to solve what is at root a 
political problem through personal love (1982:43-44). 
The first question that arises, it seems to me, is whether the 
Immorality Act is really a "substitute for the gods" in Too Late the 
Phalarope, and hence whether t he novel uses a "spurious form of 
tragedy". In Hutchings's view the tragedy is "conceived within a 
Christian, rather than an Aristotelian, world-view" (1992:188). In other 
words we should not seek a "substitute for the gods" in the novel, 
because God himself is represented in it. His effect, in Hutchings's 
reading of Paton, is to make "morality .. . a practical matter of daily 
living, not a theoretical, nor primarily a philosophical matter. It 
involves human choice, and the proper moral choice is seen as a rational 
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one" (1992: 184) . Hutchings thus follows and amplifies ..QQ.rdimer' s 
distiocti etween the public and the private domains in the novel, 
arguing against an over-emphasis on the former, and specifically against 
the view that "the private is wholly determined by the public" 
(1992:188). "It seems to me", he says, "that the strength of the novel 
lies neither in any scathing denunciation of the Immorality Act, nor in 
an indictment of male child-rearing practices in the Afrikaner 
community, but rather in Paton's ability to tell compassionately the 
tragic story of a man's j nteJ:.D& di"lis-w wrouqh in par;t b ttl ll1 f 
his commun-ity" (1992: 195). 
The existence of the private domain certainly seems to me crucial to any 
responsive reading of the novel. It is regrettable, therefore, that 
Hutchings fails to examine in greater depth the nature of the moral 
imperatives associated with this private domain, or to specify the 
relations between public and private beyond noting their ironic 
coincidence: 
~ p~ta9~1st, a figure of some eminence and status within 
his community, is split 'h' S! b an that 
derives fro tha eommu~i~y, and of his own free will, makes 
an immoral, adulterous choice which has disastrous 
consequences. That the immoral choice also involved a legal 
offence against an iniquitous law, iniquitously named The 
Immorality Act of 1927, is part of the multiple irony of the 
novel, because it links the evil in the c ' , 
i n, a hough t e community comprehends neither 
evil (1992:189). 
What is the ature of this "evil"? who defines it as "evil"? in what 
ways does it derive from the community? and can it still be recognised 
as "evil" if the law that prohibits it is also "iniquitous"? These are 
questions which Hutchings does not explicitly address, though perhaps 
some answers are implied in support of his assertion that "the 
interesting action, and certainly the tragic action, takes place within 
the private domain". He proceeds: 
The outer, public story concerns Pieter's fall from a 
posit~op of fame ?nd respect ~o n?t oriety and contempt. His 
brea~ln~ of a sO~lal taboo Wh1Ch 1S legally entrenched is a 
publl? event 1n the domain of the community. His 
conSC1ousness of the value that the community will put on 
the event and of the event's consequences is certainly part 
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of his anguish, but 's real failure is a betra l~self, 
p-L.8:J...1.Q~I:!:-..di!:.!.!nfluenced by hlS community u operating within 
his private domain ana proc~eding from a split so pr?found 
that he can risk those publlC consequences both for hlmself 
and for his loved ones. His brutal exploitation of a poor 
black woman is an assertion of his potency over the most 
vulnerable, most exploited class of human beings in South 
Africa. Yet it i ut t e dark sid at the aggressive 
tren th his community - including his father - has always 
demanded of him .... he declines to mC!lce lov t na a d 
c ew S~p~anie: the assertion of masculine aggression 
which, when discovered, is calculated to wreak the greatest 
havoc within the community that has driven him to it 
(1992:196). 
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The "evil" Pieter commits, it seems, is to enact the "dark side" of the 
aggressive strength which is valued by his community, and thus to assert 
the bivalence of its nature. Yet to accept this enactment as "evil" 
without questioning the term is to surrender critical distance from the 
consciousness of Pieter and the values of the community; both of which, 
it seems to me, need to be approached with some circumspection. 
The problem might be couched in terms of a second question that arises 
out of Watson's reading of the novel: specifically 'his accusation that 
Paton "fails to realize that the rigid Afrikaner Cal y jnist menta~ity 
cu.....JJJ:'-J!.IJ~t::.:r.2a.l.!s in this novel ... operat es as a defence meGhan .. i-sm among 
he rulin whites, especially the Afrikaners, against a basic national 
anxiety, ~~isin from ~basic national i nsecurity" (1982:44). Even if we 
are willing to condone Watson's analysis of a society in the terms of 
the psychological (the typecasting evident in his identification of a 
fICa vinist ... national character" ) , it seems to me problematic to • ,no, I 
.e.lj.pe, as he does, the historical origins the "mentality" he 
identifies. Do they postdate, as he implies, the existence of the South 
African national state? The first version of the Immorality Act was in 
fact passed in 1927, and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, though 
promulgated in 1949, had substantial origins in a private bill led by a 
Major F.J. Roberts of the united Party in 1936 (Furlong 1983:2-4). It 
seems particularly disingenuous to accuse Paton of failure to recognise 
the political dimensions of personal qualities when Watson himself 
simply takes as read the direction of the relationship between them. The 
false psychologism of the manoeuvre might be highlighted if we refer it 
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to Hutchings I s insistence that "the-.tJ;a.gic... actio [of. the novel] take§ 
place in the priv:ate damai II, that Pieter 's "real failu is a- betrayal 
of self". While I do not agree wi th Hutchings's location of the tragedy, -the denouement, and the liberation within the sphere of the private, it 
seems to me to offer an important alternative to watson's dismissal of 
Paton I s use of the tragic form as II spurious II • Unlike Gordimer who was 
able both to appreciate and to resist the tragedy, Watson's reading does 
not appear to engage on the level of the human or the experiential at 
all. 
This lack of engagement is revealed in, and perhaps can be explained in 
terms of, a third aspect of Watson's reading that is questionable: his 
sense that Sophie is Paton I s "mouth-piece". We might have reservations 
in this regard if we recall that Paton gives Sophie a hare-lip, which 
underlines physiologically the narrative ambivalence I have noted above. 
Hutchings is certainly quite decided: lithe three voices through whom the 
story is told, those of Aunt Sophie, of Pieter and of his wife Nella, 
are distinctly characterised, and none, not even the aunt's, is the 
voice of Alan Paton II (1992: 190) . To substantiate the point, Hutchings 
says of Sophie: "In building up her narrational reliability, Paton gets 
her to delineate her own character .... [and] gets her to distance 
herse I f from some of the orthodoxies of her community ... II ( 1992 : 190) . 
One of these orthodoxies is the Immorality Act. As Hutchings has pointed 
out a little earlier, the term used to describe this Act originates 
within the community itself: "Almost disingenuously, given Paton's known 
social and political opinions, he simply presents the community's view 
that Pieter van Y]aanderen breaks 'the jpon law,. k 
and stone in a land of rock and stone' (p.1S)". In fact the term occurs 
in a long passage focalised through the consciousness of Pieter, and 
hence gi ves added support to Hutchings I s contention that the tragic 
action is located wi thin the private domain of Pieter I s psyche. And 
certainly Pieter cannot be read as Paton's "mouth-piece". 
Hutchings I S reading of the novel as tragedy and Pieter as tragic hero 
has served as an instance of the critical trend noted above. It has been 
useful in challenging Watson: since Hutchings reacts Paton in Paton I s 
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terms, he recognises, as Watson did . not, the existence of the private 
domain, with its emphasis on the individual and personal reality of 
tragedy. Yet a loss of critical distance is apparent in the failure to 
examine the nature of the moral imperatives associated with this domain 
and the concomitant failure to specify the relations between public and 
private. The result, for example, is the contradiction of claiming on 
the one hand that Pieter's "real failure is a betrayal of self", and on 
the other that it is his community that 'drives' him to the "masculine 
aggression" of 'screwing' Stephanie. Nor, I think, can we accept 
Hutchings's claim that Paton "simply presents the community's view that 
Pieter van Vlaanderen breaks 'the iron law ... of a people of rock and 
stone in a land of rock and stone' (p.1S)", because it elides both the 
complexity and sophistication of the narrative strategy, and the 
problematic nature of tragedy in the Southern African context, given the 
discursive relations and the cross-culturality in which it must be 
located. Although Hutchings hints at the significance of textual and 
communal relationships when he speaks of "Paton's authorial detachment 
and his narrator's compassion" (1992: 195), we need to recognise more 
definitely two preconditions for reading the novel as tragedy: Paton's 
distance from the tragic action, and the narrative focus upon Pieter. 
The first of these entails an examination of the narrative strategy of 
the novel and particularly the first-person narrator Sophie; the second 
a recognition that the focus upon Pieter is predicated upon the silence 
of Stephanie. Each of these will receive comprehensive attention in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
5.6 Narration and Community 
Unlike Plaatje who is positioned , in significant ways, as a narrative 
insider to the community he narrates, Paton distances himself from the 
community in his novel by interposing a first-person narrator who is 
quite distinctly characterised. The structure that results presents 
something of a challenge to the model of the narrator as cultural 
translator, since the model must take into account the cross-culturality 
of the relationship that is being 'translated', and the motivations 
underlying the act of narration. Paton's position and purposes as a 
writer and the intentionality that characterises his writing of this 
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narrator will form part of a broader consideration of textual relations 
towards the end of the chapter. At present I would like to focus on 
Sophie, on her narration, on her position in regard to community, and on 
her relations with the characters in 'her' story. 
The sensitivity of our mode of approach might be sharpened if we posit 
two questions: why does Pieter not tell the story? and, hence, what 
attributes are given the first-person narrator who is chosen to tell it?, 
The first of these questions will also be addressed later, in a specific. 
consideration of Pieter; at this point it is important to bear in mind 
that Paton chooses quite deliberately not to have him tell the story. 
The person who does so is sophie, Pieter's aunt, who is physically 
deformed and has never married. Her deformity is, we infer, a harelip, 
which lends a certain irony to the fact that she is chosen to 'tell' the 
story, and works against a reading of her as Paton's 'mouth-piece'. A 
major effect of this deformity is to position her as something of an 
outsider within the community, with four consequences of significance 
for her narration: her status as an observer, her outspokenness, her 
ambivalent allegiance to its structure of values, and her excessive 
attachment to Pieter. 
Being unmarried and childless she lives with her brother and his wife, 
and on the occasion ·of his birthday party goes to check on the kitchen, 
for "it's in the kitchen that the work is done". Feeling unappreciated 
she is overtaken by what she terms "swartgalligheid" (106), the blac~ 
moods which both she and her nephew suffer. "I felt suddenly tired and 
old, and pitied myself, and remembered my lip and that no man had ever 
wanted me" (78). Being unmarried and childless she is marginalised 
within the socially important and emotionally close-knit Afrikaner 
amily to which she belongs. The effect is to diminish her participation 
and to emphasise her powers of observation. As she says: 
Yet because I am apart, being disfigured, and not like other 
women, yet because in my heart I am like any other woman 
and because I am apart, so living apart and watching I hav~ 
learned to know ~ ~eaning of unnoticed things, of a pulse 
that beats suddenly, and a glance that moves from here to 
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there because it wishes to rest on some quite other place 
(9) • 
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Evident here is her sense of heightened awareness of the subtleties of 
personal interaction, which allow her to witness gestures and responses 
which might to others be invisible. Her textual position might thus be 
seen, for the most part, as that of an observer, and her participation 
in the course of events more vicarious than direct. If this is not 
consistently true, it nevertheless provides the ground upon which her 
action at crucial moments - or lack of it - can figure. 
Also possibly because she is unmarried and childless, she is 
distinguished by the sharpness of her tongue. We see evidence of this in 
an encounter between her and Pieter's father-in-law who comes to fetch 
his daughter and grandchildren for a period of "rest and separation". 
Sophie describes the interchange thus: 
Her father ..• was a tall fierce old man, with a face like 
an eagle, . and the bluest and most piercing eyes that I have 
ever seen. They came to my brother's house to say goodbye, 
but for all his piercing eyes he did not recognize me, but 
took me for my sister-in-law, although I wear no rings at 
all. He asked me how were my other children, and my brother 
snorted like a bull, and blew hard at his nose. 
I said sharply, you had better ask my sister-in-law, she 
has some children. 
And my brother snorted still louder, and blew still 
harder at his nose. For he always said of Nella's father 
that you could put his sense of humour into a match-box 
already full (84). 
Despite her positive reading of her brother's amusement, we see evidence 
here of the difficulties and marginality of her status, and hence her 
need to protect herself verbally. We see evidence of this capacity in a 
second, rather more significant, encounter with the old man after 
Pieter's arrest under the Immorality Act, at the house of the police 
captain. 
Nella's father was waiting for us, the tall and fierce old 
man, with the face like that of an eagle, and the blue and 
piercing eyes. To him the captain told the story of all and 
when he had finished, the fierce old man struck the a;m of 
his chair and said, I would shoot him like a dog. 
Then, because no one spoke, he said to the captain, 
wouldn't you? 
And the captain said, no . 
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- You wouldn't? 
- No. 
- But 11 ha a-f-fendecLagainsL.tlle race. 
Then the captain said trembling, meneer as a policeman 
I know an offence against the law, and as a Christian I now 
an offence against God· but I do not know an offence against 
<tile race. 
So the old man turned to me and said, mevrou ... 
- Nejuffrou, I said. . . . 
Then he recognized me at last, for all hlS plerclng 
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eyes, and said, mejuffrou, I am sorry •.. 
Neneer, said the captain, if man akes ugon himself ID 
God's right to punisn, then.he must also take upon h~elf ~~ 
God's promise to restore. If we ... 
- - You are an Englishman, said Nella's father, fiercely 
but without offence. You do not understand these things. 
- I am not an Englishman, I said, but I understand them. 
The old man said, it will not help to stay any longer, 
and with a brief goeie nag, he went {196}. 
What is interesting in this interchange is not only Sophie's repeated 
need to emphasise her status, but also the fact that it is her comment 
which clinches the argument. Her rejection of the old man's judgement is 
an insistence on the need for a different kind of 'understanding' than 
the one he advocates, and hence an example of the liberal values which 
Hutchings admires in Paton, and which watson censures. It is an 
understanding she manages because, like the captain and unlike the old 
man, she has access to two cultural codes. 
This understanding alludes, on the one hand, to the range in ositions 
that exist within the community in regard to apartheid, and, on the 
other, to Sophie' s relative distance from the structure of values of 
this community. The punitive aspec of these values is demonstrated in 
the attitudes of Nella's father, the old man. Their most extensive 
~ifestation occurs in the figure of Sophie's brother, Jakob van 
~Vlaanderen, who beliey~s that- "the husband is the head of the wife, and 
that her true nature is to be obedient" (35), yet who is able to say in 
. -
company, "that he had never touched a woman, as a man touches a woman, 
other than his wife, nor had he ever desired to do so" ( 6 7 ), who 
understands the word obedience better than he understands the word love 
(65), to whom "our Afrikaans language was a holy tongue, given by Go n 
the wilderness" (65), ?-nd to whom "the point of living is to serve t e 
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Lord your God, and to uphold the honour of your Church and language and 
people" (72). 
sophie's explicit ecognition of these valueSJ in her brother serves to 
indicate both her alignment with them and her disengagement from them. 
Like Pieter's her name is inscribed in the family Bible, "the Book, the -great one that came from the Cape in 1836, and has all our van - , 
Vlaanderen names" (82). Yet she is sufficiently distanced from communal 
values to render with sUbstantial sympathy the experiences of Maria 
Duvenage, who goes off with a "worthless scamp" because her husband is a 
"hard and loveless man, who broke her spirit and enjoyed her flesh" 
(148). It seems significant that before doing so Maria should 'send for' 
Sophie to hear her story: because Sophie is able to listen, and 
subsequently record, without moralising or condemning. Certainly Sophie 
says of herself some way into the novel, "Yet I cannot judge, for where 
is the end of judging?" (149). In the self-commentary cited above she 
refers to herself twice as being "apart", and in doing so offers an . 
ironic invocation of the broader hegemonies of Afrikaner discourse. Thus 
another observation she makes, that "I am one of a people who in this 
matter of white and black suffer no confusion" (35), must be read in 
light of her narrative attempt to deal with very real confusion brought 
about by her nephew's transgression of the "iron law ... of a people of 
rock and stone in a land of rock and stone" (34). 
Yet the ambivalent allegiance she feels towards her community is 
compounded rather than resolved in her act of narration, since her 
translation of communal experience for an English readership inclines 
her to read her community in the terms of the external world. Such 
ambivalence is apparent in her description of Pieter' s involvement in 
the Second World War and the divisions it caused: "divisions even in 
families, too, even our own, for my brother said it was an English war, 
and would not believe the stories of Hitler and the Jews; but his wife 
and I were for the English, as we have always been in our hearts, since 
Louis Botha and Jan Smuts made us so" (30). Such ambivalence is also 
apparent in her comments on the smallpox epidemic that hits the black 
people around the town: "And I tell you that my sister-in-law -and I, and 
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Dominee stander, and the captain's mother and the captain himself, and 
my nephew also, were ashamed of our location at venterspan; for while it 
is true that we brou ht Christianity to the dark continent, we brought 
other things too" (157). Her atypical sense of responsibility for the 
condition of black people is evident also in her work with the Women's 
Welfare Society, which brings her into contact with Stephanie, and 
enables her to witness the effect Stephanie has on her nephew. If in 
significant ways her representation of Stephanie is an invocation of 
Stephanie's 'otherness', this seems to me to stem less from her 
allegiance to the values of the white Afrikaner community than from her 
passionate attachment to her nephew. 
A more immediate source of such ambivalence, then, is this attachment to 
Pieter and her sense of the destruction that is brouqht to "the house of 
his own flesh and blood" (200) by his transgression of the Immorality 
Act. Her personal invol vement in this transgression takes two forms: 
clearly as part of his family she suffers its consequences, equally 
clearly she blames herself for not intervening to intercept them. At the 
end of her narrative she offers a displaced commentary on its events: 
Yet my grief can still come back to me, when I read of some 
tragic man who has broken the iron law. Was he two men, one 
brave and gentle, and one tormented? And has he friends, or 
will he suffer his whole life long? And was there one 
perhaps, who knew why he had barred the door of his soul and 
should hav~hammered on it and cried out not ceasing? (200). 
We might be reminded, by this recapitulation, of Gordimer's "literature 
of victims", of her separation of "what is done to them" from "how they 
take it" with which I quibbled. These are issues which I shall take up 
shortly. For the present we might observe that Sophie's 'implicatedness' 
in her cultural translation provides a SUbstantial motivation for the 
mode of tragedy in terms of which the narrative is couched. She has 
said, "Yet I cannot judge, for where is the end of judging?" (149), and 
the mode of tragedy is functional in allowing her not to do so: in 
allowing her to condemn neither the man who transgressed the "iron law" 
nor the community which promulgated it. At this level of analysis, 
therefore, we might recognise some of the justice in Watson's problems 
with the tragic mode. 
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And yet "how [the victims] take it" is both a sUbstantial concern of the 
novel and intricately interrelated with "what is done to them". Indeed 
Gordimer's attribution of passive suffering serves to obscure a 
significant aspect of what makes Pieter interesting as a character: 
which is th between Sophie's narration of .him and stephani's 
seduction of him. 
5.7 Narration and Possession 
My discussion of the narrative structure of the novel thus far has 
concerned itself with the significance of the first-person narrator 
Sophie. In concluding this discussion I would like to focus now on the 
textual relations that exist between Sophie and Pieter, and so begin an 
address to the first question I posed in order to sharpen our approach 
to the narrative structure of the novel, which was, Why does Pieter not 
tell the story? 
Given the acuteness of Sophie's power of speech, it remains a matter of 
personal failure and self-reproach to her that she was unable, even 
after her inklings of Pieter' s situation are confirmed, to "speak to" 
him. The novel opens with her retrospective speculation: 
Perhaps I could have saved him, with only a word, two words, 
out of my mouth. Perhaps I could have saved us all. But I 
never spoke them. 
Strange it is that one could run crying to the house of 
a man that one loved, to save him from danger, and that he 
could say to one, have I not told you not to come to this 
house? And strange it is that one should withdraw, silent 
and shamed. 
For he spoke hard and bitter words to me, and shut the 
door of his soul on me, and I withdrew. But I should have 
hammered on it, I should have broken it down with my naked 
hands, I should have cried out there not ceasing, for behind 
it was a man in danger, the bravest and gentlest of them 
all. So I who came to save was made a supplicant; and 
because of the power he had over me, I held, in the strange 
words of the English, I held my peace {7}. 
In Hutchings's view, Sophie is "a reliable narrator wi thin her limits, 
for she tells her story with a decent compassion for all invol ved/ and 
with understanding .... The documentation she uses to support her 
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observations consists of intimate personal testimony - letters and a 
confessional journal ... " (1992:190). This is certainly true, so far as 
it goes, but it does not attempt to account for the motivations that 
underlie Sophie's act of narration, nor, sufficiently, those of Paton 
who writes her. Most particularly, it does not account for the fact that 
Pieter's power over sophie takes the form, on a crucial occasion, of 
silencing her: thereby thwarting her attempt to "save" him. The 
significance of this encounter seems to me sUbstantial for what it 
reveals of the personal and the narrative relationshipsl between Sophie 
and Pieter. , 
In an article on Pauline smith's "The Schoolmaster" entitled "The 
Renunciation of Voice and the Language of Silence" (1991), I noted how 
the mature consciousness of the first-person narrator Engela highlights 
- at times quite explicitly - the earlier "acts of silence" and "silence 
behaviour" which have characterised the only significant romantic 
relationship she has experienced. I s y. contention, therefore, _that 
tbe act of narratio constitutes a subsequent attempt to explain and to 
compensate for past silences. Given the similarity of its retrospective 
first-person narration, I would like, here, to posit a similar process 
at work in Paton's novel. Even if we accept the "reliability" of 
_Sophie's narrative we should acknowledge that he vested interests might 
render questienable its 'validity', might lead us to r~ecognise that it 
is as much 'her story' as it is Pieter's. 
Th~ 'crucial occasion' on which she is silenced occurs in the context of 
c: family . outing to the Long Kloof on the farm Bui tenverwagting, which 
Pieter's father has suggested in order to show his son the phalarope. 
The Lphysical contact that occurs between the two men represents an 
,.., ..... 1 -# ry 
gpiphany in their relationship, an epiphany which silences Pieter: 
Then because the son could not see, the father went and 
stood behind him, rested his arm on the son's shoulder and 
pointed at the bird. But the son could see no bird f~r he 
was again moved in some deep place wi thin, and s~mething 
welled up within him that if not mastered could have burst 
out of his throat and mouth, making him a girl or child. 
Therefore he could neither see nor speak (160) . 
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Pieter's silence here is ascribed by the narrative to his psychological 
androgyny, a ~exual ambivalence that has all along complicated his 
relationship- w't s ther. It thus serves to dramatise the 
..., --
patriarchal code which disallows differe~e, and wQich is challenged, in I 0 
the novel by Pieter's relations with stephanie. Indeed, by now, he has } /'~ 
already had ~e~~l ,contact with he~, an~ s~ t~e sight of the phalarope - ~~ 
and the posslbllltles of 'redemptlon' lt lndlcates- comes "too late 
Yet Pieter's muted response to his father seems to ,me less significant 
for the 'tragedy' than his repudiation and silencing of his aunt that 
follows directly: 
When it was time for our tea, I went to look for him, but 
could not find him. I climbed down over the rocks of the 
krantz, and looked down at the low country far below, where 
are the rocks and thorns and the hot red flowers. And while 
I stood there I saw a movement below, and it was a man's 
arms stretched out in front of him on a rock, not in the 
trees of the kloof, but amongst the grass and stones of the 
krantz. And I knew. he was praying out of some distress. 
Therefore I climbed down over the rocks, and came to him, 
and he turned to watch me come. 
- My child, my child, I said. 
And he said to me with coldness, what do you want? 
And I said to him, you were praying? 
- Can't I pray? 
- And I know what you were praying. 
- You do, do you? That would please you, to know even 
what your favourite prayed. Then you could still more 
possess him. How you would love to possess him. Then you 
could say to his mother and father, his ,wife and his 
children, it is I that possess him. And now he is a man, I 
still desire to possess him. In God's name, have you no 
pride? Or must you be taught again? (161). 
Pieter's prostration against a rock refers, symbolically, to the 
patriarchal code of "the people of rock and stone", and his rejection of 
the overtures of his aunt, by naming himself as "a man" and by invoking 
the name of God, constitutes a paradoxical application of this code. 
Al though Sophie reproaches herself for not having "hammered on [the 
door], , .. broken it down with my naked hands ... cried out there not 
ceasing" (7), it is clear that she would not have been able to reqch 
him. In none of the diary entries that are included in the narrative 
does Pieter consider confiding in his aunt. Although she believes she 
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might have saved him, "with a word, two words, out of my mouth", his own 
testimony offers no corroboration. 
This incon ruence _ sheds important light both on the nature of the 
'tragedy' and on the constitutive force of SORhie's narration. In two 
important respects ~he passage cited above links Pieter's relationship 
with nphie with his relationship with Stephanie. In the first place, it 
echoes, in ironic ways, his contact with Stephanie in the big kloof in 
Maduna' s country: the natural context is similar, the encounter as 
fraught. In the earlier encounter Pieter pursues Stephanie with easy 
authority, but when he catches her is subdued by toe impact she has on 
him: "he, shaking with shame, went and sat on a stone, and took off his -cap and wiped his brow, hot and cold and trembling" (45). In the later 
encounter, Sophie approaches Pieter with confidence and is humbled by 
his harsh rejection: "And when at last I returned, I do not know if he 
looked at me, for I did not look at hi m" (161). In the second place, if 
we note the semantic charge that falls, in the latter passage, on the 
word "possess", we might recognise these two encounters as, 
respectively, the initiation and the repudiation of possession. Such a 
reading can be substantiated by reference to Sophie's simultaneous 
description and judgement of the consummation of the relationship 
between Pieter and Stephanie: "And there, God forgive him, he possessed -her" (116). 
I I" I" 'r" ~ 
The c~tenation of occurrences of the term might lead us to consider 
again the motivations underlying Sophie's act of narration. She is, in 
fact, quite explicit about her narrative purposes: 
All these things I will write down, yet it is not only that 
they trouble my mind; nor is it only that I may show that 
t~ough one [man] neither entreated nor repented, the other 
dld both entreat and repent; nor is it only that men may 
have more knowledge of compassion. For I also remember the 
vo~ce ~hat. came to John in Patmos, saying, what thou seest, 
wrlte lt ln a book, and though I do not dare to claim a 
knowledge o~ this voice, yet do I dare to claim a knowledge 
of some VOlce. Therefore I put aside my fears and am 
obedient (10). ' 
( 
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The unctip9in9 of the narrative as an act of 
f'Y7t"" 'fexculpation is plainly related to Sophle' s sense 0 
expurgation and 
to 
moral if not hoI in 'unction. On the other hand, the 
desire to narrate that is expressed in the opening pages of the novel 
can be linked to the intensity of the relationshi between aunt and 
nephew, and the failure she believes characterises it. Given Sophie's 
identification both with his mother and his wife, and gi ven Pieter' s 
reactions to her on two seminal occasions as a boy and as a man, this 
relationship might be read as approaching the incestuous. ~he pqwer she 
acknowledges he has over her is t he power to reject and to silence. Yet 
if we are willing to connect the personal and the narrative 
relationships that exist between Sophie and Pieter, we should note the 
reversal from being silenced by him to tell~ng his story, to 
commandeering the narrative. 
To put the matter simply, Sophie tells the story, and Pieter doesn't, 
because she has such powerful motives for doing so. And yet the matter 
cannot be left there. If one of my reasons for including this novel in 
my study is the complexity and sophistication of the textual relations 
between writer, narrators and characters in relation to community, 
another is the opportunity it gives to investigate the possibilities of 
the mode of tragedy in relation to the complex discursive and cross-
cultural pressures of the Southern African context. And if one aspect of 
the tragedy is the distance Paton interposes along with his first-person 
narrator Sophie between himself and the tragic action, another is the 
narrative focus upon Pieter: a focus which is, in turn, predicated upon 
the silence of Stephanie. 
In order to approach the tragedy of Pieter in a way that takes into 
account the pressures of context I would like to return to the 
consideration of Stephanie with which this chapter opened. The question 
we might then ask is, Would the st ory look like a tragedy from her point 
of view? And who would be at the centre of the tragedy? We have 
encountered a preliminary answer to this question, of course, in the 
conversation between her and Pieter about Dick and about the impact of 
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his potential 'crime' on his mother. In response to Pieter's, "What will 
you do?", stephanie answers, 
- What should I do, she said. 
- You know who I am? 
- Baas, I know well. 
The lieutenant stood there and considered it. 
- This would bring great trouble for the man, he said. 
- Yes, baas. 
- You know his mother? 
- I know her well. 
- It would kill her. 
She made a noise of assent and sympathy, but he knew he 
was talking of things outside her world, for she had been 
often enough to prison, and no one had died of' it. 
- I can believe it, she said obediently. 
- Go home, then, Stephanie. 
- Good night, baas. 
So there she went with knowledge to destroy a man. He 
thought he had perhaps been foolish. Perhaps he should have 
ordered her to keep her mouth shut, or he would make trouble 
for her. But the truth was that it was not in him to do such 
a thing {14}. 
In my earlier analysis of the encounter between the two, I noted in 
regard to the term used for her, "the girl", the inevi tabili ty of the 
connection implied between her action in its context and her gender: the 
fact that "bare feet running" in the dark in the direction of "black 
people's location" were likely to be feminine and the cause of the 
flight a man in pursuit. !1hat is striking in this interchan e is the 
hlgnd expectati on that Stephanie should consider the "trouble" t~at 
might ensue for Dick, and the 'destruction' it would bring to his 
~other, without an reci rocal obligation on Pieter's ~art to consider 
its consequences for Stephanie. Of course my own reaction to this 
expectation might have something to do with my positioning as a woman in 
the 1990s, yet it seems to me too that the effacement of Stephanie's 
point of view in Pieter's conception of their relationship is 
fundamental to his tragedy. 
Of course it is in large measure his ingenuousness and sexual 
inexperience that leads him completely to overlook her intentionality. 
We, however, cannot. Nor, indeed, does Sophie, drawing as she does on 
her own observations and the retrospective reconstruction available to 
her in Pieter's diaries and letters. I have specified already something 
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of Stephanie' s motivation is seeking to establish a relationship with 
~ieter: I would like here to consider some of its manifestations. 
5.8 Silence and Intentionality 
My discussion of Stephanie's smile above was intended to investigate a 
specific aspect of her characterisation which, like her discourse, is 
significant within the narrative and seminal to the representation of 
her relationship with Pieter. within the context of her several 
encounters with Pieter, this smile take 0 a certain power which mark~ 
his attraction to her, and makes sense of the 'strangeness' identified 
by Sophie. Despite the sensitivity of her observation, Sophie can 
clearly not be expected to respond, as Pieter does, to its invocation of . 
intimacy. In Sophie's description of her the word ' "innocence" appears . 
frequently. Pieter's sense of her, by contrast, ~s encapsulated in the 
word "knowledge". 
Illuminating as it would be to trace in detail the development of the 
relationship between Pieter and Stephanie, I will confine myself to an 
examination of just three encounters between them. The first occurs when 
he is sent by his captain to locate Stephanie in preparation for the 
first court case. Failing to find her in the location, he traces her to 
"Maduna's country" where she keeps her child and which, in Sophie's 
description, "is a separate world all the same, and of its joys and 
sorrows no one knows at all" (41). Having sent his men to close off her 
other escape routes, Pieter himself follows her up into the "big kloof", 
where "suddenly ahead of him, under a little fall of water" he sees her. 
When he was near her, she turned and looked at him, 
smiling the secret smile, and then submissively turned her 
eyes to the ground. 
- stephanie. 
- Yes, baas. 
- What are you doing here? 
- I came to see my child, she said. 
- Here? In the kloof? 
She smiled, sheepishly. 
- Down there, she said, where the baas was. 
- Why didn't you ask me if you could come? 
She looked to left and right, taking her time. 
- I thought the baas would say no. 
- And tomorrow you must be in the court. 
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- I would have been there, she said. 
- How? 
- I would have walked. 
- Now you can ride {44}. 
The change in her smile from "secret" to 'sheepish' is evidence of her 
response to his mockery which, if not as brutal as the magistrate's 
"jest" nevertheless serves to assert the power relations between them. 
These are apparent also in his assumption of the communicative 
initiative: he questions her movements, reminds her of her obligation to 
be in court, checks up on her intentions, and concludes with an indirect 
command. At this point, however, she takes over the ini tiati ve by 
running away: 
But seemingly she did not want to ride, for suddenly she had 
fled by a little path at the side of the fall, that came to 
another, with no way up except over the rocks of the fall 
itself, green and slippery. He followed her at leisure, and 
came to where she was standing. 
- Why did you do that, he asked. 
She made no answer, except to smile in her strange and 
secret way. Then she heard the sound of the men above, and 
drew back. And as she drew back she touched him. And he did 
not move. 
He did not move, neither forward nor back, nor did she. 
It was all silent but for the sounds of the men above, and 
for his breathing, and the racing of his heart. Then she 
turned round and smiled at him again, briefly, and moved 
forward an inch or two, standing still with her eyes on the 
ground: while he, shaking with shame, went and sat on a 
stone, and took off his cap and wiped his brow, hot and cold 
and trembling. She did not turn to look at him, but went on 
smiling, with her eyes on the ground. Above them, the sounds 
of the descending men grew nearer and louder. She lifted her 
head and looked upwards into the kloof, waiting for them 
with a kind of forlorn enjoyment {44-45}. 
The shift we see taking place here is more than a shift in initiative: 
it is a shift from speech to action and a shift from verbal to physical 
'discourse'. She runs away, 
ca o~ sustaine 
reasonable to infer that at 
he pursues her, she touches him, the 
y. bQth of them. Although it seems to me 
least some of attraction t ... v-.... U<""'--...!:.2.S 
reciprocateq, ~tephanie remains comgletely undisconcerted by their 
contact, whereas Pieter is transformed -from the easy confidence and 
authority of the policeman to the shaky knees and perspiration of the 
man. This transformation is underscored, with some narrative humour, 
when he takes off his cap. If Stephanie has run so that he will follow, 
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her continued control of the situation is apparent in the fact that she, 
not he, breaks off the physical contact she has accidentally initiated, 
that she goes on smiling, and that she remains, aware of what is 
happening outside their immediate situation. 
More significant, for my purposes, is t,!le re ues fQllows, which 
gives evidence of her capacity to recognise and to grasp opportunities 
as they arise, if not yet to engender them. 
Then Vorster called out, are you there, lieutenant? 
- I'm here, called the lieutenant, the girl's here too. 
- Baas. 
- Can I see the child before I go? 
- Yes. 
The smile of irresponsibility left her face, changing it 
and surprising him. 
- Dis my enigste kind, it's my only child, she said. 
She was filled with some hurt pride of possession, so 
that he, knowing her life, wondered at it. 
- It's my only child, she said, and looked down at the 
ground again, waiting hopelessly. He, feeling pity for her, 
was suddenly purged of the sickness of his mind, and stood 
up and put on his cap {45}. 
The effect of her request to see her child is interesting: the reminder 
that she is a mother disperses his desire for her. His surprise at her 
attachment to her child seems to me to indicate his inability to see her 
as a person, whose motherhood is as intrinsic to her as her sexuality. 
The use of the word "possession" serves to link this passage with 
Sophie's attempt to communicate with Pieter in the Long Kloof. In its 
invocation of the passionate attachment of a maternal imperative, it 
also seems to me to indicate her attempt - successful here - to use her 
sexual effect on him towards securing her contact with her child. 
One evening some time after this t~ hanie seeks out Pieter to tell him 
that she has found work. He asks why she has come to him and not to 
Japie: 
At that moment I was alone there with the girl, and she said 
to me in a low voice, because the baas would do it for me. 
And the mad sickness came over me, that God knows I do 
not wan~, that ,God knows I fear and hate~ And I did not say 
to her In a VOlce of every day, do not be foolish. I did not 
even say to her, how can you know such a thing? I said to 
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her quiet and trembling, how did you know? And she raised 
her head and smiled at me, not quite submissive nor quite 
bold (91). 
199 
Since Pieter is at his father's house, it is clear that she has tracked 
him down. Her approach to him is very indirect, since he is called by 
Sophie to speak to "old Isak" in the kitchen, who tells him there is a 
woman asking to see him. Her expectation that ,he will "tell the 
Government" might seem naive, yet he is probably the only person in a 
position of authority whom she knows well enough to appeal to. The form 
his question takes, "How did you know?" is interesting because of its 
implication that he will intercede on her behalf (in fact he doesn't, 
139); it is also interesting because of its explicit acknowledgement of 
her power over him. Her smile, "not quite submissive nor quite bold", is 
thus a response to the intimacy he has implicitly admitted exists 
between them. The encounter is interrupted at this point, however, by 
the sudden presence of Sophie who witnesses the smile. She comments, in 
retrospect, "I am a watcher, and knew that no such girl might look in 
such a way at such a man" (92). 
The third encounter takes place shortly after, when Stephanie comes to 
Pieter's house to tell him she has lost her job. He opens the kitchen 
door to a knock, "and there was the girl Stephanie". , Like the one above, 
the description that follows takes the form of a diary entry. 
So I said to her, and my voice was trembling; what do 
you want? And she looked about her, and then she suddenly 
came past me into the kitchen. And I shut the door. 
- Baas, she said. 
- Yes? 
- Baas, I have lost the work. 
- Why? 
- They sent me away. 
- Why? 
- They found out. About the prison. And the child. 
And I said to her desperately, why do you not go to Baas 
Grobler? 
- I came to the baas, she said (94). 
The increased intimacy of this encounter might be indexed by the 
directness of her approach: his wife and children are away and her knock 
on the kitchen door comes after "the boy Johannes" has gone to bed. 
There is thus no-one to witness and little likelihood of interruption. 
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stephanie comes into the kitchen uninvited, and initiates the 
conversation, though her first "Baas" constitutes a request for 
permission to speak. In recounting her problem she effectively involves 
him in it, and she does so on the basis of the informal contact they 
have had before. 
Then she smiled at me, and the mad sickness that I hate and 
fear came over me, and she knew it, it being one of the 
things that she understands. I should have said to her, this 
is not my work, I should have said to her, go to Baas 
Grobler again. I should have said to her, let them take your 
child, and send you to prison, let them throw you into the 
street, let them hang you by the neck until you are dead, 
but do not come to my home, nor smile at me, nor think there 
can be anything between you and me. For this law is the 
greatest and holiest of all the laws, and if you break it 
and are discovered, for you it is nothing but another 
breaking of the law. But if I break it and am discovered, 
the whole world will be broken. 
Then she said to me, where are the mistress and the 
children? 
And I, knowing that she knew, said unwillingly, they're 
away. 
- That's a pity, she said (94-95). 
Her smile triggers his desire for her, and, despite the range of verbal 
responses he devises in retrospect, he says nothing. Despite his 
assertion that "this law is the greatest and holiest of all the laws", 
the extremit-y of these responses is evidence of the intensity of the 
desire this law wa~ designe to contain and whose existence it thus 
paradoxically continues to invoke . It is this de~ire that gives her 
power over him; power which is revealed in her questiQ abou hi wife 
apd children. The boldness of the question is apparent in its elision of 
the term "baas" 'as well as its personal nature: the rhetorical intention 
I 
underlying it is to emphasise the fact that they are alone. ~s offer 0 
money is an attempt to buy he off rathe than to assist her, yet it 
sets a precedent in their relationship which confirms her expectations 
of him. He says to her, lido not come any more to this house", and she 
replies, "when I am working, I go home at eight o'clock, past the place 
where the baas saw me running" (95). It is information he uses when 
subsequently he seeks her out (which happens, incidentally, on the same 
day he discov~rs from Japie that she has got work, 109). S~eav s 
him and he goes back to his stamps, "but I could not put my mind to 
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them. For God forgive me, my mind was on the girl, half with madness, 
and half with apprehension that she could think she could come to my 
house" (95). A rather pathetic contrast is suggested at this point with 
his wife who has said to him, "Sometimes I wish that I were a stamp .... 
Then you might look at me" (37). If his wife thinks she knows him better 
than he knows himself (105), if, in Sophie's view, she is "shocked into 
knowledge" only when the "hard hand of Fate [strikes] her across the 
face" ( 3 9 ), it i stephanie who ' nows' and ' understands' his desire, 
and smiles in response to it. 
I have referred already to sophie's description of the sexual 
consummation that finally takes place, "And there, God forgive him, he 
possessed her" (116). Yet, given Stephanie's impact upon him here and 
earlier ("he, shaking with shame, went and sat on a stone, and took off 
his cap and wiped his brow, hot and cold and trembling", 44), it seems 
rather more apt to say she possesses him. 
I began this investigation of stephanie's effect on Pieter by posing the 
question, Would the story look like a tragedy from her point of view? It 
seems to me that to recognise her intentionality is in significant ways 
to render problematic the tragedy. To classify Stephanie as a 
"destroyer" figure is to focus on what she destroys to the exclusion of 
why she destroys it: to ignore the fact that she has motives of her own. 
In my earlier discussion of the critical debate of the novel as tragedy 
I cited Gordimer's sceptical view of "lust" as a putative "national 
disaster", a view which reflected, I thought, an ability both to 
appreciate and to resist the tragedy. After the first court case sophie 
comments about Stephanie: "It's a lost creature ... that will go with 
any man that comes, but she has a passion for that child" (54). This 
discussion of Stephanie's effect upon Pieter has been undertaken to 
provide a basis for an investigation of the nature of his tragedy. It 
should also have revealed what might be termed the "covert plot"3 of Too 
3 The term is one used by Cedric Watts in regard to the novels of 
Conrad: the "covert plot ': of Heart of Darkness, for example, is 
the attempt by the statlon commander to engineer the death of 
Kurtz (1975 and 1988). 
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Late the Phalarope: tE-eJ elationship which develops between Step~anie 
and Pieter is substantially instigated by her in an attempt to secure 
~rotection for her and her child. 
I made the claim above that the effacement of Stephanie's point of view 
in Pieter' s conception of their relationship is fundamental to his 
tragedy. Having given some consideration to Stephanie's role in their 
relationship, I would like to focus now on Pieter, in order to examine 
his position in the tragedy. In doing so I will pay some attention to 
the silences that occur around him in the narrative; I will also 
examine, in part for comparative purposes, the extent to which he is a 
"discursive function", that is, the extent to which he is constructed by 
the discourse of the community and of the narrative. This evaluation 
will involve a recognition of the respective significance of discourse 
and inscription in Pieter' s life, and specifically in his attempt to 
constitute an identity. 
5.9 Discourse and Identity 
It is a characteristic of the narrative strategy of the novel that 
Sophie's predominantly first-person narrative has inter cut into it 
several excerpts from Pieter's diary and letters, to which she is given 
access after his arrest, and out of which she recreates the course of 
events. The resulting narrative shifts, or heterodiegetic analepses (to 
use Rimmon-Kenan's term), function in important ways to remind us of the 
fiction, to jolt us out of the narrative to reflect upon the relations 
between the moral frame and the narrati ve frame, and hence upon the 
narrative construction of Pieter. The critical debates about the novel 
as tragedy which were outlined above have supplied terms in which to 
read Pieter as a tragic hero. Hutchings's investigation and development 
of the distinctions posited by Gordimer between private and public 
domains are of particular relevance here, because in significant ways 
these distinctions take up the relations between self and community to 
which I gave theoretical attention in Chapter 3. 
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In pursuing our investigation of Pieter as tragic hero, we might begin 
with a definition by Peck and Coyle that occurs in their introduction to 
the genres of literature: 
What modern tragedy has in common with earlier tragedy is 
that it explores the painfulness of a world where fictions 
of a rational social order can no longer be maintained. Yet 
there is a difference .•.. The hero is as likely to be 
confronting the worst elements in himself as confronting the 
worst elements in the world (1984:98). 
Their term "fictions of a rational social order" in my view serves to 
invoke Giddens's sense of the recursive nature of social life which was 
considered in Chapter 3 . Accord~ng to his notion of the duality of 
structure, by way of reminder, "structure is not as such external to 
human action, and is not identified solely with constraint" - rather a 
"set of ties" exists "between the individual as an agent and the 
institutions which the individual constitutes and reconstitutes in the 
course of the duration of day-to-day activity" (1987:163,167). In these, 
terms our attention might be drawn to the relations between Pieter' s 
, private' action and the legislation that has been promulgated by the 
broader community of which he is a member. And yet it was my insistence 
above that the deployment (and analysis) of tragedy in the Southern 
African context must recognise the cross-culturality and the discursive 
relations which characterise this context and in terms of which tragedy 
must locate itself. Although the narrative construction of Pieter is 
extremely complex, the implications of this recognition are that we 
should focus on his position in regard to discourse and cross-
culturality especially as they manifest themselves here in the form of 
apartheid. 
In "On the Borders of Bakhtin: Dialogisation, Decolonisation", Pechey 
discusses the applicability of the concept of dialogism within the Third 
World, and offers an approach to apartheid in these terms. Considering 
first the issue of medium ("whether to decolonise writing in the 
coloniser's language or in a territorial vernacular which is itself ... 
only problematically a 'national' language") he advocates the 
recognition of a "multilingual field where the languages of coloniser 
and colonised are indelibly inscribed within each other". Such 
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'interinscription', he says, is to be found even nin, the least likely of 
(African) places: the apartheid state itself". Although apartheid might 
seem to constitute a "clear case of monologism .... it is only with 
Bakhtin's concept of dialogism and Gramsci's concept of hegemony that we 
can understand how its power is at once held and resisted" (1989: 63) . 
The reason for this is that, 
If the system's own self-description is (as Derrida 
suggests) 'untranslatable ' , exemplifying the exclusion it 
signifies, it is also true that the word apartheid cannot be 
deployed in a single sentence of the language from which it 
springs without recalling a linguistic miscegenation which 
accompanied its sexual counterpart in the early days of 
slave-ownership (1989:64). 
Thus the word apartheid, like the system, contains within itself the 
elements of its own deconstruction, and it does so because it invokes 
the cross-culturality which it seeks to manage and to contain. 
The significance of Pechey' s observations for a reading of this novel 
lies in its insistence on the multiplicity, and the interinscriptedness, 
of language-culture systems within the Southern African context. In 
Pieter's case his knowledge of several languages gives him access to the 
'worlds' that are encoded within them. It is nevertheless true that the 
dominant discourse in the novel is that of apartheid and the Afrikaner 
cultural nationalism of which it is an explicit manifestation. In 
important ways this discourse is epitomised in Pieter's father, and it 
is in large measure the patriarchal power that informs this relationship 
that serves to define for Pieter what must be kept private because it 
cannot be admitted in public. This is obviously true of his sexual 
relations, both with his wife and with Stephanie. Less obviously the 
"red oath" of allegiance to the British imperial army which Pieter takes 
leads his father, initially at least, to "bear no mention of his name" 
(72), and the term "Empire Day" must be translated into "the twenty-
fourth of May" before his father will respond to it (101). The issue 
that is made of Pieter's stamp-collecting is particularly representative 
of both his relationship with his father and his father's powers of 
definition. At the age of fourteen for the first time he does not come 
top of his ciass, and he is forbidden "to go on with the stamps". His 
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response, in Sophie's words, to t he "great hurt ... done to him that he 
had not deserved" is to armour himself, "against hurts and the world", 
so that even after the stamps are returned to him, "they were never 
mentioned again in his father's presence, nor I think did his father 
ever forgive him for having humbled him; for by now each had a strange 
power over the other, which made certain quite ordinary things 
impossible to speak of" {29}. The stamps thus cons~itute a significant 
silence in the relationship between Pieter and his father: and his love 
of his stamps moves into the private domain. {An intriguing parallel 
exists, incidentally, between the disbelief Pieter evinces at the loss 
of his stamps and that shown by Stephanie at the threat of deprivation 
of her child, 54}. 
Of course Pieter achieves considerable communal recognition for his many 
achievements - his education, his military valour, his rugby-playing -
so that the new young dominee who courts his sister invites him to 
become a diaken in the Church: "You're looked up to by the whole 
communi ty . You've been given great gifts by the Lord. Shouldn't these 
gifts be given back to Him also? Mightn't some young fellow say, there's 
Pieter van Vlaanderen, and what he does I'll do too?" {153}. And if we 
recall his comment about the Immorality Act, that "it is the greatest 
and holiest of all the laws", we might recognise i,n his choice of the 
police force for his career a deliberate alignment with the dominant 
code. Yet Sophie's comment at the beginning of the novel, "He was always 
two men" ( 8 ), and his mother's near the end, "from the years of 
childhood she had feared for him, and had known that he was hiding away, 
in some deep place within, things that no man might safely conceal" 
(189), attest to the enigmatic power of the private domain, suppressed 
as it might be. 
In Hutchings's reading of the novel, "the interesting action, and 
certainly the tragic action, takes place within the private domain", and 
the "tragic centre of the novel [is located] in Pieter's division within 
himself" and specifically in his enactment of "the dark side of the 
aggressive strength his community - including his father - has always 
demanded of him" (1992:196). 
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In my reading, however, public and private domains are not intact, and 
the tragic action is located not in either one domain but at the 
interface between the two. This might be demonstrated in regard to the 
incident at the beginning of the novel which serves as a dramatic 
foreshadowing of Pieter' s own case. In his 'arrest' of Dick we are 
offered an instance of his enforcement of the dominant code as it is 
represented in the Immorality Act. Such enforcement is clearly in the 
public domain since he is performing his duties as a policeman. Yet in 
sending Dick to his home he shifts the matter into 'the private domain: 
"I'm not talking to you as a policeman. I'm talking as your friend, you~ 
football captain" (15). 
Of course it is in the nature of sexual relations generally that they 
should fall into the private domain, and the Immorality Act serves to 
demonstrate the encroachment of state legislation into the private lives 
of individuals that is a particular characteristic of apartheid. Thus 
the 'tragic action' of the novel can be seen as shifting from the public 
to the private domain and back again. If, initially, Pieter enforces and 
subscribes to the dominant code as it is manifest in the "iron law", the 
"greatest and holiest of all the laws", in his relations with Stephanie 
he defies it, and when once he is discovered and exposed he succumbs to 
it. 
This dynamic might be clarified by reference ' to the respective 
significance of discourse and inscription in Pieter's life, and 
specifically in his attempt to constitute an identity. One of the major 
effects of his exemplary status in the community is to exacerbate the 
division between public acceptance and private experience. This dynamic 
is particularly acute in regard to the young dominee. He records in his 
diary: "By asking me to be a diaken in the church, he silenced me 
forever. For at this time I had but one thought in my mind, and that was 
to tell one human soul of the misery of my life .... And yet, though my 
need was so great, I never spoke" (64). It is a striking feature of his 
experience that he resolves, and indeed attempts, on several occasions 
to talk to people about it but fails: the young dominee, Japie (151), 
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Kappie (71, 97-99), his Captain (158). His desire for Stephanie and his 
relationship with her are thus, for him, literally as well as 
metaphorically "unspeakable" (123). 
It is Pieter's failure to speak his experiences that renders him 
vulnerable to the power of inscription. Several instances of written 
communication in the narrative have a significant impact on the course 
of the action. His letter to his wife Nella attempting to explain his 
love for her and his need for sexual response fails to find a response. 
Her reply brings on an attack of "swartgalligheid", which together with 
the fact that his written instruction is "overlooked" (110) leads to an 
encounter with Sergeant Steyn which confirms his fateful enmity. The 
note from Japie saying "I saw you" has Pieter in terror for three days 
(118), during which he contemplates the enormity of the written charge 
that might be brought against him for contravening the Immorality Act. 
His anticipation of this event offers a dramatisation of both the 
process and the power of inscription to which he becomes subject: 
And the greater fear came to him that the watcher would not 
go to the captain, but to the sergeant at ~he desk, and 
today it would be Sergeant steyn .... And the story would be 
told to him there, and he would put it down, sentence by 
sentence, with a heart full of hate and joy. And when it was 
finished he would say to the watcher, wait here, and do not 
say a word. Then he would go to the captain and give him the 
report, and stand there like a soldier doing his duty as 
though he knew nothing of hate and joy. Then there could be 
no mercy, for when a charge is made, a charge is made, and 
once a thing is written down, it is written down; and a word 
can be written down that will mean the death of a man, and 
put the rope round his neck, and send him into the pit; and 
a word can be written down that will destroy a man and his 
house and his kindred and his friends, and there is no 
power, of God or Man or State, nor any Angel, nor anything 
present or to come, nor any height, nor depth, nor any other 
creature that can save them when once the word is written 
down (124). 
In the shift from the story being told and 'put down' to the injunction 
not to say a word we see the transition from speech to the secrecy and 
irrevocable power of the written word. This power is emphasised when a 
charge is actually laid, and the captain says to steyn, "may God forgive 
you for an evil deed" (182). A negative version of the constitutive 
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power of inscription occurs when his father "crosses out the name of 
Pieter van Vlaanderen from the Book, not once but many times" (18S). 
This is the first stage in the systematic destruction of the signs of 
Pieter's identity within the home, so that subsequent references are not 
to his name or to his position in the family but to the anonymous "the 
man" and "him". In a similar way, the written charge impacts on 
discursive relations in the public domain, which , we witness in the 
narrative change from "the lieutenant" to "the ex-lieutenant". It also 
gives rise to the "supreme contempt" of the word "jou" in the note 
Vorster writes returning the eighteen pounds. It is in reaction to this 
note that Pieter takes his revolver and goes out "into the darkness of 
the town". It is only in Kappie's 'renaming' of Pieter by using the name 
he could never bring himself to use before (192), that we see the 
beginnings of a redemptive reversal. 
Such shifts in reference result from the 'translation' of his private 
experiences into the terms of the public code, once the charge is made. 
Pieter's own reaction to the charge and to the evidence marshalled in 
support of it is repeated denial. Curious as this might seem, we might 
understand it as arising from the fact that the dominant code exists 
most explicitly in the public domain and that the hostility of the terms 
of its 'translation', "guilty" or "not guilty" , (181), serves to 
invalidate his private experience and to alienate him from it. His 
"lie", then, is less a denial of the truth than a rejection of the 
public terms; based, perhaps, on the sense that exposure has taken his 
experience away from him and so he is no longer responsible for it. such 
resistance cannot endure; with its collapse he breaks down, and in 
Sophie's term is "destroyed" (197). 
The disjunction and alienation Pieter suffers at the point of exposure 
is therefore transient, because his resistance to the public terms 
collapses. His failure to speak and his subsequent construction by the 
public domain in the terms of the dominant code thus lend a particular 
poignancy to the book he takes out from its hiding place, after he is 
charged, to give to his aunt. Sophie comments, "What he could not tell 
to any man, nor any woman, he had written in a book" (198 ). As I noted 
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above, excerpts from this book, and from his letters, are incorporated 
into the narrative. In this respect he is starkly distinguished from 
Stephanie, who is given no opportunity to represent herself. Yet the 
'voice' he achieves in the process is displaced, because its 'audience' 
is the reader of Sophie's retrospective narrative who is external to his 
communi ty as well as subsequent to the course of events. His act of 
writing thus serves as an impotent substitute for offering to people 
within his community a representation of himself that might challenge 
public orthodoxies by gaining sympathy and understanding. 
We might press a little further on the reasons why Pieter fails to 
speak, fails to narrate himself. To do so we might recall the crude 
dichotomy of the terms of the charge brought against him: "guilty" or 
"not guilty". We might recall also the terms in which Pieter inscribes 
his desire for Stephanie: he calls it "mad sickness .... that God knows I 
do not want, that God knows I fear and hate" {91}, and later "some mad 
desire of a sick and twisted soul" {123}. The dominant code is manifest 
in legislation against his experiences, and yet the hostility of the 
terminology, here of 'madness' and elsewhere of 'dirt', 'disease' and 
'degradation', identifies it as a communal terminology which Pieter has 
internalised and now brings to bear on his experiences. That is, it 
functions implicitly within the private domain. His desire for Stephanie 
is "unspeakable", because black women have been defined as taboo. As is 
the case wi th any taboo, the communi ty has commandeered the 
interpretation of the experience. since the communal interpretation is 
necessarily disjunct from as well as hostile to the experience, neither 
his self nor his desire can validly be represented in its terms. What we 
read, then, is a translation into a hostile medium. 
I have noted above Sophie's comment that Pieter "was always two men", 
and his mother's that, "from the years of childhood she had feared for 
him, and had known that he was hiding away, in some deep place within, 
things that no man might safely conceal" {189}. If these comments attest 
to the enigmatic power of his private domain, they also indicate that 
his psychological problems predate Stephanie. He acknowledges as much 
himself, after seeing and touching her in the Kloof: 
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If it shocked me to see myself, it shocked me no less to see 
my danger. It was like a kind of shadow of myself, that 
moved with me constantly, but always apart from me; I knew 
it was there, but I had known it so long that it did not 
trouble me, so long as it stayed apart. But when the mad 
sickness came on me, it would suddenly move nearer to me, 
and I knew it would strike me down if it could, and I did 
not care (46). 
210 
This archetypal formulation is interesting, as John Cooke has pointed 
out (1979:40). Desire for stephanie is "mad sickness"; yet what 
threatens him is not "mad sickness" but "danger", which has been with 
him "so long that it didn't trouble" him. His danger is like "a shadow" 
of himself which moves closer when he succumbs to desire for stephanie 
and threatens to strike him down. This perception should be enough to 
dismiss as misplaced Pieter' s quest for "safety" in his wife's love 
(95). The "danger" is a part of himself, suppressed, projected outwards, 
and associated with desire for stephanie. And yet this "danger" is not 
contained in his desire for Stephanie, both because it predates her, and 
because sex with her does not satisfy him. In his terms, "such desire 
could not surely be a desire of the flesh, but some mad desire of a sick 
and twisted soul" (123). The schism in his nature is one that can be 
healed only by integration - by his transformation into, as the captain 
has it, "quite another man" ( 196). As we see in his final despairing, 
"and why and why and why" (163), Pieter' s desire for stephanie is in 
important ways incidental, because the more fundamental and the more 
potent object of desire is, in Giddens's term, discursive awareness. If 
his problem is inherent in his psyche, it is not one he can himself 
resolve: the means for its solution, the catalyst for the integration 
and transformation, are external to him. They take the form of communal 
intervention, of public exposure. And because the terms in which his 
awareness may be made discursive are communal ones, and in this 
community extremely hostile ones, his transformation effectively 
alienates him from his past experiences: 'he' is destroyed. Herein, in 
my reading, lies his tragedy: his failure to sustain a self against the 
invasion of public definitions. 
Given his failure to speak, we might now consider its effects. These, it 
seems to me, are principally two: in the first place it leaves him 
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vulnerable to seduction by Stephanie, and in the second it leaves him 
vulnerable to narration by Sophie. It is significant that the narrative 
should characterise his breakdown on two occasions as ' child-like' , 
since this regression invokes the process of socialisation that affects 
all children, who must learn ways of accommodating the social terms 
given their behaviour. Pieter has failed to sustain a self against the 
invasion of public definitions, and so he must redevelop an identity. 
His failure to speak also sheds a certain light on his relationship with 
Stephanie. Although this relationship constituted a challenge to the 
dominant code, its challenge was a muted one because it remained within 
the private domain. In an important sense, moreove~, neither Stephanie 
nor his desire for her entered the realm of discursive awareness, and so 
his relationship with her remained an instrumental one. He neither 
involved himself with her plight, nor recognised her intentionality in 
seeking to resolve it by means of a relationship with him. It is this 
failure to relate to her as a human being, this failure to recognise her 
intentionality that means he fails to see himself in her terms. As 
Shotter might put it, he doesn't allow himself to be constituted as a 
'you' by her. And so the recognition she gives his sexuality fails to 
augment or compensate for the paucity of his wife's response. Nor does 
he achieve the autonomy as a subj ect which would allow him to resist 
'possession' by the narrati ve. He remains a discursive function. For 
this reason the textualisation of Pieter as tragic hero serves to erode 
and to undermine his autonomy as a subj ect. If Paton's purpose is to 
make a moral scrutiny of the Immorality Act from wi thin the community 
most responsible for its promulgation, his constitution of Pieter as 
tragic hero is inextricably linked to the erosion and the undermining of 
Pieter's autonomy. 
5.10 Liberalism, Tragedy and Apartheid 
Yet in approaching the question of Paton's purposes and position as a 
writer, we need to address the textual relations that exist between all 
four parties within the situation of narrative discourse: him, his 
narrator Sophie, and the characters Stephanie and Pieter. I have 
recognised above that Sophie's 'translation' of a cross-cultural 
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relationship complicates the application of the ethnographic model, 
because of her closeness to the white man and her distance from the 
black woman. Although she is able to empathise with the maternal 
imperative which drives Stephanie, the racial interface is thus 
emphasised both by an apparent lack of discursive access to Stephanie's 
experiences and by Sophie's orientation. Stephanie neither speaks to her 
nor writes diaries for her to peruse. On the other hand, the marked 
construction of Stephanie as ' other' is related to an absence of 
narrative accountability towards her. 
And yet, as I have sought to demonstrate, the existence of the "covert 
plot" of her intentionality serves to qualify this narrative 
construction. Recognising her intentionality we might notice, for 
instance, that Stephanie has none of Pieter's psychological need to tell 
the story of their relationship, or to have it told. Her child is far 
nearer to her interests than Pieter can ever be, and is thus far more 
significant as a referent for her actions. The ease with which she 
integrates private involvement (with him) and public awareness (of 
Sophie in the kitchen, of the ot her policemen in the kloof) shows her 
orientation to be different to hi s, her direction in fact not simply to 
seduce or destroy him but through him to protect and secure her bond 
with her child. The far greater range of meanings a sexual relationship 
might have for her than for Piet er might become apparent if we recall 
Gordimer's question as to why this should not simply be a "love affair" 
- why, for instance, Pieter should not follow the example of Maria 
Duvenage and decamp with Stephanie to another city, ' or another country, 
leaving behind wife, family and friends, and all the tragedy they 
entail. The preposterousness of this solution is written into the terms 
of the novel: specifically that Paton's moral and didactic purposes are 
centred upon Pieter, and not upon Stephanie. If Pieter' s freedom of 
choice is repeatedly emphasised, it remains true that Stephanie has far 
greater narrative freedom, autonomy, and power than he does. She asserts 
a subjectivity which refuses to be the taboo. 
And yet behind them both are the t extual and narrative choices of Paton. 
In significant ways these reflect his position in relation to the 
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community about which he is writing, and in relation to the Centre. I 
have commented above on the distance he interposes between himself and 
the narrative action, in large measure by incorporating a first-person 
narrator who, although herself somewhat distanced from the value system 
of the community in which the action takes place, is nevertheless a 
member of it. We might, by comparison, recall the relationship between 
Mary and Moses in Lessing's The Grass is Singing which was construed by 
the narrative in terms of the absence rather than the presence of a 
moral code. Paton's choice of an Afrikaans community is motivated, I 
think, by the predominance of the patriarchal code which supplies terms 
for a moral scrutiny of the Immorality Act. Its consequence is the 
'ethnographic' position Paton takes up, as a liberal Englishman writing 
of Afrikaans society, of translating the cultural 'other' for a 
readership like himself. Thus the 'hostile medium' into which Pieter's 
private experiences must be translated is not an English one, nor are 
the values in terms of which judgements are passed on miscegenous sexual 
relations like those of an English community. The 'hostile medium' is 
that of the conservative and religious Afrikaans community in which 
Pieter is located. Both the tragic mode and the concatenation of the 
aspects of 'innocent', 'mother' and 'whore' in the textualisation of 
Stephanie align the narrative with the Centre by invoking cultural and 
mythological conventions in which both Paton and his critics might be 
expected to participate (Cooke's reading of the Long Kloof as Eden is a 
case in point). 
Some critics (Cooke, Glenn, Watson) have found Paton's own stance on the 
Immorality Act to be ambivalent, notwithstanding his "known social and 
political opinions" to which Hutchings refers (1992:189). It is a 
similar sense, perhaps, that motivates Gordimer' s contention that the 
morality of the novel is "off-centre". Yet this ambivalence, too, can be 
clarified in terms of Paton's positioning. His liberalism facilitates 
imaginative access to the world of the Afrikaans community which would 
not be possible, say, for a protest writer. Although Sophie is 
interpolated between him and this world, she also stands as an 
embodiment of such access. The mode of tragedy which he chooses for his 
text is thus functional for both of them. It allows Sophie not to judge: 
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neither Pieter who transgresses the law, nor the law whose transgression 
destroys them all, nor the community which promulgated the law. It 
allows Paton to examine the workings of the "iron law" amongst the 
"people of rock and stone in a land of rock and stone". Even though the 
original promulgator of the Immorality Act, as I pointed out above, was 
a Major Roberts of the United Party, the mode of tragedy allows Paton to 
project responsibility for this law solely onto the Afrikaans community 
of whom he writes. We might, in this regard, recall Rive's comment: 
"Paton, through no fault of his own, talks about oppression, Abrahams, 
at least while he was in South Africa, lives with it" (1983a:27). The 
predominance of discourse in this novel might well be evidence of such 
'talking about' the Immorality Act. 
In mounting his moral scrutiny of the Immorality -Act from within the 
community most responsible for its promulgation, Paton's constitution of 
Pieter as tragic hero is inextricably linked to the erosion and the 
undermining of Pieter's autonomy. In mounting this scrutiny, his choice 
of Sophie as narrator offers the textualised subjectivity of a white 
woman in addition to that of an Afrikaans man. One of the effects of 
this choice is to decentre the predominance of the masculine, to make 
possible a feminine narrative approach to Stephanie that might 
supplement the sexual 'approach' of Pieter. And yet Paton's choice of a 
white woman narrator serves to reinforce the predominance of white 
experience; and the construction of the text as tragedy is in fact 
predicated upon the effacement of the private domain of Stephanie. If 
Paton does recognise her intentionality (and, Watson notwithstanding, 
there seems no reason why the writer of Cry, the Beloved Country should 
be incapable of doing so) this recognition must remain implicit if his 
narrative designs are to be fulfilled. 
A major interest in my study of this novel has been the nature of the 
silence of the figure of the black woman. The resistant reading I have 
undertaken has sought to reverse the apparent textual relationships in 
order to identify the covert plot of Stephanie's intentionality. Both 
the deployment of tragedy and the construction of Pieter as tragic hero 
are predicated upon the silence of stephanie. Yet if, in Pieter's case, 
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silence works to prevent his achievement of textual subjectivity, in 
Stephanie's it works to protect and preserve. Sophie's narrative can be 
seen as cohering with Paton's moral and didactic purposes: the intensity 
of her love for Pieter blinds her to the common justices and injustices 
of Stephanie's case, the 'tragedy', for Stephanie, of losing her child. 
Both the absence, on Sophie's part, of any desire to 'possess' : 
Stephanie, and Stephanie's construction as "unspeakable" are 
manifestations of the narrative failure to pursue her interiority. 
Unlike Pieter who is, to a large extent, defined by the discursive 
relations in which he is located, the intentionality represented in her 
smile escapes discursive containment. Nor is her private domain 
commandeered to serve narrative purposes. Unlike Pieter she doesn't 
participate in the moral frame Paton writes into the novel which 
Hutchings appreciates and watson censures, and so her story cannot be 
recuperated into a moral scrutiny of the Immorality Act. Her 
disappearance from the narrative before the charge is laid can thus be 
read as an act of moral exculpation. Leitch's comment about character 
seems particularly apt for Stephanie: 
The modern notion of character is nuclear in structure, 
implying some residual quality neither required by nor 
expended in the action, some resistance Todorov's "narrative-
men lack to exhaustion by their situation, plot function, or 
public action (1986:149). 
It has been my endeavour, in this chapter, to investigate Paton's choice 
of the mode of tragedy for his novel. The questions I have addressed 
might be summarised thus: How does it come about that Paton can choose 
the genre? What in the public domain makes appropriate the rendition of 
private experience and private relationship in terms of tragedy? It was 
my insistence, in the first place, that the location of the tragedy has 
to be at the interface of public and private, and in the second, that 
its focus upon Pieter is predicated upon the silence of Stephanie. If 
the mode of tragedy is appropriate for a representation of his 
experience, it is inappropriate to her experience" because one of its 
contingencies is that she be defined as taboo. On a broader level, the 
choice of the mode of tragedy is evidence not of the generalisability of 
Pieter's experience, but of his location in a context in which it might 
CHAPTER 5: PATON: TOO LATE THE PHALAROPE 216 
well occur. The attempt to legislate as ' immoral' sexual relations 
across races was at its most fundamental an admission that such 
relations existed and were likely to continue to do so: the law was an 
attempt to manage and to control an extant phenomenon. If Pieter is 
entrapped by the narrative whose rendition of his experiences as tragedy 
is an indictment of the system which has legislated ,against them, it is 
left to Stephanie, by her elusion of and resistance to the narrative, to 
question the choice of the mode. Amongst the voices of the text it is 
her silence that has a crucial role to play. 
set in direct contrast with Mhudi, whose relation with the narrative was 
one of co-operation, Stephanie stands, in my view, as a key rendition of 
the figure of the black woman within our literature: because of her 
elusiveness to narration and because of the reactivity of her silence. 
The novel which will be considered next is one written some twenty-five 
years after Paton's text by a woman positioned by the circumstances of 
her birth at the racial interface between black and white. Although her 
focus is the relationship that exists between two Batswana men of noble 
birth and a woman whose tribe is outcast throughout Africa, her 
identification and examination of the black woman figure is undertaken 
with clarity, sympathy and direction. Margaret Ca~ore will be seen to 
be very different to Stephanie: educated, articulate, literate, 
artistically gifted, and equipped with a cultural heritage which 
receives substantial narrative recognition. She is also, however, the 
victim of racial prejudice that is both explicit and vicious, and if the 
role she plays out in her marriage to a chief echoes the happy ending of 
romantic fables it also reflects integration into a personal 
relationship which accommodates intuitive, spiritual and psychic 
dimensions. The novel is the only one in this study by a woman, and so 
the textual relations between character and narrator will be 
investigated in regard to questions of autobiography, in order to 
explore the writer's positioning as an exile and a refugee from 
construction in apartheid terms. 
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BESSIE HEAD: MARU 
In the case studies of Khudi and Too Late the Phalarope, some 
consideration was given to their representations of the figure of the 
black woman, to the communal and textual relations in which she was 
located, and to the positioning of the writers, Plaatje and Paton, in 
relation to the Centre and in relation to the local context. This 
consideration might now be recognised as informed by a perspective on 
the crucially postcolonial problems and issues within the Southern 
African framework that these texts address. In the case of Khudi, our 
focus was on Plaatje's 'rewriting' of history in a way that responded to 
the tensions between orality and literacy, tribal membership and non-
sectarianism, Tswana and English. In the case of Too Late the Phalarope, 
our focus was on the encroachments of the dominant code into the private 
domain of the masculine protagonist, and on the interface between the 
broadly Central mode of tragedy and the discursive and cultural effects 
of apartheid that characterise the local context. The predominant 
linguistic interface, in Paton's case, was that between the hegemonic 
code of the Afrikaans 'text' of apartheid, and English as the target 
medium of translation, although the cross-cultural relationship between 
Pieter and Stephanie invoked other language-culture systems that served 
to problematise both the narrative rendition of dialogue and the broader 
discursive relations within the novel. It was particularly in regard to 
Too Late the Phalarope that the issue of identity became important. The 
construction of Pieter as tragic hero was intrinsic to Paton's 
examination of apartheid and the Immorality Act which is perhaps its 
most explicit manifestation. Intrinsic to this construction, in turn, 
was Pieter's discursive failure to sustain a self against the invasion 
of public definitions, and so his textualisation . served directly to 
erode and to undermine his autonomy as a subject. By contrast, the 
autonomy of Stephanie's private domain is left relatively intact by the 
narrative, in part because her intentionality escapes discursive 
containment, and in part because she doesn't participate in the moral 
frame of the novel and so her story cannot be recuperated into a moral 
scrutiny of the Immorality Act. 
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6.1 A Question of Identity 
The issue of identity is an important one also in the case study that 
follows, but one that needs to be approached in rather different terms. 
Haru (1971}1 is distinguished from the two novels considered thus far by 
the fact that its writer was a woman, and, in MacKenzie's terms, "a 
first generation child of bi-racial origins" (MacKenzie & Woeber 1992:1-
2). She thus stands as the 'product' of a 'miscegenous' relationship 
such as formed the focus of Too Late the Phalarope, and, coming to 
adulthood during the early 1960s, was particularly vulnerable to the 
harsh application of apartheid policies in South Africa that followed 
the 'achievement' of Republic status in 1961. Born in 1937, Head began 
her writing career in this country, but achieved local and international 
recognition only after she left it, in 1964, with · the publication of 
When Rain Clouds Gather (1968). A second major feature of her life and 
work is thus her 'exile' in Botswana, which reflects, in my view, an 
attempt to escape definition and containment in the South African terms 
of apartheid. Her pan-Africanist sentiments lead to an alignment that is 
regional rather than national, although her lack of access to African 
languages cuts her off from the cultural heritage that informs the 
writing of other Africans. They also contribute, I think, to the 
problematic critical reception her novels have had, to the unease that 
has greeted the influence of romance and fable and to the implicit 
dichotomies set up between Englishness (as exemplified, in Haru, in the 
code of sensible simplicity of the missionaries) and Africanness (as 
Head understood it and tried to convey it in terms of myth, legend, 
fable, dream, music, art). 
It is this positioning that stands as a first · indicator for the 
significance of the issue of identity in discussions of her work. This 
is borne out, I think, by the critical trend, established by Ravenscroft 
(1976) and followed by numerous critics after him, of considering Head's 
first three novels as a trilogy. The line of argument generally taken is 
1 Head, B. 1971. Haru. London: Heinemann. All further references in 
parenthesis are to this edition. 
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that her development as a writer reveals a quest for identity within her 
writing. This quest is occasioned by the biographic features noted 
above: her birth to a white woman by a black father, and the exile she 
undertakes when she leaves South Africa to live in Botswana. Although 
broadly sound, the argument has become somewhat tendentious, and now 
stands in need of theoretical development. In my reading the combination 
of racially mixed origins, education into first-language use of English, 
and the alienating categorisation of apartheid in South Africa and 
racial prejudice in Botswana bring crucially postcolonial pressures to 
bear on her; pressures which her writing both reflects and resists. This 
is a point to which I will return. 
The second indicator for a discussion of her 'postcolonial' identity is 
the ethnographic closeness that characterises the textual relations 
between herself as writer and her character MargareP whose Masarwa 
origins and whose English upbringing give her an extremely marginal 
position within the communities in the novel. In ' Black Writers from 
South Africa watts locates her commentary on Head in a chapter entitled 
"Autobiographical Writings". She begins this chapter by noting that 
whereas "some writers, particularly those who went into exile in the 
late fifties and early sixties embark on straightforward 
autobiography ... others have adapted other literary forms to the same 
purpose" (1989:108). In regard to A Question of Power (1974), this 
observation has had ample critical recognition; it is less standard, 
however, to acknowledge explicitly the "hybrid form" of "autobiography 
as novel" in Naru. watts says, 
Two writers [the other is Mphahlele in The Wanderers] have 
used the novel form to embody autobiography, and it is 
interesting to examine how their use of the form succeeds. 
Bessi~ He~d u~ed it twice: once indirectly 
autob1ograph1cally 1n Naru, where she draws upon a life-time 
of experience of prejudice against 'coloured' South Africans 
to create the story of a Basarwa girl, and again in A 
Question of Power, more directly, when she charts her own 
In order to avoid confusion I refer to the protagonist of the 
novel, Margaret, by first name only, and to her adoptive mother 
Margaret Cadmore, by Christian name and surname. ' 
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mental breakdown in the story of Elizabeth, the heroine 
(1989:138). 
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Watt's comments are important for my purposes in foregrounding the 
relations that occur in autobi ography between the writer as character 
and the writer as self, relations which are far more apparent in Head's 
work than in Paton's, for example, and which will consequently receive 
sustained and detailed attenti on in this chapter. Although, as Watts 
indicates, the issue of identity is one that concerns Head rather more 
explicitly in her third novel, A Question of Power (1974), my inclusion 
of Jlaru in this study has been motivated by its foregrounding of the 
linguistic construction of identity, its exploration of the personal 
effects of political realities, its attempts to engender a nondiscursive 
medium in which to express them, and its resolution of many of these 
issues through the cross-cultural marriage between Margaret and Maru. 
The third indicator for a discussion of identity in regard to Head's 
work is her own explicit problematisation of the matter, at the 
'metadiegetic' level of interview and critical commentary. It is at this 
level that I would like to seek a point of ent~y both to critical 
debates about her and her work, and to an application of my own 
theoretical framework to the novel. On the one hand, a major debate has 
focused on the nature of narrative authority and power, in ways that 
invoke the terms of Spivak's critique of "third-worldism" in 
autobiography and in depictions of the figure of the black woman. On the 
other, Head's attempt to constitute a self in relation and particularly 
in reaction to the postcolonial terms of apartheid and exile might well 
lead us to pose the question, What resolutions does she achieve in her 
text? or, If we have certain 'facts of the matter' (her birth, her 
exile), how are we to read these facts? Before proceeding to my own 
consideration of their textual implications, therefore, I would like to 
focus first on the broader sphere of the ' stories' Head told about 
herself, in interview and in correspondence, and on the specific debate 
that arose in regard to them. 
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6.2 The 'True story' 
This debate began with an article contesting Head's version of her 
birth. Entitled, '" Don't Ask for the True story': A Memoir of Bessie 
Head", it was published in Hecate in 1986, the year of Head's death, by 
Susan Gardner, whose relationship with the writer dated from the 
compilation of the first NELM bibliography on Head, and the visits and 
interviews that it occasioned. Although the more personal, and the more 
contentious, aspects of Gardner's claims about HeaCt were reserved for 
this article, it was based in large measure on her Introduction to the 
Bibliography (1986a), a revised and updated edition of which has been 
produced just this year, by MacKenzie and Woeber (1992). The critical 
credence given Gardner's claims might be inferred from the fact that the 
Introduction was itself a rewriting of an article published first in 
Africa Insight in 1985, and which has since been reprinted in Clayton's 
1989 collection, Women and Writing in South Africa. since it is the 
Hecate article to which Teresa Dovey responds, I will base my comments 
on it. In it, Gardner notes, and doubts, the "idiosyncratically 
inauspicious" circumstances of Bessie Head's life, concluding, "What 
Head certainly possessed was the 'ideal biographical legend,' a concept 
formulated by Boris Tomashevskij in his essay, 'Literature and 
Biography' in 1923" (Gardner 1986b:114-115). Tomashevskij identifies the 
emergence of the notion of individual authorship in Western European 
literature in the eighteenth century, and its 'cimonisation' by the 
lyrical poets of Romanticism. For Tomashevskij, "the question of the 
role of biography in literary history cannot be solved uniformly for all 
literatures. There are writers with biographies and writers without 
biographies". Since Head falls into the former of these categories, 
Gardner claims, her "account of her origins, then, began to seem to me 
useful, but not necessarily credible. I realized it was crucially 
important for discussing her work, almost all of which, as I contend 
here, is an attempt to create a viable identity" (1986b:115). 
There seem to me several problems inherent in Gardner's article, which 
include the equivalence in status she claims between herself and Head in 
her opening phrases: "Serowe. Botswana. January 1983. Two women are 
walking hand in hand .... One of them . •• " (1986b:ll0)i the exaggeration 
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of the claim that "every other critic who has ever written about" Head 
had visited her (198Gb:111), perhaps in order to disguise the fact that 
the encounter and the relationship that followed were initiated by her; 
the projection of her own problems of categorising Head's fiction into 
the work itself, in order to bolster her assertions about Head's 
fabrication of her life story; the embarrassment which permeates her 
description of being with Head, including several allusions to Head's 
alcohol consumption; the overstatement and insincerity of the terms used 
to describe her responses to Head and the 'secret truth' she claims to 
have discovered about her ("uneasy", "terrible" (198Gb:111), 
"disquieting" (198Gb:112), "intolerable", "terrible" (198Gb:113), 
"overpowering" , "horrible" (198Gb: 115), "disastrous" (198Gb: 121), 
"bilious" (198Gb: 123) etc.); her opportunistic refusal to quote from 
Head's letters to her, because "copyright in the text belongs to her" 
(198Gb:125); her exploitation of the power of the footnote to make non-
specific allegations about Head's childhood experiences (198Gb:119,128-
9). Although Gardner's article offers an extremely problematic instance 
of cultural translation, I do not, here, wish to pursue my reservations 
about it: rather I wish to address it by examining a response which took 
up both its claims and its overall characteristics. 
Dovey's 1989 "A Question of Power: Susan Gardner's Biography versus 
Bessie Head's Autobiography" was published in English in Mrica, after 
being "not accepted by Hecate, the feminist journal which published 
Gardner's article, and which lists Gardner as a qontributing editor" 
(Dovey 1989a:30). It seems important, in light of the reflexivity 
insisted on by the theoretical delineation offered in my first three 
chapters, to register the possibilities of undertaking the kind of 
deconstructive reading of Dovey's article which it offers of Gardner's. 
certainly it is fascinating to follow the position assumed by Dovey in 
supplying a 'true vindication' of Head as opposed to the "vindication of 
Gardner herself" (1989a:30) from Head's accusation, mentioned in passing 
and towards the end of the article, of "professional misconduct" 
(Gardner 198Gb:12G). My purpose in examining the debate, however, is not 
to perpetuate it, but rather to assess the viability of an 
autobiographic reading of Head's fiction, and so it seems worthwhile 
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here to allow Dovey to answer Gardner. Dovey identifies the form taken 
by Gardner's "accounts of her biographical research procedures" as 
, quest narratives' in which both "heroine/biographer ... and subj ect 
figure as characters" (1989a:30). She goes on, 
Gardner has the best of both wor Ids as the biography is 
doubly authenticated: first by the presence of the 
biographer/narrator as character within the narrative, and 
then by the invocation of scientific evidence, that is to 
say references to critics, to 'experts' in the field of 
insanity, and to archival documents. By these means Gardner 
constructs the 'truth' or 'knowledge' of her biography. 
The 'truth' of Gardner's biography is that Head's 
autobiography is false .... Commenting that this story 
"seemed almost too 'good,' in its horrible way, to be true" 
... Gardner goes on to discount it (1989a:31). 
The ensuing argument that denounces Gardner's testimony is both informed 
and compelling, and the recuperation of Head from the imputations of 
"madness" an important exercise in itself, in light of the "racial, 
sexual, and class taboos of the white middle class" which the label 
invokes (1989a:33). Again, I do not wish to examine this argument in 
detail, but rather to select those aspects which can contribute to the 
issue at hand. 
There seem to me to be three points raised in the debate which are 
significant for an · autobiographic reading of Head's fiction. Before 
enumerating them I should like, briefly, to contextualise Dovey's 
debunking of Gardner. In a study of ethnographic narrative entitled 
Works dnd Lives: The Anthropologist dS Author, Geertz has drawn on his 
own experience as a research anthropologist to analyse the roots of the 
persuasive power of anthropological writing. He says: 
The ability of anthropologists to get us to take what they 
say seriously has less to do with either a factual look or 
an air of conceptual elegance than it has to do with their 
capacity to convince us that what they say is a result of 
their having actually penetrated (or, if you prefer, been 
penetrated by) another form of life, of having, one way or 
another, truly "been there" (1988:4-5). 
It is plain that Dovey recognises the similarity of Gardner's biographic 
claim to having "been there", though she couches it in terms of the 
biographer's figuring as a character in the 'narrative'. She quotes the 
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opening passage of this narrative to show this: "Serowe. Botswana. 
January 1983. Two women are walking hand in hand ... " (Dovey 1989a: 30-
31). My first purpose in referring to Geertz here has to do with the 
broader context he invokes for such 'truth claims': that they occur in 
ethnography as well as in the 'biography' under discussion. They also 
occur in other memoirs. In a 1991 review essay, stephen Gray can 
scarcely be said to be motivated by the same need to vindicate himself 
as Gardner. Although he does not invoke the "scientific evidence" of 
"critics" and of "experts", Gray features as a character in his 
narrative as much as Gardner does in hers, and so his description makes 
the similar 'truth claim' of having "been there". Says Gray, 
I first met Bessie Head the Easter fifteen years before, in 
Gaborone in 1976, when she had travelled to the capital to 
attend a writers' workshop on the deserted and spartan 
university campus .... Having come out of her -seclusion, she 
was to stay that night in the Holiday Inn. I drove her 
there; even being driven was a treat. But once at reception 
with her meagre luggage, I was in for two astonishments ... 
(1991:100). 
Yet if the broader context supplied by Geertz's observations qualifies 
Dovey's critique it also confirms specific aspects. The first of the 
three points significant for my purposes is thus the reminder Dovey 
offers of the ways in which narrative power renders problematic 
ethnography's textualisations of its subjects. Couching her argument in 
Lacanian terms, she points out: 
The secret of Head's identity is .•. that knowledge of the 
Other which has to be appropriated, taken from the Other. It 
can be argued that claiming to possess the secret of the 
Other's identity constitutes the ultimate gesture of power 
over the Other. 
Gardner quotes Head as saying: "I have always been just 
me, with no frame of reference to anything beyond myself" 
This may be seen as Head's expression of an impossible 
but liberatory desire to be simply identical to herself, to 
avoid the passage of the self through the Symbolic system, 
in which the individual subj ect receives a name and an 
identity. Gardner's attempt to name her is a violation of 
this desire, and represents an attempt to locate Head within 
a system which she herself preferred to negate. It also 
implies a refusal to recognize the potential for resistance 
in that which may be considered unnameable in terms of the 
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system: Head is not white, not black, not feminist, not 
revolutionary (1989a:34). 
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In relation to the model of cultural translation, we might note that 
Head's wish to be "just me" evinces a resistance t~ being 'translated' 
into the terms of apartheid, and that Gardner's 'identification' of Head 
is a refusal to accept or to condone her 'silence' about her 'identity' 
in South African society. 
A certain light might be shed on Gardner's acti vi ty if we consider 
Spivak's discussion of the constraints upon autobiography in "third-
worldist criticism", in a 1989 article entitled "Imperialism and Sexual 
Difference". Seeking to animate "the perspective of the 'native 
informant III , she invites us to acknowledge "that access to 
autobiography, for whole groups of people, has only been possible 
through the dominant mediation of an investigator or field-worker. The 
'autobiographies' of such people have not entered the post-Enlightenment 
European 'subjective' tradition of autobiography. They have gone, 
rather, to provide 'obj ecti ve evidence' for the ' sciences' of 
anthropology and ethnolinguistics" (1989:521). Clearly Gardner is not . 
working within the sphere of anthropology or ethnolinguistics, yet there 
are ways in which we might read her endeavour as an attempt to turn Head 
into the 'native informant' by assuming the position of "investigator or 
field-worker" (in Dovey's term "heroine/biographer"). As such it is an 
exercise in narrative power, a biographic contest. In a recent article 
entitled "Autobiographical Spaces and the Postcolonial Predicament", 
Nussbaum applies Spivak's terms to another, more oblique example of this 
'contest': the request of Mabel Palmer, white patron of Lily Moya, that 
she "write an autobiographical essay of 2000 words entitled 'The Life of 
a Native Girl in a Native Reserve'" (1991:26). After a first, 
unaccepted, attempt, "Lily Moya's resistance is silence, and ultimately 
rejection of her patron's well-meaning but ill-advised assistance. 
Allowing her silence to speak reminds the postcolonial critic to tread 
wi th faint step to avoid providing the very taxonomies and mapping of 
the Other that are synonymous with colonialism and i~s Western measuring 
instruments" (1991:26). 
CHAPTER 6: HEAD: lIARU 226 
It is a recognition of the 'biographic contest', I believe, that 
motivates Dovey's vindication of Head which emerges in the two remaining 
points which are important to my discussion. The first is Dovey's 
insistence, at the conclusion of the article, on the right of the writer 
to maintain what might be termed 'enabling fictions' about herself: 
We all live by fictions: some are more innocent than others, 
just as some identities are harder earned than others. If 
Bessie Head's ability to survive, and to transcend in 
writing, the suffering she endured growing up in South 
Africa was in some sense made possible by the autobiography 
she constructed for herself, then surely this identity 
should not, and cannot, be taken from her (1989a:37). 
The second is her conviction that this right must, if necessary, be 
actively safeguarded. "Bessie Head died in 1986, but even if she were 
still alive, it could be argued that her freedom as a writer, the 
freedom of her writing, is dependent upon the intervention of her 
readers" (1989a:35). Gardner's intervention, by implication, is inimical 
to such freedom, and Dovey's an attempt to secure it. Given the fatwa 
passed on Salman Rushdie for exercising this very freedom, Dovey's 
contention here certainly has wider resonances, even if what Head stands 
to lose by encroachments on her freedom as a writer is not her life but 
the identity she made for herself. 
In my view Dovey manages to resist the temptation to challenge Gardner 
by offering a further and better version of Head. It is the tenets of 
her argument that enable her to avoid this trap of circularity: her 
insistence on the intervention of the reader when necessary to secure 
the narrative power of enabling fictions writers might maintain about 
themselves. In some respects such a reading is compatible with the 
theory that I have advanced. If we recall Clifford's use of the term 
"fiction" we will be aware of the sense of "something made or fashioned, 
the principal burden of the word's Latin root, f ingere" (1986: 6). We 
might also be reminded of the conventions in terms of which characters 
can be figured as tropes, in terms of which the subjectivity of the 
wri ter can be textualised. Yet there is an important sense in which 
Dovey underplays the social nature of identity-formation, and hence the 
reader's right and power to confer identity. Although she calls Head's 
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"desire to be simply identical to herself" impossible, Dovey minimises 
the extent to which Head's attempts (like anyone else's) to forge an 
identity by telling stories about herself require social validation if 
they are to succeed. Even if we are aware of the hostility and 
"violation" entailed in Gardner's attempt to "name" her, it does not 
seem feasible, or even fruitful, to recognise Head's singlehanded power 
to "negate" a system because she "preferred" to do so. 
6.3 Identity and Fiction 
In important ways the tension that exists between ' the social and the 
personal construction of Head's identity provides a basis for a 
discussion of the communal and textual construction of Margaret's 
identity in Naru. Yet certain questions need addressing before we 
proceed to such a discussion. The first of these is why Head made such 
clear attempts to assert a contestatory, non-social identity. Gray 
begins his review essay, "For several years before her awful death over 
Easter, 1986, rumours were that Bessie Head was writing her 
autobiography .... But it was her life; that was the whole point. No 
illuminating confession has surfaced among her prodigious literary 
remains" (1991:99). Towards the end of his essay he notes how "she liked 
to remain unclassifiable", continuing, "At the outset of her career she 
said: 'I have always been just me, with no frame of reference to 
anything beyond myself.' In other words, look to the work - no 
autobiography. The myth she had constructed about herself was more self-
protective than revealing" (1991:101-102). Self-protection seems an 
ample reason to try to elude, especially, hostile or exploitative 
biographers. Thus Gray notes wryly, "No mercy was shown to scholars whom 
she, probably rightly, saw climbing on her strong shoulders to make 
their fortunes. Yet these same devotees saw to it that she was invited 
to Berlin, Denmark, London, Iowa, Australia .•. " (Gray 1991:101). It is 
certainly "Bessie [as] nobody's fool" who observes in an interview "if 
people wish to place one into categories they do so for their own 
purposes" (cited in MacKenzie & Clayton 1989:7). Yet if Head's 
resistance to biographic interest erects barriers that enclose and 
protect, this seems to me to reflect also a broader sense of the 
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fragility of the private domain: the ways in which it might be damaged 
by the scrutiny - and the storytelling - of others. 
The second question that needs addressing is why, despite reservations 
such as these, critics continue to make biographical investigations. In 
her review of MacKenzie and Clayton's Between the Lines: Interviews with 
Bessie Head, Sheila Roberts, Ellen Kuzwayo, Miriam Tlali, Dovey notes 
rather acerbically, 
At a time when literary theory is telling us that the 
individual biographical details of the flesh-and-blood 
writer are not relevant to an interpretation of her writing, 
and that the writer's pronouncements on her own work do not 
carry more weight than those of anyone else, it is somewhat 
paradoxical to find a proliferation of the author-interview 
as a mode of literary commentary. This latter phenomenon is 
perhaps testimony to the role which curiosity - simple 
curiosity about how other people live and think - continues 
to play in the act of reading (1990b:95). 
There is a sense in which Head's "ideal biographic legend" constitutes a 
challenge rather than an act of effacement, and if Dovey is content to 
obey the injunction against intrusion a better explanation than "simple 
curiosity" is needed to explain why others plainly are not. In fact 
Dovey's unease with "personal detail" (1990b:96) is motivated by a 
theoretical position as well as a scrupulous sense of tact, and, for my 
purposes, the consequences of her resistance to the biographic need to 
be recognised and challenged. In the terms of the speech-act model of 
narrative which underlies my study, her attempt, following Head's, is to 
block out one party to "the situation of narrative utterance", and to 
minimise the role of the conventions which inform readings of texts. The 
effect is to reduce the reader's power of conferring identity to that of . 
condoning or validating the identities that are asserted by writers (or 
by characters). Even given Dovey's apparent endorsement of the 'death' 
of the "flesh-and-blood writer", the value of biographic interest in a 
writer surely remains the light it can shed on the writing. This is 
because, as readers, we do bring an awareness of 'the writer' as a 
sociohistorical entity to bear on our understanding and appreciation of 
his or her work. If, to take up her example, Sheila Roberts revealed a 
tendency in her fiction to set up polarities between good letter-writers 
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and women with bad tempers it may well be worth knowing "that one sister 
writes to her every week, and that the other sister has a very bad 
temper" (1990b: 97) . 
In Head's case, the truth-value of her "ideal biographic legend" -
indeed, whether it is a legend or not - is not at issue. What is 
important is her sense of the complexities and the difficulties of the 
relation between private and public, or, in terms that seem more 
pertinent here, personal and communal constructions of identity. Thus 
although Dovey's recognition of the 'unnameableness' of being "not 
white, not black, not feminist, not revolutionary" (1989a:34) stands as 
an important corrective to attempts to "name" (and hence contain) Head 
in apartheid terms, these negative attributes constitute no identity at 
all. My endeavour, nonetheless, is not to read her . fiction simply as a 
quest for identity, but to recognise how identity is constructed at 
racial, political and cultural interfaces, and to 'investigate how the 
resistances and the assertions that arise from this positioning register 
in her fiction. It should not, therefore, constitute a further 
"violation" to quote more extensively from MacKenzie's specification of 
this positioning: 
Her life story is one which encapsulates in microcosm the 
greatest social and political evils of the apartheid era in 
South Africa. The offspring of an illicit alliance between 
an upper-class woman and a black stable-hand, she is in many 
ways the physical and psychological meeting point of forces 
that have been in conflict with each other for centuries in 
Africa: the white colonists become permanent settlers and 
the indigenous peoples who bore the impact of the European 
invasion. In more contemporary terms, Head is the physical 
evidence of racial mingling, a first generation child of bi-
racial origins, bereft of social support and identity 
(MacKenzie & Woeber 1992:1-2). 
6.4 Exile and Allegiance 
If the 'biographic legend' has been one focus of the critical debate 
about Head's work, a second poi nt of interest has been her status as an 
exile. From as early as the Marquard interview for London Hagazine 
(1978-9), it has been accepted that "her decision to leave the country 
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... was based on personal rather than political factors" (1978-9: 51) . 
Marquard quotes her: 
Life has its ridiculous aspects. What really precipitated my 
move out of South Africa was the break-up of my marriage. I 
was offered a primary school teaching post in Botswana. I 
had nothing else and I accepted. In the process I was forced 
to renounce my South African citizenship and became a 
stateless person. This was not a blow to me. I did not care. 
I didn't like the country. I have liked Botswana very much 
al though I have got nothing out of loving a country that 
didn't want me (1978-9:51-52). 
Her own sense of her status as an "exile" is an ambivalent one. She has 
said: "I could not be considered as a South African writer in exile, but 
as one who had put down roots [in Botswana]. And yet ... certain themes 
I am likely to write about, have been mainly shaped by my South African 
exper ience" ( ci ted in Gardner 198 6a : 9 ). Although, as Gardner asserts, 
"She cannot be viewed as Botswanan since she neither speaks nor writes 
Sechuana and refuses to associate herself with Botswanan writers' groups 
on the grounds that they are narrowly nationalistic and prescriptive" 
(Gardner 1986a:9), if we follow MacKenzie's thesis, at least her later 
fiction reveals these "roots" in a "new sense of allegiance to Botswana" 
(1989: 35). In Daymond's reading, the "influence on her writing of her 
life in Botswana ... [indicates] the origins of many of the strengths 
and weaknesses of Naru" , given the 'guidance' she receives from the 
"traditions, social and literary, within which she lives" (1989:249). 
Despite the fact that she was finally awarded Botswanan citizenship, 
after she had made her name as a writer of international standing, there 
nevertheless seem to me significant ways in which the influence of her 
status as an exile never completely disappeared. She has said, for 
example, "nothing can take away the fact that I have never had a 
country: not in South Africa nor in Botswana" (cited in Gardner 
1986a:8). Her position in Botswana was tenuous from the outset: once she 
lost her first job she became a refugee who, initially at least, had to 
register with the police on a regular basis. Her early letters to Vigne 
attest to her continuing schemes to "get out" of 'Botswana, indeed to 
"get out" of Africa, though none of them came to fruition. 
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It seems to me that this status helps in large measure to account for 
the 'apoliticism' of which critics have accused her. Ogungbesan, for 
example, claims that she despises and avoids political ideologies, such 
as African Socialism and political groups including the Black Power 
Movement (1979). Nkosi comments on her 'political ignorance' (1981:99) 
and complains of the "lack of precise political ' commitment [which] 
weakens rather than aids [her] grasp of character" (1981:102). Yet both 
this comment and his description of "the coloured writer [venturing] 
across the borders of the republic, and [being] forced to assume a 
larger African identity" seem uncharacteristically ungenerous. In my own 
view, and that of other critics, her 'apoliticism' was more apparent 
than real. In a letter to Sarvan she describes her allegiances to Pan-
Africanism even before she left South Africa: "I dearly loved Robert 
Sobukwe and the politics he expounded in the years 1958-60 ... Sobukwe's 
view was Pan African and generally included all things African, with an 
edge of harshness in it that forced one to make an identification with 
being African and a sense of belonging to Africa" (1987:84-85). And in a 
letter to Vigne she refers to herself as "B. Head, great Pan-Africanist 
on a soap-box" (1991: 13), an image he confirms in his Introduction 
(1991:1). Certainly the ongoing concern she expresses in her letters to 
Vigne to be accepted as an "African writer" reflects a need for an 
identity larger than the national or tribal, but no less political for 
that. 
The problems that arise from prescriptions about social and political 
commitment, as well as from overly autobiographical readings of her 
work, are perhaps exemplified in MacKenzie's suggested division of her 
work into "an 'inwardly-directed' phase (When Rain Clouds Gather 1969, 
Naru 1971 and A Question of Power 1973), followed by a period of more 
'outwardly-directed' or 'socially-oriented' work (The Collector of 
Treasures 1977, Serowe: Village of the Rain Wind 1981 and A Bewitched 
Crossroads: An African Saga 1984)" (1989:19). Useful as this 
classification might seem, its impartiality is distinctly suspect: 
The second phase of Bessie Head's output (what I have called 
her 'socially-oriented' period) represents a major break 
wi th what Came before. A Question of Power proved to be a 
CHAPTER 6: HEAD: llARU 
turning point, and Head was able from this point on to 
explore more objectively her country of exile. Her work of 
this second phase evinces few of the disconcerting anomalies 
that flaw her novels. The Collector of Treasures and Serowe: 
village of the Rain Wind, particularly, have a symmetry and 
harmoniousness of form that testifies to the author's new 
sense of allegiance to Botswana, and, of course, to Serowe 
(1989:35). 
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Aspects of the judgement which seem to me troublesome in regard to Haru 
are the failure to recognise the number of different forms that might be 
taken by 'social orientation', the lack of specification of the 
relations between "symmetry and harmoniousness of form" and 
"allegiance", and, most acutely, the subjectivity of the sense of 
"disconcerting anomalies that flaw her novels". 
since MacKenzie is by no means alone in his reservations about the 
novel, however, and since his reading of the early novels is repeated in 
his Introduction to the new NELM Bibliography (MacKenzie & Woeber 1992), 
it seems worth considering his and other arguments in this regard. Given 
the location of Jlaru in the early, "inwardly-directed phase", MacKenzie 
sees the "critical flaw in [its] didactic purpose" as being "Head's 
inability at this stage in her artistic development to unite the sphere 
of public life and social commitment with that of the inner life and 
individual fulfilment". He says of the novel: 
Haru is offered on one level as a way to end racial 
antagonism: there is a real sense that Head is concerned to 
engage with the real world, institute change, put an end to 
prejudice and reactionary codes of behaviour, establish 
genuine equality between the races and the sexes. On another 
level she seeks the liberation of the pure, creative, 
individual soul. These ideals are in conflict in Jlaru: Maru, 
at the highest rung in Batswana society is ideally placed to 
institute reform, yet in doing so he alienates himself from 
the people of his society. He achieves change at the expense 
of leadership of his tribe (1989:27). 
Although the first set of concerns MacKenzie identifies in Head might 
seem rather ambitious, some corroboration is forthcoming in two comments 
Head herself made about the novel: "One is never sure the world will 
change, least of all the power of the written word. Jlaru upsets me. My 
writing is a real service, useful. Jlaru ought to liberate the oppressed 
Bushmen here overnight" (Vigne 1991:125), and "Jlaru is a MASTERPIECE! I 
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know it. It wi 11 liberate the Bushman" (Vigne 1991: 132). Whether the 
Bushmen need liberating, and how her novel is to liberate them can 
remain unspecified for the moment. Certainly the anonymous reviewer in 
Noto offers a down-to-earth refusal to suspend disbelief on this matter: 
When she finally marries Maru we are told that the Masarwa 
as a people jumped for joy at this sign of their approaching 
liberation and their entry into the future. But this belief 
of theirs has no other foundation than that provided by old-
fashioned convention in the art of story-telling. Their 
jubilation has no more basis than that given it by the 
romance mode to which this story belongs. In a romance such 
things happen. 
In its structure the concluding marriage stands for and 
manifests as triumphant enactment the reco,nciliation of 
opposing power factions in the state. But marriage has for a 
long time now been no longer an event capable of being used 
with such large symbolic import. 
Bessie Head, for all her generous intentions, is trapped 
in the meanings her chosen story-structure generates. In the 
romance world Margaret can be whisked away by the prince who 
rides a white car instead of the traditional horse, and all 
right-minded people weep for joy. But in the real world of 
today after the marriage the Masarwa will go back to their 
jobs or their no-jobs without any idea that something 
important affecting their lives has somehow happened, 
because nothing has (1986:24-25). 
Apparent in both critiques is a sense of unease about the novel's 
relations with reality. If Head is indeed "concerned to engage with the 
real world, institute change, put an end to prejudice and reactionary 
codes of behaviour, establish genuine equality between the races and the 
sexes" we might well ask how the mode of romance can help her to do 
these things. In the reviewer'S reading, this mode is clearly invalid to 
address "real world" issues of racism, jobs and, the lives of the 
Masarwa, because it traps Head within the meanings it generates. 
The 'failures' of the novel "to unite the sphere of public life and 
social commitment with that of the inner life and individual 
fulfilment", to escape the trap of its "chosen story-mode" to impact on 
the real world, will be taken up later. Before addressing them, we might 
get some sense of their contentiousness by recalling Head's own 
enthusiasm for Naru. Besides the remarks cited earlier her 1979 comment 
has been reprinted on the back of the Heinemann edition: "With all my 
CHAPTER 6: HEAD: lIARU 234 
South African experience, I longed to write an enduring novel on the 
hideousness of racial prejudice. But I also wanted the novel to be so 
beautiful and so magical that I, as the writer, would long to read and 
re-read it" (1979:23). Her conviction at the time of its publication was 
even more exuberant. In a letter to Vigne dated 16 January 1971 she 
writes, 
you know Naru is my masterpiece .... God knows, that short 
bi t of literature is so goddam beautiful, it is the best 
thing I've written so far, in very adverse circumstances. I 
mean I wrote it right in hell. It glorifies friendship 
between a man and a man and friendship between a woman and a 
woman. That is the base. Everything is worked out from 
there. I have the final product, the book right here. I keep 
on holding it to my heart. Randolph, it is a goddam 
beautiful book, like nothing else on earth. I am getting 
five copies from Gollancz this week, I think, and I shall 
air mail a copy to you right away. The major theme is racial 
oppression and a hard look at it but it is blended and 
blended and was written with a real glow (Vigne 1991:136). 
At least one critic has been persuaded along with her: "with its 
delicacy of feeling and subtle evocation of character; above all, its 
proper sense of place, this is as nearly perfect a piece of writing as 
one is ever likely to find in contemporary African literature" (Nkosi 
1981:101). The point is not that they are right and MacKenzie and others 
are wrong, but rather that to do justice to Head we may well need to 
find more sensitive ways of reading her novel. 
6.5 Quests and Interfaces 
The starting point for my discussion of MacKenzie's critique was Head's 
status as an exile which, I believe, influences in important ways her 
sense of the relations between public and private spheres. The "quest 
for identity" thesis is, in my reading, an attempt at a critical 
recognition of these relations; its potential danger is that in imposing 
a frame and in generating prescriptive categories 'it will fail to do 
justice to the early novels. My own endeavour, as I said earlier, is not 
to read her fiction simply as a quest for identity, but to recognise how 
identity relates to her positioning at racial, political and cultural 
interfaces, and to investigate how the resistances and the assertions 
that arise from this positioning register in her fiction. My discussion 
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of the Gardner-Dovey debate thus concluded by enumerating certain 
implications for the viability of an autobiographic reading of Head IS 
work: first, that the issue of narrative power ,renders problematic 
textualisations of the subject; second, that the subject has a right to 
maintain 'enabling fictions I about herself; third, that this right must 
be actively safeguarded if necessary; and fourth, that attempts by the 
subject to forge an identity by 'telling stories I about herself 
nevertheless require social validation if they are to succeed. 
If the many biographic similarities between Head and the figure of the 
black woman in her novel lead us to condone Wattls description of Haru 
as II autobiography as novel II , certain further qualifications are 
nevertheless necessary before we proceed to a more detailed examination 
of Margaret. The first has to do with the fact that the title of the 
novel is not Head's own name, nor even Margaret's, but that of the man 
who becomes Margaret's husband (and, I would argue, is important mainly 
for this reason). This is an indication that Head doesn't enter into the 
"autobiographic pact" that has been specified as crucially 
characterising the genre. If the "proper name [which] seals a textual 
contract of identity between the actual author, the narrator, and the 
subject" has been displaced in the case of "many South African 
autobiographies ... [by] a characteristic qualification of identity II 
(Jacobs 1991:i, following Lejeune), in the case of Head's novel our 
focus might well shift from the nominal reference on its cover to 
pronominal references within it. In this regard, attention has been 
drawn by a reviewer in Noto to the I us-them I relations in which we are 
invited to participate (1986:25) - my interest will be in Head's 
distinctive use of lyoU I • 
The second qualification is Head's choice of third-person as opposed to 
first-person narration. Although, given this choice, it will not be a 
specific concern of this study to investigate 'the narrator I , we need to 
recall from earlier chapters that if character constitutes one 
textualisation of the subjectivity of the writer, 'the narrator I 
constitutes another, even though neither is represented in first person. 
The distinction is important for three related reasons. The complexities 
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associated with first-person narration have received comprehensive 
treatment in Chapter 5; we might note here that substantial parts of the 
narrative are focalised through Margaret's consciousness. The 
combination of figural and omniscient narration emphasises her autonomy 
as a subject, and diminishes the sense of her as a representation of the 
experiencing self of the writer that we might 'expect to find in 
autobiography. Furthermore, one of the more acute ways in which Head's 
own positioning at racial, political and cultural interfaces is 
reflected in the novel is in the positioning of her character in 
relation to community. This positioning will be discussed in more depth 
later: it is important to recognise at this point the tension that 
exists between the character as a textualisation of the subjectivity of 
the writer, and the constitutive force of the community in which she is 
located. Lastly, one of the ways in which the narrative relationship is 
played out is through a shift into the nondiscursive realm, which is 
related, I think, to Head's lack of access to black languages, although 
her knowledge of African history and custom was developed by 
considerable research. 
The third qualification that needs to be registered is that the term 
"autobiography as novel" might not recognise precisely or 
comprehensively enough other dimensions of the text, and specifically 
the nondiscursi ve realm which is, in my reading, a crucial feature. 
Aspects of romance and fable have been identified as characteristic (by 
the Noto reviewer (1986) and by Daymond (1989), amongst others). Daymond 
points out, "many critics, commenting on the relationship between Head's 
life and her art, have concentrated on the ways in which her experiences 
of neglect and injustice in South Africa's racist society affected her". 
Not nearly as many have considered "the influence on her writing of her 
life in Botswana, and of the studies she has chosen to make of its 
history and its stories .... [which give rise to] many of the strengths 
and weaknesses of Naru" (1989:249). Another critic whose work seems to 
me seminal in this regard is Johnson, who has related the novel more 
broadly to myths and legends within African oral tradition (1985). The 
interest of Severac ("Beyond Identity: Bessie Head's Spiritual Quest in 
Naru") has been in the spiritual dimensions of' her idealism: the 
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"syncretic messianism" and "complementary holism" which, in his view, 
"forbids [her] to falsify reality" (1991:63). In "Traditional Values in 
the Novels of Bessie Head", Heywood points out the "Afrocentric vision 
. .. achieved by active choice and research", which includes both a use 
of "the African past" and an invocation of "a mosaic of values drawn 
from the traditions of the region and all its people" (1979:13-17). 
Bearing these qualifications in mind, it seems to me, that our discussion 
of Head's work might become sensitive enough to register her own sense 
of the immediacy as well as the complexity of relations between the 
communal and the personal, a sense developed in response to her 
experiences as an exile and her positioning at racial, political and 
cultural interfaces. In "Towards a Redemptive Political Philosophy: 
Bessie Head's Haru" (1990), Matsikidze defends Head against the charges 
of apoliticism referred to above. She says, of Haru, "its unique 
political vision is problematic, that is, if we choose to judge the 
success of an artistic proposal by its ability to imitate reality. The 
text re-creates a malfunctioning traditional social order. At the same 
time it fashions a political philosophy which provides an alternative to 
confronting the problems of contemporary Southern Africa" (1990: 105) . 
She concludes with a plea: 
My argument then is that rather than dismiss Bessie Head's 
approach to politics in the novel, her readers ought to 
acknowledge that there are various ways to define politics. 
Head's political vision is also valid. For someone whose 
true history has been obliterated, someone trying to regain 
control of her own destiny, her achievement marks an 
important beginning (1990:109). 
Unlike Matsikidze, Geurts is not concerned to specify the elements of a 
political philosophy, but embarks from a similar point: "Head and others 
may not consider her work 'political' but that may simply be a matter of 
semantics and how one defines that particular word" (1986:47). Since her 
novels deal mostly with ordinary people's daily lives and relationships, 
some people consider this a purely 'personal' affair. However, 
'political' action is not limited to government officials or party 
members in national office buildings. Ordinary people, in their own 
homes and villages, can and do make political decisions all the time" 
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(1986:48). The contribution of these critics seems to me to consist in 
their attempt to develop readings of the novel sensitive enough to 
respond both to the issues Head is dealing with and the biographic facts 
of her life. In doing so they go some way towards addressing MacKenzie's 
sense that the novel fails "to unite the sphere of public life and 
social commitment with that of the inner life and individual 
fulfilment", and the Hoto reviewer's complaint that it doesn't escape 
the trap of its "chosen story-mode" to impact on the real world. 
6.6 The Figure of Margaret 
I have claimed above that Head's attempt in her ow~ life was to escape 
the terms of apartheid. We might, then, shift the orientation of the 
reviewer's complaint and ask, In what ways did this attempt impact on 
her text? More specifically, Is Margaret a 'story' that Head is telling 
about herself? And if so, does she succeed in establishing an identity 
that leaves the terms of apartheid behind? Having posed these questions, 
I would like to examine in some detail the presentation of Margaret, and 
specifically the communal and textual construction of her identity, 
before coming back to address the questions directly. 
Two aspects of Margaret's characterisation which are fundamental to her 
identi ty are her Ma-sarwa 3 origins, and her Eng lish upbr ing ing. Her art 
and her marriage to a Tswana chief, while important in themselves, are 
significantly related to these. The occasion of her birth is described 
thus: 
3 
Some time ago it might have been believed that words like 
'kaffir' and 'nigger' defined a tribe. Or else how can a 
tribe of people be called Bushmen or Masarwa? Masarwa is the 
equivalent of 'nigger', a term of contempt which means, 
obliquely, a low filthy nation. 
Al though the correct singular form of the noun is, following 
Watts, "Basarwa" , and the more neutral descriptive term for the 
people it names would be San or Khoi-San, for the sake of 
consistency I have followed Head's usage in this chapter. The 
speech-act of self-identification which she gives Margaret "I am 
a Masarwa", is a deliberate defamiliarisation of the pejo~ative 
as I will go on to show. ' 
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True enough, the woman who gave birth to a child on the 
outskirts of a remote village had the same thin, Masarwa 
stick legs and wore the same Masarwa ankle-length, loose 
shift dress which smelt strongly of urine and the smoke of 
outdoor fires. She had died during the night but the child 
was still alive and crying feebly when a passer-by noticed 
the corpse (12). 
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The passage occurs at the end of a narrative diatribe on racism in 
Botswana, and so the conferral of "the same thin, Masarwa stick legs", 
and "the same Masarwa ankle-length, loose shift dress" marks Margaret's 
mother as belonging to the tribe who suffers it most. The qualifying 
"true enough" nevertheless registers narrative resistance to the 
construction of the "tribe of people" in the terms that have been given, 
and, together with the unexpected if tenuous survival of the child, 
indicates the assertion of difference that will be offered in the story 
that follows. 
The orphaned infant is adopted and educated by the English missionary, 
Margaret Cadmore, whose name she takes on. In significant ways, her 
Masarwa origins and her English upbringing contribute to the formation 
of her identity, though one that manifests itself when she is an adult. 
Her initial survival becomes a defining feature of her nature: given the 
"good sense and logical arguments" which Margaret Cadmore passes on to 
her, "almost anything could be thrown into her mind and life and she 
would have the capacity, within herself, to survive both heaven and 
hell" (16). Like Dikeledi later on, Margaret Cadmore is able both to see 
and to acknowledge the positive aspect of Margaret's cultural heritage, 
and so the distance she maintains between herself and Margaret is due in 
part to a respect for her origins, as is the expectation she expresses, 
"One day you will help your people" (17). It is thus left largely to 
Margaret to deal with the negative aspects of this heritage: the . 
hostili ty and racial prej udice that comes her way, the pinching, the 
anger, the spi tting, the dancing and the taunts. "There was only one 
thing left, to find out how Bushmen were going to stay alive on the 
earth because no . one wanted them to, except perhaps as the slaves and 
downtrodden dogs of the Batswana" ( 18). The narrati ve assignment for 
Margaret is how to integrate, or at least to reconcile, not only her 
'Bushmanness' and her Englishness, but also the positive and the 
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negative aspects of what it is to be 'a Bushman'. In significant 
measure, this reconciliation takes place in relation' to her art. 
Margaret's artistic ability is inherited, the narrative implies, both 
from Margaret Cadmore and from her "people" (88). Certainly Margaret 
Cadmore has an emphatic ability with "sketch pad and pencil", which 
prevents her from "hurling out a continuous stream of abuse" (12). Yet 
the psychological functionality of her art is balanced by a capacity to 
respond to and represent a range and depth of emotion she does not 
herself experience. She examines Margaret's dead mother from several 
angles, and "Maybe she really saw human suffering, close up, for the 
first time, but it frightened her into adopting that part of the woman 
which was still alive - her child" (15). Such response is encoded in the 
title she gives the picture she makes of the woman: "She looks like a 
Goddess" (15). It is this 'goddess' that balances the 'outcast' in 
Margaret's Masarwa heritage. When she meets Dikeledi, who will become . 
her friend in Dilepe village, she shows her the picture and reveals the 
extent to which the joint heritage it encapsulates has become part of 
her identity: 
"But I am not ashamed of being a Masarwa," · the young 
girl said seriously. Let me show you something.' 
She opened her handbag and took out a small, framed 
picture. 
"My teacher made this sketch of my mother the day she 
died," and handed it to Dikeledi (24). 
Margaret's sketches and paintings supply a medium through which she can 
enact her identity. Once they have become friends, Dikeledi compares 
this picture with a sketch that Margaret has made of her: 
The styles of both artists were almost identical, almost 
near that of a comic-strip artist in ' their simplicity, 
except that the younger disciple appeared greater than the 
master. It was a difference in temperament. The older 
Margaret Cadmore had been essentially a cold and unemotional 
woman, insensitive to the depths and heights of life, and 
the young girl high-lighted these latter qualities, at the 
same time emulating her skill for rapid reproduction of 
life, on the spot (86). 
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The distinction, it is implied, has to do with Margaret's Masarwa 
origins, because the comment that chokes in Dikeledi's throat is, "your 
people were naturally gifted this way. There are all those rock 
paintings" (88). In the 'Goddess', in Margaret's rendi tion of the 
"depths and heights of life" (87), in the emerging ,ivigour of the goats 
and water-carriers" and new birth (108), we are offered images of the 
ability of art to envision potential selves, to render and return them 
to those who are represented. The reflexive implications of the artist 
within the text will be considered later. We should note here that it is 
the response of Dikeledi' s brother Maru to Margaret's pictures, and 
specifically his verbal translation of the meaning he finds in them, 
that reflects how intrinsic is Margaret's Masarwa identity both to her 
artistic ability and to the relationship that develops between them: 
the message of the pictures went even deeper to his heart: 
"You see, it is I and my tribe who possess the true vitality 
of this country. You lost it when you sat down and let us 
clean your floors and rear your children and cattle. Now we 
want to be free of you and be busy with our own affairs" 
(108) . 
The man with whom she falls in love, however, is Moleka, friend of Maru, 
and himself "royalty, the son of a chief", who has "grown up making 
goats and people jump" (28). The impact of the bond that occurs between 
them, almost immediately after they meet, is registered in the 
"something" that goes "bang" in their chests (28,30). The love she feels 
for him is related to the fact that he makes her feel "as though she 
were the most important person on earth, when no one had ever really 
cared whether she was dead or alive, and she had been so lonely" (30). 
This love gives her "backbone" (30); it also takes her to a "point at 
which she was no longer a Masarwa but the equal in quality and stature 
of the woman who "sat opposite her" (118), Dikeledi, who also loves 
Moleka and ends up marrying him. Significant as her love for Moleka is 
to Margaret, she believes that "He will never approach me, because I am 
a Masarwa" (94). The friendship that develops between her and Dikeledi 
is thus predicated on their respective silence about Moleka, whom both 
love. Towards the end of the novel Dikeledi' comments on her 
peacefulness. The narrative comments, "Any other woman would have said: 
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'I am peaceful because Moleka loves me.' But then she was not any other 
woman. She was a Masarwa" (114). Maru concurs: "until the time he 
married her she had lived like the mad dog of the village, with tin cans 
tied to her tail. Moleka would never have lived down the ridicule and 
malice and would in the end have destroyed her from embarrassment" (9). 
These judgements are not confirmed directly by Moleka, and indeed the 
flamboyance with which he liberates his Masarwa sJ.aves would contest 
them. And yet the fact that Margaret is Masarwa is plainly part of the 
reason she marries not him but Maru. 
Maru' s decision to marry her is instantaneous. He says to his sister 
after meeting Margaret for the first time, "I don't care whether she 
sleeps on the hard floor for the rest of her life but I am not going to 
marry a pampered doll" (67). He goes on to defend his decision in terms 
he thinks Dikeledi will understand: "A woman like that would ensure that 
I am never tempted to make a public spectacle of myself" (70). Yet 
Maru's response to Margaret goes a lot further than the instrumentality 
he verbalises to his sister. His recognition of her effect upon Moleka, 
"Who else made a god overnight but a goddess?" (67), echoes Margaret 
Cadmore's comment about her mother. It also confirms his sense of their 
kinship, and locates Margaret within the complex cosmology of the novel 
in terms of which he is himself defined. She becomes one of the "queens 
and goddesses Maru walked with all his days" (34). His friend Moleka is 
another: "There was no knowing what was behind the closed door of 
Moleka's kingdom. Maru had no key to it, but he knew of its existence 
because if he touched Moleka's heart with some word or gesture a cloud 
would lift and he would see a rainbow of dazzling light" (34). Of course 
it is not Maru but Margaret who unlocks the door, and so the two men 
become enemies. Maru 'arranges' the marriage between Moleka and his 
sister, abdicates his position as chief, and carries Margaret off to a 
village "a thousand miles away" (125). 
6.7 Discursive Relations 
As I have shown above, several critics have had problems with this 
ending and with the relations between reality and fictionality which it 
reflects. MacKenzie quibbles with what he sees as Head's failure "to 
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unite the sphere of public life and social commitment with that of the 
inner life and individual fulfilment" (1989:27). Yet it is on two 
feminist critiques that I would like to focus, since their observations 
offer a mode of approach to the self of the character and that of the 
writer, and the textual relations that exist between them. 
The first critique is rooted in a search for "The Liberation of Female 
Consciousness in African Literature" and constitutes something of a 
denunciation of Haru: . 
Even female writers with some feminist commitment can 
backslide. Head begins Haru as an indictment of racism, and 
takes as a heroine a girl who, as a Masarwa, is herself a 
victim of racial prejudice in Botswana. Yet as the novel 
develops, the female victim fades progressively into the 
background, while the foreground is usurped by the male 
figures and male consciousness of Maru and Moleka. 
Thereafter the impact of the central theme is weakened by 
the author's failure to grant the oppressed heroine's 
consciousness the prominence which the opening seems to 
promise. It is as if the author has decided that the 
thoughts and feelings of a female victim of racism cannot be 
as interesting or as important as those of the males with 
whom she comes into contact. Head's indictment of racism is, 
in my view, much weaker by this decision (Metcalf 1989:24). 
Daymond expresses reservations similar to MacKenzie's in a critique that 
takes up the matter of Head's idealism in regard to "a problem in her 
visionary fable". She points out that, "for all her recognition that 
these two claims, the personal and the general, may have to be made 
separately, Bessie Head does not seem to have managed to reconcile her 
protagonist's vision of freedom with the actual steps he takes to attain 
it" (1989:249). The instance on which Daymond focuses is Margaret's 
marriage to Maru, because it is "virtually an abduction and so denies 
her the very freedom of choice which the creation of new worlds seeks to 
provide" (1989:248). She explains, "Bessie Head seems to have felt that 
the rightness of Maru and Margaret for each other and for his cause 
would be enough to mask the question of how Margaret herself is to be 
persuaded of this rightness: by not depicting such persuasion, she has 
jeopardised her fable's power to demonstrate the very freedom for which 
new worlds are created" (1989:250-251). 
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The questions that arise from these critiques allude, on the one hand, 
to the balance of sexual power wi thin the novel: Does Margaret fade 
progressively into the background? Is the foreground usurped by the male 
figures and male consciousness of Maru and Moleka? Does the author fail 
to grant the oppressed heroine ' s consciousness the prominence which the 
opening seems to promise? such questions might be addressed by 
considering the extent to which the narrative is focalised through 
Margaret's consciousness, and the extent to which it is Head's purpose 
to focus on Margaret. In my reading of the novel Margaret is more 
important than Maru, and his power is significant largely in relation to 
her. And yet it is worth remembering Head's comments cited above: that 
the novel "glorifies friendship between a man and a man and friendship 
between a woman and a woman", and that its major theme is "racial 
oppression", but "blended and blended" (Vigne 1991:136). The focus of 
the narrative, in other words , is on not one but four people and the 
relations between them, and my concern with Margaret (and Metcalf's too, 
by implication) and the prejudice she endures is far less "blended" than 
Head's own. The question Daymond poses as to Margaret's apparent lack of 
choice in marrying Maru can thus be seen as alluding to the broader 
relations of textual and narrative power in the novel, and her 
suggestion that the claims of t he personal and of the general "may have 
to be made separately" to communal constructions of identity. It is 
these sets of relations that I would now like to consider. 
At this point it seems worth recalling Shotter' s discussion of the 
constitutive force, for a sense of identity, of "addressivity" and "the 
attribution of personhood" (1989:143-5). 
F~om our beginning as children, and continuing on into our 
11 ves as adults, we are dependent upon being addressed by 
?ther~ for whatever form of autonomy we may achieve; thus, 
ln thls sense we can say that, as persons, we are always 
'you's', always essentially second-persons. The 'thou' is 
older than the 'I' in the sense that the capacity to be 
addressed as a 'you' by others is a preliminary to the 
ul ~imate capacity of being able to say 'I' of oneself, of 
bel~g. ab~e to ~nderstand the uniqueness of one's own 
posltlon ln relatlon to others, and to take responsibility 
for one's own actions (1989:143). 
CHAPTER 6: HEAD: llARU 245 
In Chapter 3 I alluded to the developing consciousness of Margaret as an 
acute literary example of these processes. I would here like to address 
the questions identified above by considering the discursive relations 
and particularly the patterns of addressivity in which Margaret is 
located, in her marriage to Maru, in the first "remote village" in which 
she lives as a child, and in Dilepe. 
6.8 Communal Constructions of the 'You' 
Rather like Too Late the Phalarope, (and The Grass is Singing) the 
temporal structure of Haru is characterised by an initial prolepsis: we 
are presented at the outset with the resolution to which the plot will 
come. The emphasis this gives our reading of the novel, then, is rather 
'how' things will come to this point, than 'what' will happen. The 
prolepsis provides Margaret with an achieved relationship of marriage 
which serves as a point of contrast for her position in the subsequent 
narration of her past. The marriage is characterised by discursive 
ambivalence: there are days on which her husband has "vicious, malicious 
moods when every word was a sharp knife intended to grind and re-grind 
the same raw wound" (9). If such a mood "was upon him, he would walk in 
through the door and say: 'I only married you because you were the only 
woman in the world who did not want to be important. But you are not at 
all important to me, as I sometimes say you are" (10). We might 
recognise one source of the vicious effect of these words as their 
echoing of the childhood taunts she has suffered. Another is their 
reminder of the affirmation she received from Moleka soon after her 
arri val in Dilepe: "He had made her feel as though she were the most 
important person on earth" (30). By contrast, now, she is at a place "a 
thousand miles away" ( 125), and the isolation of the couple, their 
discursive community of two, emphasises Maru's power to "turn the world 
to ashes. All the fire and sun disappeared because his words were 
inwardly lived out in his deeds" (10). 
The narrative shift, at the beginning of the novel, from proleptic time 
present to time past is signalled by the engaging use of 'you'. In a 
recent article entitled "Nation, Race and Ethnicity: Beyond the Legacy 
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of victims", Wicomb reads this use as indicating Head's abandonment of 
the narrative 
to speak directly to the reader. Stepping out of her role as 
narrator to address a topic beyond the fictive boundaries, 
she invites us to step outside our role as readers of 
fiction. We are confronted with the relationship between 
fiction and the world; we are addressed directly as 'you'. 
We are reminded: "you were a child yourself", forcing us to 
recognise ourselves as perpetrators of racial violence. But 
the sign 'you' also takes another meaning - 'you', the 
victim: "Children went a little further. They spat on you. 
They pinched you. They danced a wild jiggle, with the tin 
cans rattling: 'Bushman ! Low Breed! Bastard!' Again the 
calling out, the articUlation marked by the inverted commas 
of direct speech, a speech event recalled within this speech 
event where we are addressed by the author. Language as 
marker of difference is exploited: the pronoun 'you' has 
meaning only in opposition to and differentiated from 'they' 
(1992:17). 
Wicomb's reading is illuminating in specifying the effects of what 
Warhol terms engaging narration: "Using narrative interventions that are 
almost always spoken in earnest, such a narrator addresses a 'you' that 
is intended to evoke recognition and identificatio~ in the person who 
holds the book and reads, even if the 'you' in the text resembles that 
person only slightly or not at all" (Warhol 1986:811). It also usefully 
reminds us of the effect of narrative shift which is to confront us with 
"the relationship between fiction and the world". 
And yet the pronoun 'you' has meaning not only "in opposition to and 
differentiated from 'they'" but also in relation to Maru's patterns of 
address. The constitutive force of the first reaction Margaret 
anticipates from him includes both denigration and repudiation: "you are 
not at all important to me as I sometimes say you are". The pronominal 
shift of the endearment, "My sweetheart" (10), however, reveals 
possessi veness and affirmation which is both powerful and effective. 
Earlier we have heard that, "Most often she felt quite drunk and mad 
with happiness and it was not unusual for her to walk around for the 
whole day with an ecstatic smile on her face" (8) .. Now the endearment 
goes some way towards negating the suffering she has endured in the 
past, "They were the most precious words, if you only knew ... " (10). 
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And since the past that is then recounted is Margaret's, it seems to me 
an oversimplification to read this 'you' as that of the writer speaking 
"directly to the reader". The passage is plainly focalised through 
Margaret's consciousness: it is as if she is allowed an implicit 'I' in 
order to render her experiences. The engagement that takes place, then, 
is far more immediate than that of listening to . the 'voice' of the 
writer 'speaking' on Margaret's behalf. Given her race, and the racism 
of her tormentors, the spheres of addressivity in which she has 
previously been located are far more vindictive and destructive than her 
current discursive relations with Maru, and it is part of the function 
of the 'you' to invoke our identification not with her tormentors but 
with their victim. The 'you' thus functions, implicitly, in the same way 
as an inclusively used 'we': it engenders the possibility of shared 
experience. 
It might be worth clarifying at this point why I have insisted on an 
exact understanding of the narrative use of direct address in the novel. 
The major contribution of Shotter's formulations has been their 
recognition of the constitutive force of language and specifically 
address for the development of identity; their insistence that human 
communication is ontologically formative. within a pOstcolonial analysis 
of narrative, and specifically in Margaret's case, the constitutive 
force of address coincides with several cross-cultural interfaces. If 
"the capacity to be addressed as a 'you' by others is a preliminary to 
the ultimate capacity of being able to say 'I' of oneself", addressivity 
is, in her case, particularly definitive of her capacity to say 'I' 
because she is an orphan with no Masarwa context to draw on for 
protection against the force of linguistic 'othering', and an 'English' 
background which exacerbates rather than ameliorates her 'otherness'. 
I have claimed earlier that Head's attempt in her life was to escape the 
terms of apartheid . Given this, her location of Margaret at cross-
cultural interfaces seems to me to be a specific linguistic and textual 
investigation of the problem of how to construct an identity in post-
apartheid terms. The term is, of course, a problematic one: like the 
term apartheid, it invokes that from which it would separate itself. And 
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yet my use of it here is an advised one, because it seems to me that, 
though she tried, Head was finally unable to escape the discursive force 
of apartheid. Not to beg the question, however, I would like to respond 
to the invitation implicit in the 'inclusive' use of 'you', and follow 
Margaret's endeavours in this direction: by investigating the relations 
between construction by others and the assertion of identity that takes 
the verbal form, "I am". 
The second discursive context in which we see the effects of 
addressivity is the remote village in which she lives as a child. The 
narrative describes these effects thus: 
There seemed to be a big hole in the child's mind between 
the time that she slowly became conscious of her life in the 
home of the missionaries and conscious of herself as a 
person. A big hole was there because, unlike other children, 
she was never able to say: "I am this or that. My parents 
are this or that." There was no one in later life who did 
not hesitate to tell her that she was a Bushman, mixed 
breed, half breed, low breed or bastard (15-16). 
The most acute instances of 'othering' are perhaps the direct labelling 
she endures, "Bushman 1 Low Breed 1 Bastard 1" (11), whose effect is to 
make her "aware that something was wrong with her relationship to the 
world", to give her a "vantage point from which she could observe the 
behaviour of a persecutor. What did it really mean when another child 
walked up to her and, looking so angry, said: 'You are just a Bushman'?" 
( 17 ). I have above referred to the j oint English and Masarwa heritage 
which is encapsulated in her abilities as an artist. It is significantly 
Margaret Cadmore's intervention which allows her to find answers to this 
question, "what did it really mean". The code she learns from Margaret 
Cadmore is not "love of mankind", but "common sense", the recognition 
that "what is sensible is simpler than what is stupid" (12-13). The 
label Margaret Cadmore gives the drawing of her mother, "She looks like 
a Goddess", nevertheless alludes to a heritage quite distinct from the 
English code of sensible simplicity, as does the predictive observation, 
"One day you will help your people". If the intermittent repetition of 
this remark engenders a relationship in which "There was nothing she 
could ask for, only take what was given", it also creates "a purpose and 
burden in the child's mind" (17), which is emphasised by the "few 
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solemnly spoken words" Margaret Cadmore gives her after one particular 
episode of 'torture': "They are wrong. You will have to live with your 
appearance for the rest of your life. There is nothing you can do to 
change it" ( 18). Since her identity has become thus inescapable, it 
becomes a matter of survival: "No one by shouting, screaming or spitting 
could un-Bushman her" (18). Yet the counterpoint to the matter of 
survival is the underlying claim of the narrative that her people need 
to be helped, and that they can be helped by the assertion of their 
heritage which is symbolised in the 'goddess'. The linguistic outcome of 
this acceptance is an alignment with 'her people', so that when asked, 
in Dilepe village, "Is your father a white man?", a~d, more explicitly, 
"are you a Coloured?" she answers unhesitatingly, "I am a Masarwa" 
(24,40). 
The effects of "addressivity" which she has experienced as a child 
continue in the community she meets in Dilepe. On the one hand, there is 
the powerful showdown with the children in her class, after one older 
boy, coached by the principal, asks her, "Since when is a Bushy a 
teacher?". The whole class roars, "You are a Bushman ... You are a 
Bushman" ( 4 6 ) • On this occasion, Margaret is rescued from the 
principal's machinations by Dikeledi. On this occasion too, for the 
first time, Margaret feels anger. Yet the effect of the encounter is 
reflected in her response to Maru's demand a little later that her bed 
be returned: "Were they all saying, like the children: 'You are a 
Bushman?'" (62). For the most part, however, the effects of addressivity 
are comparatively positive. The kindly truck drive+" who brings her to 
the village responds to the "stricken, helpless look on her face" with a 
suggestion: "You must not be so afraid of the world, Mistress ..• People 
can't harm you" (22). Maru's spy, Ranko, who follows Dikeledi in falling 
"head over heels in love" with her (52), uses her forgotten change as an 
introduction: "You are rich to throwaway money, hey?" (51). Her 
response is to "cry quickly, with one eye" (52), as she frequently does 
when moved. Such kindness is apparent also in the men sent to recover 
her bed who find "They had never done anything so dreadful in their 
lives". The older man in particular is "shame-faced, embarrassed. He was 
part of the village life and knew about the mutterings concerning the 
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Masarwa teacher. Even so, she was a teacher of their children and 
deserved some respect. That was his opinion" (62). His attitude, it 
seems to me, is part of the potential world which Margaret is able in 
her paintings to envision; it indicates the gradual discarding of 
prejudice that is described in Ranko's account a little earlier as being 
"like the skin of an old snake. It has to be removed bit by bit" (53). 
His attitude issues in a plan of action: "If you present your case to 
[Moleka], he will surely let you keep the bed for a day or two more. 
Come, we will take you to him" (62). 
6.9 Personal Relations and Identity 
The courage Margaret takes from his attitude enables her to challenge 
the decision. I have referred above in passing to Moleka' s response 
which makes her feel she is the "most important, person on earth", 
because "He seemed to have said to her silently: 'You see, you don't 
have to be afraid anymore. First there was one of you. Now there are two 
of you" (30-31). It is thus Moleka, in the first place, to whom she 
refers a decision as to whether she should stay in the village or not: 
"Perhaps she did not care about the bed. She wanted to see him again. 
Perhaps she would be unable to stand alone against a ~hole village of 
people who did not want a Masarwa teacher. She'd see by his face and 
then make her own decision" (62). As it happens Moleka' s face is "like 
stone and he did not look up. Should she even try to claim that she was 
human?" (59). This non-response plays a large part in her sense that, 
despite their love, he will not approach her because she is a Masarwa. 
Maru steps forward to exculpate Moleka, and the brief encounter that 
follows is easily as definitive for her life as Moleka's non-response: 
Suddenly she felt as if her throat were being choked. The 
man was Dikeledi' s brother. Dikeledi spoke of him with 
reverence. And how much had Dikeledi invaded her own life 
without giving her these awful details - that she, Dikeledi, 
was related to someone like this who had slaves as part of 
his hereditary privilege? Did you ever sort out one thing 
from another with people, especially when you were a no-
people? Did you trust intuition, and if you did, how did you 
explain Moleka and his talking heart - first there was one 
of you, now there are two of you? (63-64). 
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Margaret agrees to return the bed, and evidently decides to stay in the 
village. We should recognise here both the focaltsation through her 
consciousness and the 'inclusive' use of 'you', which involves us in her 
predicament by invoking the humanity she has in common with us. The 
focalisation shifts, however, when she walks out, "as if she were facing 
her death", and the narrative questions, "How was she to know the true 
size and nature of this sudden adversary? Almost everyone grovelled 
before him, because of his position . But she had looked down at him, 
indifferently, from a great height, where she was more than his equal" 
(64). It is Maru who is left to ponder her effect on him. 
The ' social construction' of Margaret's identity thus functions at a 
personal level, also, wi thin the group of four people linked by the 
"friendship" to which Head alluded in the comment cited earlier, because 
in significant ways it is the fact that she is Masarwa that serves to 
structure their relations with her. After this encounter, Margaret 
doesn't speak directly to Moleka again. Moleka is Gontrasted with Maru 
in his inability to deal with the "voice" which moves in his heart and 
speaks to him: "But we are surely not strangers, Moleka?", and "Help me. 
Ought I to go away? It might be that my appearance this time prevents 
you from recognizing me?" (76). He fails to relate to her successfully 
in the nondiscursive realm. Although there "was no barrier of the 
spirit", although he "had talked straight to her heart", there remain 
"almost insurmountable barriers over the physical" (77-78). Moleka 
focuses on her legs; more crucial to her "appearance", as she realises, 
and as Margaret Cadmore has before her, is the fact that she is Masarwa. 
He is thus set in contrast with Maru who considers her appearance only 
in regard to its likely effect on other people (70). When, finally, he 
comes to the point of seeing her as a person "engaged in some activity 
such as eating or cooking or drinking tea", he is prevented from 
approaching her by Maru's spy, Ranko, and the threat of death that is 
Ranko's "terrible message" (79). 
Margaret's friendship with Dikeledi is a particularly definitive one. We 
have seen Dikeledi rescue her from the machinations of the principal. 
She goes on, now, to offer Margaret her spare bed, and in doing so to 
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differentiate herself from her brother, and partly to negate his effect: 
"we live our separate lives and don't always agree. I don't want you to 
be angry with me". When Margaret doesn't immediately respond, she 
persists, "You would be small-minded if you did not accept my gift", to 
which Margaret replies, smiling, "I'm not sma ll.,.minded " (86 ). Thus 
resolved, their relationship confers on Margaret a new identity, since 
she becomes known amongst the villagers as "the friend of Mistress 
Dikeledi" (93). Yet it is within this relationship that the effect of 
her love for Moleka becomes apparent, leading them both into the same 
pattern of enmity as the men: 
They did not know how near they were to killing each other. 
One of them was the top dog, just then .... They had only to 
mention his name and one of them would die. Margaret, who 
was in the more powerful position at that time, compressed 
her lips. Any other woman would have said: "I am peaceful 
because Moleka loves me". But then she was not any other 
woman. She was a Masarwa. She thought Dikeledi would reply: 
"Don't be silly. Moleka can't possibly love you. You are a 
Masarwa and he's ... (114). 
Although Dikeledi never explicitly says such words, she thinks them, as 
we have seen in regard to Margaret's sketch of her (88), and as we see 
when her brother says he wishes to marry Margaret: ':She had to jerk her 
mind away from the words: 'But you can't marry a Masarwa. Not in your 
posi tion.' How could she say that, when not so long ago she had said 
there was no such thing as a Masarwa?" (66). And yet it is in relation 
to this friendship that Margaret finally achieves a sense of identity 
that leaves race behind. It also leaves behind their friendship: 
A few vital threads of her life had snapped behind her neck 
and it felt as though she were shrivelling to death, from 
head to toe .... There was a point at which she was no 
longer a Masarwa but the equal in quality and stature of the 
woman who sat opposite her. It was their equality which had 
given Dikeledi the unconscious power to knock her down with 
a sledge-hammer blow. No other woman could have killed her, 
but she knew Dikeledi through and through and her soul was a 
towering giant (118). 
Margaret manages to get home, where "the remaining threads went snap, 
snap, snap behind her neck and she half-stumbled, half reeled to the bed 
and fell on it in a dead faint" (120). 
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When Ranko offers his first report on Margaret to Maru, he expresses an 
opinion about the prejudice of the community: 
That very afternoon people were looking at each other with 
shock. They said: "Did you hear? The new mistress says she 
is a Masarwa." By evening they began to laugh: "The eye is a 
deceitful thing", they said. "If a Masarwa combs his hair 
and wears modern dress, he looks just like a Coloured. There 
is no difference." Those with children at Leseding school 
debated the matter. They were trying to a,ccustom their 
hearts to their children being taught by a Masarwa. They 
said: "Prejudice is like the skin of an old snake. It has to 
be removed bit by bit" (53). 
We have seen this maxim at work in both Moleka's and Dikeledi's 
relations with Margaret. It is possibly Maru's explicit recognition of 
Margaret's 'otherness' that enables him to come to terms with it and 
engender a relationship in which race finally seems to play no part. 
When he speaks to his sister about marrying Margaret, he says, "People 
would never get over it, the embarrassment: 'Why, she's only a Masarwa'" 
(70). He enlists the negative social construction of Margaret, the code 
of outcasting, in order to disguise his own sense of connection with 
her. He wonders, "Should he bother to explain to [Dikeledi] the language 
of the gods who spoke of tomorrow?" (68), the language of the "message" 
Margaret is later to paint (109). When his sister points out that 
Margaret may not wish to marry him, he formulates a proposal he might 
make, which reveals his sense of power, the urgency. of his desire, and 
his determination: 
"Dikeledi" , he said, deadly serious. "If I came to you 
one day and said: 'Look here, I have long controlled the 
affairs of your life. You can't even cry unless I will it. 
Now, if you don't agree to marry me, you will stare at the 
moon for the rest of your days.' What would you do?" (72). 
Of course this is a putative proposal, but his sense of the 'I -thou' 
relationship between himself and Margaret is emphasised when he wonders 
to himself later, "'What will I do if she does not love me as much as I 
love her?' A terrible reply came from his heart: 'Kill her'" (111). 
6.10 Modulations of Medium 
In the event he doesn't need to, but we might usefully examine the 
conversation that persuades her, as I believe it does, to marry and to 
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love him. When he finds her in the state of shock that follows the news 
that Moleka and Dikeledi are to marry, he remarks, "She's not dead, 
Ranko ... It's only her neck that's broken" (122). Seeing her response, 
he speaks directly to her: 
"You think my neck was not broken a thousand times over 
like that because you did not love me", he said softly . 
"It's not an ailment you die of. Sometimes you recover in a 
moment, especially when the cause of it is a worthless man 
like Moleka. You think I don't know everything? Moleka did 
not want to approach you because he is such a tribalist. I 
watched everything, thinking you might see that I loved you. 
Dikeledi gave me all your pictures, except the last one." 
He could quite clearly see the movement df her eyes in 
the dark and that she had begun listening intently, with 
surprise. 
"I can show you the house you painted some time ago", he 
said. "Would you like to see it?" 
Since she kept silent, he became impatient: "Self pity 
is something I don't like. other people have suffered more 
than you. You must stop this self pity. There's nothing 
hurting you any more" (123) . 
Apparent in his second and third sentences is the 'inclusive' use of 
'you' which construes her as human and thus invokes the humanity she has 
in common with him, as well as the experiences they have shared. 
Apparent in the rest of the passage is the force of his construction of 
her present state of shock: he calls it "self pity", and she finds this 
to be true. His reference to the house she has painted in particular 
serves to invoke the nonverbal communication that has taken place 
between them: his supplying her with paints, his interpretation of her 
pictures, the dreams he has projected into her mind and which only . 
disappear when she paints them (103-104), and the companionship they 
offer him "between the present and the time when he was ready to live a 
different life" (lOS). He says to her before they leave, "We used to 
dream the same dreams. That was how I knew you would love me in the end" 
(124). Her response is an acknowledgement: "He was not just anything but 
some kind of strange, sweet music you could hear over and over again. 
She was beginning to listen. It was not strange. She had heard it 
before" ( 124). Indeed she has painted it into the prophetic vision of 
her pictures: when Maru looks at them, "It was as though he had fallen 
upon a kind of music that would never grow stale on the ear but would 
add continually to the awakening perfection in his own heart" (107). 
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Our investigation of Margaret's identity thus far has focused on the 
discursive relations in which she is located, in her marriage to Maru, 
in her childhood in a remote village, and in the communal and personal 
relations she finds in Dilepe. There is a significant context for these 
discursive relations, however, in the nonverbal communication which has 
been identified above. Although Moleka is uncertain how to deal with the 
voices in his heart, he also has "a feeling that he constantly held his 
heart against hers, or his mouth against hers, and that all human 
communication had now become superfluous and a sacrilege" (77). When 
Maru sends an assortment of art materials to Margaret she leaves behind 
the world of "coherent human communications" and enters an artistic 
'fugue' which lasts two days (100). The pictures ·she paints are the 
dreams he has projected into her mind, and, in the proleptic opening 
section which follows her marriage to him, his dreams of an injured 
Moleka cause her to weep (8-9) . 
This nonverbal context posits a unique connection between "words" and 
"deeds" (10), "dreams" and "reality" (7), and helps to locate the 
criticism of MacKenzie, Daymond and Metcalf noted above. Although the 
discursive context is crucial for the construction and definition of 
Margaret's identity, there is a point at which she ceases to be "a 
Masarwa" and becomes the artist, the goddess, the woman, who responds to 
Maru 's dreams and music. There is a point, as several critics have 
shown, at which the novel shifts into the realm of fable, of romance, of 
myth and legend, which draws on African history but is not constrained 
by a simple relation to its reality. This shift has important 
implications. While, in my view, the discursiv& encounter between 
Margaret and Maru towards the end of the novel does dramatise his 
'persuasion' of her, the further question we might ask is, If the novel 
shifts into fable, can we reasonably expect to see a 'realistic' 
exercise of choice on her part? if the relations between them are 
substantially nondiscursive, can we expect to witness his persuasion of 
her? On the other hand, it should be apparent from my insistence on the 
communal construction of identity that the claims of "the personal and 
the general" cannot be "made separately", and although my emphasis has 
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been on the discursive, there seems little reason why they should not be 
made together wi thin the nondiscursi ve realm as we 11. Metcalf's sense 
that "the foreground is usurped by the male figures and male 
consciousness of Maru and Moleka" seems to me to be inaccurate on two 
counts: first that we need to recognise the foursome with whom Head is 
concerned in this novel, and second that if Margaret's identity begins 
by taking the discursive form of saying "I am" Masarwa, it moves on to a 
point where she is "no longer a Masarwa but the equal in quality and 
stature" of Dikeledi. If such quality and stature takes the mythic form 
of a recognition of the 'goddess' within her, the relocation of identity 
out of the domain of realism is surely not a fading into the background, 
nor a failure of prominence. 
In directing the question of identity to a recognition of the 
nondiscursi ve realm, furthermore, we find a point of entry to the 
problematic nature of the textual relations in ' which Margaret is 
located, and specifically the nature of the connection between her as 
character and Head as writer. We might gain a perspective for this 
discussion if we recall the character-writer relations in the two 
previous case studies. In regard to the first of these, I speculated 
that Mhudi' s response to the Barolong man narrating her would follow 
similar patterns of courtesy as those which marked her first 
conversation with Ra-Thaga. Both the control she is given over her 
communication, and the voice with which she is equipped and which she 
uses to strong effect, ensure that Mhudi registers the tensions and 
transitions that characterise Plaatje' s own narrative endeavour. Her 
acceptance of the narration of her story is thus associated with her 
'ethnographic closeness' to Plaatje, on the one hand, and with the 
mutually transitional nature of their allegiance to an oral culture. In 
regard to the second case study, I sought to demonstrate that the 
construction of Pieter as tragic hero, and, indeed, 'the construction of 
the narrative as a tragedy, is predicated upon the silence of stephanie. 
On the one hand, this prevents her from telling her story or having it 
told. On the other hand it protects her from recuperation, like Pieter, 
into a moral scrutiny of the Immorality Act; it enables her 
intentionality to escape discursive containment. In Margaret's case, the 
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narrative purpose which she is, as it were, assigned is to 'save her 
people'. Her success in doing so should be seen as taking place at the 
implici t level of "making purposes possible" ; as residing, in 
significant ways, in the constitutive force of her 'example, within the 
interrelated spheres of the personal and the political. It should also 
be seen as taking place within the broader and more significant 
narrative function of investigating the possibilities of identity in 
post-apartheid terms. 
I referred at the outset of this chapter to watts's suggestion that we 
recognise the "hybrid form" of "autobiography as novel" in Karu. watts 
elaborates, 
The book is a passionate plea on behalf of the San tribe, 
long denigrated in Botswana and other parts of Southern 
Africa as 'bushmen', and reviled for their backwardness and 
their refusal to accept the impositions of so-called western 
civilisation. But the instances of prejudice which the 
writer draws upon are experiences of her own, as another 
kind of outcast in African society - a 'coloured'. In South 
Africa the 'coloured', the child of African and white, for 
all the disadvantages this brings in an apartheid society, 
at least belongs to a group and has a place. In Botswana, 
where tribes survive more or less intact, the 'coloured' is 
the despised outsider, only a little higher in the social 
scale than the San or Basarwa. Thus the younger Margaret 
Cadmore's experiences as a child, a student and a young 
teacher mirror the author's own (1989:139). 
Although in principle Watts's comments are sound, there are two details 
which need clarifying. The first is that, despite longstanding 
denigration, the Masarwa do not necessarily share external perceptions 
of themselves as despicable outsiders, as Geurts (1986) has asserted: 
Head describes the souls of the San as being shut in a 
"small, dark air less room ... for a long time". After 
reading Lee's work on the San I do not believe that they see 
themselves in such a downtrodden, oppressed way. Their 
identity as an ethnic group reflects a much more positive 
self-image. I might even say that they see themselves as the 
only. truly free, spirited people. Head's narrative, in this 
partlcular passage, seems to be adopting , the Tswana's 
negative attitude towards the San and it should not be 
mistakenly projected on to the San as their own self-image 
(1986:52n). 
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My point is not that Head got the Masarwa wrong, rather that her 
depiction of Margaret as a member of this tribe is informed by a quite 
specific narrative purpose. Her sense of herself is derived both from 
the negative constructions of racism and hostility and the positive 
recognition of her heritage of people with whom she has significant 
relationships. 
The second detail is that, although 'coloured' by Watts's definition, 
Head neither belonged to a "group" nor had a "place", as Gardner has 
pointed out: "The 'Coloured' people form a community which has evolved 
its own characteristic language-use and cultural customs, especially in 
the Western Cape. Bessie Head does not speak Afrikaans fluently and did 
not grow up in a 'Coloured' community", having been rejected after a 
week by prospective white foster parents as being "too black", and being 
relocated from her 'coloured' foster home to an orphanage at the age of 
thirteen (Gardner 1986a:9). 
For these reasons it seems more accurate to say that, rather than 
"mirror" her own experiences in her character, Head selected and 
foregrounded aspects she deemed relevant. A specific example of this is 
the classroom attack on Margaret instigated by the principal. In a 
letter to Randolph · Vigne dated 27 October 1965,' Head refers to an 
incident which Vigne reads as the "germ of Maru". She says: 
There is a man here, the principal of our school - he sort 
of thought he could get started to sleep with me - just like 
a frenzied itch but as a woman I mean nothing - when he 
couldn't get rid of the itch he just turned on me - right to 
the point of manhandling me in front of the kids and 
twisting my arm. I had to bite his hand to let him let go. 
This happened Monday 25/10/65. I fled away from the school, 
screaming. He went and called the police - that I had gone 
out of my mind. They came to my home and took me to the 
charge office (Vigne 1991:10). 
If Vigne is correct in taking this as the basis of a fictional rendition 
in Maru, it is worth noting which aspects were left out and which 
details were changed. Although, in Margaret's experience, the principal 
instigates the attack, he is not present, and a clear shift has taken 
place in the fiction from sexual to racial harassment. The outcome for 
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Margaret is far less damaging than it was for Head, who had no Dikeledi 
to intervene on her behalf - the charge of insanity being one that was 
with her for much of her life (as well as after her death, as we have 
seen). Of course other differences between Head and Margaret might be 
noted (Margaret is extremely thin; she i~ artistically gifted), but the 
example should suffice to demonstrate how much care we need to take in 
reading the character as a textualisation of the self of the writer, 
hence to what extent we need to recognise Margaret as a subject in her 
own right. 
In order to do so we might consider again the discursive forms that the 
narrative relation can take. Recalling the insight from Todorov that to 
say 'I' is always to represent oneself, we might recognise in 
autobiography the form I-' I', and in third-person. fictional narration 
the form I -' she'. In the autobiographic novel, as watts describes it, 
the 'she' is in fact a third-person representation of the self, a closer 
representation of the self than we would normally assume character to 
be. Yet if it is generally true that to emphasise the autobiographic 
element is to privilege the ' I " it has been my endeavour, in this 
reading of Naru, to examine in some depth the construction of the 
character as 'you' by the community and the personal relationships in 
which she is located. In doing so I have drawn attention to the ways in 
which Margaret is constructed by the discursive relations that exist 
within the text and the ways in which she internalises, resists and . 
transcends them. As I have attempted to show, however, her achievement 
of textual subjectivity is one that takes place beyond the discursive 
realm, and so it is that much more likely to elude analysis. And yet we 
should not assume from this that it is not there. 
6.11 Silence, Narration and CUltural Translation 
It has been my insistence, in this dissertation, that a postcolonial 
theorisation of cross-culturality in the novel has to retain the 
subjectivity of character, and hence that the textualisation of 
character must be seen as existing in tension with the humanity of 
character. Evidence of this tension, I have claimed, is the silence of 
the character as a volitional response to narration. The reading of 
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Margaret offered in this chapter has focused on the ways in which the 
narrative purpose specified for her, to 'help her people', is 
intrinsically related to her identity, and is revealed in her marriage 
to a chief of the people who have oppressed her people. The complexity 
with which this reading has had to deal has been the fact that the 
relationship between them is in large measure a nondiscursive one. 
It is generally true of the novel, I think, that dialogue is minimal, 
and it is particularly true of Margaret, whose verbal contact with 
others is both rare and restricted. Lacking "weapons of words or 
personality" she has grown up with only a "permanent silence" to oppose 
to the torments she endures (17). This silence produces a "brilliant . 
student", yet the brilliance is "based entirely on social isolation and 
lack of communication with others" (19). It is a pattern which continues 
in Dilepe: "She was not part of it and belonged nowhere. In fact, so 
quiet and insignificant were her movements that the people of Dilepe 
village almost forgot that there was such a thing as a Masarwa teacher" 
(93). It is this loneliness that renders "precious" the personal contact 
with Dikeledi, Moleka and Maru, yet even to the two men she is known as 
"that silent, isolated person on the old library hill" (106). Her 
silence is in fact metonymic of the silence of her people, as Maru comes 
to recognise: "for who knew how long, people like her had li ved 
faceless, voiceless, almost nameless in the country" (108). 
It is, nevertheless, a silence which Margaret transcends in two ways. In 
the first place, her declaration, "I am a Masarwa" challenges the 
established hierarchies of prejudice: "if the white man thought that . 
Asians were a low, filthy nation, Asians could still smile with relief _ 
at least, they were not Africans. And if the white man thought Africans 
were a low, filthy nation, Africans in Southern Africa could still smile 
- at least they were not Bushmen" (11). Her challenge takes a dual form. 
On the one hand, she exemplifies 'a Bushman' who is plain I y neither 
"low" nor "filthy", and hence contradicts accepted 'truths'. On the 
other hand, her explicit assertion of her identity evinces pride which 
contradicts the process of othering which underlies the hierarchy. We 
see the effects of this challenge in the response of the principal, 
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Pete, to whom she has declared, "I am a Masarwa". His first reaction is 
shock, "S0 great that he almost jumped into the air" (40). Later in 
conversation he ruminates: 
"There's a real mystery about the one at the school .... 
They don't look you in the face and say, 'I am a Masarwa'. 
It was like a slap in the face. The statement was so final, 
as though she did not want to be anything else. I had given 
her a loophole. Coloureds are just trash, but at least she 
could pass as one. It would have saved us an awful lot of 
bother II (44). 
Her insistence on speaking her identity, her refusal to accept the 
"loophole", either from him or from Dikeledi before him, is in stark 
contrast to the silence she normally maintains about herself, and into 
which she returns. 
In the second place, the only extended speech she makes is her 
description to Dikeledi of the inspiration for the· three paintings of 
the dream sequence. Indeed, it seems to me that the failure of the 
medium of language to 'overcome' her alienness for other people, 
including, finally, Dikeledi and Moleka, goes some way towards 
explaining the narrative shift to new expressive media. The 'voice' she 
achieves is a paradoxically nondiscursi ve one: her communication with 
both Maru and Moleka takes the form of dreams, painting, music, mutual 
physical sensation - communication which abrogates human language. Her 
transformation of the old library into a studio registers the ways in 
which art comes to inhabit the place where words and texts once were, 
the ways in which it generates a new medium of its own. In the terms 
which I have defined, this is silence, yet it is silence that arises 
because language cannot renounce its categories. (We might be reminded 
here of Asad's comments about the intransigence of the target medium in 
cultural translation.) Margaret herself is "hardly African or anything 
but something new and universal, a type of personality that would be 
unable to fit into a definition of something as narrow as a tribe or 
race or nation" (16). If her paintings represent herself, and her 
people, they also represent a new future which carries a message to 
Maru 's heart: "Look! Don't you see! We are the people who have the 
strength to build a new world! And his heart agreed" (108). It is a 
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message and an agreement which constitute the 
substance" on which he makes his "bold moves" (107). 
in fact works: because Maru is able to respond to it., 




to 'translate' its 
The effacement of the linguistic domain and its boundaries functions at 
the narrative level as well: one of the features of the narrative is 
that cultural interfaces are not represented in linguistic terms. The 
medium of the novel is English and there seem to me very few indications 
within it that characters are not speaking English to one another. One 
instance occurs in the opening section when Maru rebukes Ranko for 
'breaking up clods': "Sudden, sharp words and the mention of his name 
threw him into confusion. Ranko meant 'big nose' in Setswana, and when 
had people not had vegetable garden soil raked in a fancy way?" (6). 
Such explicit references to cross-culturality as do occur are directed 
to the relations between Batswana and Masarwa: for example, the 
"expressions of disgust on the faces of the Batswana nurses as they wash 
the dead woman's body for burial" (14), the Bushmen as the "slaves and . 
downtrodden dogs of the Batswana" (18), and "The Batswana [who] thought 
they were safer than the white man" ( 1 0 9 ). For the most part, the 
narrative refers not to racial categories but to the generic "people", 
and even the concluding remarks about prejudice are directed towards 
"People like the Batswana" (127, my emphasis). In a SUbstantial way, the 
cross-culturality in the novel is encapsulated in the figure of 
Margaret, and what it means to be Masarwa within Tswana society. 
The effacement or elision of linguistic difference is related, I 
believe, to the fact that Head did not know African languages, and that 
her access to African culture and traditions took place through the 
medium of English. It is also possibly related to her tenuous position 
within Botswanan society, which might have moderated an explicit attack 
on the racism of the Batswana. It seems to me, however, to be related 
most substantially to a narrative attempt to circumvent the need for . 
translation. We might more easily recognise the narrative choice 
involved in this elision if we recall, in relation to the Gardner-Dovey 
debate, Head's resistance to being labelled or construed in apartheid 
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terms. Her comment about herself was, "I have always been just me, with 
no frame of reference to anything beyond myself". The statement can be 
recognised as reflecting a sense of achieved identity like Margaret's 
recognition that no one can "un-Bushman" her. Dovey speaks of this 
assertion as revealing "the potential for resistance in that which may 
be considered unnameable in terms of the system: He~d is not white, not 
black, not feminist, not revolutionary" (1989a:34). In this context, we 
might also identify choice in the narrati ve refusal to acknowledge 
linguistically that cultural translation is taking place. 
It has been my insistence, on the other hand, that these negative 
attributes ("not white, not black, not feminist, not revolutionary") 
constitute no identity at all, since identity is by nature socially 
constructed. My investigation of the figure of Margaret was thus 
undertaken in order to address the autobiographic question: Is Margaret 
a 'story' that Head is telling about herself? We might find an answer to 
this question in the reply that Margaret gives when asked whether her 
father is a white man, and whether she is Coloured: "I am a Masarwa". 
Margaret is differentiated from Head in this ability to define herself. 
She is also differentiated from Head in her ability to take the social 
terms of identity and make them her own, to ~ransform them into 
something personally meaningful so that they are expressive of herself. 
It is one of the effects of her love for Moleka that she goes beyond 
this identity to be "no longer a Masarwa but the equal in quality and 
stature" of, effectively, anyone. She renounces the allegiances which 
have helped her to survive, and takes on a human rather than a tribal 
identity. 
And yet processes of cultural translation clearly are taking place in 
the novel, not least in the figure of Margaret herself. If her primary 
narrative function is an investigation of the possibilities of identity 
at racial, cultural and political interfaces, she stands as a unique 
instance of postcoloniali ty • Born Masarwa, she is 'translated' into 
English: it is perhaps one of the profoundest ironies of the novel that 
the medium in which she asserts her tribal identity should be English, 
that she 'becomes Masarwa' in English. Yet if it, is in and through 
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English that she is able to transform the "one thing left her", the 
pejorative term, into an identity that expresses herself, its discursive 
categories are finally too limited, too inflexible to accommodate her 
humani ty. The 'voice' she achieves is displaced out of the discursive 
realm: it is through love for Moleka that she is able to recognise 
herself, it is through her art and her marriage to Maru that she is able 
to 'represent' her people. Since Maru is able to 'translate' the message 
of her pictures into words, she shifts from being d:fined, as 'you', to 
defining, through her painting: "You see, it is I and my tribe who 
possess the true vitality in this country" (l09). The expressive and 
communicative mode which she deploys is thus one which includes but is 
not contained by language. 
Head's writing of Margaret plainly reflects a cul~ural translation: of 
herself as 'Coloured' into Margaret as Masarwa. I have, above, 
recognised the use of ' you' as an act of engagement, as a mode of 
approach to the Gonsciousness of Margaret, as the narrator's attempt to 
see things from her point of view. We might note here that this use also 
reflects Margaret's attempt to conceptualise herself in ways that are 
apprehensible to a putative listener. In this way the 'you' stands as a 
point of contact between narrator and character. The introduction to the 
condi tion of being Masarwa thus takes place in the context of the 
problems of representing the experience of being marginal, to those who . 
are not. Head's choice of Masarwa as the tribal origin of her central 
character is thus a deliberate extremisation of her own experiences of 
racial prejudice within Botswanan and South African society. Thus 
Margaret cannot simply be seen as an identification and projection of 
Head: she is offered as a model that leaves apartheid in southern Africa 
behind. 
The question that remains is, Does Margaret deploy silence as an act of 
resistance to being narrated? Certainly as a child she resists the 
negative constructions of labelling, maintaining silence about herself 
because she recognises that there is no 'story' beyond or beneath the 
label. She thus resists having , her' story commandeered by the nasty 
children, just as she will later resist the category 'Coloured' as one 
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in which she might be contained. It seems to me, however, that in 
sUbstantial ways the novel is her story: in the fact of her existence 
within it, in her representation of her people, in the fact that her 
'voice' is not restricted to the discursive realm but can develop a 
medium of its own. If it is one of the functions of the narrative to 
orchestrate the relations that exist between Head and her, the task is 
surely nothing like the protective vindication extended by Dovey to Head 
herself, nor, indeed, the biographic contest entailed in Gardner's 
'rewriting' of Head. If Margaret's speech is substantially silenced 
within the narrative, it is surely significant that her 'voice' finds 
other ways of expressing itself. From her initial p,osition as an icon, 
. she becomes an iconoclast by 'inhabiting' the icon and so destroying its 
constitutive force. The further step she takes, however, is to 
appropriate the iconic mode and become herself a representer and 
envisioner of reality. 
If Margaret stands as a 'translation' of Head's identity into terms that 
leave apartheid behind, her art offers reflexive answers to Head who 
wri tes her. Positioned as she is at the textual interface, she also 
generates interfaces of her own: between words and art, between art and 
dreams and music, between the nondiscursive realm and the construction 
of identity. 
For these reasons, the case study of the novel Naru might be recognised 
as having constituted the severest test to my model of narration as 
cultural translation, since this model so clearly locates narration 
within the discursive realm. Construed as she is as an educated, 
literate, and artistically gifted person, Margaret is equipped with an 
ability to express herself not only in words and in silence, but also in 
aesthetic, intuitive and metaphysical ways; ways which go beyond my own 
discussion of silence as a linguistic and a cultural phenomenon. If the 
discursive realm has proved finally inadequate for a complete discussion 
of ' silence' wi thin the novel, the most important focus of this case 
study has nevertheless been its consideration of the question of 
identity. In the marginality of their respective communal positionings, 
both the writer, Head, and her central woman character, Margaret, 
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demonstrate the ways in which racial, cultural and political interfaces 
complicate communal and personal addressivity and attributions of 
personhood, and the ways in which such constructions of identity can be 
accepted, resisted and transcended. It is thus in their concatenation of 
racial origins, education into first-language use of English, and 
resistance to the alienating categories of apartheid that both Head and 
Margaret stand as instances of postcoloniality, and Margaret in 
particular an instance of post-apartheid identity. 
Conclusions 267 
A lot can be said about silence; a lot has been said. Having come to the 
end of this dissertation, it is perhaps time to essay some evaluations. 
The problem with which the last chapter concluded is in some ways 
exemplary. Gi ven the exploratory nature of this study, it has ranged 
into and out of a number of fields, carrying off the kind of conceptual 
"loot" that Conrad collected in Africa, and not finding a domicile for 
intensive investigations or applications of particular theoretical 
lines. Autobiography, linguistics, translation theory, ethnography, 
narrative, feminism, travel writing, psycholinguistics, 
sociolinguistics, and, dare I call it, 'identity theory' ... these are 
all areas that have been new to me, and which I would like to visit 
again. The model of narrative as cultural translation has, I think, been 
fairly tested; not least by its 'translation' of this range of 
'cultures' and discourses into a theory of silence. 
I have few regrets. One of the effects of these theoretical travels has 
been to open up the spaces so thoroughly colonised by postmodern 
literary theory, whose decline has been delineated so nicely by Nash in 
his "Slaughtering the subject: Literature's Assault upon Narrative". New 
theoretical resources have been found, and the different issues and 
problems with which other spheres grapple have provided instructive and 
stimulating models for addressing our own. The grounding of theory in an 
address to the needs of our context remains an important manoeuvre, 
although less radically new than when I first formulated it as a 
requirement for my thesis. Language will always be related to 
literature, in more and less productive ways, and it does seem a good 
time for literature to pay more attention to its discursive and dialogic 
roots. The attempt to deal with culture, and particularly cross-
cuI turali ty , is an important innovation because i't presents ways of 
envisioning ourselves out of the hegemonic impasse of "conquest and 
annihilation justified by the myth of group 'purity'" that Ashcroft, 
Griffiths and Tiffin denounce (1989:36). If the meeting place for 
cuI tures as well as for theories becomes "the civil imaginary, the 
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cuI tural space, the kgotla", as Voss (1992) has lately suggested, then 
perhaps narrative will learn to respect the silences that would resist 
it. 
There are, of course, many areas remaining to be explored: most 
prominent amongst them, perhaps, is an intensive study of silence in 
'the new South Africa', in what is beginning to be the post-apartheid 
era. And yet I would be reluctant to lose the regional perspective, and 
so the literature of other countries and of other languages should 
provide an important comparative context. The intensive and extensive 
study of individual texts is bound to become an act of validation if not 
reclamation: the comparati ve study of the figure of the black woman 
could, of course, be extended to the figure of the black man, or the 
white man or woman. Yet even this consideration has covered sUbstantial 
ground in the textual relations wi thin the culture of the texts, the 
relations between community, identity and narration. Positioning my 
model in terms of 'local' debates has served to test its application in 
the critical as well as the textual sphere. 
My own home base supplies a vantage point from which to survey the 
ground, and directs my narrative accountability: the theory this 
conceptual exploration has brought back is necessarily translated into 
the terms of my specific context and the most immediate interface I 
face, that is, teaching black students English in English. It is 
instructi ve in its insistence on the importance of the subj ect, whose 
autonomy can very readily be expressed in silence. If the problem of 
silence has thus become a crucial category in terms of which I structure 
my own theoretical context, I hope this study has demonstrated why I 
consider its realm of application much more extensive as well. 
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